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Summary 
 
 
In 1998 the European Union adopted a new self-standing instrument of collective 
enforcement - the Action for Injunction. Until then, the main focus was on the improvement 
of the position of the individual consumer through the adoption of substantive consumer law 
directives. The Injunction Directive provides for a general framework on consumer law 
enforcement in national and cross-border litigation. Qualified entities, public agencies and/or 
consumer organisations, are granted legal standing. National courts are bound to mutually 
respect the standing of EU wide registered qualified entities. Outside these clear-cut rules on 
the mutual recognition of standing, the Injunction Directive remains largely silent. The 
implementation into 28 Member States swiftly revealed the rather limited harmonising effect. 
The thesis investigates and explains how despite the legally approved diversity, the Injunction 
Directive contains the potential to turn diversity into convergence. The key to understanding 
the potential is the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures. Read together with the Annex 
the Injunction Directive establishes the deep interconnection between collective and 
individual enforcement, of substantive and procedural enforcement, of judicial and 
administrative enforcement. The different levels and means of enforcement should not be 
regarded separately but should always be looked at in their interplay, in their mutual 
institutional design and their mutual impact. Evidence for convergence can be found in the 
Invitel judgment of the ECJ and in the practice of consumer organisations via co-ordination 
actions across borders by which they overcome the boundaries of collective vs. individual or 
judicial vs. administrative enforcement. Regulation 2006/2004 re-adjusts the dualistic 
structure of enforcement in favour of public bodies and promotes convergence through para-
legal means, through new modes of enforcement, through co-operation and co-ordination 
outside courts and in open interaction between administrative bodies, to which consumer 
organisations are admitted on approval only.  
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Introduction 
 
The enforcement of consumer law is fast becoming a key area of policy for the 
Commission. The European Commission has undertaken substantial efforts in order to 
improve enforcement by launching studies, statistical analyses and examinations of consumer 
problems and expectations. It has attempted to attract attention to both nationally and cross-
border transactions from a consumer protection perspective.  
Until 1998, the European Commission’s activities were mainly focused on improving 
the position of the consumer through the adoption of substantive consumer law directives. 
The procedural side, the availability of non-context related consumer law remedies was, on 
the other hand, neglected. The latter derives from the lack of EU competence in procedural 
matters. Under the Treaty, enforcement is left to the Member States. However, 1998 
constitutes a benchmark in the development of procedural law. Directive 98/27/EC introduced 
the first self-standing directive in the field of consumer protection – the Action for Injunction 
adopted under Article 114 TFEU. This is not to say that the substantive directives adopted 
before that date did not contain procedural rules. Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading 
advertising – now Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and Directive 
93/13/EC on unfair terms provide for an action for injunction. However, Directive 98/27/EC 
(now Directive 2009/22)
1
 is the only piece of consumer law enforcement legislation which 
deals with the procedural side alone from a horizontal perspective. The injunction in Directive 
98/27/EC is disconnected from any substantive content, only the Annex to the Directive 
highlights the existence of the substantive law directives, whereas the injunction in the unfair 
terms Directive or the unfair commercial practices Directive is meant to complete the 
substance of the directives via appropriate remedies. In the Injunction Directive is the other 
way around.  
That is why it is fair to assume that the action for injunction is an atypical remedy 
which does not fit into the normal classifications in private legal orders. Its sui generis 
character triggered interest among academics as well as practioners who tried to understand 
the differences between the normal standard individual private law remedies and the 
Injunction Directive. The Injunction Directive was designed for extensive practical use; in 
                                               
1 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers interests (OJ L 166, 11.06.1998, p. 51–55) repealed by Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests (Codified version) Text with EEA relevance (OJ L 110, 01.05.2009, p. 30–36), (hereafter "Injunction 
Directive"). 
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practice it brought about changes in national transactions but it largely failed in terms of 
transborder transactions. The complexity of the procedure – requiring decisions on the 
jurisdiction, on the applicable law and on execution in another jurisdiction – require 
knowledge and resources which are scarcely available to those who enjoy standing. Two 
spheres of law are tied together in the Injunction Directive. Thanks to the Annex, the 
Directive provides for a combination of procedural and substantive legal issues. The 
combination of substantive law and procedural law, of individual civil law remedies and the 
collective action for injunction, the Injunction Directive serves as background for a “thesis of 
the dualism of enforcement” which is advanced on the basis of the analysis of the Injunction 
Directive and the way in which it was implemented in the Member States. This is the first 
major argument I intend to develop in the thesis. 
According to a holistic perspective, one could expect that many of the ambiguities it 
gives rise to are answered in the Injunction Directive itself or in the accompanying 
documents. The contrary is true. The text sets out, at most, a framework centered on the 
mutual recognition of legal standing and the notification of so-called “qualified” entities to 
the European Commission. There were no explanatory policy documents produced by the 
Commission in the process of the making the Injunction Directive. The only sources are the 
First and Second Report on Implementation of the Injunction Directive in the Member States.
2
 
The decade-long discussion on collective remedies in the EU which finally led in 2013 to the 
adoption of Recommendation 2013/396 excluded from the scope of the discussion the action 
of injunction. This is even true for former Commissioner Kuneva, who during her period in 
office promoted the elaboration of collective consumer redress through collective 
compensation claims. The current debate focuses on different forms of class actions and 
collective compensation via test cases or combined actions. There is no explanation for the 
exclusion of an action for injunction; there is even a lack of bibliographical resources and 
comments relevant to the debate on injunctions. The lack of clarity has not furthered the use 
of the action for injunction as a European remedy. This is even more astonishing in light of 
the Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, which among other priorities highlighted the need 
to build consumer confidence in the Internal Market through effective consumer law 
enforcement.   
                                               
2 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interest of 18 November 2008, COM(2008) 756 
final, Final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Concerning the 
application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interest European Commission, Brussels, 6 November 2012, COM(2012) 635. 
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The action for injunction does not look to the past, except the injunction of correcting 
past unlawful behaviour. It is meant to stop future consumer law infringements. According to 
a modern interpretation an injunction can be defined in the following way: an action for an 
injunction is an administrative or a court order requiring legal subjects, thus individual 
consumers, corporations, and other government entities to stop doing something and to refrain 
from repeating a certain unlawful conduct in the future. Therefore, the action injunction is 
defined as a tool that brings an illegal practice or an unfair behaviour to an end, a tool that 
bans repetition of these unlawful activities in the future. Injunctions never concentrate on the 
past as their legal effect occurs only from the moment an injunction order is issued. None of 
the scholarly definitions links injunctions to the past.
3
 That is why an action for injunction 
contrary to individual classical civil law remedies cannot be used as a tool of compensation or 
restitution which remedies the harm consumers suffered through the infringement of their 
economic interests. The main feature that differentiates injunctions from other civil law 
remedies is its preventive function.
4
 The combination of the two in one piece of EU law 
enhances the explanatory force of the thesis of dualism. 
The broad legal framework of the Injunction Directive established through the choice 
between judicial and administrative enforcement and through the minimum harmonisation 
approach left much discretion to the Member States to choose the manner in which to 
implement the new remedy into their national legal orders. It will be demonstrated that instead 
of the expected approximation of legal regimes, the Injunction Directive produced a broad 
variety of enforcement models. The result resembles more a patchwork than to a coherent and 
consistent European enforcement system. In a way this is surprising as a remedy of injunction 
in one way or the other existed in legal systems of the Member States. The cross-border 
dimension adds an additional layer to the rather messy looking enforcement strategy. It does 
not come as a surprise that the action for injunction ended in a deadlock here. The decisive 
change of approach took place with the adoption of Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer 
protection cooperation.
5
 The choice between judicial and administrative enforcement was 
replaced by a model whereby Member States have to designate public authorities as the 
institution of law enforcement ultimately responsible in this field. The second move occurred 
                                               
3  Rose, N (1992), Pre-emptive Remedies in Europe, Longman Law, Tax and Finance, Longman Group UK Ltd, 
p. 215 
 Fiss(1978), The Civil Right Injunction, Indiana University Press Bloomington & London, p. 23 
5 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws Text with 
EEA relevance, (OJ L 364, 09/12/2004, p. 1–11), (hereafter “Regulation 2006/2004” or “the Regulation on 
consumer protection cooperation”). 
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through the shift from reliance on hard enforcement via the action for injunction to soft 
enforcement via transborder co-operation through exchange of information and co-ordination 
of activities. It will be demonstrated that the combination of the two paves the way for the 
convergence of enforcement in European consumer law. This is the second major finding of 
the thesis.  
The methodology I use is a doctrinal and contextual analysis of the European 
enforcement model as enshrined in the two major pieces of EU law, the Injunction Directive 
and Regulation 2006/2004. Both serve as the basis for elaborating and scrutinizing the 
European framework in which the Member States implementation measures are embedded. I 
have complemented the existing available comparative analysis through my own studies of 
the Italian, the Polish and the English legal system. Interviews undertaken in these countries 
with the enforcement authorities and during my stage at the European Commission in Legal 
Services helped me to develop a deeper understanding of the context and the deeper cultural 
background of the Member States decision in choosing judicial or administrative enforcement 
in implementing the Injunction Directive.  
I will develop my argument in four Chapters: The first settles the background for the 
legal analysis of the remedy of injunction. It explains the timing of and different 
classifications of injunctions, against the background of the different legal designs given to 
the action for injunction in the Member States legal orders. It highlights its behavioural, 
restitutionary, deterrent and regulatory function, the inter-connectedness of procedural and 
substantive law directives, last but least the interplay of individual and collective 
enforcement. The key to understanding and explaining the Injunction Directive is the thesis of 
dualism of enforcement. Chapter two focuses on an explanation of the relationship between 
substantive law and procedural matters starting from a clear cut separation of the two spheres 
of law, as enshrined in a traditional understanding, highlighting the Latin principles of lex 
specialis and lex posterior generalis to understand the relationship between the Directive 
98/27 and its Annex in relation to the Directives on misleading advertising and unfair contract 
terms, which have been adopted prior to the Injunction Directive. Again, it is the dualism of 
enforcement which helps to understand and to explain the conjunction between substantive 
and procedural law. Chapter three is dedicated entirely to cross-border consumer matters. The 
Injunction Directive serves as the starting point for understanding the complex structure 
which underpins the idea of mutual recognition of legal standing in the hands of both 
consumer organizations and public authorities. The case study of the only transborder action 
for injunction brought forward so far by the UK Office of Fair Trading explains the reason 
19 
 
why consumer organizations seek alternatives through co-ordinated action and why the EU 
legislator shifted the focus towards public enforcement through soft law means in Regulation 
2006/2004. Chapter four serves two purposes: to provide an explanation as to why the EU can 
do no more than establishing a framework for injunctions and can only formally approve the 
diversity of national enforcement schemes. The reason is found in EU competence rules. 
Despite its rather difficult EU constitutional basis, - and this is the second purpose - the EU 
managed to clear the path for convergence through uniting the institutional framework of 
injunctions whilst shying away from hard enforcement measures.  
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Chapter I Foundations of Action for Injunction 
 
1. A General Classification 
 
Injunctions are enforcement tools used in consumer protection in all cases in which 
unlawful activity or unlawful behaviour shall be swiftly brought to an end. Injunctions arise as 
the most suitable tools applicable in cases that require quick and definitive action ceasing 
unlawful activity and preventing repetition of the same unlawful activity in the future. The 
action for injunction is a valuable tool for consumer enforcement in view of the fact that 
consumers all over Europe are constantly bombarded by different advertisements, unique 
bargaining offers and other unlawful practices. All those practices may infringe consumer 
rights individually as well as collectively as a group. Evidently, the remedy of injunction 
perfectly fits cases in which a consumer is asked to pay for “free” products, which in fact 
have been offered not ordered, or if an advertisement provides false commercial information 
which induces a consumer to buy. These are the most common situations in which a fast and 
effective remedy is required.  
The action for injunction in the framework of the Injunction Directive constitutes an 
appropriate reaction to these situations. It can be developed as a tool which either modifies an 
individual’s behaviour by cessation or/and brings a practice to an end; and this is an 
enforcement tool which can be addressed by consumers as a group. The use of injunctions is, 
however, dedicated to specific fields of law: it is related to substance. That is why the choice 
of injunction as a remedy depends on the nature of the infringement in terms of substantive 
law - whether unfair contract terms or unfair commercial practices or other fields of consumer 
law.
6
 
 
1. 1. A Working Definition  
  
The semantic range of wording used to describe an action for an injunction oscillates 
between a stop order and a modification order. The EU Directives do not provide for a precise 
                                               
6 Haley (2006), Stop Now – Injunction: Protecting the Interests of European Consumers, Conference on 
Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection Instruments of Actions for Injunctions and Group Damages 
Actions in Vienna; Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An Analysis and 
Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer Redress other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial 
Proceedings, prepared by the Study Centre for Consumer Law – Centre for European Economic Law Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, p. 330-354, 
<http://www.eurofinas.org/uploads/documents/policies/OTHER%20POLICY%20ISSUES/comparative_report_e
n.pdf>accessed on April 22, 2014. 
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and one-sided definition of the remedy of injunction defined either as cease or desist order, 
which at both ends provides for the modification of a person’s behaviour. This has left leeway 
to Member States to provide their own particular definition of injunctions.
7
 They developed 
various wording schemes for injunctions. This is partly an effect of language differences as 
well as of translation issues. A more complex analysis of the most commonly used notions of 
injunctions will show the extent to which national definitions differ and how many elements 
they have in common.
8
 
A starting point for clarifying the meaning of an injunction is the distinction between 
prohibition and inhibition: I adopt a working definition of injunction based on its dictionary 
definition as a proxy/common standard to compare how the injunction is understood in 
various legal systems (1) a prohibition refers to “a certain behaviour, which is forbidden or 
not allowed by the rules of law”9, (2) an inhibition refers to “an order preventing someone 
from doing or repeating a certain activity”.10 
 
1. 2. Bilateral Timing  
 
An injunction is a civil law remedy which may be addressed to situations occurring at 
two different moments (i) at the moment in which unlawful activity occurs - this is a present 
accent of injunctions, and (ii) in the future - this is a future accent of injunctions. The latter 
variant makes the remedy of injunction special and unique among existing civil law remedies, 
because normally remedies are brought for past infringement, not in anticipation of future 
events. The following illustration illustrates the differences relative to the two timelines: past-
present-future (Graph 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Craig/De Búrca (2011), The Legal Effect of Directives, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., OUP, 
2011, p. 279-280. The authors state as follows: “(…) A directive may leave some discretion to the Member 
States, it will always require further implementing measures; and if it sets out its aim only in general terms, it 
may not be sufficiently precise to allow for proper national judicial enforcement”. 
8 See Chapter I 1.5. 
9 Cambridge Dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/prohibition_1?q=prohibition+> 
accessed on April 22, 2014. 
10 Cambridge Dictionary, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/inhibition_1?q=inhibition> 
accessed on April 22, 2014. 
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 Past                                                   Present                                                                     Future 
 
Graph Nr 1 – Time-frame of Action for Injunction 
 
1. 3. Bilateral Content 
 
Regarding its content, the remedy of injunction is understood as a prohibitory order 
aimed at banning a certain activity that infringes consumer rights. The unlawful activity has 
already occurred and the effects continue to influence the future. Here the injunction 
combines the future element of prevention, and the present element of prohibition. Exactly 
this combination of present and future elements, linked to a particular subject matter, makes 
the remedy of injunction special among other civil law remedies. Injunction, in the language 
of judicial review
11
, is an order granted by a court whereby someone is required to act or 
refrain from doing a specified act. 
The order for injunction aims at slowing down or restraining a certain activity, for 
example, it should stop the unlawful activity or modify certain behaviour once the injunctive 
order is issued. Therefore, the injunction either reverts to previous behaviour or indicates the 
moment in which the actors are supposed to stop the unlawful activity. It also prevents 
someone from doing something and repeating a certain unlawful activity in the future. The 
latter accent discloses the close link of injunctions with the future
12
, even if normally 
remedies should only look to the past.
13
 By their very specific nature, injunctions arise as 
atypical legal remedies in the field of consumer law - until 1998 not even recognised at the 
EU level and only recognised to a limited extent at the national level. This is the reason why 
                                               
11 Judgment of Court of Palermo of 2 June 1998, Adiconsum v Soc. Aeroviaggi, 2077/1998. 
12 Prohibition and inhibition as defined in Cambridge Dictionary, 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/ban> accessed on June 5, 2014. 
13 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests (OJ L 166, 11.06.1998, p. 51-55) has been substantially ivied several time 
because new directives on consumer protection have been added to the Annex to the Injunction Directive. For 
reasons of clarity and rationality, the Injunction Directive has been codified in the form of Directive 2009/22/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests (OJ L 110, 01.05.2009, p. 30–36). 
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the remedy of injunction in the field of consumer protection has a rather narrow history.
14
 
Nevertheless, since the Injunctions Directive of 1998, the process of Europeanization 
commenced and led to the development of the remedy of injunction in consumer law in all the 
Member States. It is submitted here that the process of Europeanization of the remedy of 
injunction is often bound with distortions in the national legal orders of the Member States.  
 
1. 4. Semantic Scope of Notions 
 
The distinction between prohibition and inhibition, although theoretically seemingly 
clear, leads in reality to many practical problems. “Prohibition” and “inhibition” belong to 
the same semantic family. They are often used interchangeably. However, this is not the 
correct way to read the wording of the Injunction Directive in the legal context of its remedial 
nature.  
The proximity means that the two concepts are subject to mutual linguistic penetration 
and interlinks. Indeed, it is a source of “legal irritation”15 which has led to an opaque picture 
in terms of the action for an injunction in Europe. The Graphs below illustrate the mutual 
connections of the wording used in definitions of injunction operating across Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph Nr 2 - a language family for the word “prohibition” (according to Visual Thesaurus 
Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
 
                                               
14 Although the remedy of injunction in the field of consumer protection has been introduced in 1998, before the 
time the Injunction Directive issued,“(…) a notion of injunction has existed in all the Member States”, Vide: The 
Proposal for the Injunction Directive, page 5 section: The problem, para. 2. It does not mean, however, that all 
the Member States had a regime comparable to these brought by the Injunction Directive; Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- 
Flesner/Ebers (2007), The Consumer Acquis and its Transposition in the Member States, EC Consumer Law 
Compendium, p. 386. 
15 Teubner (1998), Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends in New Divergences, 
The Modern Law Review, Vol. 61(1). 
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Graph Nr 3 - a language family word for the “inhibition” (according to Visual Thesaurus 
Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
 
 
Graph Nr 4 - a language family for the word “ban” (according to Visual Thesaurus 
Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
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1. 5. Inhibitory vs. Prohibitory 
 
There are two general injunctive models on which the scheme of the Injunction 
Directive rests: (1) an inhibitory injunction
16
, which is an injunction that forbids certain 
legal activity at the time the injunction order is granted
17
, the wrongful act is going to be 
brought to the end, it brings certain limits to wrongful behaviour
18
, referring to the legal text 
of the Injunction Directive defines it as a “cessation order”, in a more general sense it may be 
called “stop order”19; (2) a prohibitory injunction20, which prohibits repetition of the 
wrongful activity in the future
21
, once it has been ceased once the injunction ordered issued
22
 
the legal text of the Injunction Directive defines it as a “prohibitory order”, or in a more 
general sense it may be called “a ban”. 
On the basis of a survey of the case law, it is easily visible that more attention and 
more focus is given to inhibitory than prohibitory injunctions
23
 which often is recognized as a 
conjunction of the two elements.
24
 Seemingly, the national definitions of injunctions focus 
more on the stop-order nature of the remedy of injunction than its cessation element. Courts 
normally stopped a practice, and upon Article 2(1)(b) of the Injunction Directive posed 
requirements upon which the effects of the infringements could be eliminated. Therefore, a 
judgment in the form of a stop order only applies to a present action. In the case of 
administrative bodies, both the cessation and prohibition of injunctions can be exercised since 
                                               
16 Fiss (1978), The Civil Right Injunction, London, p. 23. 
17 Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 26 January 2006, Case V CSK 83/2005. 
18 Frignani (1974), L’Injunction nella Common Law e L’Inibitoria nell Diritto Italiano, Publicazioni della 
Facoltà Giuridica dell’Università di Ferrara, Serie Seconda, p. 61; refers to injunction “(…) che ha presupposti e 
limiti ben precisi ed il cui campo di applicazione è abbastanza ristretto”.  
19 The Injunction Directive is defined in the following manner in various linguistic versions of the Injunction 
Directive: in the English version of the Injunction Directive it is defined as “(…) the cessation or prohibition of 
any infringement”, in the French version “(…) à faire cesser ou interdire toute infraction (…)”, in Polish “(…) 
zaprzestania lub zakazu jakiejkolwiek szkodliwej praktyki (…)”. It may also be defined as a modification order 
since in fact the cessation influences an individual’s future behaviour. 
20 Bean (1984), Injunctions, 3rd ed., London, p. 18-27; Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 2 November 
2007, Case nr II CSK 289/2007 in comparison with the following judgments: I CK 358/2002, IV CKN 
329/2001, I CKN 1319/2000. 
21 Frignani (1974), L’Injunction nella…, p. 61; refers to injunction “(…) la quale il giudice invece di ordinare al. 
Convegnuto di fare qualcosa, gli pribisce di tenere o di continuare a tenere un comportamento “omissivo””. 
22 Rose (1992), Pre-emptive Remedies in Europe, Longman Law, Tax and Finance, p. 215; Fiss (1978), The 
Civil..., p. 6. 
23 Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Barcelona of 17 October 2003, Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios 
Bancarios” (Ausbanc Consumo) v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, ECR I-4785. 
24 See the following cases: Poland - Judgment of the Polish Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 1 
January 2005, Case XVII Ama 93/2005; Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 20 December 2007, 
Case I ACa 905/2007; Italy - Judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 11 July 1990, 650/1991; Judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 27 April 1990, Pieri Franco v l'Ente Ferrovie dello Stato, 27/1991; 
Judgment of Court of Milan of 9 February 1976, 808/1976; Judgment of Court of Florence of 23 January 1996; 
Judgment of Court of Naples of 8 November 1996, 193/1997. 
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an administrative decision may tackle not only present issues, but also its future effectiveness.  
Once the abusive practice is stopped, the wrongful practice ceases. In order to eliminate the 
potential effect of infringements, the Injunction Directive gives also the authorized entity a 
right to describe the means to be used in order to exclude the practice and its negative effects. 
This right can be understood as a means to modify the parties’ behaviour.25 Indeed, the literal 
interpretation of Article 2(1)(b) of the Injunction Directive has introduced a “modification 
order”. The modification order does not exclude the practice immediately, but only indicates 
the manner in which the act contravenes the directive, which allows for cancelling the 
unlawful practice from the market. As a general rule, courts normally grant inhibitory 
injunctions which replies to a standard content of a judgment to be issued under national 
frames of legislation. Given this similarity to a standard judgment, injunctions become easier 
to enforce and more consumer friendly since they offer a clear cut solution once the injunctive 
order is made.
26
 
The implementation of the Injunction Directive in the Member States proves that a 
broad discretion is left to authorities in interpreting the action of injunction as a stop order or a 
modification order, depending and related to the concrete case at hand. This consequence may 
yield irritations and ambiguities and could be understood as an example of a disequilibrium in 
terms of legal remedies. There is an element of choice enshrined in the action of injunction, 
which discloses the real nature of injunction as an equitable remedy leaving a choice at both 
angles of prohibition or inhibition, ex lege “cessation” and “prohibition”, or perhaps giving 
some elements of modification of a wrongful activity. Indeed, the effectiveness of the 
injunction then depends on the national enforcement framework and the national role of 
judges and their reading and interpretation of the case at hand. It is submitted, that such a 
broad leeway should however be avoided in consumer policies since it makes consumer law 
remedies incoherent.  
No matter how the implementation process occurs, the civil law remedies should be 
defined precisely with regard to their addressees and the potential effects. In reality the 
injunction procedure provides only for a framework, whilst it remains for the judge or 
                                               
25 Article 26 of the Polish Act on Competition and Consumer Protection 2007.  
26 See the following case: Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court in Warsaw of 22 May 2003, Case nr I CK 
628/2003. 
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administrative authority in charge
27
 to decide on the form and the entire content of injunction 
remedy.  
 
1. 6. Differences among national Legal Systems 
 
In the Member States injunctions differ significantly. Instead of coherency and unity 
of enforcement models based on EU law - which was the aim of the Directive on Injunctions 
as far as its cross-border context was concerned,
28
 the reality is much better caught by the 
notion of “united in diversity”.29 Although the scheme of injunction procedure upon the frame 
of the Injunction Directive should be the same “for the effective and non-discriminatory 
application of the underlying Community law, the national modes of implementation among 
Member State vary since each of the Member State follows its own legal culture and 
tradition”.30 Injunctions at the national level differ regarding the wording used to describe the 
injunction order as well as the modes of implementation of the injunctions into national legal 
systems.  
  
1. 6. 1. Wording Differences 
 
The notion of injunctions does not straightforwardly translate from the English version 
of the Injunctions Directive, which describes, in Article 2, the remedy of injunction as “an 
order (…) requiring the cessation or prohibition of any infringement”. Member States have 
implemented the Injunction Directive in a huge variety of versions, models, applying different 
wordings as well as legal verbiage, which, given national linguistic differences causes 
divergence in interpretation of the scope and content of injunctions.
31
 In some Member States 
                                               
27 Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transposition. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: 
A Remedial Perspective, Loyola Consumer Law Review, Vol. 21(4), p. 496-539. The UK model of injunction 
provides a proof of this. 
28 See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on injunctions form the protection of 
consumers’ interests, Brussels, 24.01.1996, COM(95) 712 final 96/025 (COD), p. 7 (hereafter the Proposal for 
the Injunction Directive). “In principle, appropriate means of redress should exist in the legal orders of each 
Member State and, in general, there would seem to be no need for harmonisation”.  
29 <http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/indec_en.htm>.  
30 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law in the US and 
the European Community, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2007/22, Florence, p. 10.  
31 The Injunction Directive, Art. 2: 
In Italy, the Injunction Directive was implemented in Article 140 of the Codice del Consumo, in the following 
manner: 
“I soggetti di cui all’art. 139 sono legitimato ad agire a tutela degli interessi collectivi dei consomatori o degli 
utenti richiedono all Triunale: 
a) di inibire gli atti e i comportamenti lesivi degli conosmatori e degli utenti,  
29 
 
like Poland, the definition of injunction does not arise from a direct translation of the 
Injunction Directive. Injunction is understood as a “ban” and its legal meaning reduces the 
elements of cessation and inhibition to a single word. That is why the Polish model of 
injunction can hardly be understood as a concept related to the EU Directive. The definition 
can only be comprehended if one has full knowledge on the Polish law and how it is 
embedded and linked to the national understanding of injunctions – it does look like a 
standard judgment, with no specific links to protection as a future related-remedy.
32
 
The picture becomes even more blurred if one links different legal definitions 
operating in the various Member States as well as their different normative contexts to the 
variety of functions that injunctions might perform in the Member States. Taken this myriad 
of issues into consideration, it is no wonder that the action of injunction is mainly understood 
as a means of national law and not really related to European law. 
 
1. 6. 2. Transposition Differences  
 
The national differences are rooted in the scheme of the Injunction Directive which 
itself has been based on the principle of minimum harmonization.
33
 Thus, Member States 
                                                                                                                                                   
b) di adottare le misure idonee a correggere o ad eliminare gli effetti donosi delle violazioni accertate,  
c) di ordinare la publicazzione del provedimento su uno o piu quotidiani a diffusione nazionale oppure locale 
nei casi in cu la pubblicita dell provedimento puo contribuire o correggere o eliminare gli effetti della violazioni 
accerttate”. 
In France, the Injunction Directive was implemented in Article L. 421-2 Code de la consommation, in the 
following manner: “Les associationes mentionees a l’article 421-1 et les organismes justifiant de leur 
inscription sur la liste liée(?) au Journal officiel des Consommateures europannes en l’application de l’article 4 
de la directive 98/27/CE du Parlement Européen et du Council relative aux actions en cessation ou interdire tout 
aggisement illicite au regard des dispositions transposant des directives mentionées a l’article 1 ere et de la 
directive precite. Le juge peut a ces titres, le cas sous echeant sous astrainte, la suppression d’une clause illicite 
ou abusive dans tout contrat proposé ou destinée au consommateur”. 
In Poland, the Injunction Directive was implemented in Art. 23 a. 1. Act on Competition and Consumer 
Protection (Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2002 o zmianie ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, Ustawy 
Kodeks postępowania cywilnego oraz ustawy o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji Dz.U. 2002, Issue 129, Item 
1102), in „1. Przez praktykę naruszającą zbiorowe interesy konsumentów rozumie się godzące w nie bezprawne 
działanie przedsiębiorcy. Nie jest zbiorowym interesem konsumentów suma indywidualnych interesów 
konsumentów”. „Art. 24. 1 Zakazane jest stosowanie praktyk naruszających zbiorowe interesy konsumentów”. 
„Art. 26. 1. Prezes Urzędu wydaje decyzję o uznaniu praktyk za naruszające zbiorowe interesy konsumentów i 
nakazujące zaniechanie jej stosowania, (…), 2. W decyzji, (…), Prezes może określić środki jej usunięcia 
trwających skutków naruszenia zbiorowych interesów konsumentów w celu wykonania nakazu, w szczególności 
zobowiązać przedsiębiorcę do złożenia jednokrotnego lub wielokrotnego oświadczenia o treści i w formie 
określonej w decyzji. Może również nakazać publikację decyzji w całości lub w części na koszt przedsiębiorcy”. 
32 As a general rule, Polish courts a distinction between cessation and prohibition is often made in protection of 
personal rights cases. This distinction depends on the legal interest to be protected by certain rules of law. In case 
of injunctions in the area of unfair contract terms, the courts adjudicate as to the future, while a qualified entity 
like as administrative body may issue a decision which links both the present and future elements.  
33 Micklitz/Weatherill (1993), Consumer Policy in the European Community: Before and After Maastricht, 
Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 16, p. 301–303. 
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remain free to shape their laws beyond the minimum level of harmonization. The result is 
incoherency if not chaos which cannot be in the interest of a consumer enforcement scheme 
aimed at efficiency and effectiveness. The following presentation of national implementation 
is by no means complete, rather it is meant to illustrate the broad variety of solutions and 
provide evidence to the argument brought forward that the Directive instead of promoting 
approximation if not coherency has even deepened the diversity of meanings.
34
 It sketches out 
the major differences and should not be understood as a systematic comparison.
35
 
 
 (i) Malta 
  
The implementation of the Injunction Directive was realised in a particular way.
36
 
Malta did not adopt legislation that extends to all the directives listed in the Annex to the 
Injunction Directive. These gaps were to be filled by national legislative rules. Malta did not 
transpose Article 4(3) requiring the notification of qualified entities to the European 
Commission. The Consumer Affairs Act grants standing to non-Maltese entities to be 
recognised as qualified entities and permits them to act on an equal basis with domestic 
qualified entities. Hence, national and cross border entities are put on an equal footing.  
Furthermore, Malta introduced more stringent provisions, for example permitting for 
the correction of unfair contract terms or allowing for more specific measures to be taken to 
ensure compliance.  
 
(ii) Hungary 
 
The Hungarian legislation introduced an additional threshold before the action or 
injunction is brought to court. Not all infringements suffice, only a “substantial” 
infringement. The requirement of substantiality insinuates that not each and every 
infringement triggers the stop order mechanism but only those of a higher importance, where 
higher values (health instead of loss of money) are at stake. In practice, the higher threshold 
might work as a barrier for the common use of action for injunction in the field of consumer 
law. Furthermore, the highest threshold is defined on the basis of national legislation, which 
                                               
34 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC (COM(2012) 635 final), p. 3. 
35 Micklitz/Rott/Docekal/Kolba (2007), Verbraucherschutz Durch Unterlassungsklagen, Rechtliche und 
Praktische Umsetzung der Richtlinie Unterlassungsklagen 98/27/EG in den Mitgliedstaaten, VIEW 
Schriftenreihe, Vol. 17; which however, turns out to be extremely technical and in the end of rather limited use. 
36 Parry/Nordhausen/Howells/Twigg-Flesner (2009), The Yearbook of Consumer Law, p. 136-137. 
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may give rise to ambiguities in relation to cross-border consumer relationships since the 
threshold is defined at the national level. 
 
(iii) Lithuania 
 
In Lithuania, there is no summary procedure available for qualified entities although 
the procedure is foreseen in Article 2(1)(a) of the Injunction Directive. Article 2(1)(b) and (c) 
were not implemented. Here Lithuania relies on established legal principles, a policy which is 
not in line with established case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
37
  
 
 (iv) Germany 
 
The Injunction Directive was integrated into the Gesetz über die Unterlassungsklage 
(Act on Injunctions), which defines a common legal ground for all actions of injunctions, be 
they tied to unfair commercial practice or to unfair contract terms, focused on national 
conflicts or bearing a transnational dimension. The difficulty is that the substance matter is 
regulated outside the Act – unfair terms in the Civil Code, unfair commercial practices in the 
Law on Unfair Commercial Practices, which sometimes contain particular procedural 
requirements or even remedies such as the skimming off procedure the applicability of which 
is bound to unfair commercial practices alone. Whilst there is a common understanding of 
what an action of injunction concerns, the laws and rules are diffuse, found in several distinct 
legal acts rendering it a field for specialists only. 
 
(v) Poland 
 
In Poland
38
 the Injunction Directive was transposed in the Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection 2002 (ACCP), which can be regarded as a “supplement” to the Code of 
Civil Procedure. The introduction of the concept of collective interest of consumers as well as 
standing for consumer organizations is a true novelty. The individual consumer has no right to 
ask for an action of injunction. Administrative entities cannot go to court out of their own 
                                               
37 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 May 2001, Commission of the European Communities v 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Case C-144/99 (ECR 2001, p. I-03541). 
38 In Poland: Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2002 o zmianie ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, ustawy - 
Kodeks postępowania cywilnego oraz Ustawy o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji (Dz. U. 2002, Issue 129, 
Item 1102). 
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motion. This turned out to be an empty rule, which was abolished in 2007. The new 2007 Act 
on Competition and Consumer Protection banned unfair commercial practices and laid the 
enforcement into the hands of administrative bodies and consumer organisations. Consumer 
organizations, the Ombudsman and the spokesman of the insurance policy holders etc.- but 
not the individual consumer are grated “a right to flag/signal” a suspicion of an infringement 
to be denounced administrative enforcement bodies.  
In certain cases, like pharmaceutical law, the Injunction Directive has not lead to the 
introduction of a new remedy. The national model maintained reliance on already established 
rules. There is a missing link in the process of implementation. Member States implement 
rules in a way that suits them and in many cases the ratio legis of the Injunction Directive 
derives from their legislative evidence.  
 
 (vi) Italy 
  
The Injunction Directive was implemented through Decreto Legislativo 23 Aprile, 
2001, n. 224. It brought about significant changes to the Code of Consumer Protection, which, 
in its Part V, includes specific regulations on consumer associations
39
, lists formal 
requirements that consumer associations must meet in order to be recognised as qualified 
entities
40
; provisions concerning the formal legitimation process to be adhered to when acting 
on behalf of a group of consumers
41
; the merit of an action for an injunction and the course of 
the procedure.  
The Italian model relied since the very beginning on administrative enforcement.
42
 
The administrative authority does not take action on its own but rather depends on complaints 
by consumers, consumer organizations, and others.
43
 The Italian administrative enforcement 
authorities are playing a leading role in various fields of consumer law.
44
 The Consumer Law 
                                               
39 Article 136 of the Codice del Consumo. 
40 Article 137 of The Codice del Consumo; Case Study: Judgment of the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio 
of 24 June 2006, Adiconsum- Cisl v. Provincia di Latina A.T.O., 406/06; Judgment of Court of Palermo of 2 June 
1998, Adiconsum v. Soc. Aeroviaggi, 2077/1998, Judgment of the Court of Lamezia Terme of 16 July 2006, 
Associazione Consumatori Utenti Onlus v Trenitalia S.p.A, Legambiente Calabria, 2438/06; Judgment of the 
Court of Latina of 13 July 2006, Movimento Cittadinanza Onlus v. Acqualatina S.p.A., 2491/06. 
41 Article 139 Codice del Consumo. 
42 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, for more details see < http://www.agcm.it/normativa/4-
prima-pagina/6871-sintesi-dei-principali-interventi-dellautorita-20132014.html> accessed on June 8, 2014. 
43 For example: The implementation of the Directive 84/450/CEE with further amendments, leaving a 
enforcement power in the hand of Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato.  
44 Apple Case. Ruling nr 23155 of ACGM of December 21, 2011, see Chapter III 7.3. 
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Code
45
 in line with Directive 97/7 on distance contracts
46
 and prior to the Injunction Directive 
granted consumer organisations legal standing: “(…) associazioni dei consumatori e degli 
utenti sono legittimate ad agire a tutela degli interessi collettivi dei consumatori, ai sensi 
dell'articolo 3 della legge 30 luglio 1998, n. 281”.47 The two systems exist in parallel. 
Individual consumers are not compensated for damages they suffered from the infringements 
which lies behind the action of injunction.  
  
(vii) France 
 
France implemented the Injunction Directive by Ordonnance n°2001-741 du 23 août 
2001 portant transposition de directives communautaires et adaptation au droit 
communautaire en matière de droit de la consummation.48 The French counterpart to an action 
for an injunction, called “action en cessation”, has been drafted in Articles L 421-1 to L 421-
6 of the Code of Consumer Law, which ex lege granted legal standing to consumer 
associations
49
 in the form granted by the Injunction Directive.
50
 The Ordonnance defines the 
requirements that consumer associations must meet if they wish to be granted legal standing. 
It also describes in detail the course of the injunction procedure. 
 Ordonnance Nr 2001-741 is applicable to the whole branch of consumer protection 
legislation, which includes the substantive law directives within one regulation - the French 
Consumer Code. Therefore, the implementation was executed within the scope of substantive 
                                               
45 Chiarloni (2008), Il Nuovo Articolo 140 bis del Codice di Consumo: Azione di Classe o Azione Collettiva? 
Analisi Giuridica dell’Economia, 01/2008, p. 107; Miller (2008), Punti Cardine in Tema di “Class Action” Negli 
Stati Uniti e in Italia, Analisi Giuridica dell’Economia, Vol. 1, p. 211.  
46 Decreto Legislativo 22 maggio 1999, n. 185, Attuazione della direttiva 97/7/CE relativa alla protezione dei 
consumatori in materia di contratti a distanza, G.U. n. 143 del 21/6/1999. 
47 Article 36.1. of Codice del Consumo: “Le associazioni rappresentative dei consumatori, di cui all'articolo 
137, le associazioni rappresentative dei professionisti e le camere di commercio, industria, artigianato e 
agricoltura, possono convenire in giudizio il professionista o l'associazione di professionisti che utilizzano, o 
che raccomandano l'utilizzo di condizioni generali di contratto e richiedere al giudice competente che inibisca 
l'uso delle condizioni di cui sia accertata l'abusività ai sensi del presente capo”. 
48 Ordonnance nr 2001-741 du 23 août 2001 portant transposition de directives communautaires et adaptation au 
droit communautaire en matière de droit de la consommation JORF 196 du 25 août 2001 page 13645 - NOR 
ECOX0100083R (SG(2001)A/11576 du 22/10/2001 et 11790 du 25/10/2001), 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000590436 accessed on June 10, 2014. 
49 Valguarnera (2010), Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to Class Action, Global Jurist, 
10(2), p. 1-45 (in part. 9-10).  
50 Article 421-6 of the French Consumer Code: “Les associations mentionnées à l'article L. 421-1 et les 
organismes justifiant de leur inscription sur la liste publiée au Journal officiel des Communautés européennes 
en application de l'article 4 de la directive 98/27/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil relative aux actions 
en cessation en matière de protection des consommateurs peuvent agir devant la juridiction civile pour faire 
cesser ou interdire tout agissement illicite au regard des dispositions transposant les directives mentionnées à 
l'article 1er de la directive précitée. Le juge peut à ce titre ordonner, le cas échéant sous astreinte, la 
suppression d'une clause illicite ou abusive dans tout contrat ou type de contrat proposé ou destiné au 
consommateur”. 
34 
 
law pieces and as a general scheme of the civil code. Collective and individual redress stand 
side-by-side. Hence, the French system has kept a dualism of enforcement measures thanks to 
the implementation of the Injunction Directive.
51
 The previous enforcement mode based on 
“l’action individuelle” had been developed in the context of the substance related consumer 
protection directive. This path is directed to national rules of legislation covered by substance 
related consumer matters and adopted under the national laws. The extent of individual 
protection depends on the specific matter of regulation in its meaning given to it by European 
contract law directives. 
The availability of injunctions as a legal remedy has provided for a significant 
improvement of the position of consumers evidenced by an increased amount of cases of a 
collective nature brought before the courts. The most active consumer associations “Que 
Choisir” had opened the possibility for consumers to bring claims on the basis of the 
substantive law directives in a way that individual enforcement mechanisms failed to do so.
52
  
 
 (viii) United Kingdom 
 
In the UK the Injunctions Directive has been partially implemented within the scheme 
of substantive law directives as well as in the scheme of the procedural legislation. These two 
built up a complex system of consumer protection. The Directive on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (Directive 93/13/EEC) was implemented in the UK via the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. In order to implement the Injunction Directive the 
regulation was amended in 1999, in the form of Unfair Contract Term Regulation 1999 by a 
“Schedule 1” listing a number of "qualifying bodies". The regulations were further 
amended in 2001 when the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was added to the list of 
qualified bodies. The system of pre-emptive challenges is a more effective way of preventing 
the continuing use of unfair terms and changing contracting practice than ex casu actions.
53
 It 
is, however, to be noted that in a pre-emptive challenge there is no direct link between the 
                                               
51 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 9.  
52 UFC Que Choisir have brought many actions for an injunction so far: Judgment of La Cour De Cassation of 
14 November 2006, Que choisir v société Isère distribution automobiles, société Automobiles Citroën,: 04-
15890; Judgment of La Cour De Cassation of 14 November 2006, UFC Que Choisir 38 v Société Asly 38, 
Société Daimler Chrysler France, No. de pourvoi: 04-15646; Judgment of La Cour De Cassation of 1 February 
2005, UFC Que Choisir v Société Avenir Télécom, Société Net Up, No. de pourvoi 03-16905; Judgment of La 
Cour De Cassation of 1 February 2005, UFC 38 v Protection One France, No. de pourvoi 03-16935; Judgment 
of La Cour De Cassation of 25 March 2010, La société VGC distribution v l’association Union fédérale des 
consommateurs, Que choisir de l’Isère, No. de pourvoi 09-12678. 
53 Bright (2000), Winning the Battle Against Unfair Contract Terms, Legal Studies, Vol. 20(3), 08/2000, p. 333-
338. 
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consumer and the other contracting party. The Directive and the Regulations do not always 
distinguish between the two situations. This point is illustrated by the Article 4(1)(1) of the 
Directive and Article 4(2) of the Regulation on the relevance of particular circumstances 
affecting a contractual relationship. The Directive and the regulations must be enforced in a 
sensible and effective manner which can only be done by taking into account the effects of 
contemplated or typical relationships between the contracting parties. Inevitably, the primary 
focus of such a pre-emptive challenge is on issues of substantive unfairness. 
Part 8 of the Enterprise Act had replaced Part III of the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the 
Stop Now Orders (EC Directive) Regulations 2001 promoting the collective scheme of 
consumer law enforcement remains in force side by side with the Unfair Contract Terms 
Regulation 1999
54
 Although the Unfair Contract Terms Regulation 1999 is addressed as a 
protection for individual claims
55
, the Stop Now Order enforcement regime as an 
implementation of the Injunction Directive includes a wider range of domestic consumer 
protection legislation. These orders, known as Enforcement Orders, are to be classified as 
injunctions. A breach of an Order is a contempt of court and can incur a fine or imprisonment. 
Under Part 8 of the Act, three types of enforcers can be identified:  
(i) General Enforcers. In addition to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Trading 
Standards Service in Great Britain and Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Investment (DETI) in Northern Ireland are specified in Part 8 as having the power to 
act as general enforcers,  
(ii) Designated Enforcers. A designated enforcer is any public or private body in the 
United Kingdom which the Secretary of State designates in a Statutory Instrument, 
having identified that the person or body has the protection of the collective interests 
of consumers as one of its purposes. The Secretary of State has designated the 
following bodies as Part 8 enforcers by a Statutory Instrument: The Civil Aviation 
Authority, The Director General of Electricity Supply for NI, The Director General of 
                                               
54 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, No. 2083. 
55 On one hand, the Office of the Fair Trading shall be a sufficient body for protection of consumer rights, on the 
other hand - both the regulations like as Distance Selling and Consumer Contract Regulation 1999 are clearly 
designed as regulations to deal with individual consumer complaints. The situation is a very complicated and 
confusing because the Office of the Fair Trading is supposed to deal with systematic complaints, and according 
to its rules, individual consumer matters will be procedurally rejected and re-directed to Consumer Direct. For a 
lack of understanding of the dualism of enforcement measures Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), EC 
Consumer Law..., p. 385, as follows “(…) the threshold for taking action under […] provisions [of the substance 
related consumer protection directive] is lower as it does not refer to “the collective interests of consumers”, but 
see at 385, Section - Conclusions and recommendations, bullet nr 3 in the following expression: “There is a 
difference in that the provisions in the specific Directives do not include the “collective interest” criterion, 
although, at a practical level, this may not matter hugely”. 
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Gas for Northern Ireland, Ofcom, The Water Services Regulation Authority, The Gas 
and Electricity Markets Authority, The Information Commissioner, The Office of Rail 
Regulation, The Financial Services Authority, Consumers' Association (“Which?”). A 
public body will only be granted designated enforcement powers if it is independent.  
By granting a public body designated enforcement powers, it is deemed that 
that body is conclusively identified as a public body for the purposes of Part 8. A 
private organisation may be designated as an enforcer only if it fulfils the criteria 
specified by the Secretary of State in a Statutory Instrument.  
(iii) Community Enforcers. Community enforcers are entities from other parts of the 
European Economic Area. Reference is made to consumer organizations as listed in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities. These enforcers may apply for 
injunctions in other Member States according to the implementation of the cross-
border injunction procedure in the Injunction Directive.  
Part 8 of the Enterprise Act can only be used in cases where harm has been caused to a 
group of consumers. Hence, Part 8 of the enforcement mechanism is not a means of pursuing 
individual redress. However, it should be emphasised that whether or not the trader is the 
subject of an Order, consumers can still exercise their rights to obtain individual redress, for 
example by suing the trader through the Small Claims Procedure in the county courts, or by 
applying the scheme of consumer protection which pre-empts the individual scheme of 
enforcement. Therefore, this dualism of consumer protection has been maintained by using 
procedural enforcement mechanisms which allows for both individual and collective 
protection of consumer rights. The choice of the enforcement route will also depend on the 
choice of the substantive law upon which the claim will be brought. One of the ways of 
enforcement is collective and is conducted via an injunction procedure in the form given by 
the Injunction Directive. The other route goes toward the individual dimension by the use of 
the small claims procedure, or a general remedy of injunction in the form given by the 
substantive law directives. Therefore, the Injunction Directive has not deprived individuals of 
other legal bases for their claims. 
  
1. 7. Effect of Minimum Protection 
 
This short summary of the implementation legislation in a selected few Member States 
demonstrates the difficulties which result from the attempt of the European Union to 
harmonise a single, seemingly targeted remedy. There are institutional differences between 
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Member States some of which have a consumer code where the temptation is high to simply 
integrate into the code any new measure. Other Member States have taken a piecemeal 
approach or draw a distinction between substantive and procedural rules. All variations are 
possible and identifiable. This renders it difficult to get a clearer picture on what the European 
law of injunctions is all about. 
There are differences in the scope, sedes personae and sedes materiae. One of the 
battlefields is who should have standing, private bodies (such as consumer organizations) or 
public bodies. If the former are the correct addressees then the question is what kind of 
requirements should be requested for a consumer organization to be granted standing. How 
much representativity should be asked for? What are the legitimate interests? What are the 
collective interests? In the national legislation of Cyprus, Latvia and Malta a reference to 
collective interest is lacking without being clear whether this narrows or widens the scope of 
application?
56
 In Germany and Austria competitors have the right to initiate an action for an 
injunction. But these countries are special in that they do not recognize public bodies enjoying 
standing in the field of consumer protection. This is the other side of enforcement. Here all 
variations are imaginable. The public enforcer can be a specialized agency, it can be a public 
agency dealing in between others with consumer protection, or it can be sectorial agencies. 
The Directive does not give any information whether and to what extent the two ways – 
public and private should be interlinked. Thus, the law is uncertain.  
The substantive scope of application is equally subject to diversity. This is due to the 
fact that the Annex contains a limited list of consumer protection issues, mainly focusing on 
the protection of economic interests.
57
  
Since the transposition of the Annex is not required, various ways of dealing with the 
Annex arise and result in confusion as to the scope of application of the Injunction Directive. 
The vast majority of Member States have transposed the Annex into their domestic 
legislation.
58
 Some others referred to it in the explanatory notes to their implementing 
legislation.
59
 Other Member States have amended domestic law transposing the Directives 
                                               
56 Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), The Consumer Acquis…, p. 388-389. 
57 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial..., p. 34. 
58 For example: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom. 
59 The way in which the implementation occurred in Ireland and Spain, may be compared to the ECJ case 
regarding the Swedish implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC; Judgment of the 
Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 May 2002, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden, Case 
C-478/99 (ECR 2002, I-04147), followed by the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed (delivered on January 
31, 2002). Member States enjoy considerable latitude as regards form and methods of implementing a directive 
(point 13 of the Judgment), See also: Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), The Consumer Acquis…, p. 
198.  
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listed in the Annex.
60
 There are also numerous examples of Member States that have not 
transposed the Annex at all.
61
 
Last but not least, the Directive does not spell out the details on how the injunction 
procedure should be organized and what kind of additional sanctions could be applied or not. 
Penalty payments have been transposed directly in many of the Member States, but in the 
United Kingdom and Cyprus, reference was made to the general law on contempt of court. At 
least one common denominator can be identified: since 1998 individual and collective 
enforcement stand side-by-side and complement each other. 
 
1. 8. Field related Injunctions 
 
The remedy of injunction has been assigned to specific fields of law and to specific 
types of infringements, referred to as field-related injunctions. The Injunction Directive is the 
first of the consumer law directives linking injunctions with specific fields of law; hence the 
specific types of infringements – to which a remedy of injunctions applies.  
In fact, the choice of a remedy of injunction depends on the substantive law basis in 
which the infringement is rooted. The substantive law basis affects the choice of injunction as 
a legal remedy. The fields of consumer law to which injunctions applies are listed in the 
Annex to the Injunction Directive. That is why it is important to draw a distinction between 
injunctions in the field of consumer protection and those in competition law, in environmental 
law and labour law. Due to its sector-bound classification the injunction may bring about 
divergences in the general understanding of an overall cross-sector remedy within the 
European Community.
62
 
The common national understanding of injunction is in fact little more than a typical 
civil law concept. In most jurisdictions national judges may rely on a code of the procedure 
and on their respective national civil code. That is why the context of the injunction with its 
EU’s origin yields frictions between the EU and the national legal systems. National courts 
may feel tempted to refer to established remedial solutions developed over the course of time 
within the framework of national law. In many cases the Europeanised action for an 
injunction is somehow substituted by well-known procedural solutions to be found under the 
                                               
60 For example: Cyprus, Luxemburg; In the case of these two Member States, the implementation of the 
Injunction Directive was made by amending the respective domestic law implementing the consumer directives 
concerned.  
61 For example: Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands. 
62 Himsworth (1997), Things Fall Apart: The Harmonization of Community Judicial Procedural Protection 
Revised, European Law Review, Vol. 22(4), p. 291-311. 
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civil codes of national legislation, which have been given features of a remedy brought by the 
Injunction Directive.
63
 Injunctions are a kind of familiar but distant remedy: on one hand – 
they have their origin in EU law, on the other hand – they have to be constructed so as to 
remain compatible with national jurisdictions. 
The understanding of injunctions as a field related remedy can also be used to describe 
the scheme of substantive law directives of a specific nature to which the Injunction Directive 
will also apply. The unfair contract terms Directive 93/13 might serve as an example of this.
64
 
Since the potential effect of injunctions
65
 is not defined in the Directive itself but has to be 
developed through the ECJ
66
, the Directive 93/13 may be given a quite different effect from 
those related to the Directive on Injunction – theoretically at the EU level, but first and 
foremost at the national level. The unfair contract terms injunction may affect current as well 
future contracts; at least this was a presumption can be deduced from Art. 7 of the Directive. 
This seems to be the rule in most of the Member States, except Italy.
67
 In France, national 
courts are granted a right to decide whether a certain clause shall be deleted and excluded 
from a contract.
68
 This judicial discretion in the Member States goes further since unfair 
contract terms may also be deleted from the contract.
69
  
No matter which contract is considered there will always remain legal ambiguity as to 
the validity of a contract term which has been declared non-binding within the frame of the 
                                               
63 Although Howells (1996), European Business Law, Dartmouth, p. 19, states that “European laws are rarely 
completely new creations, mostly there are the result of comparative research which draws upon the experiences 
of Member States”, this is not a case for the Injunction Directive.  
64 Dickie (1996), Article 7 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, Consumer Law Journal, Vol. 4, 
p. 112-117. 
65 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 9-10; Pollicino (2010), The New Relationship between 
National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe: Towards a Unitary Theory of 
Jurisprudential Supranational Law? Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 29(1), p. 65-111; Craig/De Búrca (2011), 
The Legal Effect of..., p. 305-343. 
66 Tridimas (2005), The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, p. 18; Tridimas states that “(…) the EC 
Treaty is a traité cadre. It provides no more than a framework. It is rampant with provisions overpowering in 
their generality and uses vague terms and expression which are not defined. It bestows the Court with very 
broad powers to develop Community law. Furthermore, the Community law seeks to supplement rather than to 
substitute the national legal systems. It is logical for the Court, in filling any gaps which arise, to resort to and 
gain inspiration from the laws of Member States”. As of the judicial power and judicial activism see also: 
Tridimas (1996), The European Court of Justice and Judicial Activism, European Law Review, Vol. 21, p. 199; 
Van der Vleuten/De Waele (2013), Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice, Michigan State Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 19(3), p. 639-666. 
67 Judgment of The Supreme Court of Cassation of 21 May 2008, 13051/08. 
68 Code de la Consommation (vers. con. 30 May 2014), L- 421-6 introduces such a possibility which is left in the 
hands of the judges: “The judge may order the deletion of the illegal or abusive clause from any contract or 
standard term offered to or intended for the consumer”. 
69 Judgment of Court of Appeal of 2 April 2009, England OFT v Foxtons Limited, (2009) EWCA Civ. 288; 
“Regulation 12(3) gives the Court a very wide discretion to the form of injunction. In an appropriate case, the 
court could, for example “carve out” a contract fulfilling a particular description” (speech by Lady Justice 
Arlen).  
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injunction procedure, and this ambiguity will remain in relation to all other individual 
contracts consumers might have concluded with the same user of the standard terms.  
Invitel
70
 provided the ECJ with the occasion to clarify the relationship between non-
binding standard terms in the injunction procedure and non-binding effects in individual 
contracts. The ECJ insisted that the Member States must guarantee to extend res judicata 
under the injunction procedure to individual contracts. Setting aside how this can be achieved 
and setting aside the substantive differences in the Member States, Hungary and Poland have 
given non-binding contract terms an erga omnes effect, whilst most of the Member States 
struggle with res judicata. What matters is that the Injunction Directive does not provide for 
any guidance on the potential effect of an injunction order and therefore leaves it entirely to 
the national rules and the particularities of national jurisdictions. 
  
2. Functions of Action for Injunction 
 
The action for injunction is a remedy of a very complex legal nature. Its particular 
nature lies in the diversity of legal functions that injunctions perform in the field of consumer 
protection. In an attempt to circumvent the issues that arise concerning the fluid definitions of 
injunctions in Europe, injunctions have been defined through the prism of their legal 
functions. This must be understood as an attempt by the Member States to overcome the 
definitional problems the new remedy yielded in the implementation process. Most Member 
States, when faced with the choice between a pure translation of the definition contained in 
the Directive and the more descriptive function of “injunctions” chose the latter. This latter 
solution serves to simplify the general process of adaptation of injunctions with domestic 
legislative conditions and legal requirements. In reality, this solution has deepened the 
diversity between Member States because neither the definitions nor the functions turned out 
to be helpful in overcoming national divergences.  
Considering the diversity and with a view to clarifying the different functional 
classification of injunctions, four of them can be distinguished: a behavioural function of 
injunctions, a restitutive or corrective function of an injunction as opposed to the typical 
compensatory function of civil law remedies, a deterrent function of injunctions understood 
through the prism of avoidability of certain unwanted behaviours through the mechanism of 
                                               
70 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2012, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel 
Távközlési Zrt, Case C-472/10; discussed by Micklitz (2013), A Common Approach to the Enforcement of Unfair 
Commercial Practices and Unfair Contract Terms, Conference Paper Durham. 
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injunction, a regulatory function of injunction upon which injunction is understood as a 
market cleaner, performing the role of a tool for ex post market control.  
First of all, injunctions are considered to be and were designed as tools aimed to 
modify certain behaviour of a party against whom an injunction is granted. By prohibiting a 
certain behaviour, the injunction advocates change. Thus, injunctions should be used to 
correct unwanted behaviour that is harmful to the economy and society as a whole.
71
 This is 
an order that somehow “puts” pressure on an individual’s way of acting modifying an 
individual’s behaviour. Secondly, injunctions may be described according to their restitutive 
or corrective features. These legal features are characteristic of injunctions in consumer 
protection since injunctions in consumer law are not meant to satisfy consumers’ claims by 
compensation. Both these features should rather be recognised as equivalent to compensation.  
Doubtless, injunctions cannot be classified among legal remedies providing for 
compensation, because the Injunctions Directive does not contain an action for damages. This 
element is often recognized as missing - by purpose - concerning the future dimension of the 
remedy of injunction.
72
 Although an injunction does not provide for compensation, it is 
supposed to restore the previous market structure, the previous “infringed market nature”, 
recalling a status quo ante before an abusive action or unlawful activity has taken place. 
Furthermore, injunctions are supposed to be corrective in shaping positive and proper 
behaviour. An injunction should then indicate what it considers to be positive behaviour in a 
given case. 
Thirdly, the deterrent effect of injunctions pertains to businesses behaviour.
73
 An 
injunction is a legal remedy aimed at halting the continuation of an unlawful activity. The 
message which injunctive relief directs to a business may be simplified to full avoidance of 
similar unlawful practice and unlawful behaviours in the future. The message behind this 
legal function is clear - business should not repeat the unlawful activity in the future.  
Fourthly, we must consider the regulatory function of injunctions that is currently 
recognised as a key element of the EU debate on collective actions. The debate is mainly 
focused on the mutual relations and legal interplays between public and private bodies in 
                                               
71 Fiss (1978), The Civil Right…, p. 8. 
72 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 7, “(…) the impact [of injunctions] is projected more 
towards the future rather than being useful for correcting past damage, and it is very difficult to quantify in 
monetary terms”.  
73 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 7, “Although injunctions do not, as such, provide a 
remedy for claiming damages for the past, the possibility of using injunctions can in itself be of value. As a 
governance tool, injunctions can be used as a deterrent without being applied to Court”. 
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charge of actions for injunctions.
74
 In this regard, there is significant diversity in Europe since 
some Member States rely only on public bodies and others rely on the activities of private 
bodies. Others employ a mixed solution linking together public and private measures. 
However, regarding an action for an injunction and the fact that consumer organisations have 
been granted legal standing under the Injunctions Directive, it is questionable how and by 
which measures consumer organisations might perform a regulatory function and whether 
they should be recognised as holders of the public interest. In other words, does their legal 
status among other bodies entitle them to be public interest holders? Therefore, we must 
question whether consumer organisations should be assigned the role of a trustee of the public 
interest. It could be argued that this role may be assigned to consumer organisations based on 
their statutory activities. However, if the action is available to “qualified” consumers 
organisations only, then this necessarily entails the exclusion of individual citizens who could 
also act in the public interest, at least theoretically.  
 
2. 1. Behavioural Function 
 
Injunctions are assumed to be stimulators of the parties’ behaviour. Injunctions always 
bring a certain type of behaviour modification for the parties to a case with a significant 
influence on the behaviour of an infringer, who will in some way be “punished” by the 
injunctive order. That is why an injunction affects both the economy, and the society as a 
whole.
75
 
Injunctions are meant to correct the unlawful activities and unwanted behaviours of 
the parties that are considered harmful to the economy and for society as a whole. The 
modification of the behaviour of the parties might be done easily thought injunctive measures. 
Seeing as there are many different forms of injunctions in the field of consumer protection, 
this diversity is bound to affect the manner in which they modify a party’s behaviour. In this 
regard, a distinction is made between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions in the field of 
consumer protection. Such basic division concerning mandatory and prohibitory rules is a 
result of the fact that Europe, drawing from the experiences of the United States of America 
and following the path set by American jurisprudence, adopted such a basic and fundamental 
                                               
74 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection - The Interplay Between Private and Public 
Enforcement, Antwerp; Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 6.  
75 Kardes/Cronley/Cline (2008), Social Influence and Behavioral Compliance in Consumer Behavior, p. 303-
304. In comparison to patent infringements injunctions see: Cotter (2013), Comparative Legal Remedies: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, p. 342-344; Fiss (1978), The Civil Right…, p. 8. 
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distinction between: prohibitory injunctions that direct a party to refrain from acting in a 
certain manner, thus it is a prohibitory order to cease a certain practice, or simply an order that 
is supposed to stop a certain kind of unlawful activity; and affirmative injunctions, which 
direct a party to take a certain kind of affirmative action, mainly to provide for a modification. 
Hence, injunctions influence parties’ behaviour but the way in which they do so largely 
depends on the injunction model applicable in any given case.  
Injunctions stimulate a specific form of a party’s behaviour. The injunctive order is 
supposed to sketch a path that will lead a party to correct his/her unlawful behaviour. 
Injunctions indicate how the future behaviour of the party should be and, by the nature of an 
injunction order, they give some hints on how to achieve this. In reality, injunctions are 
powerful remedial tools put in the hands of courts. Courts have been left discretion to decide 
the way in which the behaviour should be modified as well as the extent to which certain 
behaviour shall be modified. They also decide whether the injunction should be mandatory or 
prohibitory. The only limit on the power of the trial judge is that the remedy selected must be 
reasonably suited to abate the threatened harm and that the court be in position to enforce its 
own order and assess a party’s compliance.  
The behavioural element characterises the specific legal nature of the remedy of 
injunction in its collective dimension as it influences not only a consumer but rather a whole 
group of consumers. Currently, the European debate on collective redress is focused on a lack 
of a definition of “group” in terms of the injunctive procedure, which, in turn, influences the 
behaviour of the parties being involved in a collective action.  
Within the injunction procedure at the European level however, consumers are not 
defined as a group. This is also true with regard to national procedures. Indeed, injunctions 
arise as unique collective enforcement measure among others civil law remedies.
76
 The 
injunction procedure does not require a definition of a group and it does not even mention this 
issue in the text of the Injunction Directive. It should be stressed that an action for injunction 
is the only collective redress mechanism in the field of consumer law that does not provide 
                                               
76 Stuyck (2009), Class Action in Europe? To Opt-in or Opt-out, that is the Question, European Business Law 
Review, Vol. 20(4). Collective redress is a topic of interest in of British scholars; See: Hodges (2008), The 
Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework for Collective 
Redress in Europe, Studies of the OIECL, 2008; Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 
final, 27 November 2008; Mulheron (2004), The Class Action in Common Law Systems: A Comparative 
Perspective, Oxford; Mulheron (2007), Justice Enhanced: Framing an Opt-Out Class Action for England, 
Modern Law Review, Vol. 70(4), p. 550-580; Mulheron (2009), The Case for an Opt-out Class Action for 
European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 15, p. 409-
453; Mulheron (2011), Recent Milestones in Class Actions Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal, The 
Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 127, p. 288-315. 
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any requirements as to the issue of the definition of group, an element which is de facto a 
basic requirement in most other collective redress schemes. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
definition of “group” in the Injunction Directive arises again as a problematic issue. It would 
seem from the Directive that there is no sense in and no need to indicate: how “the group” 
should be formed within the frame of an action for an injunction in terms of definition? What 
is the basic requirement of a group? With regard to the group definition which model shall be 
the most preferable? Should the US-class action model be considered as a prototype or should 
Europe at least partially consider the fundaments of the American experiences?
77
 Which 
option for a definition of the group would be most suitable as regards an action for an 
injunction in consumer law? 
Concerning the overall scheme of consumer protection in Europe with its high 
standard, it would seem that injunctions and their effects broadly speaking will never be free 
from ideology. It would be desirable if each consumer would be prepared to declare before a 
court her/his intention to participate in an organised injunction procedure. Being fully aware 
of the consequences, he would be able to join a collective procedure suit if he so wishes. This 
however is not practical especially when one considers that the goal of the Injunction 
Directive is to provide an efficient remedy and to protect consumers from future inappropriate 
behaviour.  
Currently we face a situation where there is a lack of precise rules concerning the 
definition of a “group” leading to further legal irritations in the area. The lack of precision 
yields a certain retraction on the part of consumers from relations of this kind as well as novel 
legal ambiguities. Currently, a judgment granted in the course of an injunction procedure, 
although directed against a concrete wrongdoer, because of the national effect of a judgment 
may be binding not only to the parties to a case at hand, but it may also be extended to 
                                               
77 It is always very risky to compare legal models coming from different continents and different legal cultures 
and traditions; See: Stadler (2013), The Commission’s Recommendation on Common Principles of Collective 
Redress and Private International Law Issues, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR), p. 483-488. 
Nevertheless, the US-reach experiences with regard the class action is often used as a point of reference for the 
EU-model of collective action, see for a US perspective: Hensler/Pace/Dombey-Moore/Giddens/Gross/Moller 
(2011), Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 
Calif., MR-969-ICJ, p. 10-11. For A European view: Hodges (2009), What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving 
Mass Issues, How Is It Going, and Where Are We headed? The Globalisation of Class Actions, The Annals of 
the American Academy, p. 330-345; Bober (2011), National Judicial Collective Redress Models in the US and in 
the EU, Legal Aspects of Consumer Protection in the European Union, National, Vilnius; Jasper (2005), Your 
Rights in a Class Action Suit, Oxford, p. 249; Mulheron (2004), The Class Action..., p. 167-169; Hodges (2010), 
Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 3, p. 370-395; Silvestri (2010), The 
Difficult Art of Legal Transplants: The Case of Class Action, Revista de Processo, Instituto Brasileiro de Direito 
Processual, p. 101-112.  
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potential consumers who may become parties of a certain legal relationship.
78
 Res judicata of 
judgments would then be extended to the other entrepreneurs who intend to use continuously 
the clause in the abusive practices against consumers. This gives rise to a situation where 
consumers are not aware of a particular injunctive order that has already been granted. This 
may be due to one of the major problems of collective measures - the disclosure of 
information and information flow difficulties. Furthermore, consumers might become party to 
a case without having been informed and they can even be unaware that the case has been 
adjudicated. The ex officio doctrine developed by the ECJ in the field of unfair contract terms 
could be regarded as a means to overcome the information deficit, however, imposing the 
burden on the national court.
79
 All consumers are automatically regarded as belonging to the 
group, unless they declare that they do not wish to participate.  
 
 
 
                                               
78 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2012, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel 
Távközlési Zrt, Case C-472/10 (not yet published), discussed by Micklitz (2013), A Common Approach... 
79 (I) Judgment of the Court of 27 June 2000, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero (C-
240/98) and Salvat Editores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades (C-241/98), José Luis Copano Badillo (C-
242/98), Mohammed Berroane (C-243/98) and Emilio Viñas Feliú (C-244/98), (ECR 2000, p. I-04941); 
discussed by Rutgers (2005), Case note on Océano Grupo, European Review of Contract Law, Vol., p. 87-96; 
Stuyck (2001), Case note on Océano Grupo, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, p. 719-737; Whittaker 
(2001), Judicial Intervention and Consumer Contracts, The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 117, p. 215-220; Ebers 
(2010), ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina 
Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law, Ex Officio Application of 
European Union Law and Res Judicata, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 18(4), p. 823–846; (II) Judgment 
of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 November 2002, Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout, Case C-473/00 (ECR 
2002), p. I-10875, discussed by Rott (2003), Effektiver Rechtsschutz vor Missbräuchlichen AGB – Zum Codifis-
Urteil des EuGH, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtchaftsrecht, Vol. 4, p. 5-9; Loos (2004), ECJ 24 January 2002, 
Case C-372/99, Commission v. Italian Republic, Collective Action Under the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 12(6), p. 701-707, (III) Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) 
of 26 October 2006, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05 (ECR 2006, p. I-
10421); discussed by Graf/Appleton (2007) Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium, EU Consumer 
Law as a Defence against Arbitral Awards, ECJ Case C-168/05, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 1, p. 48-66; Loos (2007), 
Case: ECJ– Mostaza Claro, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 4, p. 439-445; Liebscher (2008), Case Note 
on C-168/05, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 16, p. 454-557; Reich (2007), More Clarity After “Claro”? 
European Review of Contract Law, March, p. 42-619; (IV) Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 4 October 
2007, Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanne Godard, née Rampion v Franfinance SA and K par K SAS, Case C-
429/05 (ECR 2007, p. I-08017); (V) Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM Zrt. 
v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, Case 243/08, (ECR 2009, I-04713); (VI) Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 
17 December 2009, Eva Martín Martín v EDP Editores SL, Case C-227/08, (ECR 2009, p. I-1193); (VII) 
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina 
Rodríguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08, (ECR 2009, p. I-09579); The Court said that it is up to courts of Member 
States to protect consumers against unfair arbitration clauses. This lead, according to some authors, to so-called 
fragmentation of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts, See: Mak (2010), Case: ECJ – Asturcom v 
Rodríguez Nogueira, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 4, p 444; Loos (2007), Case: ECJ– Mostaza…, p. 
445; Nový (2014), An Alternative View on the ECJ Asturcom Judgment, 
<http://www.academia.edu/2898769/A_note_on_Asturcom_-_a_draft_version> accessed on April 10, 2014. 
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2. 2. “Restitutory” Function  
 
The innovative nature of the remedy derives from the fact that an injunction looks only 
into the future and does not tackle any past events. Furthermore, it does not provide for 
compensation contrary to most legal remedies. Although compensation is one of the 
fundamental and most common civil law remedies, it has been excluded from the scope of the 
Injunction Directive. It provides neither an action for damages nor any other derivatives of 
actions for damages. Therefore, when an injunction is granted, a consumer cannot expect that 
he will be granted an amount of money to be paid as compensation in order to make good to a 
wrongful activity which infringes consumer rights. He may only count on “reparation”, 
meaning the improvement or modification of an unlawful behaviour.
80
 Nevertheless, in some 
cases injunctions may be an insufficient remedy to deter conduct infringing consumer rights, 
while potential eventual awards of damages can remain under-compensatory.
81
 
On one hand, the absence of the possibility to claim damages is one of the most 
glaring omissions in the Injunction Directive. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
consumers deserve a high level of protection and an element of compensation (if included in 
the Injunction Directive) would be recognized as added value to consumers. Therefore, it is 
highly questionable that this key element of compensation has been excluded from the whole 
injunction procedure, considering that the EU has a mandate
82
 to create any additional means 
to make any tool of consumer protection more compatible with consumer protection policy.  
In order to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market, consumers must be 
highly confident in the market, especially when cross-border actions are concerned. Certainly, 
it is the role of the EU to protect consumers and ensure their confidence in the Internal 
Market.
83
 Consumers should be afforded better protection at the European level as opposed to 
the national level upon the EC initiatives. A consumer should not be considered as a passive 
subject of legal protection and should also expect to be supported in terms of the possibility of 
legal aid for such enforcement actions. Moreover, consumers may definitely expect protection 
of their rights that – as a general rule – derive from civil law remedies. Therefore, from a 
consumer policy perspective the element of compensation should be integrated into the 
framework of an action for injunction. The situation becomes even more complicated if one 
                                               
80 Fiss (1978), The Civil Right…, p. 10-12. 
81 Micklitz/Stadler (2006), The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil 
Procedure, European Business Law Review, Vol. 17, 2006, p. 1473-1503. 
82 Lindholm (2007), State Procedure and Union Rights. A Comparison of the European Union and the United 
States, p. 72-81, 240-249.  
83 EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013, p. 7. 
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considers that the Injunction Directive does not provide for any guidelines as to the steps to be 
taken once an injunctive order is granted. Furthermore, it does not direct consumers in 
relation to further steps that can be taken, for instance, the legal measures a consumer could 
use to bring a separate claim for restitution or compensation. No indication as regards to 
possible compensatory measures is given. The silence of the injunction procedure may be an 
obstacle for consumers who have not been provided with a compensatory tool in EU law. It 
means that consumers are supposed to look for compensation measures under national law, if 
at all.  
The Injunction Directive is designed to prevent damages. It stands opposite to actions for 
damages which are designed to “make good” the consequences. Although the Injunction 
Directive excludes provisions on compensation, it clearly provides for restitution.
84
 It is 
understood as a “reparation” that is intended to provide a remedy for loss, damage or injury 
caused - restoration to the former original state or position. In other words, restitution means 
making good of or giving an equivalent for some injury, loss or damage. It aims to restore a 
certain harmony to the market that existed before the unlawful action took place. This is 
exactly what injunctions are all about. Although historically restitution has been considered 
appropriate where competitors were deceived through trade practices, the provision of similar 
reparations for deceived consumers is a fairly modern concept. Restitution for consumers 
supports a general principle that the buyer has a right to be an equal party to a transaction: 
since restitution is also accessible for a seller who is aggrieved, such restitution must also be 
available to the buyer. 
 
2. 3. Deterrent Function 
 
Injunctions perform many different legal functions one of which concerns the 
deterrent effect.
85
 Injunctions are characterised by an element of collective redress and 
protection of the collective interest. The latter pertains to a group as a whole. Thus, the 
instrument employed to protect it focuses primarily on deterrence and prevention, definitely 
not compensation. This is exactly the case in the Injunction Directive. Currently, only a few 
civil law remedies can be said to have a deterrent effect due to the fact that deterrence is a 
dominant feature mainly in criminal law, and public law matters. That said there is certainly 
an element of deterrence attached to injunctions and as case law illustrates injunctive 
                                               
84 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 9. 
85 Fiss (1978), The Civil Right…, p. 8-11. 
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measures strongly affect the behaviour of the parties to the case.
86
 It is also true however that 
the deterrent function is often overestimated
87
 as far as injunctions in the European context 
are concerned, if compared to damages.
88
 
Injunctions were initially designed for the protection of highly important goods and 
values, for example privacy
89
, health and or personal rights.
90
 This is generally considered the 
concern of public law. Over time, however, they have become tools for the protection of 
values of different legal nature not only non-substantive matters, but also and mainly 
economic interest of both individuals and the collective dimension. The phenomenon of 
sectorial specification promoted the protection of the economic interest. Historically at least 
with the exception of the common law injunctions were rooted in the public law area. The 
Injunction Directive although rooted in civil law and applicable to the civil law area, still 
performs a public law function – of deterrence for the potential subjects who infringe 
consumer rights. Therefore, the Injunction Directive draws a link between public and private 
law, since it performs the same function as previously issued injunctions addressed in the field 
of public law.  
Formerly, injunctions were recognized as tools of punishment. Today their punitive 
function has been significantly weakened. The deterrent legal function has always been 
underestimated, mainly because the deterrent effect of injunction orders may modify the 
behaviour of only one party in the legal relationship.
91
 The deterrent function of an injunction 
is related more to injunctions that are considered in an administrative dimension; they are 
often less important in a typical judicial dimension of an action for an injunction. The 
deterrent aspect of injunctions arises in situations in which businesses are concerned with the 
issue of the publication of the judgment. Sometimes a public announcement of the fact that an 
order was granted may negatively affect the reputation of a business and as such 
representatives of a business try to avoid negative publicity as much as possible. Sometimes, 
to escape from an injunction procedure companies look for a substitute solution. This may 
                                               
86 Saraceno (2007), Can Group of Litigation Improve Deterrence? Working Paper Paolo Baffi Centre, Bocconi 
University, Milan, <http://www.side-isle.it/ocs/viewpaper.php?id=12&cf=1> accessed on April 14, 2014; 
Porrini/Ramello (2005), Class Action for Financial Losses: Deterrence Effects from Ex Post Regulation, 
Working Paper, Universita del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria. 
87 Green Paper on Collective Consumer Redress, 27.11.2008 final.  
88 Cafaggi (2009), Great Transformation…, p. 518-519. 
89 Busuttil/McCafferty (2010), Interim Injunctions and the Overlap between Privacy and Libel, Journal of Media 
Law, Vol. 2, p.1-13.  
90 In Poland, a remedy of injunction are recognised as a legal instrument for private rights’ protection Injunction 
as a civil law remedy has been developed in the US-legal system. It was recognized as an effective instrument in 
terms of religious freedoms and sexual abuses, this was also previously used in the UK among equitable 
remedies, at the end the most common use of injunction was notified in practices in trespassing someone’s land. 
91 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 7.  
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mean that a business in searching for a substitute solution may decide to choose an alternative 
scheme of dispute resolution instead of an injunction order. These alternative dispute 
resolution schemes allow the business to circumvent an injunctive order in a developed form, 
in order to avoid the risk to business reputation. The Injunction Directive includes an out-of-
court procedure that can be understood as providing the possibility for resolving the dispute 
with recourse to the courts.
92
 Since the prior consultation procedure is not a mandatory 
requirement of implementation of the Injunction Directive, in those Member States that have 
implemented the preliminary consultation procedure we find that businesses use it to escape 
the courtroom while for consumers it presents itself in business-to-consumer (b2c) conflicts as 
the simplest way to enforce their rights that have been infringed by unlawful activity. This 
escape from typical court litigation to a preliminary consultation procedure provides evidence 
of the deterrent effect of injunctions. This justifies introduction of the preliminary 
consultation procedure, as according to the scheme of the Injunction Directive. It would seem 
that the European legislator intentionally provided this escape route by including such a 
possibility in the Injunctions Directive.  
An injunction order must be expressed in a clear and legible way, in so-called “sharp 
words”. This mode of expression boosts the deterrent nature of injunctions in that the clarity 
of the order highlights the exact nature and merit of the incriminated behaviour. As far as 
formal deterrent features of injunctions are concerned, courts awarding an injunction are not 
supposed to provide guidelines to the parties in indicating the way in which the injunction 
order should be carried out. The deterrent effect of an action for an injunction may be 
considered in different contexts.  
First, it may protect consumers from further abusive actions and unlawful activities 
since the very fact that an injunctive order is granted limits the unlawful activity of a business. 
Secondly, the wrongful activity may be stopped; but litigation before courts is not only time-
consuming and expensive but the nature of court measures are adversarial. This is why 
entrepreneurs may try to switch from court measures to out-of-court settlements including the 
choice of the prior consultation procedure.
93
 Thirdly, the settlement of collective infringement 
outside courts affects individual enforcement of consumer rights. The settlement is not made 
                                               
92 See Chapter IV 5.3.4. 
93 See Chapter IV 5.3.4. For example: Poland, France, Finland - no requirement of the prior consultation; Cyprus 
– the prior consultation used on voluntarily basis, Spain – prior consultation is used only optionally; Germany, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland - it is a mandatory requirement of the injunction procedure. Case Study: 
Judgment of the Provincial Court of Balearic Islands of 17 March 2003, Asociación de Usuarios de Banca 
(Ausbanc) v Banca March, 146/2003. 
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public. Consumers will not know what has or has not been settled. They are on their own in 
defending their rights. 
 
2. 4. Regulatory Function 
 
Consumer protection has become a cornerstone of effective market regulation in 
Europe. It regulates both entry and exit of market goods, products and services. The 
Injunction Directive, as recognised as an important tool for the effective protection of 
consumer rights, is a powerful regulatory tool of a procedural dimension in consumer 
protection legislation. This regulatory function was necessary with regard to the consumers’ 
economic interest, which is supposed to be protected by the Injunction Directive. Indeed, an 
injunction is supposed to protect single market relationships before infringements, which are 
commonly used in EU-wide transactions.  
Injunctions can be an ex post regulatory measures aimed at the protection of consumer 
economic interest. Once an infringement practice appears the injunction is meant to protect 
the internal market as well as a consumer interest that should be shielded against misleading 
and unfair practices. Injunctions are meant to regulate the market.
94
 They are aimed at 
cleansing the market before consumers suffer from infringements. Injunctions clean the 
market by preventing infringing behaviours. They point towards the future. Ideally the market 
is cleaned ex ante, before the consumer interests are affected. Therefore the Injunction 
Directive requires quick action since the effectiveness and success of market cleaning 
depends on timing and the action’s speed. There is always the need for quick and dynamic 
reactions. Once the infringement has taken place and once consumer interests are already 
harmed, quick action is needed even more in order to stop similar actions in the future. In 
cases in which the economic interest is a subject of the legal protection, an ex post device is 
often the only one option which can seriously be considered.  
The ex ante and ex post distinction, following Shavell’s theory95, means the choice of 
one or the other option depends on the balance and accessibility of information at the case at 
hand. Just to give an example, since the regulation was adopted, both product safety and 
                                               
94 In this line Rosenberg (2002), The Regulatory Advantage of Mass Tort Class Action, in Viscusi/Hahn/Litan 
(2002), Regulation Through Litigation, Washington, p. 244-309. 
95 Shavell (1983), Liability from harm versus regulation of safety, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
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Enforcement, Journal of Law and Economics, The University of Chicago Press, Vol. 36(1), 255-287; Shavell 
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24, p. 209-218; In this line see also: Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial..., p. 15-17. 
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quality have been left in the hands of administrative bodies that operate ex ante, which means 
that they carry out control before a dangerous product may be circulated on the market. In 
product safety, however, the nature of the interest to be protected is different.
96
 It protects 
health and non-substantive values, while in consumer protection directives, which can be 
found in the Annex to the Injunction Directive, only the protection of the economic interest is 
at stake.
97
 That is why, the timing scheme/device of the protection, while not useless and 
theoretically still possible, is much harder to realize within the scope of the Injunction 
Directive. In practice an injunction will often be issued only once the infringement has 
occurred and once consumers have been negatively affected. The Injunction Directive is a 
stop order mechanism, prohibiting certain unlawful practices – with regard to the future.  
In concern to the regulatory function of injunction, in particular the distinction 
between inhibitory and prohibitory injunction as defined in “cessation” or “prohibition” 
order is illustrated, since the injunction stops the practice at the moment once the injunction 
order is issued, and with regard to the future effect stops repetition of the unlawful activities 
in the future. In order to achieve the goal, the Injunction Directive is a way of elimination of 
the continuing effect of infringements, hence poses a requirements for modification of the 
unlawful activity.  
   
2. 4. 1. A final (perpetual) Injunction 
 
 A final (perpetual) injunction is granted after trial of the action in which the plaintiff 
has established the existence of the defendant’s duty and the fact that the defendant has 
breached that duty or is about to do so. A final injunction is usually made without any time 
limit conditions. A plaintiff seeking a final injunction must usually establish that a violation 
by the defendant of a legal or equitable right of the plaintiff has occurred or is threatened. An 
injunction ordering the defendant to do something is granted only when the plaintiff illustrates 
a strong probability that a grave damage has occurred and monetary compensation would be 
inadequate in the case. If a mandatory injunction is granted, the cost for the defendant in 
relation to the activity he is supposed to execute, shall be considered in deciding whether to 
make the order or not. 
                                               
96 The Genaral Product Safety Directive (GPD) is not covered by the Annex to the Injunction Directive. The 
legislative process on the Injunction Directive was followed by a debate whether GPD shall be included in the 
frame of the Injunction Directive and by this – be listed within the Annex to the Injunction Directive. Some of 
the Member States, like as Italy and Greece, do so.  
97 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial..., p. 34-35.  
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2. 4. 2. An interlocutory (interim) Injunction 
 
An interlocutory (interim) injunction is sought quite often. Basically, a small number 
of cases adjudicated upon the injunction procedure, the interlocutory injunction was the basic 
form in which an action for an injunction was brought, for example Factortame case.
98
 This 
case is one of the basic examples of injunctions that have been developed to follow as quickly 
as possible upon the issuing of claim or even precedes it in case of great urgency.  
In the field of consumer protection, more and more problems arise as a matter of 
urgency thereby requiring speedy resolution. In these cases there can arise a need for interim 
measures. It directs the defendant to do something immediately or to refrain from doing 
something until the trial of the action or until some earlier specified date or until a future order 
is made. As with all forms of equitable relief, the granting of injunctions is a matter at the 
discretion of a court. All equitable remedies are discretionary. Although the discretion of a 
judge in the civil continental process should be avoided, it seems that the legal nature of 
injunctions simply allows them to use their discretionary power to a certain extent - as to the 
choice of a most suitable injunction to a specific case at hand. On the other hand, it may also 
be justified based on the loopholes existing in procedural regulations on consumer protection.  
The court may by order grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which 
it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so. On application for an interlocutory 
injunction, the plaintiff must usually establish that there is a serious question to be tried as to 
whether a violation by the defendant of a legal or equitable right belonging to the plaintiff has 
occurred or is already threatened. The usual purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to 
preserve the status quo until the trial of an action, or for a shorter period if the injury to be 
restrained is so urgent it cannot wait. Interlocutory injunctions are commonly used by courts 
when a case is urgent and a court is not able to work effectively by issuing a judgment based 
on the merits of the case. It should be emphasised that this type of injunction can be combined 
with other types in one judgment in relation to the same party of the case. The court may grant 
a mandatory injunction in connection with one of the abusive behaviours and at the same 
time, considering another unfair or misleading practice, an interlocutory injunction can be 
granted as well.  
 
                                               
98 Judgment of the Court of 19 June 1990, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame 
Ltd and others, Case C-213/89, (ECR 1990, p. I-02433); See: Prechal (1995), Directives in European 
Community Law: A Study on EC Directives and their Enforcement in National Courts, Oxford, p. 184. 
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2. 4. 3. Interlocutory Injunction ex parte  
 
It rarely occurs in the field of consumer law that a court grants an interlocutory 
injunction ex parte: also known as a one-side injunction. It is an injunction granted without 
the presence of the defendant in court. This means that a business does not have the 
opportunity to appear before the court in order to oppose the injunction. In effect, the court 
grants the injunction order without any notification to the defendant. An interlocutory 
injunction ex parte may be granted in cases of extreme urgency, and may be recognized as a 
kind of security measure. This is why, more often than in consumer cases, it is used in cases 
regarding personal injury or where significant damages are threatening a person or rather 
his/her property. Injunctions of this kind are often granted immediately if there is a need for 
secrecy so as to prevent the defendant from frustrating the injunction. Although the ex parte 
interlocutory injunction is a kind of supplement for an interlocutory injunction, ex parte 
interlocutory injunctions are not very common in consumer protection cases.  
As legal practice shows, ex parte injunctions are appropriate only when the threatened 
harm is so immediate and so severe that even giving the other party notice of the application 
for the injunction and an opportunity to be heard in opposition is not practical. Although, this 
kind of injunction is used only exceptionally in the field of consumer protection, it may 
sometimes be appropriate. Specifically, when consumers need the court’s protection 
immediately, sometimes within hours (for example in order to protect consumers of a harm to 
be suffered if an injunctive relief not issued). It can also be invoked in cases concerning 
misleading advertising, particularly where an advertisement may blacken a consumer’s name 
or reputation. In certain situations there will also be a requirement of secrecy according to 
which the main reason for applying an ex parte injunction will be, not only urgency, but also 
the need to prevent a defendant from having any notice of the application. In some cases, 
secrecy is required in order to protect the consumer’s interest particularly if there is a risk that 
the defendant could destroy documents or other evidence concerning his unlawful activity - 
by deletion of abusive clauses or their quick modification.  
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that this type of injunction, if applicable, could be 
developed as a very useful tool for consumer protection in personal injury cases, especially 
those that are brought under the Directive on product liability, where timing and urgency are 
usually of the essence, because health or human dignity values may be infringed 
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irreversibly.
99
 Since both the Directive 2001/95 on product safety
100
 and the product liability 
Directive 85/374
101
 are excluded from the scope of the Injunctions Directive, an ex parte 
injunction can only be granted if the national legislation includes health and safety in the list 
of legislation aimed at the protection of the collective interest of consumers.
102
 The restrictive 
scope of the Directive is highly unsatisfactory, in particular as the European Union has 
devoted much attention to the protection of consumers against unsafe products and to some 
extent also to unsafe services. Here the European Union has set milestones in the development 
of the European consumer policy. The lack of an action of injunction in that field results in a 
severe gap of protection, as consumers are entirely dependent on whether the public 
authorities in charge of health protection are properly monitoring and observing the market. 
Some Member States have filled that gap, such as Italy. 
 
2. 4. 4. Quia timet Injunction  
 
In the field of consumer protection, especially in common law countries, there is one 
other form in which an action for an injunction can be granted, and which particularly fits to 
consumer protection cases, namely a quia timet injunction. Besides suing after an actionable 
wrong has occurred, a consumer as a plaintiff may bring an action when an actionable wrong 
is threatened or imminent but has not yet been committed.
103
 The form of final quia timet 
injunction does not even require proof that damages would certainly occur. It is enough to 
prove that the action in question was calculated to infringe the plaintiff’s rights. This kind of 
injunction has not been adopted in continental European legal systems. The tradition of 
granting quia timet injunction has only been maintained in Ireland and the UK. However, 
under UK law the plaintiff needs to show that damage to his business is certain and very 
likely. While in other Member States such an action may cause many doubts or may simply 
                                               
99 The Product Liability Directive is limited only to damages and does not provide for an injunction order. 
However, Directive 2001/95 (OJ L 11, 15.01.2002, p. 4) does contain injunctive types of remedies in the form of 
product recall and product withdrawal. In the Italian model, individuals are granted judicially related remedies, 
since they are entitled to seek product recall and withdrawal. See also: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
of 17 April 2007, A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio and Tarmo Lehtinen, Case C-470/03 (ECR 2007, p. I-
02749); Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial..., p. 34-35. 
100 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product 
safety (OJ L 11, 15.01.2002, p. 4-17). 
101 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 
07.08.1985, p. 29–33); Tulibacka (2009), Product Liability Law in Transition: A Central European Perspective. 
102 In Lithuania, the legislation does not list the relevant measures as such, but rather includes a list of areas of 
consumer interest in respect of which an injunction is available. Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), 
The Consumer Acquis…, p. 389. 
103 Sheridan (1999), Injunctions and Similar Orders, p. 115-118.  
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be disallowed according to the rules of law, the quia timet injunction could be employed as a 
powerful regulatory tool of market control as well as a potential eliminator of unlawful and 
abusive practices, covering those actions that have not even occurred yet. This kind of 
injunction would provide significant protection for consumers, while the abusive action 
continues, but before any serious damage occurs. Certainly, this type of injunction may be 
regarded as a highly preventive regulatory measure if adopted in a national legal system of the 
Member States.  
 
2. 5. Variety of Form and Species in the European remedial landscape  
 
The specific forms of injunctions have been developed to varying degrees in the 
Member States. The simple classification provides only a general idea on the conceptual 
framework of injunctions in consumer law. As soon as one delves into the national 
particularities of Member States it is very difficult to place an action for an injunction in any 
kind of theoretical framework. The mechanisms in place to effectuate injunctions differ from 
one Member State to another.
104
 Their final shape very much depends on the way the 
consumer protection directives are implemented in the national legal orders. Indeed, the 
manner of implementation influences the way in which an action for an injunction is read in 
the national legal regime.
105
 In the European Union all pieces of legislation and documents 
issued by the EU must be translated into the languages spoken in 28 Member States. The 
conjunction of possible and real obstacles may definitely facilitate misunderstandings as 
regards wording and understanding of the action for injunction. Open-ended spaces for legal 
misunderstandings are detrimental to the overall objective of increasing consumer protection 
throughout the EU. Any adaptation might work in a national context, but in the internal 
market environment, in cross-border transactions and applications
106
, this national variety 
which conflicts with the overall objective enshrined in Art. 114 Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) that all consumer measures should achieve a “high level of 
protection”. 
                                               
104 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An Analysis and Evaluation...; 
Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), The Consumer Acquis… 
105 See Chapter I 1.6., 3.1. 
106 See Chapter III 4., IV 4.1. 
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One has to bear in mind that there are 28 different national legal systems in the 
European Union. Each one has its own traditions, principles of law and legal culture.
107
 Each 
has rules concerning governance, the judicial system, procedural rules, remedies, enforcement 
measures, time limits. National judges have different interpretation methods and apply law 
based on national legal doctrines, constitutional principles and specific procedures, not to 
speak of language. Hence the operation of EU law is to large extent dominated by the national 
procedural environments. This diversity has the potential to conflict with the principle of 
uniform application of the law, which the ECJ constantly stresses in its judgments.
108
 Correct 
enforcement and therefore effective protection of EU rights before national jurisdictions must 
be achieved sooner or later through the creation of adequate sanctions for affected individuals.  
The Injunction Directive is simply a first step. Its complex nature demonstrates how 
difficult it is for the EU to achieve even a minimum level of collective protection via a stop 
order mechanism. Exactly the complexity and the diversity of the remedy of injunction opens 
the door for an autonomous genuinely European understanding of what should be understood 
by an injunction. At least in the field of consumer law, the Injunction Directive provides an 
authoritative ground to lay down the foundations of a European understanding, that cuts 
across the different national regimes and intricacies. 
 
3. Definitions of Injunctions in the Injunction Directive  
 
One way at the European level to clarify the concept of injunctions is to either focus 
on its procedural content in the text of the Directive or the substantive context enshrined in 
the Annex to the Injunction Directive. 
 
3. 1. The procedural-related Context  
 
In its procedural context, the Injunctions Directive is the first EU directive in the 
consumer law field and the first legal regulation of a procedural nature at the EU level to 
                                               
107 Van Dam (2009), Who is Afraid of Diversity? Cultural Diversity, European Co-operation, and European Tort 
Law, Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 20(1), p. 281-308. 
108 Tridimas (2006), The General Principles…p. 25, Frenz (2007), Handbuch Europarecht: Beihilfe- und 
Vergaberecht, Vol. 3, p. 536; Rinkevičiūtė (2005), Ensuring of the Uniform Interpretation of the EU Law in the 
Judicial Practice of the Member States, Jurisprudencija, Vilnius, Vol. 72(64), p. 81-89; Beck (2013), The legal 
Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, Oxford. 
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include the legal definition of an injunction.
109
 An action for an injunction as contained 
therein is recognised as legal remedy sensu stricto. It is the first consumer protection remedy, 
to have been granted ex lege a collective dimension.
110
 This is a reason why, the Injunction 
Directive has appeared as a significantly innovative element for the whole field of consumer 
law.
111
 Thus far, a vast majority of consumer protection directives, even where they include 
an injunction mechanism, have only covered individual enforcement schemes. The situation 
changed once the Injunction Directive was issued, because the substantive law directives 
thanks to the Injunction Directive have brought about equality for collective and individual 
enforcement.
112
 
 
3. 1. 1. The Meaning of the Notion of “Injunction” 
 
Although the word injunction itself appeared in the title of the main procedural 
directive in the field of consumer protection called “full title of the Injunction Directive”, the 
notion per se has reappeared neither in the content of the Injunctions Directive nor in any 
other directives on consumer protection. Although it is mentioned in the title of the Injunction 
Directive, it is not mentioned in the text of the Directive onwards. If one examines the entire 
title of the Injunction Directive, the Directive as of its subject matter can been recognised as a 
misnomer.
113
 It clearly suggests that the Injunction Directive provides for a kind of 
enforcement procedure, so-called “injunctive procedure” applicable in the field of consumer 
protection. In reality, as it appears from the text only, the Injunction Directive essentially 
introduces a principle of mutual recognition of standing for consumer organizations which is a 
complete novelty in the field of consumer protection. The notion is unfamiliar, and because 
there is no collective injunction available in the national legal systems. 
                                               
109 Dougan (2004), National Remedies Before the Court of Justice. Issues of Harmonization and Differentiation, 
Modern Studies in European Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, p. 198-200. 
110 Article 1.1 of the Injunction Directive and Recital (3) to the Injunction Directive. 
111 So-called “extraordinary” nature of injunction has been appreciated in various jurisdictions; See: Fiss (1978), 
The Civil Rights..., p. 1.  
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In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Injunction Directive there may be found a 
statement concerning the legal context of injunctions.
114
 The Memorandum does not explain 
the current existing situation regarding the remedy of injunction. It rather focuses on the 
remedy of injunction as being a mixture of substantial and procedural elements deepening the 
“mess” by introducing the remedy of injunction without providing a clear definition. Last but 
not least it underlines that although the notion of injunction exists in all Member States, it is 
mainly understood in a national-related context without many links with the EU concept. 
Therefore a general scheme of injunction may be found in national jurisdictions of all EU 
Member States, but its meaning depends mainly on the particularities of national legislation. 
If one takes into consideration that the Injunction Directive and the few substance-
related directives on consumer protection listed in the Annex to the Injunction Directive 
provide de facto for the same injunctions, even if the wording in the Injunction Directive and 
substance related directives slightly differs, the dimension of a developing common European 
concept comes abundantly clear. Article 7 of the unfair contract terms Directive might serve 
as a starter to understand what the problem is all about. It seems as if the legislator carefully 
avoided using the word injunction which might have created confusion and 
misunderstandings: 
(i) Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, 
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in 
contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers. 
(ii) The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby persons or 
organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting 
consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts 
or before competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual 
terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and 
effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms.  
(iii) With due regard for national laws, the legal remedies referred to in paragraph 2 may 
be directed separately or jointly against a number of sellers or suppliers from the 
same economic sector or their associations which use or recommend the use of the 
same general contractual terms or similar terms. 
Provisions of this kind have been identified as substantive law/substance related rules 
on injunctions. Art. 7 makes sense only in the context of the control of unfair standard 
                                               
114 The Proposal for the Injunction Directive states on page 5 that “The inventory shows that the notion of an 
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contract terms. The wording is so different that it is hard to identify whether a national 
concept actually represents an injunction according to the scheme of the Directive or not. One 
has to examine the national structures of injunctive mechanisms, so as to decipher whether the 
mechanisms in the unfair terms Directive complies with the national rules.
115
 In fact the first 
case decided by the ECJ - Invitel 
116
 - demonstrates how the Advocate General and the Court 
struggle with the wording of Article 7 – even though Invitel strictly speaking does not provide 
much clarification of what should be understood by an injunction. Both are much more 
concerned with the potential effects of terms declared non-binding in injunction procedures 
related to other consumers having suffered from the same contract term. 
 
3. 1. 2. A Legal Scheme of Action for Injunction 
 
Article 2(1) of the Injunction Directive provides for at least some kind of a definition. 
It verba legis means “(…) an order with all due expediency, where appropriate by way of 
summary procedure, requiring the cessation or prohibition of any infringement”. The Article 
requires that the Member States designate a court or administrative authority that has the 
competence to deal with applications for an injunction.  
The powers of the court or authority concerned must include the possibility:  
(i) to issue an order to stop the continuation, or prohibit an infringement; 
(ii) to initiate the publication of a decision in an appropriate format or/and of a corrective 
statement to deal with the continuing effects of the infringements; and 
(iii) to make an order for penalty payments for non-compliance, but only if it might be 
applicable in domestic legal system of the Member State.  
The procedural definition of injunction clearly states that the order for the cessation or 
prohibition of an infringement is a basic element of an action for an injunction. If an order has 
been given in a form of cease or prohibitory order
117
 and leads to the termination of an illegal 
activity and provides for their prohibition in the future, this means that is exactly the main 
injunctive order in the sense of Article 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive. As mentioned 
previously, the inhibitory injunction draws the line for limitation of the certain wrongful 
activity, while the prohibitory injunction prohibits the repetition of the wrongful activity in 
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Good Faith, Cambridge. 
116 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2012, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel 
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the future. Both the species of injunction which modifies an individual’s behaviour bringing 
the practice to an end and/or preventing from repetition of unlawful activities in the future.  
Two other elements of the legal definition of injunctions, such as publication of the 
decision or an order providing for penalty payments for non-compliance into the public purse 
are understood as “additional elements of an action for an injunction”, which demonstrates 
that the legislator was also concerned with the potential effects of the injunction and the 
behaviour of the addressee.
118
  
Since the legislator was looking for a way out from a general “cease and desist 
order”, somehow getting outside the basic model of injunction expressed in Article 2(1)(a) - 
the basic model of injunction has been supplemented, and somewhat strengthened by the 
additional elements included in Article 2(1)(b) providing an order for publication of decision, 
and Article 2(1)(c) providing an order for payment into the public purse.
119
 The order for 
publication of the decision, or corrective statement although adopted by all Member States, 
does not introduce a major innovation in the national enforcement frameworks of the Member 
States.  
The order for publication has not been recognised as a novelty in national procedures 
of Member States, because most of the Member States recognize in their national legal 
models corresponding elements of legislation providing for the same legal tools. National 
decisions and judgments are usually published in national newspapers, regional, local, daily 
newspapers or regular journals published by courts, and today also via the Internet. Although 
a vast majority of the Member States directly implemented Article 2(1)(b) of the Injunction 
Directive, there is also a minority of the Member States
120
 in which there was no need for 
implementation because of a general principle deriving from national legislation stating that 
decisions by a court are available publicly. 
The situation differs in terms of the order of payments into the public purse or any 
beneficiary designed under national legislation according to Article 2(1)(c) of the Injunction 
Directive. Although the order for payments has been adopted by all Member States
121
 with a 
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119 See: Schulte-Nölke/Twigg- Flesner/Ebers (2007), The Consumer Acquis…, p. 391. 
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single exception
122
, the procedural requirements posed for the order depends on the various 
Member States.
123
  
The third element of the legal definition of an injunction, which is indicated in Article 
2 (1)(c), concerns an order for payments to be made to the public purse or any other 
beneficiary designed under national legislation. This element of a remedy of injunction may 
be permitted under the national law of Member States, if a national enforcement scheme 
requires such a supplementary measure. An order of this kind may include daily penalty 
payments that must be identified as typical penalty fines. The order may be also granted if the 
defendant defaults on payment to the public purse in the sense that he fails to meet the 
deadline for compliance with the injunctive order. These elements in the form of payment 
orders are not a path breaking innovation. They are found in the major part of national 
legislation (for example French astraints) as well as in the 1980 Brussels Convention
124
, 
respectively the Regulation 44/2001.
125
 
Even in European law, there is a predecessor, Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading 
advertising, now replaced via Directive 2006/114/EC.
126
 Both publication and corrective 
statements are common means in the control of unfair and misleading advertising. However, 
the Injunction Directive has a much broader scope. A long list of directives are included, not 
only commercial practices but also standard contract terms. There is no attempt to discuss the 
potential impact of the two new elements with regard, for example, to standard contract terms. 
For example, what is a corrective action in the control of standard terms? Does it mean that 
the user has to publish a note in a newspaper or on his website that this and that term has been 
found “non-binding” (to stay within the legal framework of Directive 93/13/EEC) or does it 
mean that the user has to publish the new version of the standard term which is meant to 
replace the incriminated version. So much has been written in the field of commercial 
practices on the notion of corrective statement
127
 and in particular consumer organisations 
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have placed hope on the impact of potential corrections.
128
 It is somewhat disappointing that 
none of this reached the EU level, neither during nor after the legislative process. 
The true innovation results from the model of injunction in Article 2(1)(a) as a “cease 
and desist order”. This constitutes the foundational basis of the EU instrument. It suffices to 
compare the wording with the rather opaque reading of Art. 7 of the unfair terms Directive. 
Art. 2 (1)(a). The other two elements of the Injunction Directive shall rather be regarded as 
supplements, or additional security tools alongside the basic scheme of order, but they do not 
enjoy equal legal value. 
 
3. 1. 3. Injunction as sui generis Legal Remedy 
 
The action for injunction does not fit into the general classification of remedies. 
Injunctions differ significantly among the Member States and at the EU level. This is a reason 
why injunctions shall be classified as a sui generis legal remedy.
129
 Four reasons can be given 
for the here-promoted understanding. Firstly, they can be classified as in-between as they 
contain procedural and substantive law elements. Secondly, injunctions may impact both the 
individual and general, namely collective consumer interest. Thirdly, injunctions affect both 
individual and collective enforcement mechanisms. Fourthly, the legal effect of injunctions 
can be inter partes, erga omnes or extended to third parties. Such mixture provides evidence 
that injunctions are somehow outside the scope of the general rules on classification of civil 
law remedies. Injunctions simply do not stick to the rules of jurisprudence upon which legal 
notions are defined. Hence, the framework for injunctions as per the Directive requires new 
answers.  
Civil remedies are in place so as to either protect individuals or a general consumer 
interest. Injunctions are equipped to protect both providing a peculiar innovation in the field 
of consumer protection since they are recognized as enforceable remedies addressed to both 
individual and collective schemes. Any classification of injunctions in the abstract sense leads 
to a risky generalization of injunctions. Specific and characteristic features of injunctions may 
only be caught by a case-by-case analysis. The flexibility of injunction as a legal remedy may 
be considered both as a weakness and as a strength. The extent of the limits depends on the 
                                               
128 Report on the application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, BEUC position paper, Ref.: 
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particularities and nuances of injunctions, which are rooted in national laws, as the EU 
directive gives only the legal framework that shall be developed in the national scheme of 
enforcement.
130
 This leads to a certain level of uncertainty behind the injunction mechanism. 
An effective consumer policy would require a clearer indication of what the merit of an action 
for an injunction is, how the remedy operates and what real the final effect could be. In order 
to properly analyse injunctions, one would be forced to search for the “hints” and “stimuli” 
in interpretation and in legal practice. In case of the remedy of injunctions, only the practical 
experiences may demonstrate the real context and the real merit of an action for an injunction 
in the consumer law area. This kind of analysis provides evidence of the huge diversity of 
understanding of the content of an action for an injunction. Although Member States have 
chosen different implementation techniques
131
, the theoretical basis and the legal construction 
of the remedy remains always the same.
132
 This sounds like a contradiction but it is not. The 
overall idea which holds the remedy together is the “cease and desist” logic, but behind this 
broad concept a myriad of solutions show up if one digs into the transposition and the 
application of the injunction in the Member States. Member States are united in their 
diversity. The remedy of an action is a perfect example for this overall philosophy that ties the 
whole Union together. 
 
3. 1. 4. Binding Effect of Injunctions 
 
The sui generis nature of the remedy of injunction becomes clear in its legal effects. It 
breaches the principle of res judicata. An injunctive order does not only apply to the potential 
parties to a case, but also - quite exceptionally
133
 - may bind third parties, namely the parties 
not related to the case at hand. The binding effect of injunctions may also differ among 
sectors or subjects. Thus far res judicata is heavily discussed in the field of standard contracts, 
less so in commercial practices.
134
 The binding effect of injunction varies in each Member 
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State
135
 since it is grounded in the particularities of national procedural laws. Three forms 
have to be distinguished inter partes, erga omnes and third party effect. 
EU law does not provide for a clear indication, setting aside Invitel
136
 where the ECJ 
for the first time had to deal with the binding effects of an injunction in the field of unfair 
contract terms. As a rule, a judgment has effects only inter partes. Hungary and Poland have 
granted injunction orders erga omnes effects
137
, while in Italy inter partes effect dominates. 
Germany is to be located somewhere in the middle as a certain extension to third parties is 
possible, under restrictive conditions. 
 
(i) INTER PARTES 
 
As a general rule, injunctions orders issued by courts bind the parties to the case only. 
These depend on who has standing, public agencies, consumer organisations or business 
organisations on the side of the plaintiff and the defendant, normally a company, or a business 
or in the field of standard contract terms, also the business organization which recommends 
the use of a standardized model of contracts, usually bound to a particular sector. Inter partes 
effect is a general rule of adjudication in most of the Member States, as spelt out in the Report 
on Implementation of the Injunction Directive
138
 “(…) [injunction] it is mandatory only with 
respect to the case and the parties in question” [emphasised added MO].  
The Injunction Directive itself does not give any indications as to the binding effect of 
judgments given upon the scheme of the Injunction Directive. No hints can be found in the 
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices (UCPD) which has introduced the 
action of injunction in b2c advertising relations. Somewhat more specific is Directive 
93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. The above quoted Article 7 of the Directive 
must be read in combination with Article 6(1): “Member States shall lay down that unfair 
terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided 
for under national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to 
bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair 
terms”. 
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This implies that Article 6 sets standards for the action of injunction. This was the 
gateway for the ECJ in Invitel to lay down basic European standards for the potential binding 
effect of the injunction order on individual contracts. However, just like the Injunction 
Directive, the unfair terms Directive provides for minimum standards only. There remains 
much leeway for the Member States concerning how to implement the EU requirements into 
the national law and how to render it compatible with the existing national procedural laws. In 
Poland this leeway led to a lively discussion of Invitel
139
, in relation to the necessity of 
adjusting the existing regime of injunctions to guarantee consumer protection whilst at the 
same time complying with national market needs. 
 
(ii) ERGA OMNES  
 
Two of the Member States - namely Poland and Hungary - have granted erga omnes 
effect to injunctions in the field of unfair contract terms. The erga omnes approach states that 
the effect of the injunction is not limited to the parties involved in litigation since it is extends 
to all consumers, who in the future may be bound by the terms which have been declared non-
binding in the injunction procedure, and all other future entrepreneurs
140
, who while using the 
unfair terms, may be stopped automatically by the injunction order issued previously in a 
given case.
141
  
In Poland, erga omnes effect of a judgment comes into being once it is inserted into 
the Court National Register of Unfair Contract Terms.
142
 Therefore, those cases addressed to 
the specific field of Unfair Contract Terms breach res judicata. In practice the National Unfair 
Terms Register is ineffective, and the quality of registration of clauses rather doubtful. The 
clauses in the Register are defined ad casum. They de facto fit the case at hand. The excerpt 
of the case may, however, not have the same meaning for overall similar cases. The use of the 
judgment may be misleading and confusing in some cases, in others simply irrelevant. Erga 
omnes effect, so impressive in nature, is in practice a failure. To give an example: in the 
Register there are many clauses like “the indication of the jurisdiction of the Court in Poznan 
is not allowed in consumer relationships”. The erga omnes effect refers only to business 
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activities to in Poznan, and the clause does not bind third parties, for example, in the area of 
Gdańsk or Warsaw. This results in a sort of territorially limited erga omnes effect. This is 
certainly not the erga omnes effect in the meaning of the code of civil procedure. Secondly 
and equally important, the National Register of Unfair Clauses quite often contains only the 
excerpts of judgments, hence they are disclosed in the Register with no explanation. The 
unlawful term is taken out of the context of the judgment, thus it can easily be misinterpreted. 
In Poland Invitel triggered a long standing useful political discussion on how to make 
erga omnes effects more operational, which might lead to the abolition of erga omnes 
effective and its replacement by a more limited concept.  
 
(iii) THIRD PARTY 
 
Injunctions “affect” third party rights. In the simplest question is whether a consumer 
who is party to a contract that contains a contract term which has been subject to an action of 
injunction in which exactly that term – and to make it even more striking – with exactly the 
same user of the term - may be legally bound. Invitel
143
 deals with a collective action of the 
Hungarian National Consumer Protection Office against a telecommunications services 
provider which used a unilateral price amendment clause without a valid reason and without 
explicitly describing the method by which prices could vary. In her Opinion, the Advocate 
General argued: “These terms are therefore intended for use in a large number of consumer 
contracts. They can therefore be combated effectively only if the decision of the national court 
finding a particular term to be unfair is accorded fairly wide applicability” (para 51). And the 
ECJ decided: “These terms (…) are not binding on either the consumers who are parties to 
the actions for an injunction or on those who have concluded with that seller or supplier a 
contract to which the same GBC apply” (para 38). 
The Advocate General focused on the effect utile of the Directive, which requires an 
extension of res judicata. Without further discussion the ECJ limits the effects to “those who 
have concluded with that seller or supplier a contract”. The submission of the Hungarian 
court does not require a distinction to be drawn between the two forms of extension of res 
judicata as the relevant Hungarian law does not include third parties. The addressee of the 
extension of res judicata is a consumer in whose contract the same term can be found. It is the 
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term itself, which has been declared illegal, even though the contract is applied identically by 
another business. Are Member States now obliged to introduce a principle of erga omnes? 
One might therefore question whether further clarification is needed in order to decide on the 
mandatory character of the extension to third parties. Even if Member States are obliged to 
introduce an extension of res judicata, they have substantial leeway in shaping the extension. 
This goes together with the principle of procedural autonomy as stressed by the Advocate 
General (Opinion in Invitel, para 28). 
As far as the Polish example is considered, the EU scheme of third party effect is 
taken as an instance of how the future solution may look like. Since it is a procedural matter, 
the Member States benefit from a large measure of discretion. The Polish proposal opts for a 
solution under which a judicial injunctive order made in the context of the unfair contract 
terms legislation will be binding on all consumers who are recognized as parties to unlawful 
legal relations, and all those who may potentially be bound, provide the contract is concluded 
with the same entrepreneur.
144
 Therefore, the extension of judgments understands the 
consumers as a group that should be particularly protected; however, the extension will not 
cover other entrepreneurs who are using the same unlawful term. The judgment will be 
binding only against the party who had infringed consumer rights. Third parties such as 
entrepreneurs who infringe consumer rights, even if on the same legal basis as the case at 
hand and even if the contract term is identical, require a new judgment. This seems to be in 
line with what the Advocate General in Invitel proposed. However, it has to be recalled that 
the ECJ carefully avoided that distinction - meaning that it is unclear whether the Directive 
bans unlawful contract terms independent of the user, or whether the Directive bans only 
unlawful contract terms in which the user is always the same, and only the consumers as 
contract holders might differ. It remains to be seen what happens in Poland and maybe also in 
Hungary. At least the Polish proposal found support in the professional environment because 
the erga omnes effect has often been criticised as going too far. 
 
3. 2. The Hybrid Nature  
 
The hybrid - procedural and substantive - nature of the remedy of injunction has 
brought about a dualism of definitions. This partially substantial and partially procedural 
                                               
144 Micklitz (2010), Reforming European Unfair..., p. 352-354. 
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dimension is a characteristic feature of the Injunctions Directive. In this respect, the 
Injunction Directive is unique. 
The Injunctions Directive was the first and most pioneering directive in the field of 
consumer law with a directly expressed procedural dimension. However, the Injunction 
Directive is not limited to a purely procedural dimension because of the complex legal nature 
of the Annex to the Injunction Directive. The Annex to the Directive lists material-related 
consumer protection directives that are concerned with substantive law matters.  
Thus, the overall legal nature of the Injunction Directive cannot be characterized as 
either procedural or material-related giving rise to its hybrid nature. Again, the injunction 
stands at the junction of two different currents, which the Injunction Directive has bound in 
one legal act. The hybrid nature of the Injunction Directive may cause uncertainty because in 
fact the whole legal context of injunctions becomes ambiguous. Injunctions as per the 
Directive are applicable to those actions arising under the consumer protection directives 
enumerated in the Annex. Three of the directives listed in the Annex, Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair contract terms
145
, Directive 97/7/EC on distant selling
146
 (today Directive 
2011/83/EU)
147
 and Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices
148
 (replacing 
Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising
149
 in b2c relationships combine substance 
and procedure, substantive protection and the action of injunction. The procedural nature of 
the Injunctions Directive is expressed in a way that touches upon the issue the legal standing 
of the potential actors to an injunction action. 
(i) Art. 2(1)(c) delineates that the Member States can impose monetary damages in cases 
where violators fail to comply with the orders. 
(ii) Art. 4 of the Injunction Directive introduces mutual recognition of legal standing for 
consumer organisations in cross-border litigation within the EU. Thanks to the 
Injunction Directive, the Member States courts have to accept standing of non-national 
“entities” subject only to a screening of potential abuse (see Chapter IV).  
                                               
145 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (OJ L 95, 21.04.1993, p. 29-34). 
146 Previous version: Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts - Statement by the Council and the Parliament re Article 
6 (1) - Statement by the Commission re Article 3 (1), first indent, (OJ L 144, 04.06.1997, p. 19–27). 
147 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64–88). 
148 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (OJ L 149, 11.06.2005, p. 22–39). 
149 Previous version: Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising, (OJ L 
250, 19.09.1984, p. 17 – 20). 
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(iii) Art. 5(1) of the Injunction Directive lays down time limits concerning the procedure in 
that it gives a limited window for infringers to resolve the issue at stake before an 
injunction is to be issued. Article 5 last sentence and Recital (15) of the Injunction 
Directive permits concerned parties to bring an action for an injunction if the 
wrongdoer does not cease infringement within two weeks after being notified of the 
violation. 
The Injunctions Directive has been designed as a procedural piece of legislation, as a 
kind of code of procedure that has been dedicated specifically to the injunctive procedure. The 
overall structure appears as a code of civil procedure with all its particularities regarding its 
matter of regulation. It includes provisions concerning the scope of regulation and assigns 
roles to those entities qualified to bring an action for an injunction. It outlines an innovative 
definition of intra-community infringements to which the Directive applies, the existence of a 
prior consultation procedure, which by itself is identified as a procedural measure of specific 
nature, and an obligation to report the infringement alongside provisions on a wider action.  
However, there are two important elements of a purely procedural nature that have not 
specifically been provided for. The Injunction Directive remains silent on costs.
150
 The 
question concerning the cost-bearer of an action for an injunction is crucial for the success or 
failure of a remedy.
151
 Such a provision has been quite arbitrarily excluded from the scope of 
the Directive, and the matter was left to the discretion of the Member States. It is up to them 
to decide the issue of costs according to domestic legislation, for example whether the loser 
pays principle should apply. The second issue, on which the Directive is silent, is the decision 
on which law applies in transborder injunction litigation.
152
 The current uncertainty leads to 
an open-ended discussion on whether the substantive infringement at issue shall be judged on 
the basis of the law of the Member State where the infringement has its origin
153
 or based on 
                                               
150 The “loser-pays” principle is the predominant legal rule in vast majority of Member States. Austria, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, England, Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Spain and 
Sweden. Poland, Portugal, France, Italy and Spain require evidence. For a deeper analysis: 
Hodges/Vogenauer/Tulibacka (2009), Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, Oxford 
Legal Research, Paper No. 55; Hodges/Vogenauer/Tulibacka (2010), Costs and Funding of...; Reimann (2012), 
Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Comparative Study (Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on 
Law and Justice), p. 151-127. 
151 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers’ interest, Brussels, November 18, 2008, COM(2008) 756 final, p. 11, 15-16, para 
4.1. 
152 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC, p. 7; Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 
6.  
153 Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 11, 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (OJ L 199, 31.07.2007, p. 40-49).  
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the law of the Member State where the impact of the infringement is felt.
154
 The decision is 
thus fundamental in all instances where there is a choice between two different bodies of 
legislation offering different degrees of protection. The revised version of the Injunction 
Directive did not provide for any changes although there is ample evidence of the limited 
importance of the injunction order in cross-border litigation.  
 
3. 3. The Substantive Context  
 
The substantive law enshrined constitutes an integral part of the Injunction Directive. 
It includes a non-exhaustive list of substantive law directives on consumer protection, some of 
which contain specific procedures on injunctions. This kind of dualism is likely to add 
uncertainty as to the relationship between these two separate sets of rules. It is quite 
troublesome in terms of practical use of the Directive - let alone that the legislator does not 
make any effort to clarify the relationship between the Injunction Directive and, for instance, 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms. One may assume that the substantive law 
related provisions on enforcement in Directive 93/13/EEC were introduced on the basis of an 
urgent need to provide a normative background on which that particular directive could be 
based. It was the best solution for the EU legislator allowing it to compensate for the deficit of 
enforcement measures in the field of consumer law, especially considering the fact that the 
Injunction Directive came into existence only 5 years later (1998). 
Neither the recitals nor the legislative history provide a deeper understanding behind 
the choice of the substantive law directives and their legal classification within the scope of 
the Annex. Most of the Member States understand it as a mere minimum requirement and 
make injunctive actions applicable according to all laws and regulations that aim at the 
collective protection of the consumer. In such circumstances, it is left to the national courts to 
decide whether the purpose of national laws is to protect the collective interests of consumers 
or not.
155
 Here it might be difficult to figure out what kind of legal solution has been adopted 
                                               
154 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 12, 16.01.2001, p. 1-23).  
155 Hungary is referring to illegal activities causing substantial harm to a wide range of consumers or illegal 
activities affecting the wide range of consumers. Cyprus has not established any specific reference to “collective 
interests”. Portugal goes even further than the EU scheme, because the notion of collective interest covers 
„individual” and „diffuse” interests of consumers, similarly in Spain: Judgment of the Court of First Instance in 
Barcelona of 17 October 2003, Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios” (Ausbanc Consumo) v Caixa 
d’Estalvis de Catalunya, ECR I-4785. No coherence of enforcement mechanisms in this regard is to be 
recognized in the Member States.  
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in other Member States. Indeed, considering that there are 28 Member States, both parties to 
the contract would technically need to be aware of 28 different enforcement options. 
 
Graph Nr 4 - The relationship between the Injunction Directive and substantive law 
directives in the field of consumer protection. 
  
Graph Nr 4 illustrates the mutual dependence and interrelationships between different 
schemes of substantive and procedural measures bound by the scope of the Injunction 
Directive. Enforcement provisions, included in the substantive law directives have been de 
facto given a procedurally related nature. For this reason, an injunction can be classified as a 
substance-related remedy. Although they are delegated in completely different pieces of 
legislations, differently defined and they appear in a completely different context, substantive 
law injunctions are identical in content with the strictly procedural injunctions defined in the 
Injunction Directive.
156
 Moreover, this kind of dual-solution has brought a situation in which 
two sets of rules on injunction operate in parallel and are simultaneously in use. No legal 
indication is given as regards the relationship between them. Neither the Injunction Directive 
nor substantive law directives which are listed in the Annex to the Injunction Directive 
indicate which legislation prevails.  
Although the Annex to the Injunction Directive circumscribes in a rather precise way 
the scope sedes materie of the Injunctions Directive, the list of substantive law directives 
included in the Annex is not exhaustive. The Directive has only listed those directives 
concerned with the collective protection of economic consumers and does not refer to health 
and safety related Directives.
157
 Positively speaking the list of directives makes up a 
                                               
156 Micklitz (2005), The Politics of Judicial..., p. 229-230. 
157 See Chapter II 2.1., 4.5. 
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significant part of the European corpus iuris consumentis on the economical non-subjective 
spectrum of consumer protection of the Internal Market as a whole. 
The substance-related directives on consumer protection include a kind of descriptive 
definition of procedural mechanisms that can certainly be understood as an action for an 
injunction. However, substance-related directives do not specify the precise word 
“injunction”.158 The notion “injunction” does not appear in the substance-related regulations 
at all, even if consumer law directives include a remedy of injunction in so-called substance-
related form. These remedies are exactly the same if their context is taken into consideration. 
Therefore, to make a distinction and to compare injunction mechanisms included in both sets 
of regulations, it might be possible to draw a distinction between constellations where the 
Injunction Directive provides for the collective dimension and where the Directives in the 
Annex provides only for the substantive context, whereas on the edge we find those 
Directives in the Annex where the substance-procedure related context existed already before 
Directive 98/27/EC, but where the Injunction Directive inserted a particular procedural layer.  
As a rule, legal definitions should be formulated in the same manner where they 
regulate exactly the same legal issue.
159
 This rule, however, does not apply to the Injunction 
Directive; although it has to be recalled that the explicit purpose of Directive 2011/83 was to 
establish more consistency and coherence in consumer contract law.
160
 However, the situation 
is different in the Directive on Injunctions, exactly because of the combination between 
substance and procedure. It gives way to a kind of a hybrid of substantive and procedural law 
elements settled simultaneously upon the Injunction Directive. More than this, their parallel 
validity and applicability gives rise to confusion. The opinion of the Advocate General in 
Invitel
161
 can be understood as a serious attempt to streamline the meaning of an injunction 
within the scope of Directive 93/13/EC.
162
 In combination with the Injunction Directive the 
task would have even been greater. 
 
                                               
158 See Chapter I 3.1.1. 
159 Wronkowska/Zieliński (2012), Komentarz do Zasad Techniki Prawodawczej, p. 16, 188. With a reference to 
the Polish legal language see also: Malinowski (2006), Polski język prawny. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warszawa, p. 
156. 
160 Directive 2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights (OJ L 304 z 22.11.2011, p. 64-88). 
161 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 6 December 2011 to Case C-472/2010, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115981&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=176282>. 
162 Micklitz/Kas (2014), Overview of Cases Before the CJEU on European Consumer Contract Law (2008-
2013), Part I, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 10(1), p. 1-63. 
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4. National Design of Injunctions  
 
At first sight, it appears that there is nothing substantial to compare between Member 
States since Member States have in most of the cases recast action for an injunction into a 
domestic pattern. The prevailing dualism therefore exists at the national but also at the 
European level. Most of the definitions are based on a direct translation of the Injunction 
Directive. Therefore, definitions of an action for an injunction differ from one Member States 
to another including translation differences and potential linguistic mistakes, though they 
contain a common European “core”.  
Many different legal and non-legal factors have played a role in establishing this 
conceptual diversity within the European Union. The phenomenon shall be considered 
through different prisms, ranking from simple translation mistakes, to the leeway granted to 
Member States on the basis of the principle of procedural autonomy. This diversification of 
injunctive schemes is often influenced by the different normative frameworks of the Member 
States and their various legal cultures and histories.
163
 Other differences emanate from 
variations in legal cultures and legal traditions present in each of the Member States. In fact, 
the European enforcement map presents a patchwork of enforcement schemes of action for an 
injunction. This patchwork and diversity of injunctions is grounded in the variety of 
definitions and a diversity of the legal contexts of injunctions as well as diversity of 
implementation of the remedy of injunction into national frameworks of the Member States. 
This enforcement patchwork looks even more fragmented and complex if the enforcement 
mechanisms for injunctions are considered, since many different enforcement models are 
developed in various Member States.  
Until now, no clear theory has been advanced to explain the differentiation of wording 
that has occurred with regard to injunctions. Apparently, there is no sense to invoke the 
principle of procedural autonomy or de minimis nature of the Injunction Directive as the only 
explanation of the differentiation of injunctions which has arisen in Europe. No clear answer 
for the mishmash of wordings can be found either in the EU's documentation on collective 
redress, or in documents strictly referring to the Injunction Directive.  
There remains a difficulty in understanding the concept of injunctions by both lawyers 
and non-lawyers. Only lawyers and professionals tend to explain nuances and particularities 
of the injunction order; still - only a few of them - heard about the Injunction Directive and 
                                               
163 Van Dam (2009), Who is Afraid of Diversity..., p. 281-308. 
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only some of them recognize the injunction as a particular tool of consumer protection, 
mainly by indication of its collective dimension.
164
 In case of consumers, most might feel 
disappointed and disorientated, as the concept has no clear meaning. Addressees of the 
Injunction Directive have been left without any normative guidelines on how to deal with 
procedures and how to face the potential problems regarding injunctions in the field of 
consumer protection, and further, how to handle its complexity. 
 
5. From Diversity to Convergence  
 
Is there a way out of the diversity? A short summary might highlight this diversity: 
(i) There is no common understanding of what an injunction is, 
(ii) There are no common European procedural standards for collective enforcement, 
except the minimum standards, 
(iii) There is no common understanding of the collective interest, 
(iv) There are consumer matters, which demonstrate a collective dimension, for example 
unfair terms, whereas others do not for example the Directive on consumer sales
165
, 
(v) There are different collective enforcement mechanisms, via organisations with the 
help of the judiciary, and via administrative agencies, 
(vi) There is an unclear relationship between directives providing for individual remedies 
and those providing for individual and collective remedies, and those providing for 
collective remedies alone, 
(vii) There are 28 different national variations, 
(viii) There is the cross-border dimension, which adds a further three layers: jurisdiction, 
applicable law, and execution.  
In the following section I will propose a concept which is deeply, though not openly, 
enshrined into the European enforcement scheme. I have termed it the dualism of 
enforcement, the fusion of individual and collective enforcement.
166
 This modest concept, 
                                               
164 Authors personal communication to lawyers and legal counsels in Kraków, Gdańsk and Warsaw, Florence 
and Brussels which proved that around 80% of lawyers in Poland never practice injunctions, and only heard 
about it. The remedy of injunction is known to members of consumer organizations, in particular Federacja 
Konsumencka, Warsaw, and is more often a subject of academic discourse than practical use. The judges 
interviewed are familiar with a remedy of injunction, but they do not regard it as necessary procedural 
instrument of consumer protection. They prefer traditional civil law remedies. 
165 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ L 171, 07.07.1999, p. 12–16). 
166 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 9, stating that “(…) consumers whose rights have been 
infringed have to enforce their rights by bringing an action before ordinary Court, either individually or 
collectively, in those Member States where collective redress mechanisms exists”. 
75 
 
which is anchored in the Injunction Directive opens up new avenues for debate and for a 
stronger interaction between individual and collective enforcement schemes cutting across the 
boundaries of national and European consumer laws, of maximum and minimum 
harmonization. 
 
5. 1. The Thesis of Dualism of Enforcement Measures  
 
The concept of dualistic enforcement measures answers the question concerning the 
lack of clarity with regard to the relationship between enforcement provisions that have been 
included in the substantive and procedural laws on injunction. In the Injunction Directive, the 
dualism of enforcement measures arises as a kind of hidden aim of the Injunction Directive, 
which causes the Injunction Directive to be used as a tool for both individual and collective 
enforcement. This aim, however, has not been openly addressed in the Injunction Directive 
itself, but is signalled by what I call “the mark of reference”167 in the Annex to the Injunction 
Directive, which must be understood as the deeper layer of the scheme of individual and 
collective enforcement measures. Unfortunately, most of the Member States have 
concentrated on a literal interpretation of the Injunction Directive or any other directive 
related to the Injunction Directive via the Annex, without attempting to understand the deeper 
meaning of dualism enshrined in it.  
The Injunction Directive does not exclude individual enforcement schemes within its 
scope of application. Currently in Europe different enforcement modes exist and are used in 
parallel. The message behind the Injunction Directive has been over-simplified. This is why 
the real the aim of the Injunction Directive has not been discovered. Indeed, most of the 
Member States gave more attention to locus standi of consumer associations. In fact, this was 
not the only aim of the Injunction Directive, although the mutual recognition of standing is 
triggered by the adoption of the Directive.
168
 
Obviously, the mutual recognition of standing is an important issue, but it also paves 
the way for a new understanding of the bundle of the individual and collective enforcement 
methods, substantive and procedural matters, and last but not least of combining the 
                                               
167 By “a mark of reference” I mean footnote (1) to be found in the Annex to the Injunction Directive. This 
footnote refers to points 5, 6, 9 and 11 listed in the Annex to the Injunction Directive, which include specific 
provisions on injunctions. 
168 Micklitz (1993), Cross-Border Consumer Conflicts – A French-German Experience, JCP, Vol. 16(3), 411-
434. 
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individual rights of consumers with ADR schemes.
169
 The latter, in the entire scheme of 
substance related consumer directives, is only addressed to individuals.
170
 ADR
171
 and 
ODR
172
 do not deal with collective enforcement.
173
 The legal scheme of the Injunction 
Directive brings together consumer rights in a collective and individual manner. It draws links 
between individual rights and ADR and ODR schemes via the substance related directives in 
the Annex to the Directive which always refer to some form of ADR.  
The thesis of dualism of consumer protection enforcement looks at injunctions as a 
remedial mechanism from a holistic perspective. An injunction is not only a tool, which is 
meant to lead to an approximation of an injunction in the collective dimension, but also a tool, 
which is aimed at merging different elements of an individual and collective nature, a tool 
which advocates for a combination of substance and procedure, for individual and collective, 
public and private element. Therefore, injunctions in European law have two faces leading to 
an intersection of elements differing in nature, which have not been merged so far. There are 
arguments needed which underpin this thesis. I find evidence for this proposition in the 
particular meaning of the Annex of the Directive and in the history of the Directive, the socio-
political environment in which collective enforcement was discussed prior to the adoption of 
Directive 98/27 and in the discussion on collective redress
174
 after the Directive has been 
adopted. The starting point of the analysis is the search for an answer to the following 
questions: why has the EU legislator issued the Injunction Directive at all? Why does the 
regulation leave so many options open? How does it fit to the field of consumer law 
enforcement? To answer these questions one has to locate the Injunction Directive into the 
overall structure of EU policies. The catalyst for this investigation is the absence of any 
reasonable explanation of the legal remedy. Thanks to the “mark of reference” the dualism of 
the enforcement measure has turned into a basis for the literal interpretation of the 
                                               
169 C. Hodges refers to so-called “CADR” - Consumer ADR in order to describe the entire frame of alternative 
disputes resolution frames, in this regard: Hodges (2012), New Modes of Redress for Consumers: ADR and 
Regulation, Oxford Legal Studies Research Centre, Vol. 57, p. 1-14. 
170 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, (OJ L 
165, 18.06.2013, p. 63–79). 
171 Directive on consumer ADR 2013/11/EU (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 63–79). 
172 Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online 
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (also called ‘Regulation on consumer ODR’ (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 1–12). 
173 See Chapter I 5.3. 
174 Communication from the Commission and of the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013. Empowering consumers, enhancing 
their welfare, effectively protecting them [SEC (2007)321, 322, 323], 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/cons_policy/EN%2099.pdf> accessed on April 17, 2014. 
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enforcement in consumer protection legislation. The EU legislator has established an 
enforcement mechanism of consumer rights on two parallel levels. 
 
5. 2. The Role of the Mark of Reference in the Thesis of Dualism of Enforcement 
Measures 
 
The mark of reference is the tool to overcome the existing diversity. It is aimed not 
only technically to stress a distinction between injunctions in line with the body of the 
Directive and injunctions in line with the specific provisions covered by the substance related 
directives, listed in the Annex to the Injunction Directive. The mark of reference has a much 
higher legal value since it marks a shift from diversity to convergence. It changes the reading 
of the Injunction Directive and clarifies the ambiguities caused by the Directive.  
One may wonder why the mark of reference makes this distinction, and what is the 
reason for such a procedure. The answer to this enquiry cannot be found in the Injunction 
Directive or in the working documentation and reports on implementation of the Injunction 
Directive. The mark of reference should be treated as one of the key elements in interpreting 
the relationship between substantive law and procedure in the Injunction Directive. The EU 
legislator by linking the procedural rules in the Directive to the Annex construed a new 
relationship and a new understanding of the collective side as enshrined in the first series of 
articles and the substantive side, as enshrined in the Annex. They are not regarded as being 
separate but as being interlinked. Previously, the action for injunction existed only in a few 
substance related fields, such as unfair terms and unfair commercial practices. But now, we 
find a long list of directives where the prime addressee is the individual consumer, who in 
addition has standing in Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms in consumer 
contracts
175
, Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts
176
, Directive 2001/83/EC relating for medicinal products for human use
177
, Directive 
2005/29/EC concerning unfair-b2c practices.
178
 The integration of all these directives makes 
sense only if the decisive step forward is fully realized and the link between the collective and 
the individual is noted. This link has also been discovered in Recommendation 2013/396, 
                                               
175 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC (OJ L 95, 21.04.1993, p. 29).  
176 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ L 171, 7.07. 1999, p.12).  
177 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2011 n the Community 
code relating the medicinal products for human use: Article 86 to 100 (OJ L 311, 28.12.2001, p. 67). 
178 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (OJ L 149 z 11.06.2005, p. 22-39). 
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which is the first document from the Commission to affirm the parallel existence of various 
means of redress - either individual or collective.  
The mark of reference stresses the distinction between the substantive law and 
procedural law, between action for an injunction deriving from the substantive law and that 
deriving from the Injunction Directive itself. The Member States have adjusted or amended 
their national understanding of an action for an injunction without paying particular attention 
to the mark of reference, which has not been mentioned in any of the explanatory notes on 
implementation of the Injunction Directive either at the EU or national level.  
 
5. 3. Historical, Legal and Political Background for the Thesis Dualism of 
Enforcement Measures 
 
EU directives are always a response to a certain policy of the EU toward its plan or a 
strategy. Considering the working documentation prepared prior to the publication of the 
Injunction Directive, it seemed at first sight that the Injunction Directive was adopted in a 
speedy procedure
179
, somewhat ad hoc without an analysis of the need for the introduction of 
such a measure. However, the Injunction Directive in a manner similar to most of the 
directives on consumer protection had to undergo a rigorous consultation process. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that the dualism of enforcement measures might be a result of a neglected 
legislative technique, a legislative mistake or a kind of oversight on the side of the EU 
legislator. The dualist emphasis was perhaps this – discovered by chance, since there is no 
single word in the EU documents regarding any line of dualism. Was that a missing point of 
the Injunction Directive? An oversight of the legislator? Among the various EU activities, 
already the Commission has shed a light on thesis of dualism very latterly after the 
implementation of the Injunction Directive, while national legal models and the modes of 
implementation of the Injunction Directive paved the way for dualism creating an issue itself.  
It seems that the overall scheme of the remedy gave the background for the idea of 
enforcement in the field of consumer law. This kind of legislative technique must have been 
used in a certain sense; however, a more profound legal analysis of the issue shall be 
conducted. It can be excluded that the particular structure of the Injunction Directive was not 
introduced without conveying a message. However, it is difficult to “decode” the intention of 
                                               
179 An Injunction is often characterised as a remedial instrument for which timing matters. As Recommendation 
2013/96 states injunction procedure shall be defined “(…) where appropriate by way of summary proceedings 
(…)”, (Article 1(1)).  
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the EU legislator in this regard.
180
 No explanation for the mark of reference is given either in 
the legal documents or in the EU position papers. 
Let us assume that the existence of the dual purpose is the sheer result of a slow and 
“patch-work-character” of the legislative process on the part of the EU during the course of 
its work on the procedural aspects of consumer law. There was no experience with regard to 
the legislative technique that should have been employed in creating a complex and coherent 
framework of consumer protection legislation of a procedural nature. Certainly, the structure 
of the Injunction Directive and the fact that both the Directive and the substantive laws 
provide for actions for an injunction cannot be regarded as a pyramidal legislation according 
to which some pieces of legislation may be randomly duplicated. It would seem that the EU 
legislator supported the structure of the Injunction Directive and maintained the double set of 
actions for injunctions so as to realise EU policies and strategies that aim at a high level of 
consumer protection in the internal market. The Injunction Directive constitutes an important 
element of the more complex EU plan. 
The Injunction Directive was one of the elements of the EU’s policies and strategies 
that were meant to provide for important innovations and changes in consumer protection 
policy at both EU and national level. It represented the missing link in the overall structure of 
enforcement schemes, which previously did not provide for collective actions and did not 
include collective measures. In consideration of the growing interest in collective enforcement 
ideas imported from the US, the EU instigated a policy focusing on the development and 
improvement of collective redress measures within the European Union. The Injunction 
Directive, being a minimum harmonisation directive, like most of the consumer protection 
directives with the exception of the unfair commercial practices Directive
181
, does not prevent 
Member States from adopting, or maintaining, more favourable provisions to protect 
consumers. Member States have relied extensively on this minimum harmonisation measure, 
which to a certain extent also affected the diversity of injunctions within the EU. However, 
regardless of the level of harmonisation, the Injunction Directive has led to important 
innovation in the field of consumer protection, which is simply overlooked when constantly 
stressing its minimum character. 
The need for the development of collective redress measures was expressed, for the 
first time, by Ms. Maglena Kuneva, the then European Union Commissioner for Consumer 
                                               
180 No indications have been provided by the Report on Implementation of the Directive 98/27/EC COM(2006) 
744 final. 
181 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (O.J. L 149 z 11/06/2005, p. 22-39). 
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Protection, at a conference on collective redress held in Lisbon at the end of 2007. While 
stressing “how important it is to ensure that consumers can confidently enforce their rights 
across the European Union”182, the Commissioner acknowledged that “collective redress, 
both judicial and non-judicial, could be an effective means to address this problem”.183 
Although the Injunction Directive has confirmed moves to tackle this issue, its effectiveness 
leaves much to be desired. In her speech, the Commissioner took a very categorical and 
severe stand against class actions, but she did not express any opinion as regards actions for 
an injunction, which although classified as part of collective redress measures, has always 
been separated from other collective redress measures. The Commissioner did not explain the 
diversity of the action for injunction, but only stresses its diversity without giving any further 
explanation of this how the injunction varies among other civil law remedies. Although the 
Commissioner has criticised class actions as a model of collective enforcement that could be 
applicable in Europe, she did not mention at all the quite ambiguous nature of an action for an 
injunction among other collective tools of consumer protection. 
Further attempts to improve consumer enforcement schemes regarding collective 
redress measures are expressed in the EU Consumer Protection Strategy 2007-2013.
184
 
Although the Strategy lists many different priorities as regards consumer protection policy, it 
is often concerned with a high level of consumer protection and pressure to strengthen the 
enforcement of consumer protection rules. First of all, the EU considers it necessary for better 
monitoring of the national enforcement regimes through surveys, national reports and other 
monitoring tools. It has announced the creation of collective redress mechanisms for eventual 
breaches of the EU rules. Although the Commission seriously considers collective redress 
schemes in the Strategy, the action for an injunction does not appear throughout the text. The 
European Commission adopted in 2012 the European Consumer Agenda - the new consumer 
policy programme - with its strategic vision for EU consumer policy, for the years to come. 
The Consumer Agenda aims to maximise consumer participation and trust in the market and 
is very much in line with the previous one in that it puts ever more emphasis on enforcement. 
A chronical lack of attention to actions for an injunction may be understood as flowing 
from two issues: (i) the injunction is employed in Europe in a proper manner, so that there is 
                                               
182 Silvestri (2010), The Difficult Art of... , p. 101-112. 
183 Kuneva (2007), Healthy Markets Need Effective Redress, Speech - Saturday 10 November 2007, 
<www.ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kuneva/speeches/speech_10112007_en.pdf> accessed on April 22, 
2014. 
184 Communication from the Commission and of the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013. Empowering consumers, enhancing 
their welfare, effectively protecting them. 
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no need to make any comments on this at the European level, the nature of remedy is clear 
and understandable or rather that (ii) the Injunction Directive explores a scheme of collective 
enforcement that can be recognized as a pattern for overall collective enforcement schemes to 
be implemented in the European Member States. The break through, however, came with the 
adoption of Recommendation 2013/396 in 2013.
185
 Whilst not binding, it underpins and 
confirms the understanding of the Injunction Directive as a tool which could only be 
understood correctly if the parallelism of collective and individual enforcement is taken into 
consideration. For the first time, the EU undertakes concrete steps and took a view on 
collective redress mechanisms, with a particular focus on remedy of injunction which has 
finally been settled into the entire framework of European collective redress measures.
186
 
Without doubt as to the coverage of injunction by collective redress measures, a remedy of 
injunction has been covered by the scope of collective redress. This is a sign that injunctions 
shall be governed - as the rest of collective redress measures - by the common principles on 
collective action mechanisms indicated by the Recommendation 2013/396, and even going 
further a remedy of injunction gives a pattern for the entire framework of collective redress 
measures to be governed by common principles on enforcement.  
The Recommendation 2013/396 provides some basic principles on collective redress 
enforcement instruments to be taken into account by the Member States when implementing 
collective injunction and a mechanism of compensation in the framework of collective redress 
mechanisms. However, the Member States have no obligation to implement the instruments 
of a collective nature since is can only be obligatory if passed either through a directive or 
regulation. The EU legislator accepts a heterogeneous, patchwork-structure to the European 
enforcement map, or recognises some missing issues affecting enforcement gaps as far as 
collective redress concerned.
187
 In the remarks of the Recommendation 2013/396
188
 attention 
is given to the national legal traditions, following that requirement – also to legal cultures of 
the Member States. Finally, by the EU documentation and in the literature, the injunction 
mechanism was recognized as a one of the most important tools for collective redress.  
                                               
185 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress mechanisms in 
the Member States for injunctions against claims for damages caused by violation of EU rights, COM(2013) 
396/EU (OJ L 2013, L 201/60, p. 60-65; hereafter Recommendation 2013/396). 
186 A remedy of injunction is already mentioned in the title of the Recommendation 2013/396, and in Section III 
and Section IV.  
187 Stadler (2013), The Commission’s Recommendation on..., p. 483-488.  
188 Article 1(1) of the Recommendation 2013/396; European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on 
Toward a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress (2011/2089/(INI)).  
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Injunction as a remedy constitutes a definition of “collective redress”189, which is 
crucial for the entire Recommendation 2013/396. The injunction appears as a pattern for the 
collective framework of redress to be used as an example for the rest of the species of the 
collective redress mechanisms. It suffices to say, injunction exists, but it is quite risky to say 
that injunction is already developed in the national frames. First of all, the definition of 
collective redress refers to injunctive collective redress, as a matter of fact this collective 
dimension introduced by the Recommendation 2013/396 leads to the conclusion that 
previously established injunction were also given an individual dimension. In the preamble to 
the Recommendation 2013/396, the EU legislator also refers to the individual form of 
enforcement which exists side by side with collective models of enforcement, and in no stage 
of implementation of collective measures, individual redress enforcement mechanisms lose 
their legal force - since they are standing side by side.
190
 The choice of the enforcement path 
either individual or collective depends on the nature of claim, and of the case at hand - 
whether it is, or it is not, addressed to “mass harm situations”.191 If not, a choice of the 
individual frame is also possible. This appears clearly to be a proof of confirmation for the 
thesis of dualism of enforcement schemes. It has been stressed in para. 14 of the Preamble to 
the Recommendation 2013/396, which states that the EU legislator introduces the injunction 
and compensatory collective aspect, but “(…) It is without prejudice to the existing sectorial 
mechanisms of injunctive relief provided for by Union law”. Hence, the individual frames of 
injunction remedies introduced by the consumer protection directives are not excluded 
because of the introduction of the collective compensatory measures. That would mean that 
the individual and collective measures are kept side by side, and the two enforcement modes 
are used to realised different goals, so they do not interfere with. 
A remedy of injunction has finally been recognized, however, the Recommendation 
2013/396 does not provide for any specific and technical details of the remedy in comparison 
to the Injunction Directive, except some new matters regarding the costs, funding or the law 
applicable
192
, and issues which in particular would refer to collective redress schemes.
193
 The 
Recommendation 2013/396 helps to clarify the general understanding of the remedy of 
injunctions among other consumer remedies and re-define the scope of the remedy of 
                                               
189 Recommendation 2013/396 Section II, 1 (I) definition of “collective redress”. 
190 Recommendation 2013/396 – para. (8) and (9) of the Preamble.  
191 As defined in Recommendation 2013/396 Section II, 3(c). 
192 See Chapter III 5.4, 5.6. 
193 Recommendation 2013 focuses on the opt-in principle to be applicable in collective redress frames.  
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injunction and introduce specific principles relating to injunctive collective redress.
194
 A 
collective remedy of injunction is defined as a judicial or administrative order, aimed at 
cessation or prohibition of consumer rights granted by European Law. The definition stresses 
a requirement of procedural speed of the injunction procedure, and its future effect focuses on 
prevention of certain infringements. The second of the provisions addressed exclusively to the 
injunction order is focused on efficient enforcement of injunction orders – on this basis, the 
Member States are supposed to introduce a measures as previewed in Article 2(1)(b) and (c) 
of the Injunction Directive, which in the Recommendation 2013/396 are called “sanctions”, 
which in fact are aimed at ensuring effective compliance with the injunction order.  
Although the Recommendation 2013/396 does not provide for a significant innovation 
as to the new modes of enforcement, it definitely strengthens the meaning and the position of 
the remedy of injunction among other civil law enforcement frameworks.  
 
6. Individual and Collective Enforcement Side by Side  
 
There is no doubt that the substance related regulations/as listed in the Annex to the 
Injunction Directive are dominated by individual enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, before the 
Injunction Directive was issued, for a long time the question of whether “consumer 
organisations” should be granted legal standing at all was on the table for discussion and they 
were not allowed to take any kind of legal action on behalf of consumers.
195
 Although 
consumer organisations have still not been granted legal standing ex lege on the basis of the 
substantive law directives, they have been trying to establish confirmation of their legal 
standing in civil procedure. Their efforts were rewarded with the Injunction Directive in that 
they have finally been granted legal standing therein. This has been recognised as important in 
improving the position of consumer organisations in Europe. 
As a result of this, the Injunction Directive has simplified cases to which consumer 
associations are party in that it has done away with the need for extensive interpretation as to 
the legal standing of consumer organisations on the basis of the substantive law directives. 
Their standing has finally been confirmed according to rules as opposed to extensive 
                                               
194 Recommendation 2013/396 – Section IV, para. 19.  
195 Dickie (1996), Article 7 of the Unfair…, p. 112-117, Cases : Judgment of Spanish Supreme Court of 4 
November 2010, AUSBANC v Caja Provincial de Ahorros de Jaén, 663/2010, Rec. 982/2007; Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance in Barcelona of 17 October 2003, Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios” 
(Ausbanc Consumo) v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, ECR I-4785; Judgment of the Provincial Court of Balearic 
Islands of 17 March 2003, Asociación de Usuarios de Banca (Ausbanc) v Banca; March, 146/2003; Judgment of 
Court of Palermo of 2 June 1998, Adiconsum v. Soc. Aeroviaggi, 2077/1998. 
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interpretation and legal analysis conducted by the European Union Court of Justice. However, 
in granting the specific right to legal standing to consumer organisations the EU legislator 
may deprive individual consumers a right of action. In fact, this right has already been 
provided for in the substantive law directives. For this reason, the EU legislator has left both 
sets of rules intact leading to a parallel development of individual and collective enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The thesis of dualism is underpinned by a literal interpretation of the Injunction 
Directive and directives listed in its Annex. The fact that these two series of rules have been 
kept on an equal footing might be recognized as a sign that the EU has intentionally enforced 
the dualist nature of injunctive measures in consumer law. The thesis of dualism assumes that 
the EU legislator with the introduction of the Injunctions Directive decided to create a parallel 
enforcement model of consumer protection. A consumer may be protected on the basis of the 
substantive law through means of collective enforcement measures that derive from the 
Injunction Directive or by individual enforcement means that are included as specific 
provisions on enforcement in the substantive law directives on consumer protection. The 
choice of the enforcement model depends on the qualification of the interest that is to be 
protected and this element – a justified legal interest of consumer - affects the choice of one of 
the enforcement models. Therefore, the EU legislator aimed at strengthening consumer 
protection via a parallel model of enforcement that depends on the interest to be protected.  
It is arguable whether the substantive law directives on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts and unfair commercial practices should be recognised as supplementary measures 
with regard to the Injunctions Directive. This significant diversification of substantive law is 
caused by the fact that most of the directives are minimum harmonisation measures and are 
therefore implemented differently from one Member State to another. Therefore, different 
implementation of substantive law will influence the final shape of the national legislation. 
This is inclusive of procedural schemes and even more so since the Member States have been 
left a certain leeway in this regards so they may design procedural rules according to the 
needs of legal practice and national particularities. This may be regulated in the substantive 
law, as in case of an individual consumer who is granted standing in the Directives enlisted in 
the Annex to the Injunctions Directive (as far as subject related directives are concerned legal 
standing is granted to “organisations” only in exceptional circumstances), or may be put in 
the framework of the procedural regulations like the Injunctions Directive, which is only 
concerned with collective enforcement. The EU has offered the consumer a double-track 
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enforcement mechanism aiming at the protection of the consumer interests, be they individual 
or collective.  
Such dualism of enforcement of consumer rights is justified in the consumer 
protection policy of the EU that is aimed at strengthening the position of consumers to render 
them active and confident internal market players. The enforcement path should be chosen to 
protect the justified legal interest of consumers either individual or collective. The fact that 
the Injunction Directive, is more of a procedural nature should not be understood in the sense 
that the EU legislator wanted to add procedural provisions, intended to resolve the problem of 
mutual recognition of legal standing with the Community alone, to the framework of 
consumer protection regulations. Although the Injunctions Directive helped to improve some 
procedural aspects of consumer protection regulation, this was not the only reason for which 
the Injunction Directive has been added to other items of consumer protection legislation.  
Individual judicial enforcement has always played a strong role as the ECJ 
instrumentalised private individuals to foster the European integration process by granting 
individuals rights and even particular remedies.
196
 The same has never been true with regard 
to collective private enforcement. However, from the same substantive law basis two different 
enforcement models can be depicted as the substantive law on consumer protection may serve 
as a basis for the legal framework for the collective enforcement of consumer rights. This is 
the decisive step forward in the Injunction Directive. Both collective and individual interests 
must be protected in parallel and their legal protection may also be exercised in parallel.  
Most of the Member States allow for the legal interpretation of substantive law 
regulations in the field of consumer protection in a manner that has led me to confirm this 
thesis in relation to legal practice. Although regulations do not introduce restrictions as 
regards the competition between both sets of rules, in some of the Member States, for 
example Poland, the fact that a consumer can join a collective suit, automatically closes the 
consumer’s path to an individual claim. Nevertheless, if a consumer does not join a collective 
suit, the consumer has a right to act on the basis of the rules of the individual enforcement. 
We have a situation by which the same substantive law may be enforced in two different 
ways. The criterion of demarcation for my classification is the particular interest to be 
protected. Whose interest deserves for the protection? Whose interest has been infringed? Is it 
an interest of an individual consumer? Or is it an interest of a group of consumers whose 
interest has been collectively infringed? The choice of the enforcement path depends on a 
                                               
196 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial... 
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certain interest that deserves protection. This is an element that will certainly influence the 
choice of enforcement path. 
Therefore, it might be argued that an action for an injunction is a kind of new remedy 
in the field of consumer protection law. As a remedy, it is not completely new although it has 
always been recognised as a specific and extraordinary legal remedy. Its extraordinary nature 
derives from the fact that it is a remedy of a hybrid nature, a combination of different 
remedial solutions deriving from both the EU and Member States levels. Through the 
suggested parallel protection, the EU legislator has managed to avoid a disharmony 
concerning the substantive law regulations that to a significant extent create the shape of 
national legal orders while simultaneously securing the same level of consumer protection in 
both collective and individual instances.  
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Chapter II Procedural and Substantive Dimensions of Injunctions 
 
1. Overview 
  
The Injunction Directive combines for the first time two different schemes of 
enforcement: individual and collective. Until the Injunction Directive came into force, in 
consumer law matters individual enforcement has been presented versus, but never in 
conjunction with, collective enforcement. The Injunction Directive considers them both at the 
same level, and interlinked. Moreover, it builds links between individual and collective 
enforcement, in particular the Injunction Directive covers the relationship between substantive 
law and procedure. These two spheres of law have been interlinked in a very particular 
manner, which has not been exampled so far in other consumer protection directives. Indeed, 
the Injunction Directive is the first of consumer law directives, which presents the atypical 
phenomenon of a joint approach to substantive and procedural law. The key to the 
understanding is the Annex. 
The substantive law directives listed in the Annex have been bound to the procedurally 
related scheme of the body of the Injunction Directive which are tightened by a mark of 
reference.
197
 In light of the therein proposed concept of dualism of enforcement measures
198
, 
the Annex brings together substantive law and procedure, individual and collective 
enforcement.
199
 The ambiguous relationship between substance and procedural cannot be 
explained other than through the prism of possible links between these two spheres of laws.  
Therefore - and this is the aim of Chapter II - in a search for an explanation of this 
ambiguous relationship, I will look into theoretical and, where possible, practical aspects of 
the relationship between the substantive law and procedural law. The purpose is to analyse the 
interrelationship more deeply, starting from the dominant and traditional understanding of a 
clear-cut separation between substantive and procedure law, which however, does not fully 
cover the way in which the Injunction Directive has been conceived. More sophisticated and 
more practical models are needed
200
 to cover the particularities of the new regulatory device. 
                                               
197 See Chapter I 5.2., II 2. 
198 See Chapter I 5.1. 
199 Thus far, no one pays attention to the rule of the Annex and the mark of reference. Cafaggi has reached the 
following conclusion that “(…) both substantive and procedural rules (…) give claimants the choice between the 
two models of enforcement of the possibility of using them both, simultaneously or sequentially”. Cafaggi 
(2009), The Great Transposition…, p. 510.  
200 There only a few cases on the Injunction Directive, <http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/casedetails1_en.cfm> 
accessed on May 10, 2014. 
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My overall hypothesis is one of complementarity between procedural and substantive law.
201
 I 
will spell out the concept of complementarity after having discussed various doctrinal and 
theoretical concepts on the relationship between general and special laws which all turn out to 
be insufficient.  
  
2. A Mixture of Spheres of Material and Procedural Law 
 
Although the Injunction Directive touches upon both procedural and substantive law 
issues, the extent to which these two spheres interpenetrate each other remains unexplained in 
the EU documentation and papers, in the implementation of the Injunction Directive, as well 
as in the Injunction Directive.
202
 This indeed may be a source of “legal irritation”203, because 
the mere fact of merging two separate areas of law in one single piece of EU regulation 
remains unexplained, legally unjustified and certainly under-theorised. The bold mix of 
procedural and substantive rules may be the consequence of the way in which European 
integration in the field of procedural law is going to happen, ad hoc in reaction to a concrete 
problem. Take distant shopping - a test case promoted and even financed by the European 
Union attempt to reveal the deficiencies of cross-border enforcement
204
 - unsystematic in that 
the EU has no competence to harmonise or legislate on procedural matters
205
, hidden in that 
the EU is not disclosing the full dimensions behind the Injunction Directive and experimental 
in that the EU is just trying out new avenues which are legally opened-ended and where only 
the ECJ can provide shape to an unfinished and incomplete legislative approach.
206
 
Considering the different nature of both strands of the Directive: (i) the body, which is 
a procedurally related piece of legislation, and (ii) the Annex, which because of its content is 
related to substantive law, the Injunction Directives in its entire shape is not free from 
ambiguities, and incoherencies. Although it is difficult to assess the extent of the relationship 
                                               
201 The argument was been tackled by Caffagi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial…, p. 20-21.  
202 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC.  
203 Teubner (1998), Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends in New Divergences, 
The Modern Law Review, Vol. 61(1), p. 11-32. The notion of “legal irritations” was coined by Gunther 
Teubner. The transfer of a legal concept from one system to another will have unpredictable effects and will 
cause legal ambiguities.  
204 See in more detail Chapter III 5.6. 
205 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection: General Comparison EU-USA. 
Enforcement of Consumer Rights and Legal Redress for Consumers in the EU: An Institutional Model, in 
Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 65-69; Craig (2008), The Institutional Balance Between EU 
Competence and Member State Autonomy, Discussion Paper for Workshop The European Court of Justice and 
the Autonomy of the Member States, Ws RSCAS/LAW/2008-2009, p. 1-35. 
206 Tridimas (2005), The General Principles…, p. 18-20, Tridimas (1996), The European Court of…, p. 199, De 
Waele/Van der Vleuten (2013), Judicial Activism in…, p. 639-666. 
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perhaps better described as the mutual interpenetration, there can be no doubt that the 
Directive differs from other consumer protection directives
207
, and inter alia is a unique one 
in terms of the structure and of the content. Concerning its double nature - binding in 
substantive and procedural law matters - the Directive for Injunction shall be classified 
according its substantive and procedural-related framework.
208
 This means that the Injunction 
Directive remains outside the scope of already existing classifications of remedies. The 
overall concept of a clear-cut distinction of rules of laws, although still existing in the civil 
law area
209
, appears outdated.  
Article 1 of the Injunction Directive describes the scope of application of the Directive 
bringing a legal reference to the Annex of the Injunction Directive; therefore linking the scope 
of the Injunction Directive with the substantive law directives which determine the scope of 
its application, since the Annex to the Injunction Directive covers the substantive law 
directives to a large extent.
210
 
Therefore, already in its Article 1 of the Injunction Directives, the substantive and 
procedural law matters are bound to a single scheme of a single piece of legislation.
211
 
Although the Annex to the Injunction Directive slightly differs from the general structure of 
the Injunction Directive, the Annex constitutes an integral part of the Injunction Directive. 
This is an extraordinary regulatory technique: the Annex enshrines the substance of consumer 
law but it constitutes part of a procedurally-related piece of legislation. The Annex 
enumerates a list of substantive related consumer protection directives, which have been 
selected according to the nature of the interests to be protected. The choice of and the 
limitation to consumer economic interests, however, follows only implicitly from the text of 
the enlisted Directives.
212
 The Commission has remained silent on this matter because none of 
the Reports of the Commission on application of the Injunction Directive
213
 considered the 
legal nature of the substantive law directives, neither in its collective content nor the nature of 
the interest protected within their frame. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that all those 
substantive law directives, which are listed in the Annex aim at the protection of the economic 
                                               
207 See Chapter I 3.2. 
208 Sinaniotis (2005), The Interim Protection of Individuals Before the European and National Courts, p. 52. 
209 Micklitz (2005), The politics of Judicial…, p. 298 as quoted “Usually, the two limbs of civil law substantive 
law and procedural law are kept separate”. 
210 Schwartz (2000), Loose Teeth in European Consumer Protection Policy: The Injunction Directive and the 
Mass Default Scenario, Georgia International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 28(1), p. 527-554. 
211 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European Consumer Law, 2nd edition, p. 355.  
212 Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the European Economic Community for 
a consumer protection and information policy (OJ C 92, 25.4.1975, p. 1).  
213 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC; Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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interest of consumers since they all refer only to the protection of the consumer’s economic 
interest. It is consistent with a legal basis for the Injunction Directive, which hardly focuses 
on protection of the economic interests in terms of “a high level of consumer protection” (see 
Article 114 TFEU)
214
, and which is the most important legal value at stake.
215
 The protection 
of health and safety and the protection of economic interests for consumers are not put at an 
equal footing.
216
  
The result is a quite uncommon combination since the criterion of consumer protection 
in the Injunction Directive was shifted, downgraded, reduced and lately replaced by the 
criterion of the protection of economic interests. It has to be recalled that both objectives form 
the core of European policy and both range equally high. There is little hope in leaving space 
for Member States to fill the gap and to add health and safety issues to the list. Health and 
safety is a subject of EU legislation for decades, from a consumer perspective mainly 
enshrined in Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability
217
 and Directive 2001/95/EC on 
general product safety.
218
 There was discussion during the legislative process and the public 
official of the European Commission, Dieter Hofmann
219
, who represented the Commission in 
the negotiations with the Parliament and the Council, strongly advocated for the integration of 
these Directives into the Annex (at that time consumer safety was covered by Directive 
92/59/EC - later replaced by Directive 2001/94/EC). Hofmann’s proposal would have 
considerably enlarged the scope of the action for injunction but also created new areas of 
conflict between public enforcement of product safety and private enforcement.
220
 
The substance related directives in the Annex have been selected according to the 
criterion of protection of consumer economic interest, with the focus on consumer contract 
                                               
214 As to the role and function of Article 114 TFEU see Chapter IV.  
215 On the fundamental right dimension, Benöhr (2013), EU Consumer Law and Human Rights, Oxford Studies 
in European Law. 
216 See Chapter II 2., II 4.5.  
217 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, (OJ L 210, 
07/08/1985, p. 29–33). 
218 Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety (OJ L 11, 15/01/2002, p. 4-17). 
219 By the time Head of Unit of DG Sanco, on the basis of the personal communication to the author. 
220 The issue of private enforcement in the Area of Consumer Product Safety was taken into consideration by the 
Commission already in a new consumer policy strategy for 2007-2013 aimed at, inter alia, at boosting „in terms 
of practice, quality and product safety”. In the Consumer Policy Strategy for 2007-2013, the Commission 
planned, inter alia, the introduction of ‘collective redress mechanism’ for consumers. The Commission 
considered that private enforcement of product safety standards is necessary and appropriate complementary to 
the public enforcement regime. For more information to the pros and cons of private enforcement in the area of 
consumer product safety see: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
BDI Law and public procurement, Private Enforcement in the European Union – Pitfalls and Opportunities. An 
analysis of existing mechanisms and instruments in the area of antitrust law, environmental law, consumer 
product safety and capital market law, Section C – Private Enforcement in the Area of Consumer Product 
Safety, accessed on May 13, 2014, p. 35-49. 
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law matters, as well as those where the injunction procedure existed already - unfair 
commercial practices and unfair contract terms.
221
 Formerly, the substantive law consumer 
protection directives have protected individual economic interests, but thanks to the Annex to 
the injunction Directive, which ties substantive and procedural law matters together, they 
cover both individual and collective enforcement elements. Since the Injunction Directive 
itself was not designed as a contract law measure in terms of the substantive law consumer 
protection directives, but rather as a procedural piece of legislation, what is at stake is of a 
different nature than all the rest of the consumer protection directives. It covers technical 
elements of the procedure for an action of injunction, such as the explicitly given legal 
standing of consumer organizations in the collective scheme of injunctions.
222
 One might, 
therefore, wonder whether the Injunction Directive, which is full of technical and procedural 
details should not have been adopted in the form of the EC regulation. Even more so, as the 
Directive does not provide for a holistic view on the overall injunction procedure, but limits 
itself to some basic elements of the procedure. Whilst this might have been an unusual step in 
the mid-nineties, the transformation of the Brussels
223
 and Rome Conventions
224
 into 
Regulations
225
 opened up a new understanding of the regulatory technique. In theory the – 
consolidation Directive in 2009/22 – would have provided an opportunity. However, such an 
opportunity remained a hypothetical possibility, as the European Commission did not 
introduce such a proposal.
226
 The reason might very well have been that the Member States 
could have raised the argument that the scope of application should be limited to trans-border 
issues and that Article 81 instead of Article 114 would be the appropriate competence rule in 
the Treaty.
227
 
The specific procedural nature of the Injunction Directive has been expressed by 
putting the mark of reference at the very end of the Injunction Directive - in the Annex. The 
mark of reference serves as a bridge between the substantive law related body to the 
Injunction Directive and the strictly procedural part based upon the Injunction Directive. 
                                               
221 Schulte-Nölke/Twigg-Flesner/Ebers (2007), EC Consumer Law…, p. 5-9. 
222 For more details as of the procedural aspects of the Injunction Directive. 
223 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1968 
(OJ C 27, 26.1.1998, p. 1-27). 
224 Rome I (OJ L 266, 09.10.1980, p. 1-19). 
225 Accordingly: Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 12, 16.01.2001, p. 1-23) and Rome I (OJ L 
266, 09.10.1980, p. 1-19). 
226 Nevertheless, a supplementary act to the Injunction Directive in the form of the Regulation 2006/2004 has 
changed the Commission view as of the form in which procedurally related piece of legislation could have been 
issued.  
227 See Chapter IV 4.1.  
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There are various legal theories based on the assumption that
228
 a legal mark of reference 
included in a piece of legislation shall be understood as a linkage between two sets of rules of 
different legal nature.
229
 The mark of reference binds them together.  
 Nevertheless, the legal nature of the Annex to the Injunction Directive gives rise to 
questions concerning the close relation of the Annex to the substantive law directives. The 
legal nature of the Annex which introduces a substantive law dimension is - in theory- 
incompatible with the procedural dimension of the entire frame of the Injunction Directive. 
230
 
The two frames of substantive and procedural law matters simply vary to the extent that – at 
least in theory - they should not be bound together. It is not clear, why the EU legislator has 
shifted from using a previously developed legislative technique aimed at maintaining a clear-
cut distinction between substantive law and procedure in the field of consumer protection to 
opting for a joint approach. A substantive and procedural conjunction was the only solution 
for combining the two spheres of law, which in fact tie individual and collective enforcement 
schemes. The specific legislative structure of the Injunction Directive has provided evidence 
for a thesis of dualism of enforcement measures in the area of consumer law.  
Concerning the specific technical structure and untypical content of the Injunction 
Directive, the Directive itself is a complete novelty and can definitely be recognized as a sui 
generis remedy in the area of consumer protection. It is a piece of legislation which binds 
various schemes of laws, and matters upon a single scheme of consumer protection 
legislation, it shifts the focus from diversity of enforcement models to their convergence. It 
was possible thanks to the dualism of enforcement inbuilt within the scheme combining 
substantive and procedural law matters, which allows consumers to benefit from either 
individual or collective enforcement.  
 
2. 1. Practical Implications of the Mixture for National Legal Orders 
  
The Injunction Directive is a piece of legislation that was supposed to respond to the 
needs of legal practice as well as filling existing enforcement gaps in the scheme of the 
enforcement of consumer law. The combination of substantive and procedural law matters 
                                               
228 Morawski (2002), Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Toruń, p. 123-127. The Author discussed a rule of general mark 
of reference in civil codes regulations. 
229 Tobor/Nowacki (2003), Prawoznawstwo, Kraków, p. 234-235. 
230 The substance-related nature of the substantive law directive is expressed in their titles, Council Directive 
90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours (OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 
59), Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use: Articles 86 to 100 (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 67), 
and others.  
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within the single scheme of the Injunction Directive was recognized as a way to fill the 
enforcement gaps in the national legal systems of the Member States, also via the 
development of the dualism of consumer law enforcement. Since the Injunction Directive was 
sketched as a flexible and a kind of “one suit fits all” enforcement instrument, it can be, 
depending on the situation, used either in individual or collective form. 
The ”two-layer legal nature” combining the individual and collective schemes of 
enforcement cannot be put into question by the Member States. In the process of 
implementation of the Injunction Directive, Member States amended both procedural and 
substantive laws schemes and they have introduced enforcement frameworks of a collective 
dimension
231
 without giving much attention to a potential conjunction of individual and 
collective enforcement. It seems that the legal consequences of the mark of reference were 
underestimated. Member States implemented the Injunction Directive as a collective 
enforcement tool, stressing that the collective element emerged as crucial in a vast majority of 
the Member States. No attention was given to the individual frame of enforcement, which has 
already existed in the Member States. Furthermore, neither the Injunction Directive nor the 
working documents of the European Commission considered the interrelationship existing 
between individual and collective enforcement. The dualism of enforcement, and the possible 
links between individual and collective enforcement has become evident in Recommendation 
2013/396
232
, which for the first time pays more attention to individual enforcement
233
 in terms 
of the entire frame of collective remedies to be available in the field of consumer 
protection.
234
 
 
2. 2. The Rule of Mark of Reference in the Mixture of Spheres 
  
The mark of the reference serves as a tool to “rescue” individual enforcement and to 
put it side-by-side with the collective scheme introduced by the Injunction Directive. The 
implementation of EU laws has required a revision and amendments to both substantive law 
and procedural-related law in most Member States.
235
 Although all of the Member States have 
                                               
231 See Chapter I 1.6.2. 
232 Recommendation 2013/396 (OJ L 201, p. 60-65). 
233 Recital 9 and 14 of the Recommendation 2013/396 in particular directly refers to individual enforcement 
measures which shall be accessible for consumers at equal footing. Their choice however may be determined by 
the nature of the legal interest to be protected, and the incentives related to that. 
234 Recommendation 2013/396 (OJ L 201, p. 60-65). 
235 Docekal/Kolba/Micklitz/Rott (2005), The Implementation of the Directive 98/27/EC in the Member States. 
Study of the Institute for European Business and Consumer Law in Cooperation with the Consumer Protection 
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met the general requirements of implementation provided for by de minimis nature of the 
Injunction Directive, the techniques of implementation vary since they are based on the 
national prerequisites dedicated to the particularities of each of the Member State. This is why 
the process of implementation of the injunction procedure in the Member States has increased 
diversity within the European Union, at least in the short term.
236
 
Some Member States had already enacted special consumer protection laws and they 
have chosen a combination of the substantive and procedural law provisions in the single act 
of the Injunction Directive. Other Member States have implemented the Directive within the 
general legislative framework either a code of consumer law
237
 or as purely separate 
procedural pieces of legislation.
238
 There is no evidence to suggest that this diversity will 
become more coherent any time soon. Suffice it to say, the current scene represents a 
patchwork of many different legal solutions deriving from, among other things, variations in 
legal implementation.
239
 This diversity is, however, driving towards convergence, for the 
simple reason that the scheme of the Injunction Directive allows for a parallel, non-
adversarial existence of substantive and procedural law, of public and private enforcement, 
and finally of individual and collective enforcement measures to be read together.  
The introduction of the Injunction Directive into national legal orders led to increased 
attention on the procedural aspects of consumer matters. Until the Injunction Directive came 
into force/was enacted, collective enforcement was not afforded much importance - at least at 
the EU level - setting aside the two exceptions of the Directive on unfair contract terms 
(93/13/EEC)
240
 and on unfair commercial practices (2005/29/EC).
241
 The Commission 
focused its policy on the production of substantive consumer law directives leaving the 
enforcement to the Member States and relying in line with the original design of the Treaty on 
the existence and the effectiveness of national enforcement schemes. The added value of 
strong substantive law provisions is downgraded without proper enforcement rules ”(…) 
although a sound consumer protection system requires well-conceived and strong 
                                                                                                                                                   
Association Commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Social Security, Generations and Consumer 
Protection. Summary of the Results. Bamberg/Vienna. 
236 As to minimum harmonization,  see Chapter IV 4.4. 
237 For example: Italy and France. 
238 For example Germany and Austria. 
239 Van Dam (2009), Who is Afraid of…, p. 281–308. 
240 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC (OJ L 95, 21.04.1993, p. 29–34). 
241 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (OJ L 149, 11.06.2005, p. 22–39). 
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(substantive) consumer rights, it should be noted that even ‘best’ substantive rights cannot 
benefit the consumer if their enforcement is not reasonable or possible”.242 
The Injunction Directive has not brought a standardisation of implementation since it 
differs from other pieces of legislation on consumer matters in various aspects. By its 
diversity, the Injunction Directive has inspired Member States to consider a new structure of 
EU consumer protection law as well as new modes of enforcement and implementation. The 
new structure of the Injunction Directive aimed at increasing effectiveness of the consumer 
law enforcement tools.
243
  
The goal of the Injunction Directive was to provide for important changes in relation 
to the enforcement procedures applicable in the substantive law directives on consumer 
protection, and to introduce a scheme for parallel use for the individual and collective 
enforcement frames. In fact the injunction procedure was supposed to introduce a swift 
procedure
244
 and to increase the effectiveness of consumer protection remedies.
245
 Essentially, 
this premise constitutes the response of the EU legislator to the need for a timely and effective 
enforcement procedure capable of protecting consumers in both national and cross-border 
relations.
246
 The intention was to accelerate a process of revival of the substantive law 
directives that lacked procedural underpinnings. However, without the procedural measures 
the substantive law matters have no particular legal value, because substantive law, in order to 
be used, requires a tool in the form of procedural legislation.  
  
3. Structuring the Relationship of Material and Procedural Mixture 
 
The combination of procedural and substantive law aspects in the Injunctions 
Directive has opened up many legal questions. The fact that the Directive does not fit neatly 
into the substantive or procedural classification gives rise to questions that have until now 
remained unanswered. On which side of the classification is the injunction? Shall it be 
                                               
242 Wrbka (2012) European Consumer Protection Law: Quo Vadis? – thoughts on the compensatory collective 
redress debate in Wrbka/Van Uytsel/Siems (2012), Collective Actions? Enhancing Access to Justice and 
Reconciling Multilayer Interests? Cambridge, p. 32. 
243 The Commission on various occasions pointed out the problem of the lack of the sufficient and effective 
consumer law enforcement, Viviane Reding - Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Commissioner 
for Justice, dates on March 19, 2013, “Towards a more coherent enforcement of EU consumer rules”, 
SPEECH/13/237.  
244 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An Analysis and Evaluation…, p. 329. 
245 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 final, Brussels, 27 November 2008. 
246 Hodges (2007) Europeanization of Civil Justice: Trends and issues, Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 26(1), p. 98-
123. 
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classified both in terms of substance and as of procedure; does it fall outside these 
classifications?  
The distinction between substantive law and procedural law fits to an archaic and a 
very classical and academic interpretation of law. In fact this distinction has lost its former 
relevance in legal practice and remained only a matter of academic discourse.
247
 This came to 
light in conducting a number of interviews with judges at various occasions. Judges tend to 
avoid complicated academic discourses in the course of adjudication of consumer law 
cases.
248
 This is all the more true considering the complex mixture of substantive and 
procedural law that the Injunction directive brings about not to forget the interplay between 
national and the European law. In the common opinion of judges
249
, purely dogmatic 
constructions and somehow schematic classifications of rules - if applicable to the legal 
practice at all - may produce false outcomes
250
 in the practical reading of EU law. Although 
traditional classifications may assist judges in understanding the general theoretical structure 
of civil law, the classic clear-cut distinction between substantive law, which operates in sharp 
separation from procedural law, should not be used before and in the courts. In legal practice - 
substantive and procedural law are inseparably linked. They constitute a kind of connected 
vessel that cannot exist separately. All the clear-cut distinction schemes regarding these legal 
classifications are irrelevant and completely outdated. 
 
3. 1. Separation of Substance and Procedure or Conjunction and Interrelation 
 
From a theoretical point of view, injunctions within the scope of the Directive lie 
somewhere between the two spheres of law. Although these spheres need to be interpreted 
jointly, they rather fall under two completely different legal classifications.
251
 These two 
spheres significantly differ concerning the factors of their differentiation, qualification of 
                                               
247 Smits (2002), The Making of European Private Law. Towards a Ius Commune Europaeum as a Mixed Legal 
System, Antwerp, p. 145. The author discusses the long awaited processes of formulation of the fundamentals for 
substantive law and procedure, and examines Roman law sources.  
248 On the basis of the empirical research - according to the results of interviews conducted with judges, Mgr 
Robert Fonfara, a judge at District Court in Kielce, Poland (interviewed on the 14th of January, 2011) states as 
follows: “At the stage of application of law and adjudication, there is no time and no space for a investigation 
whether a certain norm has a material or rather procedural legal nature, the rule has to be applicable no matter 
how it is classified due to meet requirements and the needs of a specific case at hand”.  
249 The conclusion is made on the basis of the interviews with judges from Warsaw and Kielce at various 
occasions. 
250 An interview on the 20 of December 2008 in Trier with Mgr Łukasz Piebiak judge at the Court of 
Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw and participation in discussion of the judges in Academy of 
European Law in Trier, Germany. 
251 Smits (2002), The Making of European…, p. 156. 
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rules and general legislative frameworks because they perform quite different legal functions 
and they perform different legal goals. No matter how the distinction between substance and 
procedure is made these two spheres are closely interlinked. Although it is quite difficult to 
assess precisely the nature of this relationship identified in the Injunction Directive, the 
relationship linking them may be recognized as complementarity.
252
 
The explanation is quite simple since substantive law cannot exist without civil 
procedure, and vice versa. Seen through the prism of practical experiences, procedural rules 
hang in the air if they do not have a substantive law basis.
253
 According to the fundamentals 
of legal theory, procedural law is given a certain kind of precedence over substantive law 
rules.
254
 Although procedural law serves to enforce substantive law, without procedural 
measures substantive law is rendered useless.
255
 Substantive law cannot be exercised without 
a procedural scheme upon which the substantive law can be governed. From a theoretical 
point of view, the procedural and substantive law never collide.
256
 Procedural rules allow for 
the substantive law to be applied.
257
 They draw the limits within which substantive laws can 
be exercised in order to assure their proper execution. It suffices to recall procedural 
instruments, such as limitation periods and the time of their expiry, legal admissibility of 
procedural instruments or recognition of pre-trial bodies.  
The “clear-cut distinction” theory cannot provide an explanation for the ambiguous 
relationship between substance and procedure in the Injunction Directive. The Injunction 
Directive does not stick to the general framework of this scholarly classification because it is 
of a more practical as opposed to theoretical nature. A mixture of substantive law and 
procedural elements shall now be regarded as “the new legal spirit” of consumer protection 
law arising at the junction of both. Therefore, it seems that the “clear-cut distinction” theory, 
recognised as academic/scholarly, has no relevance in legal practice.  
Given the above, it will be useful to rely on a more practical understanding of the 
interrelation of the substantive and procedural law. The model combining substantive law and 
procedural law seems to better fit the current structure of consumer protection legislation, 
which does not maintain a clear-cut separation of substantive and procedural law. In fact, this 
classification is deprived of practical relevance. The theory concerning the clear-cut 
                                               
252 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial… 
253 Tobor (2002), Prawoznawstwo a Praktyka Stosowania Prawa, Warszawa.  
254 Morawski (2002), Wstep do…, p. 156-167; Tobor/Nowacki (2003), Prawoznawstwo…, p. 235-236; Pałecki 
(2003), Prawoznawstwo. Zarys wykładu. Prawo w porządku społecznym, Warszawa, p. 256-289. 
255 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner, European Consumer…, p. 378. 
256 Pałecki (2003), Prawoznawstwo…, p. 234-239. 
257 Wrbka (2012), European Consumer Protection…, in Wrbka/Van Uytsel/Siems (2012), Collective Actions…, 
p. 32-33. 
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distinction of substance and procedure does not fit the Injunction Directive. There is no need 
to argue that procedural regulations serve to enforce substantive law regulations, because this 
is a core issue of each theory concerning the practical use of procedural norms. Procedural 
norms advance the performance of substantive law norms. It is a dogmatic statement, which 
finds confirmation in each of the theories concerning the relationship between substance and 
procedure in the civil law. Even if the distinction is treated as a flexible one
258
, it must 
nevertheless be introduced into the overall scheme of the Injunction Directive in a way that 
will assist with the construction of the form and delineate precisely the particulars. 
Although the clear-cut distinction theory has led to the conviction that substantive law 
is the basis for procedural law, this statement has been falsified through the theory of the 
interrelation of procedural and substantive matters. In particular cases, procedural rules may 
constitute the legal basis for a claim. In other words, they can suffice as the starting point for 
any claim.
259
 It should be underlined that a procedural rule
260
 may also be given a specific 
function as it may be used to sketch the scope of a particular substantive law in practical 
terms. The issue of res judicata of judgments is a good example of this correlation.
261
  
A clear-cut distinction concerning the procedural body of the Injunction Directive and 
substantive law-related Annex has been brought together and combined through the mark of 
reference. Therefore the Injunction Directive has yielded a novel legislative technique. This 
element allows this author to classify the Injunction Directive somewhere in the middle of 
substantive law and procedural law. The Injunction Directive is a unique example of 
consumer law legislation of this kind tackling both the spheres of substance and procedure. 
Therefore, the thesis of interrelation serves as a key to explaining the atypical nature of the 
Injunction Directive.  
The lack of clear rules on the legal classification of injunctions allows for an 
understanding of this remedy as a kind of sui generis legal remedy. As the injunction fits no 
                                               
258 In many of the codes of civil procedure and codes of civil law that have been adopted in Europe so far, there 
is no ex lege distinction of norms on substantive and procedural law. It is not a rule that a civil code includes 
only substantive law rules, while a code of civil procedure includes only procedural related rules. Just to give an 
example of the flexibility of norms: the fundamental rule of the Polish Code of the Civil Procedure – the burden 
of proof, which concerns the nature of the whole code has been included in Article 6 of the Civil Code which 
states as follows “Article 6. The burden of proof relating to a fact shall rest on the person who attributes legal 
effects to that fact”; (translation taken from private sources of Marek Safjan). 
259 Just to give an example: In the Polish procedure on unfair contract terms has introduced a separate scheme for 
unfair contract terms. Although this procedure has been given a kind of administrative nature, it has been 
integrated into the civil code. 
260 Osuchowski (1968), Rzymskie Prawo Prywatne. Zarys Wykładu, Warszawa, p. 456-458. 
261 See Chapter I 1.8. 
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extant typology nor to any other commonly accepted classification of civil law remedies
262
, its 
different and extraordinary nature among other civil law remedies invites a different frame of 
classification. This is why the remedy of injunction opens up a new classification of remedies 
in the field of consumer law putting itself in the middle of substantive law and procedural 
matters.  
The action for injunction has been given a quite specific form as a civil law remedy. It 
is often treated as an alien mechanism in-between civil procedure and substantive law. The 
fact that it has such a specific nature, particularly in relation to its merit and legal 
construction, is certainly one of the reasons why it is treated in isolation from other remedies 
in the field of consumer law. Injunctions do not meet the requirements of any schematic 
classification and therefore do not fit anywhere in commonly sketched legal schedules of 
classification of legal remedies. In addition, neither the Commission nor the Member States 
have conducted much legal research in the field and expertise concerning the specific nature 
of injunctions differs in relation to other means of redress. Although injunctions have been 
recognised as quite innovative, and at the same time unclear and ambiguous, professionals 
and scholars rarely discuss them. In fact, a profound silence surrounds the issue which means 
that it will continue to cause confusion and “irritation”. 
The EU and the Member States have never attempted to confirm the sui generis nature 
of injunctions. Neither the First Report
263
 nor the Second Report on implementation
264
 
brought any clarification. Indeed, the practical use of injunctions within the European 
Community is limited. The EU has never posed the question why this was the case? Perhaps 
the limited practical effectiveness of the Injunction Directive derives from its extraordinary 
nature, which made it too complicated. Perhaps the increase of interest in injunctions is only a 
matter of time, because sooner or later they will find their own place in the national legal 
classification of remedies. This, in itself, raises the problematic issue of how to assess the best 
place for an injunction mechanism within national legal orders and the classification features 
that ought to be taken into consideration so as to place the remedy in the most suitable place 
in a given national legal order. 
 
 
                                               
262 Zakrzewski (2005), Remedies Reclassified, Oxford, p. 189; Kilpatrick/Novitz/Skidmore (2000), The Future of 
Remedies in Europe, Oxford. 
263 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC.  
264 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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3. 2. General Principles on the Relationship between Conflicting Laws 
 
In search for an explanation concerning the distinction between the substantive and 
procedural elements in the Injunction Directive, one of the ways to interpret the 
interrelationship between procedure and substance in the Injunction Directive lies in an in-
depth interpretation of the Latin maxim lex posterior generali non derogat legi priori 
speciali.
265
 This type of interpretation fits well with the concept in the theory of 
complementarity advanced by Micklitz and Cafaggi.
266
 It serves to (i) advance reasons with a 
view to explaining the relationship between substantive and procedural law that will be 
discussed in detail below in the context of a thesis of dualism of enforcement measures in the 
field of consumer protection, and (ii) it may serve as a counter-argument against the theory of 
derogation.
267
 
The European legal order - since it is rooted in Roman legal culture
268
 - allows the 
transferring of the old Roman principles to the current EU related national legal systems.
269
 
The application of Roman maxims/principles into domestic legal orders brings for a smooth 
and systematic interpretation and analysis of rules of law, since the classification of the rules 
of law has introduced more coherence and predictability in overcoming established national 
rules of law. 
Recently, the focus changed from the old rules and principles, including the Roman 
law basis as established in the Roman law schools, toward a casuistic legal interpretation 
which is based on the developments of national judiciaries, the European Union Court of 
Justice and on the legal rules and principles created as a result of “judge made laws rule”.270 
                                               
265 The Latin maxim has been expressis verbis transposed in Article 15 of the Italian Civil Code in its Art. 15 that 
states: “Abrogazione delle leggi. Le leggi non sono abrogate che da leggi posteriori per dichiarazione espressa 
del legislatore, o per incompatibilità tra le nuove disposizioni e le precedenti o perché la nuova legge regola 
l'intera materia già regolata dalla legge anteriore”. 
266 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2008), Administrative and Judicial… 
267 Schulte-Nölke/Twigg-Flesner/Ebers (2007), EC Consumer Law…, p. 404. The authors claim that too much 
discretion has been left to the domestic courts, which will make it more difficult to apply these rules effectively 
(p. 612). 
268 For such an interpretation, Zimmermann (1993), Heard Melodies Are Sweet, But Those Unheard Are 
Sweeter... – Condicio Tacita, Implied Condition und die Fortbildung des Europäischen Vertragsrechts, Archiv 
für die civilistische Praxis, Vol. 193, p. 121 – 173. 
269 Osuchowski (1968), Rzymskie Prawo Prywatne…, p. 456-458. 
270 The shift from the Roman rules to the more casuistic interpretation of law is to be observed in the Polish 
judicature as far as consumer law cases concerned. Before accession to the European Union judgments were 
always based on the principles and rules which derive from the Roman rules of interpretation of law. After the 
accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Union, the interpretation is more often based on the similar 
case judgment lines that have been developed across the Community. For more information as of the judicial 
power and judicial activism in the context of law-making activity see also: Tridimas (1996), The European Court 
of…, p. 199; De Waele/Van der Vleuten (2013), Judicial Activism in…, p. 639-666. 
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In this new frame, general rules have been left aside, and they do not perform the same role 
they once assumed. 
  
3. 2. 1. Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generali 
 
The first principle that springs to mind regarding the relationship between substantive 
law and procedural matters is the rule of lex specialis and lex generalis. It is one of the most 
commonly used principles which could determine the relationship between procedural and 
substance related issues in the Injunction Directive. For that reason, there is a need to classify 
the rules contained in the Injunction Directive into either lex specialis or legi generalis 
groups. It should be underlined that a theoretical distinction based on specific and general 
rules of law should not be mixed up with a classification based on general and specific actions 
for injunctions, which has been done on the basis of definitional differences identified in both 
sets of regulations as one of the definitions is described in a more specific manner and the 
another one - in more general way. Although the definition of injunctions, according to both 
the body of the Directive and that contained in the Annex arises as identical as to their 
content
271
, their wording and scope does not give way to an easy classification as to what 
might be considered lex specialis and lex generalis.  
The general or specific nature of legal rules essentially permits classification of them 
as either lex specialis or lex generalis. For our purposes, the rules pertaining to injunctions 
shall be identified through the prism of the specific field of law to which certain pieces of law 
apply and the overall legal nature of regulation. Indeed, in the case of the Injunction 
Directive, on a first reading the apparent definitional nuances may give rise to confusing 
results. Only with a more profound analysis of the issue can one demonstrate that a common 
understanding of the rules does not correspond to their general theoretical value. Differences 
between definitions cannot be taken as distinctive factors of legal classification because in 
actual fact in-depth interpretation brings about the opposite effect such that general definitions 
included in the substantive law are treated as lex specialis, while the specific and more 
detailed definition of injunction included in the Injunction Directive is recognized as a lex 
generalis. It must be emphasized that substantive law related provisions have only sketched a 
general enforcement scheme for injunctions without giving any further details as to the 
subject matter of this legal remedy. Since the enactment of the Injunction Directive, injunctive 
                                               
271 Micklitz (2005), The politics of Judicial…, p. 229-230. 
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measures have become more transparent since the whole regulation has been designed to be 
very specific and comprehensive.  
Thus, in the current European scenario the application of this principle would be 
unreasonable since the provisions of the Directive (bearing in mind its scope, for example. to 
provide for a holistically understood scope of the law on consumer protection) cannot be 
derogated by the provisions on enforcement included in the substantive law regulations 
already in force. If this reasoning is switched to the frames of provisions, its collective and 
individual dimension is now at stake; what in fact would lead to the understanding of 
injunction of rules through the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures.  
 
3. 2. 2. Lex Posterior Generalis, Non Derogat Legi Priori Speciali 
 
The analysis may be continued by examining the relationship between the two spheres 
of law according to another Latin principle, perhaps an even more suitable one, the principle 
of lex posterior generalis, non derogat legi priori speciali. The Injunction Directive 
understood as a lex posterior generalis brings about a derogation of specific rules of law 
issued previously. Thus, it cannot be recognized as a legal tool leading to the cancellation of 
the enforcement provisions included in the substantive law regulations covered by the Annex. 
This legal maxim may represent a strong argument on behalf of the thesis of dualism of 
enforcement measures in the field of consumer protection. It provides a justification for the 
mark of reference that has been inserted at the end of the Directive that emphasizes the co-
existence of both enforcements means side-by-side. This also goes a long way towards 
explaining the intentions of the legislator, who, by inserting a mark of reference, has sought to 
substantiate the existence of both sets of rules.
272
 Moreover, by the mark of references it is 
clear that a distinction concerning the substantive and procedural related actions for 
injunctions must be maintained. Thus, the EU legislator upholds the double path action 
provided for by both procedural and substantive law related measures. The theory is one of 
the first steps that could assist in advancing an explanation of the nature of the relationship 
between the procedural and the substantive in the Injunction Directive. 
 
 
                                               
272 That would be a counter-argument for a theory of derogation and against the negligence of the EU in the law 
making activity discussed in details in Chapter II 5.  
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3. 2. 3. “Axis Concept” 
 
The idea is to treat the Injunction Directive as an “axis” - a kind of skeleton providing 
a procedural framework for substantive law regulations on consumer protection. According to 
this understanding, the Injunction Directive should be understood as a procedural foundation 
or a kind of framework for the consumer protection legislation listed in the Annex to the 
Injunction Directive.  
Therefore, it should be treated as the dominant regulation concerning the consumer 
protection legislation therein, which somehow leads to “a substitution” of substantive law 
rules by procedural measures or their supplementation by the frame of the Injunction 
Directive due to their general and only descriptive nature. Such a reading basically purports 
that the Injunction Directive as a procedural mechanism was aimed at supplementing the 
provisions on injunctions that had been included in the substantive law directives. For this 
reason, it understands the Injunction Directive as a kind of procedural skeleton that has given 
rise to a way of partial legal derogation, in case of a potential substitution or a supplement in 
terms subject related provisions on injunctions.  
It has brought about a more specific regulation concerning actions for injunctions that 
aims to be much more detailed and specific in comparison to previous provisions on 
enforcement. Accordingly, the Injunction Directive ought to be treated as a kind of procedural 
regulation that could somehow be regarded as a building block for a procedural code on 
consumer protection aimed at perhaps replacing the general provisions on enforcement 
introduced by the substantive law directives. The “axis concept” is based on the assumption 
that the Injunction Directive should be treated as a kind of “code of civil procedure”, while 
the substantive law directives enlisted therein ought to be regarded as “a civil code” of 
consumer protection regulations. Therefore, the Injunction Directive is a frame that introduces 
procedure for substantive law directives on consumer protection. Therefore, the theory 
envisages a cancellation of provisions of a procedural nature to be covered by substantive law 
directives. The detailed and more specific provisions on enforcement in the Injunction 
Directive should serve to substitute the general provisions on enforcement included in the 
consumer protection directives. Such an understanding explains the ambiguous relationship 
between the rules of the Directive. These theoretical and conceptual divagations provide 
guidelines on how to interpret the relationship between the Annex with the consumer 
substance related directives, and the body of the Injunction Directive.  
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The axis theory may also be developed in a way that maintains the procedural frame of 
individual and collective enforcement together with no interference. The fact that the 
Injunction Directive has introduced a collective dimension in consumer protection does not 
harm the rights of individuals who can claim individually upon the scope of the substantive 
law directives. In this sense, the axis theory would be a very convenient tool of consumer 
protection which additionally is consistent with the thesis of dualism in enforcement 
measures.  
 
3. 2. 4. Complementarity 
 
The thesis of dualism of enforcement measures reinforces the concept of 
complementarity pioneered by Micklitz’ and Cafaggi.273 When this concept was proposed, no 
evidence concerning the practical effects of the Injunction Directive was available. For this 
reason, the legal scholars based their considerations on theoretical assumptions as to the 
relationship between substantive and procedural law in the area of consumer protection on the 
ground of their knowledge on consumer protection. Legal scholars, since they are open to 
novelties and future development, initially believed that their statement would be verified or 
falsified by the practical experience of the Member States or by research and reporting from 
the Commission via Reports on the Implementation of Injunction Directive.
274
  
However the first Commission report on implementation of the Injunction Directive 
has failed to explain many of the questions and ambiguities raised when the Injunction 
Directive was issued even though it was supposed to clarify the relationship between the 
Injunction Directive and subject related directives. The Second Report on Implementation has 
provided us with no more information in this regard and only few clarifications.
275
 The latter 
has focused on the issue of the different legal nature of injunctions, which was compared to 
the other legal remedies dedicated to the field of consumer protection. Nevertheless, the 
Report remains silent as to the mutual relationship between procedural and substantive law 
matters.  
In terms of complementarity, the main focus is given to the principle of mutual 
recognition of standing. The legitimisation of legal standing, which was formally granted to 
consumer organisations as qualified entities, was one of the primary goals of the Commission 
                                               
273 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial… 
274 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC; Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC. 
275 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC. 
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as to the Injunctions Directive.
276
 It goes back to the test case before French and German 
courts on so-called sweepstakes.
277
 The Injunction Directive has finally sanctioned legalized 
standing of consumer organizations
278
, and for a vast majority of the Member States this was 
a main focus of interest since it was unclear for a long time whether consumer organisations 
are granted the legal power to represent consumers.  
Secondly, the Injunction Directive provides a mixture of substantive and procedural 
measures. This leads to a conjunction of individual and collective enforcement in the area of 
consumer law. These two spheres – both substantive law and procedural matters as well as 
individual and collective enforcement are inseparably linked in the Injunction Directive, even 
if legal scholars investigating the issue of complementarity in the theoretical frame have not 
given much attention to the mark of reference, and do not provide for a legal analysis in terms 
of its value for consumer law enforcement based on injunctions.
279
 It is, however, clear that 
the EU legislator has put more emphasis on the procedural related aspects of the Directive 
illustrated by the legislative technique used in designing the Directive, which does not, in fact, 
reflect the content of the Injunction Directive. One could certainly deduce the procedural 
nature of the Injunction Directive from its title, especially if the title is compared to the 
previously issued directives on consumer protection. Furthermore, the procedural dimension 
is expressed through the legislative scheme of the Injunction Directive, for example the body 
encompassing the procedural elements with the Annex enlisting the substantive law to which 
the Annex applies.  
Thirdly, the mark of reference can be highlighted as an element proving a procedural 
nature to the Injunction Directive. It has additionally emphasized the specific nature of the 
directives listed in the Annex including those provisions providing for actions for an 
injunction. The mark of reference can be described and characterized as a procedural related 
element. It is often used in procedural regulations in different fields in that it assists to provide 
for a reference to different branches of law; allowing for an extension of the scope of the 
directive to certain areas and branches of law. In the overall context of the Directive, 
                                               
276 Schwartz (2000), Loose Teeth in…, p. 527-554. 
277 See Chapter III 5.6. 
278 Consumer organizations have become active players action for injunctions; for example: Judgment of Spanish 
Supreme Court of 4 November 2010, AUSBANC v Caja Provincial de Ahorros de Jaén, 663/2010; Judgment of 
the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio of 24 June 2006, Adiconsum- Cisl v. Provincia di Latina A.T.O., 
406/06; Judgment of the Court of Palermo of 24 February 2006, Adiconsum v Banco di Sicilia, 2491/06; 
Judgment of Court of Palermo of 2 June 1998 Adiconsum v. Soc. Aeroviaggi, 2077/1998 ; The Judgment of the 
Supreme Court, Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bíróság, Legf. Bír. Pf. IV. 21.980/2002. 
279 The Polish implementation of Act on grants a legal standing for both consumer organizations, and other legal 
entities as well as a single individual consumer, who is directly granted a legal standing in Article 12 of the 
Combating Unfair Commercial Practices explicitly refers to a single individual consumer. 
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especially concerning the lack of clarification regarding the relationship between the body and 
the subject related consumer protection directives, the mark of reference yields one more 
element of the Directive that constitutes its ambiguous legal nature. The mark of reference 
and the position it has been given in the Injunction Directive may be explained in two ways: 
(i) through theoretical conceptions of the legal theories, or (ii) pragmatically, through the 
prism of legal practice of the Member States to be developed in the course of years; in 
particular in terms of rules that they have employed in order to intensify the effectiveness of 
the Injunction Directive in legal practice.  
 
3. 2. 5. Silent Derogation/Cancellation of Specific Provisions on Collective 
Enforcement 
 
One of the theoretical explanations as to the relation between the specific enforcement 
provisions and the Injunction Directive can be found in the theory of so-called silent 
derogation of the enforcement provisions from the substantive law directive, which could 
have been replaced by a new remedy of collective dimension of injunctions introduced by the 
Injunction Directive. That theory is based on the assumption that the substance related 
injunctions in the substantive law directives will somehow be replaced, by the more specific 
provisions of the Injunction Directive introducing a collective dimension instead of an 
exclusively individual one.  
This theory would indeed deprive the individual consumer a possibility of claiming 
upon the frame of the Injunction Directive. Obviously, the claim of the individual may be 
passed to consumer organizations, but per se, individuals will not be given a right to claim. 
Hence, consumer organizations, as representatives of a group of consumers, or other qualified 
entities will be entitled to act in the place of single individual consumers. This is one of the 
possible scenarios regarding the use and the reading of the Injunction Directive. The 
underlying message of the Injunction Directive in the Member States varies to a significant 
extent, demonstrated via the implementation of the Injunction Directive in the Member States 
for example most of the legal orders gave a legal standing to consumer organization while 
individual consumers have rather been excluded from the list of legal entities, with some 
exceptions.
280
 Nevertheless, this again begs the question of whether the legislator, by way of 
introducing the collective tools of enforcement, intended to deprive the individual of her legal 
                                               
280 For example: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
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protection? Is it a goal of EU legislation to place limits on consumer protection? If so, why 
has the mark of reference appeared in the Annex of the Injunction Directive? And how shall it 
be interpreted in the collective context of the Injunction Directive?  
In theory, it seems that it is quite possible to make such a substitution of norms. But 
this would be a sign that the EU legislator wishes to limit the scope of consumer protection.  
 Practical experience of the Injunction Directive in the Member States shows a variety 
of scenarios. In the vast majority of Member States, the Injunction Directive is identified as a 
collective redress instrument that brought about the legal standing of consumer organisations. 
It is worth stressing that only a few Member States granted legal standing to individuals, who 
can bring parallel actions to consumer organizations
281
, and who are not registered in the list 
of qualified entities side by side with consumer organizations. 
The national enforcement models vary significantly. It seems that only time will tell 
which of the implementation theories – as presented below – adequately explains the 
interrelation between individual and collective enforcement in the field of consumer 
protection.  
Thus far, even though the Injunction Directive was passed in 1998, the Member States 
have not granted much attention to the mark of reference and it has not been recognized as 
indicting any specific enforcement mode. In terms of the development of the thesis of dualism 
of enforcement measures, this may be one of the reasons why the implementation of the 
Injunction Directive varies so significantly and why the adoption of the Injunction Directive 
seems to awaken or even exclude individual enforcement from the scope of the Injunction 
Directive.  
Since Recommendation 2013/396 was passed, it appears that the Commission is 
indifferent as to the choice of individual and collective enforcement in the Injunction 
Directive and the reading of the mark of reference and its role in the entire enforcement 
scheme goes in the right direction.
282
 It is true that the Injunction Directive in the process of 
its development has encouraged the blossoming of collective enforcement schemes within the 
national models of enforcement. Nevertheless, owing to the mark of reference - which in my 
view is a core element in understanding of the Injunction Directive, which in fact has been 
                                               
281 In Poland, in the Unfair Commercial Practices an individual consumer is given a standing side by side with 
consumer organizations, and the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. The implementation of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive in Poland brought a fragmentary implementation of the Injunction Directive, 
which was divided between the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code, both individual consumer and 
consumer organizations have a right to injunction.  
282 Indeed, the adoption of the Recommendation 2013/396, the Commission has considered the mutual existence 
of individual and collective enforcement frames. Thus far, this approach which links the individual and 
collective frame of enforcement was unknown for the Commission.  
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missing in most of the national jurisdictions - it is not possible to speak about a profound 
understanding of the intricate nature of the Directive and its implementation in accordance 
with the spirit of the Injunction Directive. The spirit, as this analysis provides, was a dualistic 
one.  
Individual enforcement upon a common collective reading of the Injunction Directive 
loses its intrinsic value; it becomes an instrument of minor value. The derogation is 
understood in a broader sense as partially taking away effectiveness of law from substantive 
law directives and passing it toward the collective scope of enforcement. If the replacement of 
substantive law is conducted via the legislative activity of the Member States, the national 
rules of law will be amended toward the collective measures. This brings a risk that 
substantive law rules will lose their practical usefulness. This may occur because of the 
Injunction Directive, which can deprive individual enforcement of its practical relevance.  
The Injunction Directive - if implemented in line with the theory of derogation, has 
provided a derogation of rules since the substantive law provisions have been substituted by 
the new procedural provisions of the Injunction Directive. Therefore, the individual 
enforcement, which has been a crucial issue in the substantive law directives loses its 
relevance and is substituted by the collective dimension. However, in some of the Member 
States the substance related provisions on injunctions may become, or may be treated as dead 
letter within the framework of the substantive law regulations and may have been left without 
any legal significance due to the so-called “implicit, or silent derogation” by the collective 
scope of the Injunction Directive. The substantive law frame of enforcement may be excluded 
from application in legal practice.
283
  
First of all, in some of the Member States, for example in Poland
284
 a general concept 
of injunction was partially transposed in the Code of Civil Procedure and partially via a 
supplementary piece of legislation like the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, 
which directly refers to the standing of consumer organizations. As the research evidence 
provides, in most of the Member States, like France, Italy
285
 and Poland, procedural rules 
include an explicit legitimation of the legal standing of consumer organizations, which, due to 
                                               
283 This is also the case with the Polish implementation of the Injunction Directive which has introduced a 
general conviction of a purely collective nature of injunction frame developed upon the Injunction Directive.  
284 In Poland: Ustawa z dnia 17 listopada 1964 r. - Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Dz.U. nr 43, poz. 296 ze 
zm.); Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów (Dz.U. 2000 nr 122 poz. 1319). 
285 Caponi (2009), L’azione collettiva...; Finocchiaro (2008), Class action: una chance... 
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procedural laws, have become active players in the framework of the Injunction Directive. 
Their legal standing has also been confirmed by sector specific legislation.
286
  
 
4. Dualism and the Conjunctions between Substantive and Procedural Matters 
 
Until the 1990s actions for injunctions were recognized as effective enforcement 
measures for the protection of consumers in the field of competition law and the field of the 
intellectual property rights. In the 90s, the remedy of injunction was largely absent in the field 
of consumer law. The added value of the injunctive mechanisms has only become clear for 
the majority of the Member States after the adoption of the Injunction Directive. Although the 
Injunction Directive has not created any new or specific remedies, it has definitely brought 
about a new scheme within the civil law remedies.  
The action for injunction has finally brought a new quality to procedural law regarding 
the legal remedies, in particular in its collective context and quite innovative pro future 
dimension. However, although the Injunction Directive has introduced a powerful and quite 
flexible enforcement measure, it has led to new legal irritations due to the lack of provision 
providing for monetary compensation. This lack affects the popularity of the action for 
injunction, since it does not offer comprehensive protection. An expected increase of 
consumer law cases has not been achieved upon the frame of the Injunction Directive. There 
has been no specific signs of a growing importance of injunctions before national courts 
either.  
The current legal situation has demonstrated that in the majority of Member States the 
Injunctions Directive has somehow silently derogated the substance related provisions on 
enforcement and substituted them with specific procedural means implemented in the various 
codes of civil procedure, codes of consumer protection or separately included in the subject 
related provisions on injunction. From the general reading of injunction it appears that the 
provisions on injunction shall simply substitute the material related - indeed, not very 
successfully formulated - provisions through the “new” action for an injunction based on the 
Injunction Directive. This seems incongruous with the “mark of reference”.287 
 In light of this observation, the role and function of the mark of reference is still not 
entirely clear. In light of the theory of derogation, the mark of reference gives rise to many 
questions, such as how, in light of the theory of silent derogation, should we interpret the 
                                               
286 The Polish implementation of Unfair Contract Terms and Unfair Commercial Practices.  
287 See Chapter I 1.7., 5.1. 
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mark of reference and its inclusion at the end of the Injunctions Directive? Have the Member 
States properly considered the rule of the mark of reference in their overall legislative 
structures? It is rather unclear what the mark of reference actually is all about, and what it was 
intended to be. On the one hand, the theory of derogation of rules could be promoted on the 
basis of the various experiences of legal practice in the Member States. On the other hand, it 
seems that the Member States did not consider the legal role and value of the mark of 
reference.  
 
4. 1. Legislative Structure and Normative Technique 
 
The nature of injunctions as per the Directive, for example balancing both substantive 
law and civil procedure, becomes clear in the specific legislative technique used in the legal 
drafting of the Injunction Directive. The specific nature of the remedy is rooted in the fact that 
injunctions are sui generis civil remedies. The injunctive concept does not neatly fit into 
ready-made classifications of civil law remedies. As stated in Article 1, there are two spheres 
of the Injunction Directive:  
(i) “the body of the Injunction Directive”, which is of procedural nature as it includes a 
whole list of provisions that specifies the action for injunction. The Injunction 
Directive begins with a recital, and it is followed by the description of the scope of the 
Directive and is concluded by the Annex linking the body of the Injunction Directive 
with the Annex. The body of the Injunction Directive defines an action for an 
injunction, it delineates the rules of legal standing, defines the crucial notion of intra-
community infringements, outlines a requirement of prior consultation as a form of 
procedural alternative dispute resolution frame, introduces a requirement to report on 
implementation - hence it defines all the procedural-related issues to be necessarily 
found in each procedural-related legislation; and  
(ii) the Annex to the Injunction Directive, which delineates a huge portion of the 
Community consumer protection legislation in the form of substantive law directives 
on consumer protection. Although the Injunction Directive is a piece of legislation of 
procedural – related nature, the Annex to the Injunction Directive covers only 
substantive law directives. This is why the Annex has been recognized as a 
conjunction between procedural and substantive law matters since it brings coherence 
between the procedural and substantive-law elements covered by the frame of the 
Injunction Directive.  
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Although the list of substantive law directives listed in the Annex seems to be quite 
long, it is not exhaustive.
288
 The list may be permanently updated by adding new consumer 
protection directives, and if suitable within the frame of the rest of the directives.
289
 The 
Directives listed in the Annex, however, must meet certain requirements such as (i) they shall 
be focused on protection of the collective interest of consumers
290
, and (ii) they shall protect 
economic consumer interests.
291
 
Since the Injunction Directive does not provide for any explanation of the existing 
interrelations and explanatory notes from the EU legislator are missing, it is up to the national 
legislator and legal practice to give shape to the relationship. They have to decide how to deal 
with the problem of interrelation, whether it is to be regarded as a problem understood in a 
negative sense, or perhaps in its positive sense in that it can be recognized as an added value 
to the Injunction Directive. One might think that the regulatory technique is just an example 
of legal overlapping, and in line with this, some have concluded that the substantive law 
provisions covered by the scheme of the Injunction Directive should be set to one side. On the 
other hand, the combination of the two, the procedural and substantive, indicate the need to 
look for a deeper meaning behind the link. Since one should start from the premise that the 
EU legislator operates rationally, that we are not dealing with a legislative mistake or error, it 
seems fair to conclude that it is the dualism of enforcement which serves as the background 
for keeping both sets of rules.  
The provisions of the procedural and substantive law nature differ in terms of wording 
but are identical in merit.
292
 If one compares the substance related provisions with the 
provisions provided for in the body of the Directive, it is noticeable that the Directive 
provides for much more detailed procedural-related and more forceful enforcement provisions 
as opposed to those included in the directives listed in the Annex which have been formulated 
in a general and descriptive manner. The content of the remedy remains the same, whilst the 
definition differs. There is, however, the factor of collective interest, which distinguishes the 
two parts of the Directive from each other. Although the collective dimension is present in the 
Injunction Directive itself, it does not appear in the directives included in the Annex to the 
Injunction Directive. The mark of reference links the individual dimension enshrined in the 
                                               
288 Schwartz (2000), Loose Teeth in..., p. 527- 554. 
289 Apparently, neither the Injunction Directive nor the working documentation on the Injunction Directive 
provides any indications as to the choice and selection of the pieces of legislation to be covered by the eventually 
extended version of the Annex.  
290 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis and evaluation…, p. 329. 
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292 Micklitz (2005), The politics of Judicial…, p. 229-230. 
112 
 
consumer law directives with the collective dimension.
293
 While the injunction procedure has 
been given a collective dimension, the substantive law directives listed in the Annex read in 
separation from the Injunction Directive have been given an individual dimension, and the 
two frames have been bound upon the single scheme of the Injunction Directive.
294
 This two 
different tracks and enforcement layers read in conjunction provides the background for the 
thesis of dualism of enforcement. The Directive has tracked a path for both individual and 
collective schemes of enforcement that exist in a parallel level, so that they can be used as a 
tool either for individual or collective enforcement. In sum: 
(i) There is the Injunction Directive, which stands alone as a collective piece of 
legislation, which introduces for the first time a detailed model of injunction procedure 
of cross-border collective dimension,  
(ii) The substantive law directives in the frame of the Annex to the Injunction Directive 
have been given either an individual or collective dimension since the injunction 
procedure can be performed either as a collective or individual tool of enforcement 
depending on the legal interest to be protected, which in turn implies a choice in 
relation to the enforcement mode. Hence, depending on the case at hand and on the 
nature of interest to be protected, the Injunction Directive may serve to enforce rights 
toward individual or collective enforcement. This is only possible, because two of the 
elements – the Annex and the procedural body of the Directive - are inseparably 
interlinked, which causes the Injunction Directive as a whole to be read through the 
prism of two different layers: individual and collective However, the extent of the 
interrelation between the two elements and the deep infiltration of both spheres cannot 
be assessed without taking into account the implementation of consumer protection 
directives in the national legal orders of Member States as well as the available case 
law regarding the issue.
295
  
 
4. 2. The Idea behind the Distinction 
 
The relationship between substantive law and procedural law becomes even more 
difficult if one considers that two different definitions of injunctions in the substantive law 
                                               
293 EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013, COM(2007) 99 final. 
294 This is notable that a mark of reference appeared in the Injunction Directive 98/27/EC and it was also 
repeated in the amended version of the Injunction Directive, Directive 2009/27/EEC, so the latter scheme allows 
to conclude that the EU legislator intentionally posed a mark of reference in the frame of the amended version of 
the Injunction Directive.  
295 See Chapter I 1.6.2. 
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and procedural law context have been introduced by the EU legislator. Surprisingly, the 
doubling of the definitions has not attracted the attention of the European Commission, 
neither within the legislative procedure nor with regard to the process of its implementation. 
The reason might simply be that the rules on injunctions remain rudimentary and far beyond 
the more sophisticated procedural requirements of the Directive of Injunctions. This has to be 
spelt out. 
The Commission’s focus on substantive law did not match the ideal model of 
enforcement of consumer rights. Thanks to the Injunction Directive two schemes exist in the 
form of individual and collective enforcement. Although many of the substance related 
directives have included provisions on enforcement of a more general nature – Member States 
have to take measures to ensure that the EU directives can be properly enforced - these 
provisions were too general to elaborate a more sophisticated enforcement scheme apt to the 
particular contextual requirements. Until now, not much has changed, at least not with regard 
to individual enforcement. It is more and more the ECJ, which is giving shape to the general 
rule of effectiveness.
296
 The collective dimension required a particular legislative intervention. 
That is what happened in unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices. The decisive 
step forward, however, comprised the adoption of the Injunction Directive. The specific and 
detailed schemes of collective enforcement in the frame of the Injunction Directive do not 
deprive the general contract law directives of their added value in individual enforcement. 
Individual and collective enforcement have to be understood as two strains of procedural 
schemes, as alternatives.  
With regard to individual enforcement measures, Member States while exercising their 
procedural autonomy, have designed procedural schemes of consumer protection, which at the 
national level fit best to domestic conditions and which are suitable considering the 
particularities of their national legal models.
297
 They designed national models of enforcement 
of consumer rights with regard the individual enforcement scheme – upon implementation of 
the consumer protection directives, and seemingly – in line with Injunction Directive 
providing a frame of collective enforcement which again had to meet the national conditions 
and legal requirements.  
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297 Craig/Burca (2008), EU law… 
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Considering that enforcement provisions in substance related directives are rather 
general and do not lay down specific requirements as to their implementation
298
, Member 
States did not devote too much attention to the fact whether and to what extent the directives 
in question require an adjustment of the enforcement schemes. If it turned out that there was a 
problem, quite often Member States escaped into the adoption of new models without 
discussing the compatibility with the old scheme.
299
 The situation does not differ much in 
cases of collective enforcement schemes brought by the Injunction Directive. Since it is a 
minimum harmonisation directive
300
, Member States were allowed to design it nationally in 
the frame most suitable to national conditions and requirements. However, contrary to the 
substantive law directives, the Injunction Directive formulates detailed procedural 
requirements that narrow the leeway of Member States. 
The EU legal frame produced an obviously unintended diversity in the area of 
enforcement. Substantive law rules provide for subject related legal remedies, but usually do 
not contain procedural rules in line with the constitutional architecture of the EU, which the 
Injunction Directive provided. This has led to the often-criticized phenomenon that one and 
the same remedy has been given different shape in different substantive law directives and has 
been implemented in various manners in the national jurisdictions of the Member States 
facilitated through minimum harmonisation. Insofar as EU requirements are missing, the rules 
on individual enforcement have to be taken from national law. Their European character may 
often remain invisible if it is implemented within a national remedial enforcement scheme. A 
similar phenomenon can be observed in the two substantive directives, which provide for 
collective redress. Besides from the fact that they introduce an action for injunction, there is 
not much that can be taken from the text of the directives. All this dramatically changed with 
the Directive on Injunctions. Here quite detailed procedure rules
301
 compel the Member States 
to adjust their procedural rules. It is fair to say that the Directive on Injunctions introduces 
elements and opportunities of convergence. 
It is highly unlikely that the European Commission expected such significant 
differentiation in relation to enforcement measures. In fact, nobody could have predicted that 
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the Injunction Directive would in fact increase the level of confusion in the consumer law 
enforcement. The contrary seemed to have been the intention. This is even more so as the 
Directive on Injunction applies to national and transborder litigation. It seems that the 
European Commission has by and large accepted the incoherencies as unexpected side effects 
of different implementation strategies. The strategy to overcome divergences and to promote 
convergence was further harmonization. For years, the idea of collective enforcement in 
consumer law remained present in various policies of the European Commission.
302
 
Cautiously but also steadily the Commission moved ahead in order to improve collective 
redress. At some point in time it seemed as if the new plan of enforcement policy 
development
303
 and the temporary interest of DG Sanco
304
 would lead to further EU 
regulation. However, with Recommendation 2013/396 on consumer redress and the draft 
proposal on anti-trust injuries
305
 the situation has come to a halt, at least for the time being.
306
 
It has to be recalled that the emphasis laid on the search for an appropriate collective 
compensation scheme, either by way of an opt-out or an opt-in solution. The intricacies of the 
action for injunction did not attract much attention. 
In particular, consumer organizations very much promoted a US type of class action, 
advocating for the introduction of a collective redress scheme at the EU level, to compensate 
for what they could not get at home.
 
As the experience has shown, all the attempts of the 
European Commission to shape a policy on collective redress remained half-hearted
307
 the 
most decisive factor being the resistance in the Member States against the US-style class 
action. It is often overlooked that the European Commission pursued a parallel strategy to 
improve individual enforcement in terms of alternative dispute resolution schemes. At first 
glance, it seems as if ADR does not fit the collective dimension of the Injunction Directive, 
                                               
302
 The Consumer Protection Strategy 2007-2013 - underlined the importance of effective mechanisms for 
seeking redress and announced that it would consider action on collective redress mechanisms for consumers; 
Portuguese Presidency Conference on Collective Redress - Lisbon on the 9th and 10th of November 2007; The 
Leuven brainstorming event; Three Workshops on Collective Redress Issues on 21 May 2008, 29 May 2008 and 
6 June 2008 in Brussels; Consultation Paper for Discussion on the follow-up to the Green Paper on Collective 
Consumer Redress, the Commission's initiative on Collective Redress of 11 June 2013 called Recommendation 
2013/396, which is a final document regarding collective redress matter in the area consumer law. 
303 Green Paper on Collective Consumer Redress, COM(2008) 794 final; Consumer Protection strategy 2007-
2013, COM(2007)99. Empowering consumer, enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them; Report on the 
application of Directive 98/27/EC. 
304 Kuneva (2007), Healthy Markets Need...  
305 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, Strasburg, June 11, 2013, 2013/0185 (COD). On April 17, 2014, the European Parliament 
adopted a text of the Directive on antitrust damages actions which was agreed between the European Parliament 
and the Council during the ordinary legislative procedure. 
306 See Chapter I 5.2. 
307 See Chapter I 5.3. 
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but it must be understood as a return to the safe harbour of individual enforcement, as 
reflected in consumer protection directives listed in the Annex to the Injunction Directive.
308
  
Indeed, shortly after the implementation of the Injunction Directive, the Commission 
had expressed and started a new initiative in a policy development towards the general 
attention to the procedural aspect of law on consumer protection, shifting the focus from 
individual enforcement via courts to individual enforcement via alternative dispute resolution 
schemes. All the alternative dispute resolution frames established by the Commission in the 
aftermath of its new policy, can only be linked via the Annex of the Directive on Injunction to 
the individual side of enforcement. SOLVIT, FIN-NET and others provide only for individual 
enforcement frames. They do not build links to collective enforcement measures, at least not 
explicitly. 
There are two ways to bring the dualist nature of consumer enforcement back to the 
fore. The first results from the existence of an ADR scheme in Directive 2005/29
309
 as a tool 
Member States are requested to install prior to the initiation of an action for injunction.
310
 
Similar rules exist in Directive 93/13
311
 at least if read together with Factortame.
312
 The other 
and more promising variant results from the idea that individual and collective enforcement 
exist in parallel, but are interlinked. This concept requires granting ADR/ODR a status in the 
action for an injunction. The collective stop order mechanism and the individual redress 
schemes could be combined to compensate the consumer for the harm they suffered through 
the unlawful market practices.
313
 
 
4. 3. Reasons for the Differentiation 
 
The Injunction Directive has triggered a quick and dynamic change in the enforcement 
schemes of consumer law. The Commission put more pressure on the purely procedural 
effectiveness of the Injunction Directive than on individual aspects of enforcement or the 
mixed zone of procedural and material injunctions as reflected in the Annex to the Directive. 
Concerning the practical relevance of the Injunction Directive, the Commission tried to place 
the piece of consumer protection legislation as quickly as possible in the framework of 
                                               
308 Hodges (2012), New Modes of Redress…  
309 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (OJ L 149, 11/06/2005, p. 22–39). 
310 For details Chapter IV 5.3.4. 
311 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC (OJ L 95, 21/04/1993, p. 29–34). 
312 Judgment of the Court of 19 June 1990, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame 
Ltd and others, Case C-213/89, (ECR 1990, p. I-02433). 
313 See: Viitaanen (2007), Enforcement of Consumer Collective Interests by Regulatory Agencies in the Nordic 
Countries, in Van Boom/Loose (2007), Collective Enforcement of…, p. 83.  
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European consumer law, in order to combat the lack of effective enforcement measures which 
had been recognized as one of the basic stumbling blocks to access to justice for 
consumers.
314
 Consumer law, perhaps more so than other fields, ought to be an area of 
particular importance with regard to accessibility.
315
  
As practical experience shows, clear-cut distinctions and classifications hamper the 
applicability of the law. Once the Injunction Directive was passed, there was no need to draw 
a distinction between individual and collective dimensions. They can exist both as they stand 
in the frame of the Injunction Directive. That was the reason why the Commission finally 
realised that there is need to increase access to justice on the basis of both individual and 
collective enforcement measures. Thereby the Commission has increased the effectiveness of 
substantive law
316
 in the field of consumer protection. This was an element missing so far, 
which effectively hampered consumer confidence in the Internal Market and blocked the 
development of consumer policies.
317
 
The Commission intended to secure the confidence of consumers by strengthening of 
laws on consumer protection. The idea behind this was the following: the EU consumer must 
be protected from economic and financial harms that could arise as a result of transnational 
purchases within the European Union. The main focus was however given to cross-border 
transactions. The fundamental premise justifying the need for consumer protection within the 
law of the European Community and its Member States concerns the lack of sufficient 
knowledge, awareness and other socio-economic obstacles
318
 to be faced by consumers
319
 as 
regards their rights and the means of enforcement of these rights.
320
 The injunctive relief 
provided for by the Directive represents one of the important elements in the attempt to 
                                               
314 Green Paper on Review of Consumer Acquis (2007); Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013; Green Paper on 
Collective Consumer Redress (2008); Report on the application of the Injunction Directive (2008); Evaluation of 
the effectiveness of collective redress measures (2009); Eurobarometer – Consumer Redress in European Union: 
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Collective Redress (2010). 
315 Uff (1996), Incorporating the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive into English law, in Lonbay 
(1996), Enhancing the Legal Position of the European Consumer, The British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, London, p. 172. 
316 Wrbka (2012), European Consumer Protection…, in Wrbka/Van Uytsel/Siems (2012), Collective Actions…., 
p. 31-32. 
317 Consumer confidence is necessary for the harmonious functioning of the single market and “the interest of 
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319 Łętowska (1999), Prawo Umów Konsumenckich, Warszawa. 
320 Wrbka (2012), European Consumer Protection…, in Wrbka/Van Uytsel/Siems (2012), Collective Actions..., 
p. 31-32. 
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bolster both consumer protection and consumer confidence.
321
 The Injunction Directive was 
aimed at strengthening the enforcement measures in the area of consumer protection. This 
goal can only be achieved as a combination of a two levels of enforcement measures based at 
individual and collective enforcement, which have been inbuilt in one scheme of the 
Injunction Directive which accord to the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures. 
These joint schemes are apt to coexist within the scheme provided by the Injunction 
Directive, especially concerning the fact it is based on the principle/policy of minimum 
harmonisation.
322
 In fact, it is unsurprising that different combinations have been made 
available in the Member States since it was never expected that the level of protection and in 
correlation to this the level of confidence of consumers would be consistent in all Member 
States.
323
 Furthermore, legal solutions and modes of implementation differ across Europe and 
therefore enforcement will always be far from coherent. That said, this lack of coherence in 
combination with an unclear relationship between the substance and procedure has given rise 
to double-sided problems. According to Dougan
324
 consumer protection directives, which in 
the vast majority of cases are implemented according to the principle of minimum 
harmonisation are characterised by a lesser need for uniformity as to national remedies and 
procedures. This would justify the confusion and patchwork structure of national enforcement 
frames built into the frame of the Injunction Directive. Therefore, as far as the Injunction 
Directive is considered, more attention should be given to it as a procedural tool. On the other 
hand, incoherence surely negatively affects consumer confidence and rather results in 
consumer reluctance to enter into cross-border relationships.  
Furthermore, “(…) the problem of effectively enforcing consumer protection 
legislation is aggravated by sector-specific factors”, for example, many consumers are 
unaware of their rights in certain fields or they have little incentives to pursue them.
325
 In 
order to achieve coherence and confidence in consumer law as a whole, Dougan argues that 
one may demand a high level of Community intervention in the domestic judicial legal 
                                               
321 Schwartz (2000), Loose Teeth in..., p. 527-554. 
322 The reasoning was quite obvious: “(…) there is no ‘best’ concept existing at the national level; no model has 
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324 Dougan (2004), National Remedies before the…; Fitzpatrick/Szyszczak (1995), Remedies and Effective 
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325 See also a legal reasoning for the following judgments: Judgment of the Court of 27 June 2000, Océano 
Grupo and others (ECR 2000, p. I-04941), in which the ECJ has justified the same argument.  
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systems.
326
 So as to achieve the best possible result and to convince the consumer that he is 
well protected by both substantive law and procedure, more work must be conducted in the 
field of law enforcement. Even if substantive law in the field does not necessarily require 
complete harmonisation to increase its effectiveness
327
, procedural legislation does, at least 
partially need to be harmonised to ensure the effectiveness of the Directive.  
These concerns have also been taken into consideration by the ECJ in Océano328 and 
Claro.
329
 The final outcomes resemble each other. Basically, in Claro the ECJ followed the 
opinion Advocate General Saggio had given in Océano.330 Both concern the enforceability of 
consumer rights - Océano jurisdiction clauses, Claro arbitration clauses - as opposed to the 
clarification of substantive elements of substantive law. The Injunction Directive illustrates 
not only the current policy and plans of the Commission, but also serves to illustrate the 
political and methodological approach of the ECJ. The approach of the Court is perfectly in 
line with the EU’s policy on consumer law. It is clear from these two cases that the ECJ is 
more concerned with the effectiveness and uniformity of procedure as opposed to the 
substantive law aspects of the consumer protection directives. Thus, it would seem from the 
judgments that more focus should be given to procedural rules since substantive law 
directives are not recognised as the only tools of market integration any more. This goes hand 
in hand with the policy of the EU that has clearly been expressed in the Injunction Directive. 
A basic conclusion to be drawn then is that in order to ensure consumer protection, 
effectiveness and uniformity of remedies are far more important than the uniformity of the 
substantive context.
331
 
 
4. 4. The Impact of Dualism of Enforcement Measures on Consumer Law 
Enforcement  
 
With the adoption of the Injunction Directive, the EU has finally provided an effective 
means of enforcement in the field of consumer protection. The scheme, which binds 
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individual and collective enforcement of consumer law, provides for a quite complex scheme 
of remedial consumer protection. The collective scheme of enforcement is, however, highly 
innovative especially considering that the previously existing procedural mechanisms of 
enforcement were based on individual enforcement only.
332
 In sum, the Directive led to real 
innovation in the form of dualism of enforcement measures since the Injunction Directive 
entitles consumers to: 
(i) Claim on the basis of the regime of individual enforcement; in this scheme an 
injunction can be brought on the basis of the substance related directives on consumer 
protection, which offer an injunctive relief for “a consumer” understood as a natural 
“individual”. This scheme is based on enforcement measures rooted in national 
enforcement schemes, which are based on substantive law consumer protection 
directives. Indeed, consumer protection substantive law directives have been listed in 
the Annex to the Injunction Directive, which illustrates the link between individual 
and collective enforcement schemes of enforcement and provides a linkage between 
the two modes of enforcement. 
(ii) Claim on the basis of the collective enforcement regime, which appears with the 
Injunction Directive upon which enforcement measures have been made available for 
groups of consumers who have been affected by collective harm or have suffered as a 
result of a collective infringement. The claim may be brought by a group of consumers 
whose rights have been infringed by the unlawful activity of an entrepreneur/business. 
Obviously, the choice of the enforcement path depends on the nature of the legal 
interest to be protected - whether it is individual or collective - therefore the nature of 
the legal interest influences the choice of the enforcement path - individual or 
collective. Thanks to the mark of reference individual enforcement rooted in 
substantive law directives on consumer protection is not deprived of its legal value 
upon introduction of collective redress mechanisms. In fact, the construction of the 
Injunction Directive is sketched in a way that allows consumers to benefit from both in 
terms of the choice of mode of enforcement since it is the consumer who is the crucial 
subject of consumer law protection measures.
333
  
This “double path” recognized as a dualism of enforcement measures simplifies the 
enforcement of consumer rights and is one of the crucial elements truly ensuring a higher 
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level of consumer protection. Consumers can be protected at both sides from the individual 
and collective perspective, and the choice of the nature of the protection will depend on the 
case at hand. That said, the option introduced by the Injunction Directive is not in line with 
the implementation practice of the Member States. Not all the Member States have 
maintained the dualism of enforcement means.
334
 The dualism of enforcement means has 
strengthened the position of the consumers in the Internal Market, but most of the progress 
remains on paper only. 
 
4. 5. Injunction as a Conjunction between Economic and Health and Safety Issues 
 
One may have expected that such a procedural enforcement tool would be more 
indicative as regards its position with other consumer protection regulations. One may also 
have expected that the Injunction Directive would be more comprehensive in relation to other 
pieces of legislation already in force. The Annex to the Directive includes only a limited 
group of directives dealing with consumer protection leaving aside a number of important - at 
least from the consumer’s point of view - pieces of legislation, which have remained outside 
the scope of protection of the Injunction Directive. However, this exclusion aims deliberately 
at the general protection of economic interest which derives from the Injunction Directive. 
Although these directives touch upon specific fields of law, although they do not protect 
consumers’ economic interest, they are nonetheless of significant importance to consumers.  
In searching for an explanation, the preparatory documentation concerning the 
Injunction Directive may be relevant. In the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the Injunction Directive
335
, the following statement can be found: “(…) there should be a 
right to bring the Injunction action for violation of any provisions that is designed either 
directly or indirectly to protect consumers, if an injunction would be an effective redress for 
such violation”. That would mean that injunctions could be used to cover all violations that 
either directly or indirectly infringe consumer rights. Therefore, we can infer from the 
Opinion that the Annex is only supposed to reflect the general scope of the Directive 
especially since the list of directives indicated in the Annex is not exhaustive and may be 
extended to these consumer law directives to which a remedy of injunction would be suitable 
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because of the nature of the substantive law rights covered by its protection. If an injunction is 
supposed to be an effective redress for consumer law violations, it has been given an 
individual and collective dimension to secure more complex protection of consumer rights. 
Nevertheless, this does not answer the question as to what is included and excluded from the 
scope of protection offered by injunctions. The Opinion provides for a vague statement that 
allows us only to sketch a general idea that can only partially justify the exclusion of the 
regulation on the product safety.
336
 On the other hand, this exclusion may be justified by 
referring to the very specific nature of the legal interest to be protected.  
There are more radical theories that aim to explain the exclusion of these specific 
directives. Brandy argues
337
 that the industry groups have considerable clout in affecting 
community legislation, in particular in the case of the Injunction Directive this clout is said to 
have presented a threat to the strength of consumer protection legislation. This is quite a 
radical and a rather suspicious statement that the policy agenda of the Injunctive Directive has 
been undermined by “capture”.338 Since Brandy’s conclusion seems vague and is not justified 
by strong arguments or empirical evidence, it seems that the activity of lobby groups should 
not be taken as a point of reference in explanation of the legal issue. Indeed, in light of the 
Opinion of the Committee one might argue that in the excluded pieces of legislation an action 
for an injunction might not necessarily increase effective redress. Such specific matters need 
to be enforced through health and safety related enforcement measures. There is no need for a 
remedy for an injunction that de facto has a future effect and does not allow a consumer to be 
granted compensation.  
Therefore, concerning the relationship between consumers and businesses, especially 
in the field of consumer protection, it is worth considering whether consumer protection 
legislation is really taking into account the economic interest of consumer as a priority. The 
activity of the EU, which aims to ascertain a high level of consumer protection, although it 
has a consumer protection at stake, aims to ensure that a business is not affected in a negative 
way, by which a business may suffer for any harms or inconveniences. Simply speaking a 
protection of one interest cannot damage another interest of different nature. The protection 
offered by the Commission on the one hand, cannot cause harm on the other for example to 
                                               
336 See Chapter I 2, II 4.5.  
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Promises? North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 23(1), p. 155-200. 
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the business. EU looks for a balance between consumers’ interests no matter of the nature of 
the interest protected.  
On the one hand, it is easy to note that all matters excluded from the Annex of the 
Injunctions Directive are focused on protection of the consumer economic interest. The 
injunction as a remedy fits well into substantive law directives, which protect consumer 
economic values, and is not definitely addressed to be a tool of protection of other non-
economic values.
339
 This leads to the conclusion that a remedy of injunction is not recognized 
as a sufficient remedy in those situations in which health and safety issues are at stake. To the 
issue of non-economic values, the remedy of injunction is an insufficient tool of enforcement. 
Therefore, in terms of the extension of the scope of the Injunction Directive for new consumer 
protection directives, it seems that a rational reasoning goes toward extension of the Annex 
only to those directives which protect consumer economic values. 
 
5. Explanations and Solutions for the Doubling of Injunctions  
 
Rules governing an action for an injunction have been included in both the Injunction 
Directive and other substance related consumer protection directives, mainly Directive 
93/13/EC
340
, Directive 97/7/EC
341
 and Directive 2005/29/EC.
342
 Academics have delineated a 
sense of legal overlapping
343
 requiring further explanation. The fact that the provisions are set 
down in two branches of law might be regarded as the result of mere negligence on the part of 
the EU legislator or may also be recognized as being done purposely. The latter explanation 
seems hardly convincing. The Legal Services of the Commission and all the bodies involved 
in legislative process would not have brought the question to the fore. Therefore, there is the 
need to discover the message behind the Injunction Directive and to disclose its particular 
legal context.  
The obvious reasons might very well be that splitting the consumer substantive law 
directives into substance and procedure would have triggered complicated political 
discussions on whether, and to what extent, the European Commission has competence at all 
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to regulate enforcement.
344
 It should be recalled that the ECJ had accepted the integration of 
enforcement mechanisms only in cases where substance and procedure were together.
345
 In 
the literature on this topic, it has simply been proposed to delete the substantive law 
provisions concerning injunctions contained in the substantive law directives
346
 and 
recognized them as a sign of the negligence of the EU legislator. In practice, the issue can be 
solved the other way round. If a certain group of legal provisions become extinct, they will be 
derogated in the frame of time, because they have lost their practical value and relevance. 
Derogation, however, requires much more time, and only the flow of the time will prove any 
real practical relevance of the legal acts. In order to bring a proof of derogation, more time 
and more experience is needed; therefore, the EU could have used much more relevant 
instruments than simply expect for the effluxion of time in order to provide for a derogation. 
Setting aside the importance of the Directive on Injunction in cross-border cases
347
, 
this statement undermines the key role of the Annex in the shaping of the dualistic character 
of the Directive, which has been used as a counterargument against the suspicion of 
negligence undertaken if the Commission’s negligence becomes a real argument. By placing 
the mark of reference as a footnote to the Injunction Directive, the EU legislator has 
intentionally emphasized that the provisions for an action for an injunction also refer to 
substantive law regulations. Otherwise, the mark of reference does not make much sense in 
the overall context of the Injunction Directive. 
The fact that there are two sets of norms providing an action for an injunction in 
existence has led to questions concerning a struggle of norms understood as a form of a 
hidden competition of legal norms, of which norm prevails over the other. Although these two 
sets of rules are characterised by quite different legal natures, they should not collide. Rather, 
they should be understood as incompatible with each other.
348
 They cannot be juxtaposed as 
inconsistent rules. In such circumstances, theories have advanced the concept of silent 
derogation, or of typical implicit derogation. The procedural parts in the subject related legal 
norms would then be substituted by the respective rules in the Injunction Directive. The 
problem would be that the procedural rules in the Injunction Directive are not fully covered in 
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its counterparts, let us say in Art. 7 of Directive 93/13/EC.
349
 The reasons is that Art. 7 refers 
to the substantive part, as the ECJ in line with the Advocate General has made abundantly 
clear in Invitel.
350
 
The relationship remains quite a problematic issue since no single and comprehensive 
theory has been advanced thus far as to how to handle this type of conflict. In addition, no 
inspiration can be drawn from the Member States, either practical or theoretical; especially 
since modes of implementation of the regulations in both spheres of law slightly differ among 
Member States. No clear answer can be discerned from the legal analysis of both sources of 
regulations or from an analysis of the materials and reports on injunctions passed by the 
Commission, or coming from a legal research. 
Obviously, the legislative technique of doubling introduces a kind of double-track 
definition of an action for an injunction. Therefore, we are faced with two sources of 
definitions that operate in parallel within the market irritations in relations to:  
(i) the choice of injunction, and in which kind of case which injunction shall apply, 
(ii) whether these double-track norms collide in practice as some doctrinal discussion has 
assumed
351
, 
(iii) if so, what kind of collision would that be,  
(iv) whether an action for an injunction may build up a new classification of rules 
recognized as sui generis legal remedies.  
The Injunction Directive itself neither provides for indicative details to clarify the 
relationship nor introduces any regularity. That would mean legal practice has to clarify. From 
a theoretical perspective, the relationship between substantive law and procedure causes many 
ambiguities. Under the general scheme of the Injunction Directive it is not possible to 
theoretically explain in a clear and reasonable manner how the relationship is to look like. At 
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first glance, the relationship is defined as neither complementary nor substitutionary. The 
current frame of injunction may be rather described through the prism of links of the 
procedural and substantive law-related provisions. 
In addition, it is purported that the extent of their interrelation varies according to the 
specific case at hand and one strand may dominate the other at any given time. The extent of 
this interrelation can only be assessed on the basis of the analysis of the specific case at hand. 
Hence the analysis of the Injunction Directive requires a casuistic interpretation. As a matter 
of fact, only legal practice can provide us with hints as regards the nuances between these two 
spheres of law. The situation becomes even more complicated when one realises that the 
Injunction Directive is not solely rooted in theoretical divagations, according to which the 
extent of the interrelation may be measurable, but is intended to serve as a tool of practical 
value used for the enforcement of consumer rights. 
 
6. Interim Conclusion 
 
The position of the mark of reference, and various methods of implementation found 
in the Member States which allows either for individual or collective enforcement measures 
has led to the development of the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures. The thesis is a 
novelty, because thus far no links have been made between individual and collective 
enforcement in this field of law. In particular, the background of the mark of reference is a 
crucial element in reading and understating of the Injunction Directive.  
Although the Injunction Directive has introduced significant changes and 
improvements as regards the collective enforcement rights of consumer rights
352
, by the 
dominant focus given to the collective element, it has deprived individual consumers of 
individual enforcement rights granted via substantive law under the substance related 
directives on consumer protection. Since the Injunction Directive was issued, the main focus 
was given to collective enforcement, and basically the shift was made from individual to 
collective schemes, which have never been read in conjunction, but always side-by-side and 
no links have been discovered between them. This does not mean, however, that the 
provisions on individual enforcement have been deleted and repealed from national legal 
models. Individual enforcement has simply been given a lesser value and they simply 
becomes less important in consumer protection. With the introduction of the Injunction 
                                               
352 See Chapter III 5. 
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Directive, more focus was given to mechanisms of collective enforcement, which have been 
introduced with this line into the national models of enforcement within the Member States.  
Although the consumer is still protected in national law, all the Member States with 
the implementation of the Injunction Directive have given more focus to collective redress. 
Collective redress has been recognized as quicker, cheaper and most effective than individual 
redress measures, which protect a single consumer and have not been given a group, or 
collective effect. The thesis of dualism has been given light in the reasoning of 
Wilhelmsson
353
, who tackled the issue of the links between individual and collective 
enforcement, and who argues that the unfair commercial practices Directive remains silent on 
individual claims and therefore does not impose any obligations on the Member States to 
harmonise this specific area. In Wilhelmsson’s view, the silence of the UCPD as regards 
individual cases does not prejudice that the context of the UCPD cannot be used in individual 
cases. By adoption of the collective scheme, the individual enforcement is not deprived its 
practical and legal relevance. Wilhelmsson’s statement proves a thesis of dualism, which goes 
toward a concept of linkage between individual and collective schemes of enforcement. 
Wilhelmsson argues that it cannot be a purpose of the Directive - especially in the field of 
consumer protection to eliminate the right of individuals to take an injunctive action. The 
assumption that the UCPD is not directly meant to cover such private rules on individual 
protection should not be read a scheme, which deprives a single individual her protection.
354
 
Wilhelmsson’s conclusion, although they are not based on the linkage of individual and 
collective enforcement made on the basis of the mark of reference, also make a link between 
individual and collective frame of enforcement and is in line with the thesis of dualism of 
enforcement measures as elaborated in this thesis/chapter. Following the theory of 
Wilhelmsson, the UCPD is definitely “without prejudice to individual actions brought by 
those who have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice”355 and “the preliminary 
focus shall be on unfair practices that cause detriment to the interests of consumers as a 
whole, rather than individual cases”.356 Therefore, although the UCPD is meant to solve 
collective maters it should not be interpreted as a legal measure aimed at exclusion of 
individual claims. This limitation of the scope of the UCPD, albeit an indirect one, 
nonetheless means the harmonising obligations of Member States in relation to individual 
                                               
353 Wilhelmsson (2006), Scope of the Directive, in Howells/Micklitz/Wilhelmsson, European Fair Trading Law: 
The Unfair Commercial Practice Directive, Dartmouth, p. 51-54. 
354 Schulte-Nölke/Twigg-Flesner/Ebers, EC Consumer Law…, p. 88. 
355 Recital 9 of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (OJ L 149, 11.06.2005, p. 22–39). 
356 Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, COM(2002) 289 final 9, 
Brussels, 11 June 2002. 
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claims are limited. As Wilhelmsson claims, if the UCPD is “without prejudice” to such 
actions it must mean that Member States are free to adopt, and their courts are free to develop 
stricter rules on unfair commercial practices as long as the only sanctions available are related 
to individual actions. Furthermore, nothing prevents Member States from using the UCPD 
and to implement the UCPD in a way which justifies individual claims, nor does anything 
prevent member states from reading UCPD in both an individual and a collective enforcement 
scheme. 
Therefore, it is a questionable issue whether the EU legislator intended to shift from 
individual to collective enforcement and by doing so increasing the protection offered to 
individuals. As the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures shows the EU legislator does 
not intend to shift from individual to collective enforcement, but to combine them both to the 
benefit of consumers. Considering the new plans and strategies at the EU level, it would seem 
a little unreasonable that the EU legislator intended to only introduce collective measures 
leaving individual enforcement to member states law. However, as the process of 
implementation of the Injunction Directive demonstrates, most of the Member States 
implemented the Directive in a way that does not deprive individual enforcement from its 
importance and meaning. Both individuals as well as groups of consumers are entitled to 
bring a claim in consumer matters. 
The lack of consideration in regards to individual claims was not the real aim of the 
Injunction Directive and the exclusion of individual way of enforcement from the scope of the 
Directive was not intended by the legislator. This is more the effect of different 
implementation methods in the national legal orders which have understand the remedy of 
injunction as individual or collective, with more focus as of the latter. This way of thinking 
may be wrong, because the modes of enforcement should be read in parallel, and because 
consumer protection should provide complex solutions. Since collective enforcement was the 
only missing link in the framework of consumer protection enforcement measures, the 
Injunction Directive is a supplement in the area of consumer law enforcement which in order 
to be complex enforcement tool it has envisaged the individual and collective scope of 
enforcement lined together. The EU legislator intended to increase and extend consumer 
protection through the development of all possible enforcement means in order to increase 
consumer confidence such that the EU legislator cannot limit the consumer protection by 
excluding individuals from the basic legislative framework. The reading shall be conducted in 
consideration of a deeper sense of consumer protection policy, and not to be based on the 
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literal meaning of provisions on enforcement included in both sets of regulations, but keeping 
in mind the overall scheme of the injunction procedure.  
In the thesis of dualism of enforcement measure a crucial role is given to the mark of 
reference binding the sphere of substantive law and procedural issues. The mark of reference 
plays a role of a paper clip holding together substantive and procedural law spheres, as a 
conjunction of individual and collective enforcement means as well as public and private 
devices. This is a unique solution among other consumer law directives, which has not been 
used and developed so far. Member States present a variety of enforcement models, and a 
variety of injunction procedures. However, they are united in diversity since they have 
adopted the EU scheme of injunction and implemented the Injunction Directive in ways 
always in accordance with the EU requirements of the Injunction Directive and particularities 
of their national enforcement schemes. The Injunction Directive in view of its atypical 
structure and atypical nature allowed for implementation of dualism of enforcement measures. 
The dualism strives for convergence of enforcement models, and allows for using the 
injunction procedure accordingly to the procedural schemes settled by each of the Member 
States.  
The silence of the EU, and the lack of explanation for the overall situation have 
yielded a variety of modes of implementation of the Injunction Directive within the national 
enforcement schemes. This was a kind of a vicious circle, because on the one hand the 
Injunction Directive was aimed at bringing coherence, at least partial coherence of 
enforcement models in Europe. On the other hand, its flexibility and ambiguous frame and 
structure have left many questions opened and not entirely clarified, so that the Member 
States were somehow pushed to develop an enforcement model that would fit, and that would 
not be against the scheme brought by the Injunction Directive. Member States have designed 
the enforcement schemes in line with their national traditions and their national legal 
cultures.
357
 The Injunction Directive brought about the flexibility of a choice between the 
public and private enforcement models, brought a conjunction of substantive and procedural 
law matters, and in the final effect, a dualism of enforcement models as a conjunction of 
individual and collective enforcement measures. All those have been implemented and 
generally adopted by the Member States in variety of modes and a patchwork of enforcement 
models within the European Union.  
                                               
357 Micklitz (2005), The Politics of Judicial…, p. 292; „Private law is tied up with national traditions and 
cultures. Any attempt to subject private law to EC law would therefore be fraught with difficulties and would 
meet opposition”.  
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The promised coherence in fact is “a one size fits all solution”. This made the 
Injunction Directive feasible within the overall national legal schemes in Europe. It is not the 
imposition of a fully-fledge enforcement scheme, but a broad frame which opens the path 
towards convergence. Although the Injunction Directive does not bring a unique and unified 
pattern of injunction, at least it laid down basic requirements towards convergence and 
coherence within diversity and provided for a conjunction of individual and collective frames 
of enforcement.  
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Chapter III Cross-border Context of the Injunction Directive 
  
1. Overview  
 
The Injunction Directive protects consumers against intra-Community infringements. 
Contrary to the national dimension the entire scheme does not leave any doubts that the 
protection of consumers in cross-border matters was a crucial issue to be considered in the 
Injunction Directive. In chapter II the Injunction Directive has been conceptualised – based on 
evidence obtained from a study of national jurisdictions – as including individual 
enforcement, though mainly in the national environment. To date, however, a very limited 
number of collective cross-border disputes have reached the courts since its adoption in 
1998.
358
 In light of this, integrating the ambitious objective into member state legal orders this 
cannot be regarded as a success.  
Although in the national enforcement frame, the Injunction Directive introduces and 
binds both individuals and collective enforcement actors, links the substantive law and 
procedural law matters, it will be shown that similar convergence has not been achieved in 
cross-border litigation. In this context, it follows an either/or, collective or individual pattern; 
neither are interlinked – they stand side-by-side, separated from each other. As a matter of 
fact, more attention is given to individual cross–border measures, a result of practical 
experience in the Member States.  
European collective cross-border enforcement requires a different reading to national 
scheme of enforcement. The dualism of enforcement measures in consumer law, however, as 
regard the cross-border scheme of the Injunction Directive shall be analysed in light of the 
existing diversity of enforcement measures, even if the cross-border scheme does not provide 
for specific links and conjunctions between individual and collective scheme of enforcement 
or substantive law and procedural law matters. Cross-border collective consumer transactions 
are, for quite a long time, of interest to various influential groups. EU consumers while 
crossing borders cannot/do not fully benefit from the dualism of enforcement measures. Their 
interests are not protected at all. The collective scheme of enforcement suffers, it turns out, 
from significant inconsistencies and complexity lack of comprehensiveness. These 
inconsistency and the mal-functioning of the collective enforcement element in cross-border 
                                               
358 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC, p. 5 - only one case concerning the use of injunctions with a 
collective cross-border dimension has been brought; Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 3 – 
Germany: 20 cases; Austria reported: 8 cases. 
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litigation promoted the development of new tools of enforcement addressed to cross-border 
measures, namely, the adoption of Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation. 
The new modes and enforcement measures were supposed to improve the EU cross-border 
enforcement scenario and to handle the complexity of cross-border conflicts in a more 
suitable way. However, the new tools were not co-ordinated with the Injunction Directive. 
Due to the insufficiency of and the poor results achieved by the Injunction Directive and of 
Regulation 2006/2004, consumer organisations and national enforcement authorities look for 
a new design for fighting unfair commercial behaviour which affects consumers in the 
Internal market by way of co-ordinated action. Here consumer organisations and national 
enforcement bodies do not engage into complex collective cross-border issues, but co-
ordinate their collective strategies on the basis of the action for injunction at the national level 
against the same or similar wrongdoers.
359
  
Finally the design for individual cross-border litigation has been developed via extra-
judicial measures, such as ODR and ADR frames with a cross-border dimension, which are 
addressed to individuals only. The two acts adopted in 2013, on ADR Directive 2013/11
360
 
and on ODR Regulation 524/2013
361
, have boosted the establishment of Europe-wide out-of-
court dispute settlement schemes.
362
 Both the “invention” of co-ordinated actions and the 
strong promotion of ADR/ORD serve as a substitute for weaknesses of both the Injunction 
Directive and of Regulation 2006/2004. In light of the thesis of dualism of enforcement 
measures, cross-border enforcement shall be considered in the following contexts: 
(i) collective cross-border enforcement as introduced by the Injunction Directive 
98/27/EC; 
(ii) collective cross-border enforcement under the regime of Regulation 2006/2004; 
(iii) co-ordinated action at the national level operated under the regime of the action for 
injunction, not necessarily the Injunction Directive; 
(iv) individual enforcement via non-judicial measures as now provided for by 
Directive 2013/11/EU on ADR and Regulation 2013/524/EU on ODR.  
 
                                               
359 See Chapter III 7. 
360 Directive on Consumer ADR Directive 2013/11/EU (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 63–79). 
361 Regulation on Consumer ODR (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 1–12). 
362 See Chapter III; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Toward a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress”, Strasbourg, 11 June 2013, COM(2013) 401 final, p. 3.  
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2. Dualism of Enforcement Measures in Cross-border Context of the Injunction 
Directive  
 
The dualism of enforcement measures has been identified as a link between collective and 
individual enforcement which at national level can exist and operate on an equal footing, 
which in parallel ties individual and collective elements. At the national level consumers are 
offered a choice of individual and collective enforcement measures within the scheme of the 
Injunction Directive paving the way from diversity to convergence of injunctions. Although 
dualism plays an important role in promoting coherence of enforcement schemes, the theory 
does not fit with cross-border enforcement. In the cross-border context the phenomenon of 
dualism of enforcement does no longer serves as a way to obtain reasonable solutions for 
overcoming inconsistencies in the Injunction Directive in binding different spheres of laws 
and enforcement. In the cross-border context the Injunction Directive does not establish a 
parallel basis for the possible coexistence of individual and collective enforcement methods. 
Practical experience shows that individual claims are predominant in cross border 
enforcement, while the collective dimension is missing. Consumer cross-border collective 
actions are legally too complex, too expensive, too time consuming and the effect of rulings is 
always limited.
363
 It will be shown that the Directive despite its ambitious character has done 
little to overcome all these foreseeable insufficiencies. In cross-border matters, the collective 
dimension of the Injunction Directive requires a co-ordination of different fields of laws, 
jurisdiction, applicable laws, and co-ordination of a number of bodies entitled to protect the 
collective interests of consumers.  
The Injunction Directive as well as the supplementary Regulation 2006/2004 bear a strong 
procedural flavour, though tied to substantive law issues. Both pieces of legislation are 
intended to ensure a smooth functioning of the Internal Market, to protect (collective) 
consumers’ interests and both are focused on the protection of the economic interests of 
consumers.
364
 The Injunction Directive aims at fighting intra-Community infringements ex 
lege, though it covers purely national litigation as well, while Regulation 2006/2004 covers 
only cross-border infringements. The scenario is less colourful and less structured once the 
cross-border element is taken into account. In cross-border EU enforcement, there is no 
linkage between the individual and the collective dimension of injunctions. It suffices to recall 
                                               
363 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC, p. 6-8. 
364 See Chapter IV 4.1.  
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that both Directive 2013/11/EU on ADR
365
 and Regulation 524/2013/EU on ODR
366
 are in no 
way integrated into either Directive 98/27/EC nor Regulation 2006/2004. Therefore, in the 
cross-border context the thesis of dualism of enforcement finds little support in the existing 
body of EU law. Since the two spheres of enforcement stand alone, the cross-border 
dimension of the Injunction Directive as well as of Regulation 2006/2004 divides the 
collective and the individual dimensions. Schemes such as SOLVIT, EEC-Net or the new 
ADR/ODR set of rules do not provide for links to the collective issues.
367
 Only individuals are 
the addressees of out-of-court enforcement measures. Hence, the current cross-border 
scenario presents itself as a parallel scheme of individual and collective enforcement 
measures, grounded in a variety of enforcement schemes from the Injunction Directive, 
through Regulation 2006/2004 up to the out-of-court measures of enforcement of consumer 
laws. Contrary to the national litigation, Member States have neither been able nor willing to 
fill the conceptual gap between collective and individual cross-border enforcement. It remains 
to be seen whether and to what extent Member States are willing to use the ongoing 
implementation of the ADR Directive 2013/11/EU
368
 and the ODR Regulation 
524/2013/EU
369
 as an opportunity to remedy this deficiency. 
 
3. Cross-border Matters in Consumer Law 
 
The first generation of consumer protection directives did not deal with the cross-
border dimension. This is true for the Directive 93/13/EC on unfair contract terms as well as 
for Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising and later Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair 
commercial practices. All substance-related consumer protection directives cover only the 
national dimension of consumer cases. The cross-border aspect had been left aside until 1998 
when the Injunction Directive was adopted.
370
 The growing interest in cross-border 
relationships in the field of consumer law is related to the swift development of new methods 
of communication and the availability of efficient and affordable means of transport, which 
enable products to cross borders easily and in a short period of time. In the last few decades, 
European consumers are being offered more goods and services - both business and 
                                               
365 Regulation on Consumer ODR Regulation (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 1–12). 
366 Directive on consumer ADR (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 63–79). 
367 See below Chapter III 8. 
368 Directive on consumer ADR Directive (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 63–79). 
369 Regulation on consumer ODR (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 1–12). 
370 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 final.  
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professional - throughout the European Union.
371
 There is a vast array of choice and huge 
opportunities for traders, meaning that consumers can decide where to buy goods, using 
several methods of purchasing and payment. Consumers have gained access to a much greater 
diversity of goods and services of different nature than a decade ago. Although the Internal 
Market is undergoing rapid change and although the position of the consumer has improved 
considerably in recent years, consumers still have to face many different obstacles when it 
comes to the cross-border purchase of goods and services.
372
 Cross-border trade requires 
appropriate redress means. Consumers must deal with complicated technical, legal and 
cultural problems in the enforcement of their rights when a product or service turns out to be 
defective or even dangerous.
373
 The cost of the various legal proceedings to rectify the matter 
might be significantly higher than any compensation that a consumer could ever reasonably 
be granted. These high administrative costs can result in a decrease of consumer confidence, 
who become reluctant Euro-shoppers. The enforcement of cross-border claims not only 
depends on the quality and accessibility of enforcement measures, but also and most often on 
language barriers
374
 or of deeper cultural differences in national enforcement patterns.
375
 All 
these factors deepen and multiply the difficulties for consumers entering into retail 
transactions across borders. They may cause various problems that strongly influence the 
national enforcement schemes in Europe. The growing cross-border transactions yield the 
need to develop and design particular enforcement methods, including those dedicated to 
specific fields of laws, or specific sales methods, like e-commerce. 
Since the Internal Market has become more open, consumers from different Member 
States increasingly encounter unfair and ambiguous practices when purchasing cross-border. 
                                               
371 Documents in which the Commission has indicated the legal and socio-legal value of cross-border 
relationships in particular with respect to collective cross-border redress can be found in various documents that 
have built up a coherent scheme of Commission policy in cross-border matters, for example: Green Paper on 
Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 final; Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013 {SEC(2007) 321}, 
{SEC(2007) 322}, {SEC(2007) 323}. 
372 For a description of the obstacles consumers currently face in cross-border relationships see: “Evaluation of 
effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union”, Final Report, A study 
submitted to the European Commission, DG SANCO by Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford Economics, 
<http://www.civic-consulting.de/reports/collective%20redress_study.pdf> accessed on June 2, 2012. 
373 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 
07.08.1985, p. 29–33) and the Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety (OJ L 11, 15.01.2002, p. 4-17). 
374 Storme (2009), The Foundation of Private Law in a Multi-level Structure: Balancing, Distribution of 
Lawmaking Power and other Constitutional Issues, A paper at the Conference “The Foundations of European 
private law”, EUI Fiesole/Firenze 28-30 September, in Brownsword/Micklitz/Niglia/Weatherill (2011), The 
Foundations of European Private Law; Micklitz (1993), Cross-Border Consumer…, p. 411-434. 
375 Reich (1998), Jurisdiction and Law Applicable in Cross-Border Consumer Complaints, Socio-Legal Remarks 
on an Ongoing Dilemma Concerning Effective Legal Protection for Consumer-Citizens in the European Union, 
Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 21(3), p. 315-337. 
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Therefore, consumers require a stronger and more complex legal protection. The creation of 
the Internal Market meant that consumers, who buy more goods and products need to be 
equipped to face diverse problems. Consumers question the accessibility and effectiveness of 
enforcement measures, which are currently at their disposal in Europe.
376
 In light of the 
deficient legal design of cross-border enforcement
377
, it seems questionable whether the path 
paved by the Injunction Directive, Regulation 2006/2004 and the ADR/ODR tools allows 
consumers to effectively enforce their rights.  
These pieces of legislation have to be read conjointly. They focus on assuring a high 
level of consumer protection and on improvement of cross-border relationships. Both the 
Injunction Directive and Regulation 2006/2004 are aimed at the protection of collective 
consumers’ interests378; in other words, they were not aimed at handling individual consumer 
complaints at least in theory when one considers the legislative technique used to sketch them 
within the EU level enforcement frame.
379
 The introduction of the Injunction Directive and 
Regulation 2006/2004 as means of enforcement has enhanced the equal protection of 
consumers with regard to intra-Community infringements, which is recognized as one of the 
main factor for a proper functioning of the EU Internal Market
380
 - but this protection exists 
largely on paper.  
In reality, the Injunction Directive has mainly yielded positive effects as a remedy 
addressed to national enforcement issues.
381
 The national methods for its implementation have 
left no doubt as to the possibility of application of the Injunction Directive to domestic 
matters.
382
 The practical experiences of Member States demonstrate that injunctions have 
been successfully developed, mainly by consumer associations as enforcement tools to 
combat national infringements.
383
 However, the argument that the Injunction Directive is 
equally applicable to cross-border situations still requires proof.
384
 The experience gained 
                                               
376 Final Report to DG SANCO, Part I: Main Report, Submitted by Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford 
Economics; Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis… 
377 See Chapter II 3., 4.3. 
378 In the Injunction Directive uses: “the collective interest of consumers”, the Regulation 2006/2004, “the 
consumer economic interests”. 
379 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 6.  
380 The issue was discussed in the High Level Meeting during the Belgian Presidency of the EU, held in Brussels 
on the 22 September 2010, by Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe, Consumer Ombudsman of Denmark, in the 
presentation entitled “Which Tools to Enforce the Consumer Acquis?”, at slide 2. 
381 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 3. 
382 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 3. The vast majority of actions for injunction reported 
by the Member States came from the national level.  
383 Report from on the application of Directive 98/27/EC, COM(2008) 756 final. 
384 Hodges (2008), The Reform of Class…, p.108; The same sentiment has been expressed by Betlem (2007), 
Public and Private Transnational Enforcement of EU Consumer Law, in Van Boom/Loos (2007), Effective 
Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, p. 39-41, 44-45. 
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from the application of Regulation 2006/2004 is equally not very promising.
385
 Within the 
space of a few years, the European Commission was preparing a revision of the original 
design of the enforcement frame so as to improve its efficiency and to overcome existing 
gaps.
386
 
These research findings are somewhat concerning in light of an Internal Market, which 
sets aside the distinction between domestic and cross-border situations. Nowadays, ever more 
national transactions end up having cross-border dimensions. Currently, it is quite difficult to 
imagine a consumer law-relation with a purely domestic dimension or to find a consumer, 
who has never crossed a border, especially in the era of the Internet communication, when the 
border is crossed virtually, setting aside the delivery of the product and the financial 
transactions. The same is true for collective consumer redress. Beforehand, these matters bore 
only a national dimension, but increasingly they have a cross-border dimension, as market 
misbehaviour and unfair commercial practices are not tied to a Member States territory only. 
These two examples show that a distinction between the national and cross-border element 
within the current market structure no longer makes sense. Restricting the scope of EU law to 
cross-border and/or national cases might prove impossible, most visible in collective actions 
where the plaintiff acts for a group of consumers, which could reside anywhere in the EU or it 
would at least be inefficient to emphasise national or cross-border dimensions only.  
The same argument applies to the distinction between collective and individual 
enforcement. Breaking down consumer conflicts into individual disputes before national 
courts or via ADR/ODR in cross-border transactions quite often hides the fact that the 
problem the litigating consumer tries to solve is of a collective dimension. That is why the 
latest shift of the EU enforcement policy, first from the Injunctions Directive to the 
Regulation 2006/2004 – means a move from a common scheme for national and trans-border 
issues in which consumer organisations play a key role, to a mechanism which relies on 
statutory agencies bound to transborder transactions and secondly, to a transborder litigation 
scheme where the individual plays a key role, does not really demonstrate how the promised 
land of effective individual and collective, national and cross-border enforcement of 
consumer rights could be achieved. 
 
                                               
385 Report on the application of Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws (the Regulation on consumer protection cooperation), Brussels, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/biennial_national_reports_en.htm#biennial> accessed on March 12, 
2014. 
386 See Chapter III 6.  
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4. Different Models of Cross-border Injunctions  
 
The cross-border model of the Injunction Directive starts from the following 
constellations: 
(i) the Injunction Directive requires that a qualified entity387 from a Member State A can 
sue a business operator from Member State B, if the business operator in Member 
States B while trading with consumers in Member State A breaches consumer rights; 
(ii) the Injunction Directive serves as a legal basis for a situation in which the trader of 
Member State B operates within Member State A, and a qualified entity in Member 
States B can bring a case before a court of Member State A or any other Member 
State, to which he has directed his activity; 
A third category has emerged from legal practice: 
(iii) “cross-border co-ordinated procedure” – “a co-ordinated action” of consumers 
organizations.
388
 The co-ordinated action rises as a novel and quite atypical solution, 
so far unknown in the European scenario, but its practical relevance may be 
appreciated in various areas and fields of law. In the pioneering “aircraft case”, all 
judgments were delivered in Belgium.
389
 They obliged simultaneously three airlines to 
stop using a number of contract terms, which have been regarded as unfair in those 
Member States, which participated in the co-ordinated action. The cross-border 
procedure has been overridden by national enforcement schemes which tied together 
have yielded a spectacular effect close to a cross-border procedure.  
Although the definition provided by the Injunction Directive leaves no doubt that the 
Directive applies to cross-border cases, it does not explicitly exclude either domestic matters 
from its scope.
390
 Actions for injunctions as trans-border measures of consumer protection 
have been implemented in all Member States. However, in the majority of Member States, the 
cross-border element of injunctions has been overlooked and under-conceptualised. There are 
various reasons for the lack of interest of Member States in the cross-border dimension of the 
                                               
387 See Chapter III 5. 
388 A particular kind of cross-border action started in May 2009 in Portugal, France, Belgium; See: Judgment of 
La Cour De Cassation of 25 March 2010, La société VGC distribution v l’association Union fédérale des 
consommateurs, Que choisir de l’Isère, No. de pourvoi 09-12678; Judgment of The Namur Commercial Court 
(Tribunal de Commerce de Namur) of March 10, 2010, The consumer association Test-Achats v Brussels 
Airlines, Ryanair and EasyJet, Répertoire 784. 
389 See Chapter III 7.3. 
390 Although the definition of cross-border infringement applies to both the Injunction Directive and Regulation 
2006/2004, there is a difference between Article 4 of the Injunction Directive and Article 3b) of Regulation 
2006/2004.  
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injunction mechanism.
391
 The national legal orders tend to use measures related to the 
national sphere. They have not recognised the need to introduce mechanisms of innovative 
nature reaching beyond national enforcement scenarios. 
  
5. Collective Cross-border Enforcement via the Injunction Directive
392
 
 
The Injunction Directive was adopted due to the insufficiency or/and the “deficit” of 
cross-border enforcement mechanisms and the lack of speedy procedures
393
 in the field of 
consumer protection.
394
 The Injunction Directive was intended to be a ”panacea” for cross-
border consumer problems. The injunction mechanism applies, where unlawful practices 
produce effects outside the country they originated in and in cases of this kind Community 
legislative action is required.  
With regard to the legal context of the Injunction Directive its title is a misnomer
395
, 
because it does not illustrate the real content of the Injunction Directive and does not focus on 
what was the really important element of the Injunction Directive. The title of the Directive 
focuses on a consumer interest rather than on a scheme of procedural protection and it does 
not draw any particular attention to its collective cross-border dimension, which arises as one 
of the crucial elements of the Injunction Directive. Furthermore, the title does not refer to the 
mutual recognition of legal standing of the qualified entities, which indeed is a crucial and 
quite untypical issue related to the Injunction Directive. Surprisingly, the Injunction Directive 
in the title did not indicate that (i) an injunction procedure is a form of group action, and 
should be considered in the same manner as other forms of collective redress at the EU level, 
and (ii) that the Injunction Directive is a measure addressed to cross-border collective 
relationships. In theory, one would expect that the title of a legislative act provides for a 
description of the content of the legal act. As far as the Injunction Directive is concerned the 
title does not make clear what the content of the Injunction Directive.  
The collective nature of the Injunction Directive is not reflected in the use of action of 
injunction. The content of the Injunction Directive provides evidence that it is a collective 
redress instrument, which is classified amongst other mechanisms of collective redress. The 
                                               
391 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
392 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of April 23, 2009 for the protection of 
consumers’ interests (OJ L 110, 1.05.2009, p. 30-36). 
393 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…, p. 326. 
394 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 for the protection of 
consumers’ interests (OJ L 110, 1.05.2009, p. 30), Recital 2. 
395 Koch (2001), Non-class Group…, p. 355-367. 
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collective dimension of the Directive cannot be questioned, even if not all the pieces of 
legislation listed in the Annex can be classified as protecting collective interests.
396
 The 
Injunction Directive should perhaps be titled in a more precise manner, and given its legal 
value that would be desirable to make it define injunctions as “associations’ suit” according 
to a proposal made by proposed by H. Koch.
397
  
In order to make the Injunction Directive a flexible tool for consumer law 
enforcement, it contains both public and private enforcement. The Injunction Directive was 
supposed to function as “one suit fits all” enforcement solution. This approach leaves a large 
margin of discretion to Member States. It is up to them to decide which option fits best their 
national enforcement schemes. The injunctive procedure then becomes applicable to 
consumer cases of a various nature, thereby, however, it allows for differentiation since the 
Member States are left the choice of the preferred enforcement path, which may be purely 
public, purely private, or may also be a mixture of both.
398
 
The way in which the Injunction Directive handles the complicated issue of “legal 
standing” is of paradigmatic importance.399 The Directive does not clearly indicate who 
should be granted legal standing, the reasons for which legal standing may be claimed, or 
whether or not the entitled party may be an individual or exclusively a consumer association. 
It simply contains a reference to the right to take action and the legitimate interest to which 
the action is tied. That is why it is necessary to draw a distinction between the right of action 
and the standing to sue. It seems as if the European legislature has borrowed this distinction 
from French law, the right of action
400
 (in French “qualité d’agir”) and the legitimate interest 
in taking a legal action (in French “intérêt pour agire”), the standing to sue.401 While the 
right to bring a legal action is a key issue in the Injunction Directive, the standing to sue has 
been touched upon by the Directive, but the very same Directive has left a number of issues 
open.
402
 In relation to this issue, the Injunction Directive remains clear, since it introduced ex 
lege confirmation of a mutual recognition of the legal standing of consumer organisations, 
                                               
396 See Chapter I 3.3., 6. 
397 Ibidem. 
398 See Chapter III 5., 6.  
399 Koch (2001), Non-class Group…, p. 355-367. 
400 The right of action (qualité d’agir) that determines which lex fori applies, also brings much more clarity by 
providing a mutual recognition of the standing of national consumer organizations. 
401 The legitimate interest to take legal action (intérêt pour agir) is determined by lex fori delicti, given the nature 
of an injunctive order – delict, perhaps a quasi-delict. See: Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European 
Consumer..., p. 313.  
402 In Weatherill/Bernitz (2007), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29: 
New Rules and New Techniques, Studies of the Oxford Institute of European & Comparative Law, p. 239-240. 
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while with regard to standing to sue, also known as legitimate interest to take a legal action, 
its delictual and quasi-delictual nature through the lex loci delicti rule is to be considered. 
 
5. 1. Right of Action 
 
The mutual recognition of standing is meant to significantly improve cross-border 
consumer relationships. The key instrument to establish mutual recognition of standing is the 
establishment of an EU wide list of registered qualified entities.  
Article 4(2)of the Injunction Directive: 
“For the purposes of intra-Community infringements, and without prejudice to the rights 
granted to other entities under national legislation, the Member States shall, at the request of 
their qualified entities, communicate to the Commission that these entities are qualified to 
bring an action under Article 2. The Member States shall inform the Commission of the 
name and purpose of these qualified entities. [emphasis added MO] (3) The Commission 
shall draw up a list of the qualified entities referred to in paragraph 2, with the specification 
of their purpose. This list shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union; 
changes to this list shall be published without delay and the updated list shall be published 
every six months”. 
In order to be registered, each Member State has to notify to the European 
Commission the name and purpose of the particular qualified entities, which can be public or 
private, on their request.
403
 All what qualified entities are required to do in order to be 
recognized is to provide relevant evidence of their “purpose”. This can only be understood as 
the capacity to act on behalf of the collective interests of consumers along the line of the spirit 
of the Annex. Once enrolled on the list published in the Official Journal, the entities are 
formally and automatically granted the legal standing to sue. The administration and the 
management of the list lie in the hands of the European Commission. The Commission lists 
the qualified entities meant to be established for intra-community infringements. All qualified 
entities are published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The list shall be 
“frequently” updated. In practice, it is updated twice yearly with certain possible delays of an 
administrative and technical nature. Delays in updating the list in the Official Journal could 
potentially prevent a qualified entity from one Member State from taking action in another 
Member State. It is questionable whether the list is sufficiently up-to-date, considering the 
                                               
403 See Chapter III 5., 6, IV 4.4. 
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multitude of consumer organisations still being established at the national level and the 
potential of each of these to be notified to the Commission.
404
 
Article 4 of the Injunction Directive requires Member States to take all measures 
necessary to ensure that, in event of an infringement originating in that Member State, any 
qualified entity from another Member State, in circumstances where the interests protected by 
the qualified entity are affected by the infringement, have the legal standing to make a claim 
in the Member State in which the infringement took place. The Injunction Directive 
established a general framework for the mutual recognition of standing of qualified entities. It 
formulates only minimal standards on the requirements a qualified entity had to fulfil to 
represent the collective consumer interest.
405
 Concerning the requirements posed by the 
Injunction Directive, it is highly debatable whether the minimum standards can provide for a 
proper solution and can be regarded as an adequate “filter” for qualified entities. This is all 
the more so as the Injunction Directive gives no clear indication as to how mutual recognition 
should be applied in practice and it does not establish any requirements in this regard.
406
 
Legal standing is limited to those consumer entities indicated in the list published by the 
European Commission. This means that cross-border consumer cases may be brought only by 
qualified entities, which have been recognised and registered in the list of the Commission. 
Unregistered consumer organisations not recognised as qualified entities cannot act as 
qualified entities in cross-border cases. Therefore they cannot be identified as qualified 
entities in the form of consumer organizations established upon the frame of the Injunction 
Directive. This legislative technique should help to develop a properly working scheme of 
who is responsible for what, and where. If a consumer organisation has been included in the 
list, Member States have lost their powers evaluate this registration within the EU run list.
407
 
The registration is definitive and cannot be questioned.  
Although Member States have no right to verify a listed entity ex post, they are 
granted input in the choice of qualified entities which should be included on the list of 
qualified entities. It is up to Member States to notify a particular consumer organization to be 
covered by the list. The entities may request notification. Here, discretion should not be 
confounded with arbitrariness, because the Member States have to respect the European 
                                               
404 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European Consumer…, p. 386.  
405 Muir Watt (2010), Brussels I and Aggregate Litigation of the Case for Redesigning the Common Judicial 
Area in Order to Respond to Changing Dynamics, Functions and Structures in Contemporary Adjudication and 
Litigation, IPRAX, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, Vol. 2, p. 111-116. 
406 Micklitz (2008), in Krüger/Rauscher, Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordonung, Band 3: §§ 946-
1086 EGZPO - GVG - EGGVG - UklaG Internationales Zivilprozessrecht (in English translation made by Alicja 
Sozańska), p. 1279-1282. 
407 Weatherill/Bernitz (2007), The Regulation of…, p. 239-244. 
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minimum standards. It would be interesting to know whether and to what extent a national 
consumer organization which has not been notified to the European Commission may go to a 
national court claiming that they have indeed met the minimum requirements. Thus far this 
has not happened, perhaps because most of the Member States have turned out to be quite 
generous in nominating the qualified entities and proposing them to be registered. The deeper 
reason why Member States enjoy discretion can be found in the broad variations on what may 
be called a qualified entity legitimized to represent the collective interests of consumers in 
courts.
408
 Indirectly the Injunctions Directive imposes on the Member States the obligation to 
lay down standards which if met allow for taking legal action before a national court in 
another country than the home country. However, this obligation covers cross-border standing 
only. The Injunction Directive does not oblige Member States to introduce a register for 
purely national litigation. That is why today’s national landscape of registered qualified 
entities looks quite different with regards to national and cross-border standing. Nationally, 
there might be no list, only the national requirements have to be meet. They may be examined 
by national administrations and national courts. Shifting to cross-border issues, the picture 
changes dramatically. Here the Official Journal of the EU informs any judge in charge of a 
cross-border dispute based on action for injunction, whether the claimant consumer 
organization has been registered, what means that it has been granted standing.  
 Most of the Member States seized the opportunity to define common standards for 
national and trans-border infringements. The Injunction Directive does not include ex lege 
exclusion for domestic cases, which means that there are no obstacles to prevent the Member 
States from extending the scope of application of the Directive to national matters. It should 
be stressed that consumer organisations that play a role under the Injunction Directive may 
not focus exclusively on cross-border infringements. Quite the contrary is true. Most 
consumer organizations limit their activities to the national level.
409
 It will be shown that 
consumer organisations are rarely involved in cross-border conflicts.
410
 
 
 
 
                                               
408 Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania – only one consumer association, the Netherlands, Romania and Sweden more than 
15 established, and Spain, Italy and France less than 30 consumer associations established, Germany and Greece 
– more than 70 established consumer associations. 
409 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 3-4.  
410 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 3.  
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5. 2. Abuse of the Right to take Action 
 
The only way to stop an EU registered qualified entity before a national court or 
before a national consumer agencies is to argue that the registered entity is misusing its 
power. The Injunction Directive expresses this reservation in the following language: 
Article 4 (1) of the Injunction Directive:  
“Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, in the event of an 
infringement originating in that Member State, any qualified entity from another Member 
State where the interests protected by that qualified entity are affected by the infringement, 
may apply to the court or administrative authority referred to in Article 2, on presentation of 
the list provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article. The courts or administrative authorities 
shall accept this list as proof of the legal capacity of the qualified entity without prejudice to 
their right to examine whether the purpose of the qualified entity justifies its taking action 
in a specific case” [emphasis added MO]. 
Member States, in dealing with a particular qualified entity, can assess whether the 
entity in question has met the minimum standards under the Injunction Directive, and whether 
- based on these minimum standards - the consumer organisation should be allowed to take an 
action in the case-at-hand. However, the power is limited to test the “use” of the right sue in 
that particular case, under that particular circumstances.
411
 Doubts may result from the fact 
that the qualified entity has lost legal capacity or is pursuing purposes that are not covered by 
the statute or are not in the interest of consumers. Certain kinds of cases may require a certain 
profile of competence and activity. Therefore, the particular profile of the consumer 
protection activity might fit, but equally, might not fit at all.
412
 The threshold for such an 
intervention is therefore high.
413
 Any other interpretation would run counter to the spirit of the 
Injunction Directive which deliberately aims at preventing national administrations and courts 
from second guessing the national criteria. Admittedly, the borderline between a second 
control of the national registration standards and the abuse of the power in a concrete case is a 
                                               
411 Weatherill/Bernitz (2007), The Regulation of…, p. 239. 
412 Some consumer organizations, in particular from new Member States use only experts in the areas of 
consumer guarantee and product liability cases while specialist as of the e-commerce area are highly sought after 
on the market.  
413 In a similar direction the German Supreme Court, Monatszeitschrift für Deutsches Recht 2010, 1339. 
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rather thin one. It is for the national courts of Member States to carefully handle that 
distinction.
414
  
Therefore Article 4(1) sent. 2 of the Injunction Directive, provide courts and 
administrative bodies with the capacity to verify whether the aim of a qualified entity justifies 
its legal action in a particular case. Nevertheless, it is up to national enforcement bodies - 
these being actively involved in the injunction procedure - to verify and juxtapose the aim of 
the qualified entity in relation to the subject of its complaint. This would resolve a problem 
that could arise when an entity has a limited scope of activity. EC guidelines limit the activity 
of the national legislator and national courts to control of abuses in this regard. However, the 
control of abuses of certain rights cannot be extended to include control of qualified entities 
already on the list, or of the requirements of qualified entities which act before national 
courts. This may be called a limited verification of legal interest. Despite these uncertainties, 
the Injunction Directive leaves no doubt that a “double control” of the standing to sue of an 
EU wide registered qualified entities included is not allowed. 
 
5. 3. Legitimate Interest to take Legal Action 
 
Although all procedural rules and principles are applicable to the Injunction Directive, 
quite surprisingly, the Directive remains silent on the key issue of the legitimate interest to 
take a legal action. The Injunction Directive provides for no specific rules in respect of 
standing to sue. It neither provides a full and exhaustive list of requirements for standing to 
sue, nor provides a single example of an applicable law in cross-border transactions. The 
guidance given is limited: 
Article 3 of the Injunction Directive:  
“For the purposes of this Directive, a ‘qualified entity’ means any body or organisation 
which, being properly constituted according to the law of a Member State, has a legitimate 
interest in ensuring that the provisions referred to in Article 1 are complied with [emphasis 
added MO], in particular:  
(a) one or more independent public bodies, specifically responsible for protecting the 
interests referred to in Article 1, in Member States in which such bodies exist; and/or  
                                               
414 Judgment of the Court of 3 June 1992, Alberto Paletta and others v Brennet AG., Case C-45/90 (ECR 1992, 
p. I-03423); Judgment of the Court of 2 May 1996, Brennet AG v Vittorio Paletta, Case C-206/94 (ECR 1996, p. 
I-02357), 427 final. 
146 
 
(b) organisations whose purpose is to protect the interests referred to in Article 1, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by the national law”.  
All what the Injunction Directive provides for is a reference to the legitimate interest, 
with a reference to Article 1 of the Injunction Directive, which means that the interest must be 
a collective one and this it is bound under the minimum standards to the protection of 
economic interests. One may read the formula such that the Directive leaves the issue of 
providing substance to “legitimate interest” in taking legal action to the Member States to 
decide. This is only partly correct. Already the wording draws a distinction between the 
qualified entity properly constituted according to the law of a Member State and the 
legitimate interests to take legal action in the collective interests of consumers.
415
 Two 
arguments matter: the scope of application is not bound to cross-border cases alone. So the 
reference to legitimate interests turns into the EU concept even for purely national cases. 
Secondly in cross-border cases the Injunction Directive ties the mutual recognition of legal 
standing to qualified bodies acting in the legitimate interest of consumers. That is why the 
notion of “legitimate interest” opens the way for an autonomous interpretation. To be sure, 
these requirements can only be of a minimum nature. Public qualified entities must be 
“independent” this would mean for consumer organisations being free from business 
membership. A stable organizational structure, an office, a certain minimum size, a long-term 
activity and a concretisation of the envisaged activities in the field of consumer policy would 
equally fit into that category. Funding is a particular difficult issue.
416
 However, it is not 
possible to derive from EU law a particular Member States obligation to provide for the 
necessary resources.  
The cross border nature of the Injunction Directive provides for particular intricacies, 
due to the hybrid nature of the action for injunction which combines procedural and 
substantive issues.  
Article 2 (2) of the Injunction Directive states:  
“2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the rules of private international law with 
respect to the applicable law, that is, normally, either the law of the Member State where the 
infringement originated or the law of the Member State where the infringement has its 
effects.” 
                                               
415 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European Consumer…, p. 387.  
416 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC. 
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There is a significant difference between the German, Italian, Polish, English
417
 and 
French versions.
418
 The German version refers to international private law and international 
procedural law.
419
 The Polish version made a reference to the international private law and 
the Italian version
420
 refers to delle regole di diritto internazionale privato. As has been 
previously established, an injunction order compels someone to refrain from doing something, 
or to modify certain behaviour. This specific nature has led to its classification as a legal 
remedy, located somewhere between tort or delict and a quasi-delict, combing substance and 
procedure. The fact that the action for an injunction is of quite undetermined nature is of great 
relevance to the choice of law applicable to the case-at-hand. 
The nature of an action for an injunction procedure paves the way for the application 
of the Rome II regulation.
421
 The choice of law in the case is determined by the lex loci 
delicti, which is typically the place where the infringement has taken place. This is known as 
the market rule.
422
 The alternative is the country of origin principle which was brought 
forward in particular in transborder advertising and sales promotion.
423
 In Reich’s opinion424 
the country of origin principle must ensure that no risks originate in the territory of Member 
State A which could endanger citizens in Member State B. However, Rome II ended to the 
debate. However, the market rule has to comply with the particular substantive issues at stake. 
Here the picture might slightly differ according to the subject matter concerned. 
 
 
 
                                               
417 Article 2(2) of the Polish version: „Niniejsza dyrektywa pozostaje bez uszczerbku dla zasad prawa 
prywatnego międzynarodowego odnoszących się do właściwego prawa, prowadzących zazwyczaj do stosowania 
bądź prawa Państwa Członkowskiego, z którego pochodzi szkodliwa praktyka, bądź prawa Państwa 
Członkowskiego, w którym wystąpiły skutki szkodliwej praktyki”. 
418
 Article 2(2) in the French version: “La présente directive est sans préjudice des règles de droit international 
privé en ce qui concerne le droit applicable, qui devrait donc normalement être, soit le droit de l'État membre où 
l'infraction a son origine, soit celui de l'État membre où l'infraction produit ses effets“.  
419Article 2 (2) in the German version: „Diese Richtlinie läßt die Vorschriften des Internationalen Privatrechts 
und des Internationalen Zivilprozeßrechts hinsichtlich des anzuwendenden Rechts unberührt, so daß 
normalerweise entweder das Recht des Mitgliedstaats, in dem der Verstoß seinen Ursprung hat, oder das Recht 
des Mitgliedstaats, in dem sich der Verstoß auswirkt, angewendet wird“. 
420 Article 2(2) in the Italian version: „La presente direttiva non osta all'applicazione delle regole di diritto 
internazionale privato sulla legge applicabile e comporta, di norma, l'applicazione della legge dello Stato 
membro in cui ha origine la violazione o della legge dello Stato membro in cui la violazione produce i suoi 
effetti“. 
421 Rome II (OJ L 199, 31.07.2007, p. 40–49). 
422 Reich (2014), Cross-border Consumer Protection, in Reich/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner (2014), European 
Consumer..., p. 313-314. 
423 The European Court of Justice made a clear point concerning this issue in: Judgment of the Court of 20 
February 1979, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, Case C-120/78, ECR 1979, p. 
649. 
424 Howells/Micklitz/Wilhelmsson (2006), European Fair Trading…, p. 235, 509. 
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5. 4. Consumer Organisations in Cross-border Injunctions 
 
The Injunction Directive grants legal standing to consumer organisations, which are 
supposed to deal with cross-border cases. Although it has for a long time been questionable as 
to whether consumer organisations are granted legal standing and whether they are recognised 
as of equivalent standing to that of an individual
425
, the Injunction Directive has brought about 
the long expected clarification. Since the Injunction Directive was issued, consumer 
organizations are allowed to act on behalf of consumers all over Europe. It has simplified 
cross-border enforcement and thereby cross-border trade. An analysis of the current use of 
remedy of injunction in terms of cross-border relationship demonstrates however a quite 
cloudy picture.
426
 In most Member States consumer organisations do not really engage in 
litigation. However, recently the evolution of the consumer movement is becoming more 
transparent
427
 and consumer organizations more often try to assist plaintiffs in individual 
disputes, in terms of expertise, sharing experiences, which supports the argument above.
428
 
Essentially, this is a relic of the public enforcement tradition, which is particularly strong in 
Europe and even more so in the new Member States. Public enforcement still appears as the 
most common form of enforcement. This explains the rather limited role and function of 
consumer associations in cross-border enforcement.  
Another potential obstacles are human resources
429
 and funding for consumer 
organisations.
430
 No funding means no case.
431
 The success or failure of activities of 
consumer organisations also depends on the financial risk of the proceedings, length of the 
proceedings, complexity of the procedure, the limited effect of the rulings and their 
enforcement.
432
 If these aspects remain underdeveloped, no one can expect the injunction 
procedure to work properly. It is one thing to grant consumer organisations legal standing, 
                                               
425 On agencies and NGOs empowered by legislation to enforce particular areas of private contract law see: Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law (2011), Vol. 11(2), Debates over Group Litigation in 
Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn From Each Other?; Hensler (2010), Using Class Actions to 
Enforce Consumer Protection Law, in Howells/Ramsay/Wilhelmsson/Kraft, Handbook of Research on 
International Consumer Law, p. 515. 
426 Caponi (2009), The Collective Redress… 
427 Poncibò (2009), The Reform of Directive 98/27/EC, in Cafaggi/Micklitz, New Frontiers of..., p. 283-303. 
428 Personal communication of the author with consumer association representatives at the occasion of TRACE 
training held in Brussels at BEUC premises. Consumer organizations face a problem of not being able to pass the 
threshold of the strict bureaucratic control usually managed by the ministries or governmental bodies which 
check the threshold in terms of the number of consumer organization members, their presence in the relevant 
territory, the internal organization, and others.  
429 BEUC, training materials Collective Consumer Redress Course, <www.beuc.eu> accessed on September 14, 
2011. 
430 Hodges/Tulibacka/Vogenhauer (2010), The Costs and Funding…, p. 489-492. 
431 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 46-47. 
432 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC; Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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and another to equip them with a certain degree of power, which would entitle them to 
monitor infringements and violations and to open up room for the proper selection of cases to 
be brought before a court. In the majority of Member States consumer organisations have 
neither the legal power to monitor the market, nor sufficient funding to properly organise a 
monitoring process, nor funding for selection the appropriate cases, which would be necessary 
in order to take a case to the court. All these issues are already complicated in a national legal 
and cultural environment and in a cross-border dimension the difficulties multiply. The 
reaction of consumer associations to all these difficulties was, and is, to rely on co-ordinated 
enforcement as a more successful alternative to cross-border litigation. Here they can at least 
frame the litigation in the national context, within the national network, including media 
support, more often attention of consumers and governmental bodies to consumer 
organization activity, last but the least the issue of funding.  
The shift from cross-border litigation to co-ordinated action, however, reveals the 
differences between the role and function of consumer organisations in the old versus the new 
Member States. As a rule of thumb one might say that consumer associations play a more 
significant role in the old Member States. In the new Member States they are often 
downgraded to mere puppets and they are certainly not regarded as serious societal actors.
433
 
This is both indicative and in consumer policy terms problematic. It is indicative in that only a 
strong civil society may yield social activities and the formation of associations. Despite all 
the rhetoric on civil society building, it seems as if there is still an imbalance between the 
“old” and the “new”. It is problematic in that consumer organisations from the new Member 
States are under-represented in co-ordinated actions, which means that the old Member States 
dominate the selection of the appropriate cases.  
 
5. 5. Public Bodies in Cross-border Injunctions 
 
The Injunction Directive is rooted in public and private enforcement. Under 
Regulation 2006/2004, the main focus is given to public enforcement since Member States 
were obligated to nominate public authorities which manage cross-border conflicts and which 
are - at least as a means of last resource - equipped with the necessary powers to initiate an 
action for injunction.  
                                               
433 Bakardijeva-Engelbrekt (2009), Public and Private…and Safjan/Gorywoda/Janczuk (2009), Taking the 
Collective Interest of Consumers Seriously: A View from Poland, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers 
of…, p. 91-138, 171-200. 
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Member States are free to decide on the institutional structure of the empowered 
public body as an integral part of their procedural autonomy.
434
 The qualified entity can be a 
part of a ministry
435
, it can be an agency
436
, which is in charge of other market surveillance 
activities
437
 – here cross-border injunctions is just another field – or they can establish a 
particular public entity which has the competence to look after consumer matters alone.
438
 
Needless to say, the large leeway given leads to all sorts of institutional arrangements, which 
are not necessarily beneficial for the building of a European enforcement regime. The 
intended revision of Regulation 2006/2004 might improve and streamline the future 
institutional design.
439
 The move towards public bodies is potentially more valuable than 
private enforcement.
440
  
It might suffice to contrast the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and the former 
post-Communist countries. For decades the Office of Fair Trading, as an independent public 
agency in charge of matters of trade and consumer policy, operated rather successfully in the 
protection of the collective interests of consumers. Typically various fields of policies are 
merged in one public body. The Nordic model looks different.
441
 Here consumer policy 
matters are bundled in the hands of a Consumer Ombudsman, which has to monitor and 
supervise
442
 the market and to take legal action where appropriate. As the name indicates, the 
Consumer Ombudsman focuses of consumer matters alone. However, the situation is 
currently in flux. The Office of Fair Trading has been dissolved and re-established under a 
new design with less focus on consumer protection issues. In Finland the Consumer 
Ombudsman is merged with the competition authorities, which reflects a general trend in the 
                                               
434 In the certain systems such as in Scandinavia and Central and Eastern European Member States the role of 
public bodies is predominant.  
435 For example: Belgium.  
436 For example: the Netherlands. 
437
 For example: Sweden.  
438 For example: Lithuania.  
439 The European Commission roadmap regarding the Review of the Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws, <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2014_sanco_001_consumer_protection_cooperation_review_en.pdf> 
accessed on June 10, 2014. 
regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2014_sanco_001_consumer_protection_cooperation_review_en.pdf> 
accessed on May 29, 2014; proves a direction of potential changes in order to increase effectiveness and 
sufficiency of the EU net.  
440 In the UK - the Office of Fair Trading has been very active in policing unfair terms. Over 6,000 contract 
terms have been deleted or amended after 1000 cases. This was stressed in a speech by G. Monti, The Revision of 
the Consumer Acquis from a Competition Law Perspective, speech at the conference: The Common Frame of 
Reference and the Future of European Contract Law, Amsterdam June 1-2, 2007, p. 5. 
441 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 27, Vitanen, K. (2007), Enforcement of consumers’ collective interests 
by regulatory agencies in the Nordic countries Argomenti, Consumatori, Diritti, Mercato, 2007 , p. 79-101.  
442 Vitanen (2007), Enforcement of consumers’ collective interests by regulatory agencies in the Nordic 
countries Argomenti, Consumatori, Diritti, Mercato, 2007 , p. 79-101, at. 82.  
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EU of what might be called “institutional merger”.443 In the new Member States the 
institution of the ombudsman or public enforcement bodies such as the former Office of Fair 
Trading
444
 are largely unknown. Here specific ministerial units are supposed to deal with 
enforcement issues. In post-Communist countries there is still a deep reliance in the power of 
administrative bodies and the public sphere of enforcement
445
, which are used once 
consumers’ interests are infringed by any kind of unlawful activity on the business side.  
In the Czech Republic, although both judicial and administrative measures exist side-
by-side, administrative instruments have been developed in a consumer-friendly manner. 
They made injunction procedure easily accessible. Both consumer organizations as well as 
individual consumers may file administrative motions. The Czech Republic injunction 
procedure has three features: 
(i) Courts446, which are not specialist and governed by special rules on consumer 
protection, are still underdeveloped which implies that “(…) the judicial system does 
not deem enforcement of collective interest desirable”. Due to the expenses and the 
long procedure this variant is of minor importance,  
(ii) Ombudsman activity - with specific rule in the area of consumer law. the Ombudsman 
intervenes only in case of failures between a consumer and the public administration,  
(iii) Governmental administrative bodies, which do not have links to the judiciary and 
which are governed by administrative procedural law.
447
 It is a common sense that 
agencies make a part of governmental structure creating more societal respect for the 
administrative procedures.  
In Poland, the action for injunction has been introduced through the Act on 
Competition and Consumer Protection. It provides, as in most of the new Member States, for 
a mix of judicial and administrative measures. The administrative scheme, the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection, decides on practices infringing the collective 
                                               
443 Ottow (2014), Erosion or Innovation? The Institutional Design of Competition Agencies - A Dutch Case 
Study, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, p. 25-43. A similar trend is observed with regard to the Office of Fair 
Trading which since 1973 was responsible for protecting consumer interests throughout the UK. It closed on 1 
April 2014, with its responsibilities passing to a number of different organizations including the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) and the Financial Conduct Authority. 
444 More details with regard the issue analysis can be found in: Howells/Weatherill (2005), EU Consumer…; 
Ramsay (2007), Consumer Law and Policy, p. 327. 
445 Kmieciak (2005), Postępowanie Administracyjne w Europie, Kraków, p. 329.  
446 Tichy/Balarin (2009), Efficiency of the Protection of Collective Interest: Judicial and Administrative 
Enforcement in the Czech Republic, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 79. 
447 The Administrative Procedure Act No. 500/2004, < http://www.zakonyanglicky.cz/?documentation=act-no-
5002004-coll-administrative-procedure-code> accessed on May 29, 2014. 
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consumer interest. The decision is subject to judicial review.
448
 The Office of the Competition 
and Consumer Protection will initiate regulatory action only if the infringement is harmful to 
the public interest of consumers. Standing in the administrative procedure is given to the 
Ombudsman, the consumers’ spokesman, consumer organizations, including those recognized 
as qualified under the Injunction Directive excluding a consumer, who may claim upon rules 
of civil law and civil procedure in the procedures dedicated to specific legal fields. As 
Bakardjieva states “(…) public enforcement was recognized as indispensable element of the 
overall institutional framework of consumer protection in all CEE”449 [Central and Eastern 
European Countries].  
 
5. 6. Practical Use of Collective Cross-border Mechanisms in Duchèsne 
 
Although the collective cross-border consumer element was already established in 
1998, its practical value and relevance is more appreciated in the national context than the 
cross-border one.
450
 All in all, the picture is not very promising. Only a few cases
451
 have 
been adjudicated on the basis of the Injunction Directive. Duchèsne remains a flagship for 
cross-border collective use of the Injunctions Directive.
452
 This is why Duchèsne is as also 
recognized as a test case upon which pros and cons of the cross-border aspect of the 
Injunction Directive may be considered, and what kind of obstacles can be faced in this 
regard. It also illustrates how the rules on legal standing can and should be exercised in legal 
practice, and what kind of legal obstacles can arise, and last but the least prove how the rule 
of law applicable imply ambiguity and uncertainty and how it can dramatically change the 
final judgment.  
This case was brought to court by the Office of Fair Trading, which is a public body, 
precisely a non-profit and non-ministerial government department in the United Kingdom, 
which sued a Belgium company - Duchèsne bay Dutch company, named Best Sales BV. The 
two bodies had been engaged in sweepstakes activity. Duchèsne was engaged in retail-by-
                                               
448 Stefaniuk (2010), Sądowa Kontrola Decyzji Administracyjnych Wydawanych przez Prezesa Urzędu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów w Sprawach Ochorny Konkurencji na Podstawie Przepisów Ustawy z Dnia 16 
lutego 2007 R. o Ochronie Konkurencji i Konsumentów, Teka Kom. Praw. OL PAN, 192–206 
449 Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (2009) Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 101-
104.  
450 Chiarloni/Fiorio (2005), Consumatori e Processo, La Tutela degli Interessi Collettivi dei Consumatori; 
regarding the use of the Injunction Directive in the national and cross-border context, including statistical data 
see: Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC. 
451 Micklitz/Stuyck/Terryn/Droshout (2010), Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law, Oxford, p. 573.  
452 Since Duchèsne there is little progress; Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 
2009/29/EC. 
153 
 
correspondence and sent unsolicited mail-order catalogues including advertisements for 
household goods, decorations, leisure and Do-It-Yourself products to residents of the United 
Kingdom. The goods were promoted through the notification the addressees were recognized 
as a prize’s winners of a lump sum of 10.000£. The company offering this cross-border 
sweepstake operated in a number of Member States, in particular France, the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. A participant in the promotional game was automatically recognized as 
price winner. The tickets were circulated with the catalogues. Each person, who received a 
catalogue was only supposed to indicate necessary details, then to contact the game organizer, 
and to find out whether the ticket he had received together with the catalogue was a winning 
one, prior to a deadline that had been drawn for this lottery.
453
  
Since this practice was obviously harmful to consumers, the OFT has initiated the first 
cross-border procedure for an action for an injunction. The first truly cross-border collective 
action took place in Belgium before the Court d’appel de Bruxelles. The legal standing of the 
OFT was not put into question. The OFT acted on its own initiative. The case, which from the 
beginning was very particular had been very carefully prepared by the different departments 
of the OFT. One of the crucial elements of the investigation on Duchèsne was monitoring of 
the catalogue campaign in the relevant Member States, as listed below, where different 
regulatory actions had been taken afterward. Such methodology allows to consider the OFT as 
a national regulatory body acting in the collective interest of consumers not only those in the 
UK consumers, but also consumers from other EU-states as far as they the sales promotion 
campaign could have affected their rights. 
The OFT recognized the practice as a breach of the Fair Trade Practices Act
454
 and of 
the English law of 23 May 1988 on consumer protection.
455
 The OFT argued that consumers 
were misled by the company since they believed that they only had to make a purchase in 
order to secure a prize, while in practice the winners were selected in advance and only a very 
few recipients would actually receive a prize. According to the Court of Appeal in Brussels, 
the company had received about 4. 000 orders each day with a reference to the sweepstake in 
the catalogue. Many of the consumers complained. Although the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal in Brussels relied on the cross-border injunction, it seems that the basic elements of 
                                               
453 Micklitz/Stuyck/Terryn/Droshout (2010), Cases, Materials…, p. 573; Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 
107-108.  
454 Referring to the Fair Trade Practices Act of the 14 July 1991 with reference to Article 23.1, 23.2, 23.4, 23.10, 
23.14 and 94. 
455 The Control of Misleading Advertising Regulation 1988 – Statutory Instrument 1998 No. 915. 
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the judgments and its innovative nature did not gain much public attention. More interest than 
the judgment itself was given to the amount of the penalty payments imposed on Duchèsne.  
The penalty payments remained a subject of controversy. At first instance, the Court 
ordered that the company had to pay 25.000 Euro for each infringement of the cessation order. 
In the final result, the Court found this penalty to be exaggerated and reduced it to 2.500 Euro 
per folder, limiting the total aggregate penalty to 1.000.000 Euro. The Court of Appeal in 
Belgium had exercised its judicial power and independence and managed to apply a role on 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions. The Court indeed calculated a penalty 
upon the frame of the national legal requirements and sanctions. The Court was allowed to do 
so since EU law leaves it up to the discretion of national legal systems.  
The costs resulting from the preparatory phase of the procedure were a crucial issue 
since the preparatory phase for Duchèsne was very lengthy, expensive and time-consuming. 
The preliminary stage was begun by the OFT long before the case was brought to court. The 
OFT acting by various departments had started a lengthy and detailed investigation, searching 
case-by-case, literally catalogue-by-catalogue. This investigation was very costly, because of 
the necessity of to translate documents, which was necessary not only for the OFT but also for 
the Court of Appeal in Belgium.  
Although the OFT brought a claim for the reimbursement of the costs of translation of 
the documents in the preparatory phase, the claim for reimbursement was rejected by the 
Court. The Court classified these items as expenses, which are not essential to proceedings. 
The Belgian judge did not consider that the court procedure could not be started without the 
set of documents giving a basis for the claim. A decision in favour of OFT would have had a 
deterrent effect for potential repetitions of this kind of activity, since the widespread strategy 
of using sweepstakes to promote the sale of products and services have become very common 
and their popularity among business has significantly increased. 
Although the Injunction Directive is always identified with potential problems 
regarding the legal standing of the qualified entities, in Duchèsne it was never put into 
question whether the OFT can sue a company from Belgium. The Court in Brussels did not 
even consider whether or not to grant a standing to sue to the OFT. Such a statement of the 
Belgian Court may be recognized as a great success of mutual recognition of standing. The 
mechanisms of the Injunction Directive really works in practice. Duchèsne may also be 
recognized as a sign that public bodies, in particular the OFT, enjoy a good reputation even 
beyond its borders. In terms of common perception that public bodies are more powerful than 
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private actors, this demonstrates the power of public bodies in the area of consumer law 
enforcement.  
The OFT, a public body from the United Kingdom, had filed the action in Belgium. 
This was the way to circumvent eventual problems German and French consumers’ 
organisations faced in direct shopping. French consumers’ organisation wanted to protect 
French consumers against German-based unfair commercial practices in France, and German 
based consumer organisations became involved in protecting not only German consumers in 
Germany, but also French consumers in France against strategies which had their origin in 
Germany.
456
 Although the case demonstrates that OFT, a public organization, enjoys legal 
standing according to the principle of mutual recognition of standing, the situation might have 
looked quite different if the standing had been in the hand of consumer organisations. 
The Court has given special attention to the decision on the applicable law. Both the 
court of first instance and the court of appeal were actively engaged in a debate on whether 
Belgian or English law applies, since the activity of the company could have been recognized 
as a breach of either the UK or Belgian law. The Court of first instance argued in favour of 
the applicability of English law, whereas the Court of Appeal came to the contrary conclusion 
and applied the Belgian rules of law. Hence, the courts have developed reasoning afterward 
adopted, and which is consistent with the Rome II Regulation.
457
 Commercial practices have 
been classified as extra-contractual obligations. Furthermore, claims made under unfair 
competition law are influencing the competitive relations or the collective interest of 
consumers. This was further codifies as a “market rule” in Rome II.458 This means the law 
applicable is the law of the country in which due to the competitive relations a collective 
consumer interest is affected.
459
 Therefore, the Court of Appeal intended to stop unfair 
commercial practices in the place of their origin. The law of the state affected by the 
advertising has completely no influence on the applicable law. In that case only the state of 
origin of the unlawful practice matters. 
The provisions of the UCPD are very much in line with the general message behind 
Rome II indicating the applicable law on the basis of lex loci delicti commissi. This means 
that the law has to be chosen where the damage has arisen or is likely to occur; in practice, 
this means it is usually the victim’s place of residence. Although Duchèsne raises many 
                                               
456 Micklitz (1993), Cross-Border Consumer…, p. 411-434.  
457 Weatherill/Bernitz (2007), The Regulation of…, p. 238-240. 
458 Micklitz/Stuyck/Terryn/Droshout (2010), Cases, Materials…, p. 575. 
459 Cafaggi (2006), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law, Oxford, p. 191. It should be added 
that Article 3 of the Regulation Rome II acknowledges the lex loci delicti commissi, such as situations in which 
the damage arises or is likely to arise. In a majority of situations it is the place where the victim is a resident. 
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different and interesting procedural aspects, the Court somehow disregarded the issues that 
could have shed light on the innovative potential of the Injunction Directive. Apart from the 
issue of the applicable law, Duchèsne has caused commentators to underline that UK 
consumers are recognized as robust consumers
460
 in comparison with the EU consumer who 
falls into a more continental tradition. The Court, however, did not provide any tangible 
argument for this. The argumentation of the OFT went in the complete opposite direction 
since advertising measures undertaken by Duchèsne were recognized as particularly 
dangerous for vulnerable consumers.
461
 Considering the blurry picture and ambiguous nature 
of both concepts of the definition of a consumer
462
, the Court rejected the arguments of both 
parties, because neither of them provided extensive and relevant proof in terms of the case 
complexity. This has opened up a discussion of whether EU legislation really needs to 
differentiate on the basis of vulnerable and robust consumers, as these notions have brought a 
massive amount of ambiguity into the case-law of the Member States since they introduce 
conceptual description rather than precisely formulated definitions. The Court decided to 
check the merit of the catalogues, and concluded that the catalogues were supposed to mislead 
consumers by affecting consumers sincerely and leading consumers to believe that they had 
really won a prize, which was the amount of money on the cheque mentioned in the 
catalogue. Overall Duchèsne blatantly demonstrated the difficulties and barriers in the 
application of the Injunction Directive. 
 
6. Collective cross-border enforcement via Regulation 2006/2004  
 
Due to various problems that had been identified in relation to the cross-border 
dimension of the Injunction Directive, including its complexity, the broad variety of Member 
States solutions, lack of funding and lack human resources in particular of consumer 
organisations, the Commission as a kind of rescue tool decided to issue Regulation 
2006/2004. Regulation 2006/2004 was supposed to bring about improvement consumer law 
                                               
460 The Court has come back to the concept of the robust consumer which was developed in the United Kingdom 
in early ’90; Collins (2000), White and Green and not much Re(a)d: The 1988 White Paper on Broadcasting 
Policy, Television, Policy & Culture, 2000, p. 81-82. 
461 Burden (1998), The Office of Fair Trading, Vulnerable Consumer Groups: Quantification and Analysis, 
Research Paper of the Office of Fair Trading, Vol. 1; Scott/Black (2000), Cranstons’ Consumers and the Law, 
Cambridge, p. 4-5. 
462 See: Hesselink, European Contract Law: A Matter of Consumer Protection, Citizenship, or Justice? 
European Review of Private Law, Vol. 3, p. 323-348. 
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enforcement as far as a remedy of injunction was concerned.
463
 The enforcement mechanism 
introduced by Regulation 2006/2004 complements the scheme of the Injunction Directive – 
the two pieces of legislation follow the same rationale and they are focused on achievement of 
the same goals.  
In Article 1, the Regulation 2006/2004 describes its objectives: “This Regulation lays 
down the conditions under which the competent authorities in the Member States designated 
as responsible for the enforcement of the laws that protect consumers' interests shall 
cooperate with each other and with the Commission in order to ensure compliance with those 
laws and the smooth functioning of the internal market and in order to enhance the protection 
of consumers' economic interests.” Hence, the Regulation 2006/2004 is meant to enhance 
Internal Market building through cooperation between public authorities. Regulation 
2006/2004 does not address individual claims. It is notable that neither during the legislative 
process nor in the recitals is there any effort to connect the two pieces of cross border rules. 
This is all the more important as the Regulation 2006/2004 tilts the carefully established 
balance between the individual and the collective towards the collective, administrative side.  
Regulation 2006/2004 is meant to create a network of national public authorities, 
which are responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer law, and are equipped with a 
minimum of common investigation and enforcement powers. Public authorities in the network 
are (i) obliged to work together and, (ii) cooperate with the Commission in order to share 
information about enforcement problems and in order to work on development of new 
effective enforcement solutions for consumer collective enforcement problems. Regulation 
2006/2004 stresses the value of the “mutual assistance” between national authorities and the 
Commission. Mutual assistance is based on an exchange of information on request
464
 and 
without request
465
, on requests for enforcement measures
466
, co-ordination of market 
surveillance
467
 and technical side of the enforcement activities like as the maintenance of 
secure databases available only to national authorities involved in the public enforcement 
scheme sketched under Regulation 2006/2004.
468
 Enforcement activity of the public bodies 
includes also enforcement co-ordination in terms of training and exchange of officials, 
development of existing communications tools, or collection and classification of consumer 
                                               
463 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws, Brussels, 3.01.2011, COM(2010) 791 final. 
464 Article 6 of the Regulation 2006/2004.  
465 Article 7 of the Regulation 2006/2004. 
466 Article 8 of the Regulation 2006/2004. 
467 Article 9 of the Regulation 2006/2004. 
468 Article 10 of the Regulation 2006/2004. 
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complaints
469
, and others. Although the exchange of information takes place with the 
participation of the Commission, the Commission is not formally a member of Consumer 
Cooperation Network. Although it does not form part of the Consumer Cooperation Network, 
it participates in the activities of the network. The Commission is in charge of technical issues 
such as the processing and storing of information circulated within the network rather than 
sensu stricto activity in the course of procedure and action. The public bodies transpose the 
EC consumer acquis communitaire as listed in the Annex to the Regulation 2006/2004. 
Therefore, Regulation 2006/2004 provides for cross-border enforcement of 18 designated 
measures comprising corpus iuris consumentis.
470
 It is worth stressing that Regulation 
2006/2004 following the legislative technique of the Injunction Directive introduced a mark 
of reference in the Annex to the Regulation 2006/2004, which lists the pieces of legislation to 
which Regulation 2006/2004 applies. It only repeats what was already said in the mark of 
reference to the Injunction Directive Regulation 2006/2004 is rather straightforward and does 
not allow much for interpretation. 
Regulation 2006/2004 is a kind of “a sister act”471 to the Injunction Directive. Both 
pieces of legislation have been designed to improve the position of the consumer in cross-
border consumer law enforcement and are aimed at the protection of consumers’ economic 
interest. The two pieces of legislation are compatible enforcement measures used to combat 
cross-border consumer rights violations. Although they have are directed at realising a 
common aim, they are completely different regarding their procedural content procedure and 
their normative structures. On the one hand, there is the idea of mutual recognition of standing 
to promote and increase enforcement on the other there is the concept of co-operation 
between regulatory agencies. Although the goal of protection provided by the two legal acts 
are common, it does not mean that the two pieces are not interlinked. The opposite conclusion 
comes from the Report on implementation of the Injunction Directive.
472
 I indicated the 
significant impact of Regulation 2006/2004 on the use of injunctions, in particular in terms of 
their more frequent use. This impact is said to result from the fact that most of the public 
authorities have opted to use co-operation mechanisms when combating an illegal practice by 
a trader in another Member State, instead of directly seeking an injunction before the courts of 
the Member State.  
                                               
469 Article 16(1) of the Regulation 2006/2004. 
470 Hodges (2008), The Reform of, p.109. 
471 Betlem (2007), Public and Private…, in Van Boom/Loos (2007), Effective Enforcement of…, p. 39-45, 
Micklitz/Styuck/Terryn (2010), Case, Materials…, p. 578. 
472 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 8-9. 
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In essence, the new Regulation 2006/2004 realizes the idea of networking.
473
 Cross-
border enforcement depends on the flow and speed of information, which paves the way for 
taking collective actions, as foreseen in the Injunction Directive.
474
 Regulation 2006/2004 
secures a mutual exchange of experiences within the network of authorised bodies, which can 
be mutually supportive. The cooperation is based on the principle of confidentiality.
475
 
Although authorities do not go cross-border, they may ask for assistance from authorities, 
which are familiar with procedures in the state of the wrongdoer.
476
 Regulation 2006/2004 is 
aimed at development of mutual cooperation in the use of standing among the Member States, 
but only if this is the result of networking.
477
  
The key to understanding the Regulation 2006/2004 is the shift towards public 
enforcement. The Commission promoted the establishment of a network of public authorities 
as a net into which and on which an eventual action for injunction could be based. The 
European Commission and the Member States are united in the idea that it is much easier to 
organise cross-border enforcement via public bodies.
478
 Regulation 2006/2004 shifts from the 
free choice between private and public enforcement measures – the model of Injunction 
Directive, - to the EU obligation to nominate and appoint public enforcement authorities.
479
 
However, this shift does not mean that consumer organisations are fully excluded from the 
new cooperation procedure. They may still – but only indirectly – be recognised as 
participants in this network. This provides, however, for a decision of the respective Member 
States to delegate the enforcement in cross-border issues to consumer organisations. The key 
addressee of Regulation 2006/2004 remains, however, the national public authority as 
precisely indicated in the Regulation 2006/2004. Consumer associations become part of the 
network only through the delegation via a public authority.
480
 They may cooperate and assist 
                                               
473 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p.109-110. 
474 II Report on implementation of the Injunction Directive, p. 6. 
475 Howells/Micklitz/Wilhelmsson (2006), European Fair Trading…, p.238. 
476 Presentations by E. Terryn and M. Bober (March, 2011) on collective consumer redress <www.beuc.eu> for 
Consumer Redress Training, BEUC.  
477 The model of the network designed on the basis of the Consumer Protection Cooperation was taken from the 
formerly established International Marketing Supervision Network, as founded by the OECD, and which has 
been lately renamed as the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICEN). Rules of their 
activities and manners of working were the same as those that had been adopted when the Consumer 
Cooperation Network was created. Although it has been an informal body for more than 20 years, it meets twice 
a year to discuss problems which arise in connection with unfair commercial practices. See for more information 
at website of ICEN, <https://icpen.org/> accessed on May, 11 2011. 
478 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European Consumer…, p. 389. 
479 Van Boom/Loos (2007), Effective Enforcement of…, p. 24. 
480 This solution was found under pressure from Austria and Germany where no consumer enforcement authority 
exist.  
160 
 
public bodies.
481
 Regulation 2006/2004 moves consumer organisations away from the 
enforcement scheme, but their indirect activity is described in Recital (14) of Regulation 
2006/2004 which states as follows: ”Consumer organizations play an essential rule in terms 
of consumer information and education and in the protection of consumer interests, including 
in the settlements of consumer disputes, and should be encouraged to cooperate with 
competent authorities to enhance the application of the Regulation”.482 Although consumer 
organisations do not play direct enforcement role in the consumer law enforcement, they have 
are placed on an ancillary position in respect of the aim and message behind Regulation 
2006/2004 with is focused on networking and cooperation of national enforcement.  
The strong reliance on public enforcement sits uneasily with Member States with no 
public enforcement tradition, such as Austria, Germany and Slovenia. These, basically, were 
expected to establish public bodies in order to meet requirements of Regulation 2006/2004. 
This change appears to be quite difficult both in practical and theoretical terms, since a newly 
established public enforcement body does not necessarily fit into already established 
enforcement frameworks.
483
 The major conceptual change and novelty of Regulation 
2006/2004 results from the shift from private towards public enforcement. Possible resistance 
and frictions between public/private and public-only enforcement systems will probably be 
overcome by using a regulation as a measure instead of a directive, because the regulation 
would be directly applicable such that it would be a much more rigid instrument than the 
Injunction Directive with its flexibility based on minimum harmonisation.
484
 The content of 
Regulation 2006/2004 provides for quick and direct steps which will definitely help to adjust 
consumer enforcement under the frame of the Injunction Directive. The new European 
enforcement policy based on the Regulation 2006/2004 was supposed to provide for more 
clarity and for more coherence in the complex and difficult field of transborder consumer 
enforcement.  
However, there was a price to pay for the immediate shift from private to public 
enforcement, hence from a Directive to a Regulation since Regulation 2006/2004 is 
exclusively addressed to cross-border matters. National enforcement matters have not been 
covered by the scope of the Regulation 2006/2004.
485
 The EU was simply looking for a basis 
                                               
481 Micklitz/Reich/Rott/Tonner (2014), European Consumer…, p. 389.  
482 Regulation 2006/2004 Recital (14) to the Regulation.  
483 Report pursuant Article 21of Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/docs/austria_report_en.pdf> accessed on September 6, 2011. 
484 The issue was already discussed in Chapter II 2. 
485 Micklitz/Stuyck/Terryn/Droshout (2010), Cases, Materials…, p. 578-580. 
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to derive its competence for posing an obligation on Member States to introduce a public 
enforcement body in consumer matters. In other words, Regulation 2006/2004 may be 
understood as an attempt to achieve through the backdoor – meaning via the regulation of 
cross-border co-operation – what is impossible to achieve via the front door – the introduction 
of a network of competent public authorities including a competence for national enforcement 
issues. The implicit “hope” at least of the European Commission as the instigator of the 
whole exercise seems to have been that there is a spillover effect from the cross-border to the 
national dimension and that Member States, now obligated to nominate a national public 
enforcement authority, will be ready to introduce a clear cut solution, the most favoured 
public authority. 
Given the above, domestic matters remain the exclusive competence of the Member 
States
486
, which remains a major difference, indeed a conceptual one, between the Injunction 
Directive and Regulation 2006/2004. The former introduces a procedural scheme for the use 
of the action for injunction for national and cross-borders matters, and which is in fact 
designed for the promotion of consumer associations - the later relies on co-operation and soft 
enforcement mechanisms through public authorities. This is a bit confusing since Regulation 
2006/2004 and the Injunction Directive were meant to be sister acts. Indeed, Regulation 
2006/2004 should rather be recognized as a supplement.
487
  
 
6. 1. A Net of “Public Watchdogs” 
 
Regulation 2006/2004 is based on the activity of public bodies which are established 
to form a network of Member States’ public bodies dealing with infringements in consumer 
cases. These bodies are allowed to use so-called “reprimand procedures”. Thanks to the 
mutual assistance mechanisms
488
 created by this Regulation 2006/2004, a public authority in 
one Member State may, at the request of a public authority in another Member State, bring an 
injunction in its own jurisdiction to stop an illegal practice against consumers from the 
Member State of the requesting authority.
489
 In line with the more general discussion on 
enforcement schemes in Europe these public authorities are called “watchdogs”. Although 
this notion seems to have a somewhat pejorative meaning, it per se expresses the way in 
                                               
486 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p.109. 
487 Styuck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 79. 
488 Goyens/Vos (2005), Handling on Cross-border Consumers Disputes, European Consumer Law Journal, Vol. 
3. 
489 Report on the application of Directive 98/27/EC. 
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which public law forces are commonly understood in the context of the European 
enforcement framework.
490
 However, Regulation 2006/2004 does not envisage a 
harmonisation of administrative, civil and criminal causes of action as such. Its major purpose 
is to enhance the role and function of public enforcement authorities.
491
 Thus, only public 
watchdogs have been significantly distinguished and somehow privileged by Regulation 
2006/2004. 
Watchdogs are defined as public bodies empowered and obliged to take actions 
against traders committing intra-Community infringements. Non-governmental bodies
492
 
designated by the Member States are not put on an equal footing with public bodies. They are 
empowered via delegation by the Member States but they are not obliged to exercise 
enforcement under the Regulation 2006/2004. Any non-governmental organisation entrusted 
with public authorities’ tasks must seek civil redress. These are “(…) bodies having a 
legitimate interest in cessation and prohibition of any intra-Community infringements 
(…)”.493 This definition includes non-governmental consumer associations and self-regulatory 
bodies, but is not limited thereto. Member States may pass enforcement power to business 
organisations, supervisors of certain sectors, standardisation authorities, and many others. The 
notion is quite extensive and may be extended even further to include other, different bodies, 
located on the boundaries of public and private enforcement bodies. All what is needed is the 
power granted to these entities to enforce consumer law as laid down and concretised in the 
Annex to Regulation 2006/2004. 
The logic, however, also works the other way round. Not each and every Member 
State had a public body in place, which could have been included in the network of 
authorities. In these Member States - mainly Austria, Germany, Slovenia, to some extent the 
Netherlands - a public body must be established. The leeway left to Member States in 
designing their national watchdogs relates to the different enforcement cultures and traditions. 
There are Member States in which the public enforcement of consumer law has existed for a 
long time, for example the United Kingdom, and there are Member States where such a 
tradition never existed, where private law enforcement has always been dominant, for 
example Germany, France and the Netherlands. Here Regulation 2006/2004 has opened room 
up to make choices - in designing the public law enforcement structure in a way which is a 
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suitable and proper one for the national legal conditions, in accordance with existing private 
law schemes within the general consumer enforcement structure, while at the same time, 
meeting the requirements outlined in Regulation 2006/2004.  
The public bodies are involved in a mutual assistance procedure in situations where 
there are intra-Community infringements of national laws of Member States transposing the 
EC consumer acquis communitaire as listed in the Annex to Regulation 2006/2004. Thus, 
Regulation 2006/2004 provides for cross-border enforcement of 18 designated measures 
comprising corpus iuris. Regulation 2006/2004 grants specific powers to the public enforcers, 
verba legis “competent authorities”.494 They have the power to investigate and the 
enforcement powers necessary to apply Regulation 2006/2004. This power should be 
exercised in conformity with rules of national legislation. Regulation 2006/2004 draws a 
clear-cut distinction between public bodies’ powers of enforcement and the power of 
investigation. Investigation and enforcement power may be given only to public bodies. This 
may be a justification for the exclusion of private enforcers from the scheme of Regulation 
2006/2004. Private bodies may, if the power is delegated to them, exercise enforcement 
power, but there is no reference to investigation power. The latter is traditionally and 
functionally left in the hands of public bodies. Therefore, private actors may become involved 
in procedures based on Regulation 2006/2004, but their involvement is only of a subsidiary 
and supportive nature. They may assist and be useful in terms of collective information, but 
they are not entitled to exercise investigative power of their own motion. 
It is up to the Member States to decide whether public authorities are able to exercise 
their power in a direct or indirect way. Competent authorities may act directly under the 
discretion of their own authority or indirectly by seeking a judicial order. Article 4(4) lit. (a) 
and (b) seems to indicate way that are compatible with the Regulation 2006/2004.
495
 A literal 
reading of the provisions shows that the freedom to choose is not addressed to the legislature, 
but to the watchdogs themselves. They are given the option. Thus, the choice shall be made 
based upon the practical experiences of the national legislatures.  
Article 4(6) of the Regulation 2006/2004 lists specific powers, which can be exercised 
by competent authorities once “(…) there is reasonable suspicion of an intra-Community 
infringements”.496 Although the list of powers is quite long, it is non-exhaustive and may be 
adjusted by new measures, or new powers if exercised in the legal practice of Member States. 
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The list includes the right of competent authorities (i) to have an access to any relevant 
documents, in any form, related to intra-Community infringements, (ii) to require the 
provision of relevant information related to the intra-Community infringement by any person, 
(iii) to carry out necessary on-site inspections, (iv) to request in writing that the seller or 
supplier concerned cease the intra-Community infringement, (v) to obtain from the seller or 
supplier responsible for the intra-Community infringements an undertaking to cease the intra-
Community infringement; and where appropriate, to publish the resulting undertaking, (vi) to 
require the cessation or prohibition of any intra-Community infringement and, where 
appropriate, to publish the resulting decisions, (vii) to require the losing defendant to make 
payments into the public purse or to any beneficiary designated in or under national 
legislation, in the event of failure to comply with the decision.  
Although most of the rights are typically of technical and administrative measures, 
such as the seizure of documents and entry to premises, there is also a group of rights that 
meet the requirements of an injunction order.
497
 These rights may be exercised directly by 
competent authorities under public law rules, or indirectly by a civil court, which brings an 
action for injunction. This provision demonstrates that injunctions are one of the instruments 
on which Regulation 2006/2004 is supposed to be based, particularly to protect collective 
consumer interest under the enforcement scheme adopted by Regulation 2006/2004. 
However, injunctions are not the only instruments of consumer protection that can be used in 
order to fulfil the requirements of Regulation 2006/2004. Injunctions are recognised as the 
“main enforcement tools” for consumer protection, but due to the existence of other, different 
measures, they may be substituted by other means. The Explanatory Memorandum
498
 to 
Regulation 2006/2004 recognised the action for injunction as the only possible tool to be 
used. However, in the final version the scope of the respective provision was changed in a 
way which allows for more extensive interpretation in terms that not only injunction can be 
used as a remedy to be used upon the frame of Regulation 2006/2004.  
Article 4(6)(g) makes a reference to lack of compliance with “the decision” and 
should be considered in its injunction-related context. By “decision” the EU legislator 
understands both (1) “a court order” requiring the defendant to discontinuation of the 
infringing practice and (2) “an administrative order” passed by the competent authority on 
the basis of national legislation. In a wider understanding, a “decision” also includes a 
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trader’s undertaking to cease intra-Community infringements, understood as a kind of 
sanction for non-compliance with the undertakings.  
On the one hand, Regulation 2006/2004 detracts from existing authorities’ 
investigation and enforcement powers, which had been granted to these bodies by the general 
rules of international law, Community law and national law. The extent of this detraction 
depends on the particularities of competent authorities that act in the Member States under 
consideration. On the other hand, the rules of Regulation 2006/2004 are supposed to 
complement the existing tools of public and private law regulation. It could be contended that 
by passing a regulation of this kind, the EU attempts to realise a plan which concentrates on 
strengthening the power of consumer law remedies. Certainly, Regulation 2006/2004 is a tool 
for strengthening them. However, in the EU’s view, it was only viable to do so by way of 
passing enforcement power into the hands of competent authorities based in the public law 
sphere. It is still questionable as to why the EU has identified the public authority as a 
stronger alternative. Matters become even more complicated as the enforcement power was 
put into the hands of Member States, which were intended to organise an enforcement 
structure and enforcement measures at the national level and apply Regulation 2006/2004 in a 
direct (based on public law) or indirect way (by courts based on a private law model). 
 
6. 2. The Role of the European Commission  
 
The Commission based the envisaged improvement of enforcement structure of 
consumer law on the idea of networking.
499
 The idea of networking in the field of consumer 
law is not new. It was also present in the general product safety Directive (GPD). For the 
purpose of this Directive the Commission has a right to take action only in case of 
emergency.
500
 This role of “the emergency guard of the Commission” is however missing in 
Regulation 2006/2004. This may be recognized as one of the basic reasons why the extensive 
Annex to the Regulation 2006/2004 is not covered by the scope of Regulation 2006/2004. If 
the two were integrated, the interplay between the GPD and Regulation 2006/2004 would 
have required more in-depth and detailed clarification. The extension of the action of 
injunction to matters of product safety may cause ambiguities in Regulation 2006/2004. 
                                               
499 For the first time networking was codified in the general product safety Directive which established a 
networking of enforcement bodies; See also: Howells/Weatherill (2005), EU Consumer…; Ramsay (2007), 
Consumer Law…, p. 488. 
500 Article 13 of the GPD. 
166 
 
Although the two sets of rules are aimed at the promotion of networking, they follow 
completely different paths.
501
  
Although Regulation 2006/2004 promotes the idea of networking of public bodies it 
does not indicate any details as to their establishment and procedural scheme. There is no 
obligation for Member States to establish new bodies; it is sufficient to adjust existing 
systems in order to meet the requirements of Regulation 2006/2004. New enforcement bodies 
are required only for those jurisdictions in which enforcement was left in the hands of private 
bodies. Therefore, Regulation 2006/2006 does replace the old enforcement structure of public 
bodies by introducing new enforcement bodies. Nor does it pass the enforcement power to the 
Commission. The Commission in the enforcement scheme of Regulation 2006/2004 is 
deprived of enforcement power and it performs only a very limited role in terms of 
administrative tasks. For example, its participation in the enforcement network is required 
only to the extent to which information is smoothly communicated by Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network to the Commission. This, however, is only half the truth. 
Since the Commission is deprived of any regulatory power, it plays a role as a 
monitoring and controlling body besides the network in terms of monitoring or controlling of 
the consumer cooperation network. This main function is realized by chairing the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation Committee. This Consumer Protection Cooperation Committee main 
task is to implement the rules on cooperation and secondly, it plays the role of a forum for 
analysis and monitoring of network activities and controlling for non-legislative actions. The 
crucial tasks of the Committee lies in the interpretation of rules based on certain directives on 
consumer protection
502
, like the unfair commercial practices Directive and the unfair contract 
terms Directive, as well as clarifying the understanding of certain elements of consumer 
protection regulations and legal instruments in the context of the linkage of the substantive 
law directives with the procedural scope of Regulation 2006/2004.  
 Under the umbrella of the European Commission the national public authorities are 
obliged to cooperate in sharing information about current enforcement problems and 
employed enforcement solutions and to exchange them in the network, which is stored in the 
Commission database. Formally, Regulation 2006/2004 does not leave the Commission any 
power based on controlling or monitoring how the network works. In practice the 
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Commission plays a role of “the spider in the cobweb”.503 This expression captures the role 
the Commission plays in the consumer cooperation framework. Formally, the Commission is 
not a member of the consumer protection cooperation network, but only participates within it 
to the extent that information must be communicated to the Commission by national public 
bodies. The Commission crucial task is database maintenance, storing and processing 
information collected under Articles 7-9 of Regulation 2006/2004.
504
 In practice the 
Commission monitors and controls the flow of information, it gains knowledge about all 
information movements within the network. However, the Commission does not monitor the 
enforcement activities of the Member States. Member States are supposed to submit a report 
to the Commission. This report is made available to the public by the Commission in order to 
show the working progress of members of the network.
505
  
 
6. 3. The Role of Courts 
 
Article 4(4) of Regulation 2006/2004 clearly indicates two methods for its application 
within national enforcement regimes, direct and indirect ones. Direct application thus far has 
not caused any major legal ambiguity, while indirect application has raised many. There is 
always a question about which court of which Member States on the basis of which rule may 
be in charge of the application in a concrete case. None of these questions is explicitly 
regulated.
506
 
The powers granted to competent authorities, which are listed in Article 4(5), (a) to 
(g), include a mechanism for an action of injunction - which is a court-measure of collective 
enforcement of a cross-border dimension - that additionally raise a question on jurisdiction 
and of the applicable law.
507
 In this case, an injunction will be granted as an effect of the 
cooperation between the competent authorities of different Member States. Therefore, the 
interpretation of Art. 4(4)(b) granting investigation and enforcement powers to watchdogs by 
application to courts, competent to grant a necessary decision’ remains ambiguous. 
Obviously, Regulation 2006/2004 refers to an action for injunction, but it does not make 
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explicit links to the Injunction Directive. Hence, the injunction is a procedure which swiftly 
brings a case to an end, but only where it is used properly in the network envisaged by 
Regulation 2006/2004.
508
 
Article 4(4) of Regulation 2006/2004 may raise ambiguity since it indicates the 
application of Regulation 2006/2004 within the national legal orders of Member States via 
courts. This issue deserves a closer look: (i) the competence of civil courts which are 
supposed to deal with a case where the defendant is based in the state of the competent 
authority, and (ii) whether the competent authority is given a right to turn to the courts of a 
Member State other than its own, and what legal basis it will have. The Injunction Directive, 
similarly, leaves these issues open.
509
 Article 3(b) of Regulation 2006/2004 refers to situations 
in which the trader is based in member state A and the harm has occurred in member state B. 
According to Regulation 2006/2004, a competent authority established in member state A is 
entitled to take legal action against a trader only if the trader is based in its own territory. This 
may be either in response to a request from the other competent authority, or may be a result 
of its own enforcement initiative. Furthermore, since Regulation 2006/2004 applies without 
prejudice to the Brussels I Regulation
510
, in situations where the defendant is based in a 
Member State other than the watchdog’s territory, the case is better brought before the court 
of the Member State of the watchdog’s establishment. 
From the literal meaning of provision Article 4(4) of Regulation 2006/2004, we may 
conclude that there is no exclusion of the competence to access courts, which are outside the 
home state of the competent authority. However, in practical terms, it seems that a watchdog 
which wants to initiate proceedings for an injunction established in Member State A will ask 
the relevant competent authorities in Member State B or C to involve their own courts. That 
would mean that Regulation 2006/2004 has introduced a solution, which differs from the one 
in the Injunction Directive. While Regulation 2006/2004 does not, verba legis, confer 
standing on a watchdog before foreign courts, the Injunction Directive does so directly.
511
 
However, it should be stressed that most of the “qualified entities” granted legal standing 
under the Injunction Directive have been included in the lists of competent authorities 
according to Article 5 of Regulation 2006/2004.  
 Article 4(5) seems to be a sort of empty rule. This is a kind of reminder addressed to 
Member States in order to make them sure that watchdogs which bring consumer cases before 
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the relevant court are empowered to meet the requirements of Regulation 2006/2004. 
Considering that all European courts have judicial powers, the rule is quite ambiguous. 
Perhaps this provision represents a form of overregulation having in mind that all courts in all 
the Member States have their own standards and principles of adjudication. Competent 
authorities should be enabled to make a choice as to the appropriate court of jurisdiction, 
taking into account both the position of watchdogs and defendants.  
Another issue of high cross-border relevance which causes many ambiguities results 
from Article 4(6)g Regulation 2006/2004, which introduced - similar as the Injunction 
Directive - financial penalty payments. Regulation 2006/2004 as well as the Injunction 
Directive envisage financial penalties either in the event of non-compliance with a 
watchdog’s decisions or a failure to execute a court order. It is up to the Member States to 
decide about the form of penalty payments which will be granted, whether is a fine of a kind 
of astrainte for each day of non-compliance with an injunction order or whether it takes the 
form of a civil law penalty.  
 
6. 4. The Concept of “Networking”  
 
One of the crucial obstacles identified by the Commission in cross-border enforcement 
in consumer law was a lack of its effectiveness.
512
 The Commission, while looking for 
enforcement modes and solutions to increase effectiveness has developed the concept of 
networking which has much in common with the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures. 
Networking is neutral as to the choice of collective or individual enforcement. Once the 
deficiencies of the Injunction Directive became evident, the EU legislator searched for ways 
to improve the enforcement structure of consumer protection. The traditional mode of 
enforcement, grounded on both public and private enforcement responsible for consumer law 
faces difficulties, when it comes to cross-border litigation. Enforcement authorities cannot 
cross borders, and can only ask for the assistance of the authorities of another state.  
This unsatisfactory situation came to an end with the adoption of Regulation 
2006/2004. Since then, there were no further doubts as to whether public authorities are 
entitled to protect the interest of consumers based outside of their own state. Public bodies 
have the right to act on behalf of consumers in their own country.
513
 This can be read as 
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meaning that restrictions in national laws are no longer applicable within the scope of 
Regulation 2006/2004.
514
 Although obviously addressed to improve cross-border relations, 
the Regulation 2006/2004 does not make its cross-border purpose explicit. The cross-border 
issues and competences are defined by a reference to national measures. This is not an ideal 
situation. Explicit and clear cross-border consumer protection measures would be more than 
welcome under the given legal uncertainties. It is unclear why the EU neglects the position of 
consumers in the multilevel structure, which yields the need to handle both domestic and 
cross-border issues.  
The dualistic design of enforcement constituted the hidden aim of the general 
construction of the Injunction Directive. The EU legislator had identified the problem and 
even provided for an instrument, the action for injunction, meant to remedy the enforcement 
deficit. The lack of clarity reduced the effectiveness of the Injunction Directive and paved the 
way for the adoption of Regulation 2006/2004. The EU’s response touches upon the 
effectiveness of public and/or private enforcement in the field of consumer law. It addresses 
administrative and/or judicial enforcement, as well as the (thus far) rather negative 
experiences with the Injunction Directive. The latter has left too many options in the hands of 
the Member States. That is why the EU decided in Regulation 2006/2004 to reduce the choice 
the enforcement options to be used in cross-border enforcement. Regulation 2006/2004 
expresses an explicit preference for public enforcement of consumer protection law as far as 
trans-border consumer relations are concerned. By doing so, the EU has stressed the 
predominant position of public enforcement in the protection of cross-border relations. Private 
enforcement bodies, no matter in what way and to what extent they are developed, cannot 
adequately substitute public enforcement measures. Both enforcement regimes may exist 
alongside one another, but private enforcement can only have a complementary nature in 
relation to the stronger and more powerful public enforcement tools.  
Regulation 2006/2004 was not supposed to bring about an optimal enforcement 
mechanism within the Member States. The shift from a choice between public or private 
enforcement towards public enforcement is not sufficient to improve the EU consumer law 
enforcement. However, how the EU has decided to allocate powers is the public enforcement 
scheme which was recognized as more efficient in consumer law enforcement. Since the 
changes were swiftly introduced, it was obvious that they would not fully fit to the previously 
adopted mechanism. It should be stressed that although this is a single change, it tackles a 
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crucial issue of the choice of the enforcement path, which in fact depends much on the 
national enforcement structure. The European Commission imposed a single solution and this 
one size fits all solution was claimed to be suitable for all the Member States. This is virtually 
impossible, both practical and technical terms. The best the Commission could hope for is a 
general pattern, which could be implemented in all other Member States and which would, at 
least partially, streamline an injunction procedure applicable in all national legal orders. 
The Commission was aware of the fact that the taken choice of enforcement power 
indicated in Regulation 2006/2004 could raise doubts and ambiguities. This, however, goes 
hand in hand with the overall enforcement policy of the Commission. The Regulation 
2006/2004 aims at the organisation of a European enforcement structure, which would help to 
achieve at least partially coherence of the enforcement structure in the field of consumer law. 
This is a straight indication of public enforcement as the ideal as far as intra-Community 
infringements are considered. More importantly, it has also introduced evolutionary changes 
introducing public enforcement measures to Member States with a purely private enforcement 
culture. 
Regulation 2006/2004 brought about improvements and became the standard tool, in 
particular in concern to its public enforcement dimension.
515
 Public bodies often have more 
legal capacity to get access the necessary information for dealing with consumer law cases. 
Duchèsne might also be read as a case, which demonstrates the incapacity of private actors - 
consumer organisations to properly handle cross-border litigation. Public bodies might 
enhance social exchange and identity building across borders to a higher degree than 
consumer associations, which vary across Europe. They often do not enjoy institutional 
stability and respect unlike public bodies. In theory, although private enforcement bodies have 
more possibilities to get the right information before an infringement occurs or they may 
simply engage in cross-border social exchange with other consumer associations, they often 
react ex post once a consumer has already suffered a loss. A small loss suffered by an 
individual consumer multiplied by all those who are concerned may however bring about 
market distortions. The question becomes who should look after these collective damages? 
One might expect consumer organisations to initiate of this sort of complaints, in particular in 
cross-border litigation. The civil society in which consumer organizations enjoy a common 
respect is much more open for exchange of information than a society which relies on public 
bodies for information. Hence, there are tasks, which may be better executed or more swiftly 
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executed by public bodies, while there is a group of tasks, which perfectly fit to role played by 
private bodies. With all respect for sectoral differences and sectoral gradation of 
effectiveness, the Commission opted for public enforcement with no special exceptions for 
Member States, which never used public bodies for law enforcement. The Commission 
introduced a public scheme to some fields of law, which for many years have been in the hand 
of private bodies. The Commission has recognized public enforcement through information 
exchange and co-operation as the better option especially in light of the deficiencies resulting 
from the Injunction Directive which affected this radical change in the EC consumer 
policy.
516
 
The Injunction Directive creates a link between divergent practices and legal solutions 
that have been developed by the Member States. Although the cross-border element of 
consumer law has at least been partially harmonised, the Injunction Directive has also shed 
light on a considerable number of practices, incompatible in both their merit and their 
effect.
517
 The dark side of all these efforts can be condensed in the formula that cross-border 
litigation through consumer associations are still not entirely accepted as qualified entities in 
some Member States. The idea of cooperation between public bodies in charge of consumer 
rights protection constitutes a way out of this dead end and would definitely help to boost 
consumer confidence in the Internal Market. Networking looks like a promising concept, an 
equivalent of Eurojust.
518
 The Eurojust network has been successfully established in the field 
of criminal law. Eurojust fits well into most legal systems. Its activities are quite effective, as 
proved by statistics provided.
519
 The network of consumer protection public bodies was 
supposed to play a similar role. But the idea failed at an early stage.  
Regulation 2006/2004 has not been a source of any of the ECJ decisions. Some 
aspects of the Regulation 2006/2004 have been subject of queries, but the queries have been 
answered already by the Commission Legal Services and DGs opinions, and the legal issues 
raised mainly focused on issue of the applicable law or technical elements of public authority 
cooperation. Studying the practice of cross-border consumer conflicts means embarking on 
mainly administrative, but also judicial practice, on reports and on formal and also informal 
information. The few cases, which have been brought to national courts do not provide a 
comprehensive account of the consumer conflicts, neither in number nor in quality. The future 
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of solving cross-border consumer conflicts lies in networking between public agencies under 
the participation of consumer organisations.
520
 In its networking approach the European 
Union is very much following the well-established policy of the OECD. The 2011 OECD 
Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices 
Across Borders
521
 have put on paper the long standing practice of co-operation in one 
particular are of consumer policy which is particularly apt to cross borders.
522
  
 
6. 5. The Annexes of Regulation 2006/2004 and Directive 98/27 Compared 
 
The scope of the Annex to the Injunction Directive is not as extensive as in Regulation 
2006/2004. The Injunction Directive covers 13 pieces of consumer protection legislation, 
while Regulation 2006/2004 covers 18 pieces. The Annex refers to the Directive 98/06 on 
price indication and the regulations on the rights of air transport
523
, sea and inland, and bus 
and coach transport passengers
524
, which are not included in the Annex to the Injunction 
Directive. The Annex to the Regulation 2006/2004 does not, however, refer to the Directive 
on Services, which is included in the Annex to the Injunction Directive. Harmonising the two 
Annexes, as has been proposed by certain Member States
525
, would call for both the 
Injunction Directive and Regulation 2006/2004 to be amended in parallel. 
Although both pieces of legislation are complementary in nature, the fact that they 
differ concerning the form – directive versus regulation, the scopes – 13 vs 18 with 
overlapping subjects - cannot be explained alone via a detailed comparison of the two 
Annexes. One has to dig deeper and recall the different philosophies behind the two pieces of 
EU law. The Injunction Directive established a dualistic approach, combing collective 
enforcement with individual enforcement, promoting in particular the social role of consumer 
organisations in the establishment of the Internal Market or even more ambitiously in the 
emerging European Society (if there is one). Here the Annex to the Directive 98/27/EC played 
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a key role in disclosing the parallelism of collective and individual enforcement. Put this way 
the Injunction Directive is strongly anchored in the established consumer policy since the 
1980s with consumer organisations being involved in the defence of the collective interest of 
consumers and individual consumers looking after their ever better and ever more extended 
consumer rights, partially with the support of consumer organisations. The Regulation 
2006/2004 while complementary in nature and while building on the experiences gained in 
cross-border litigation, shifts the focus from private to public enforcement. This has two 
implications – public bodies are needed in each Member States, consumer organisations are 
somewhat downgraded, - and these public bodies are integrated into a network that exchanges 
information and co-operates beyond the much promoted action for injunction. The latter is 
equally been side-lined and is not the key instrument as under the Injunction Directive. 
Regulation 2006/2004 initiates a policy change which goes deep and maybe much deeper than 
the one promoted by the Injunction Directive. Networking must be procedurally embedded, 
but once there is a mechanism in place and once the public bodies trust each other, the 
material scope of the activities becomes less important. Nobody prevents public agencies 
from exchanging information outside the list of the 18 pieces of law. If the network works 
successfully, there is not even a need to apply the action for injunction. This tool turns into an 
instrument of last resort. It is only at the very end when the question arises whether this and 
that practice is covered fully or partially in the Annex.  
 
6. 6. Experience within the Network 
 
The Commission’s plans to develop the public enforcement structure and strengthen 
the network established by Regulation 2006/2004. It remains to be seen if and how these 
plans materialize. The recently published report of the European Commission on application 
of Regulation 2006/2004 reveals practical problems in the use of the Regulation 2006/2004.
526
  
The Report states ”the Network is producing tangible results for consumers”.527 
Member States stress that Regulation 2006/2004 is a particularly valuable tool for managing 
misleading advertising
528
 and on-line commercial practices, EU-sweeps in communication 
and transportation. Nevertheless, Member States face technical and organizational 
shortcomings as well as discrepancies in the Annex to the Regulation 2006/2004 and the 
                                               
526 Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004.  
527 Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, p. 9.  
528 Council Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising was in force until the end of 2007, the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC now covers the misleading adverting area.  
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Injunction Directives. Hence, the shortcomings, which have been identified within the scope 
of Regulation 2006/2004 may be classified as follows: 
(i) There is a general problem with the software used – some of the authorities are not 
connected, or they cannot use the system due to technical obstacles; 
(ii) The complexity of cross-border cases implies long-lasting procedures on how to 
decide over the jurisdiction and the applicable law; 
(iii) National authorities are using IT system. The understanding of when and in what kind 
of situations they shall use it significantly differs. Some Member States send alerts and 
requests
529
, even if unnecessary just to make sure that nothing has been omitted; others 
do not notify all cases. A case rejected by one of the authority may be regarded as 
being legal another one; 
(iv) Speed and quality depends on human resources and their abilities, this depends on 
people who are more or less accurate, more or less educated, communicative or not. 
Uncertainties prolong the procedure; 
(v) There is still no common practice as to when the notifications should be deleted, what 
raises data protection issues; there are no deadlines for data transmission and potential 
feedback of summaries;  
(vi) There is a discrepancy between Regulation 2006/2004 and Regulation 261/2004 on air 
passenger rights
530
, which although covered by Regulation 2006/2004 introduces its 
own enforcement authorities.  
The general idea and aim behind the Regulation 2006/2004 remains to be full realized. 
Despite all the practical experiences, the mutual learning process will over time improve the 
enforcement practice. It should not be forgotten that the record in comparison to the 
Injunction Directive is quite impressive. The envisaged amendment, although the details are 
not yet clear, might further improve cross-border enforcement.
531
  
 
7. Beyond Directive 98/27 and Regulation 2006/2004 – Co-ordinated Enforcement  
 
Since the phenomenon of co-ordinated action has been only mentioned once by the 
Commission
532
 it should be clarified at the beginning of an analysis of consumer 
                                               
529 See Annex 1, The Regulation on consumer protection cooperation. 
530 Regulation on Air Passenger Rights (EC) No. 261/2004 (OJ L 46, 17.02.2004, p. 1–8). 
531 The European Commission roadmap on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
532 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 6.  
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organizations’ activity against carriers: what kind of action have consumer organizations 
initiated against carriers? Is it a joint action, a co-ordinated action or a cooperative action? 
This is all the more important as the consumer organisations have learnt their lessons from 
difficulties using cross-border litigation as the appropriate form of enforcement. They have 
used – co-ordinated action via BEUC533 – the more recent interest of the European 
Commission is to improve cross-border enforcement so as to apply for enforcement related 
projects, first the Consumer Law Enforcement Forum (CLEF)
534
, then the Consumer Justice 
Enforcement Forum (COJEF).
535
 These EU financed projects allows national consumer 
organisations to engage in enhanced enforcement activities, and although they are not be 
formally classified as regular cross-border litigation
536
 they can help consumer organizations 
to override shortcoming and obstacles identified in the frame of the Injunction Directive or 
Regulation 2006/2004. 
The herein proposed distinction is a direct result of the practical experience gained. It 
combines a descriptive with a normative perspective.
537
 It uses the following parameters: 
organizing, staffing, directing and controlling. Based on these criteria the following typology 
could be built in terms of explanation of consumer organization activities held in consumer 
law enforcement area. 
  
Typologies of actions by consumer organizations 
Factors Planning Organizing Staffing Directing Controlling 
Joint Action X X    
Co-operative Action X X X   
Co-ordinated Action X X X X X 
 
This classification allows to describe and analyse the various activities of consumer 
organisations also within CLEF and COJEF projects, by now the most structured ways of 
cooperative efforts, which have been undertaken by consumer organizations in the last 
decade. 
                                               
533 The European Consumer Organization profile, <http://www.beuc.eu/> accessed on June 2, 2014. 
534 < http://www.clef-project.eu/> accessed on June 9, 2014. 
535 <http://www.cojef-project.eu/> accessed on June 9, 2014. 
536 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 6.  
537 The author of this PhD was actively involved in preparation of the meetings of the national consumer 
organizations for the TRACE programme held at BEUC in Brussels addressed to national consumer 
organizations acting as a trainer for a TRACE courses from 2009 until 2012. The author was invited as an 
internal speaker for CoJEF Programme presentation in Brussels at the occasion of the first forum meeting in 
Brussels 6-7 October 2011 which focused on the action for injunction in the field of consumer protection.  
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7. 1. Joint Action 
 
Joint action is the simplest form of action through which consumer organization’s 
activity can be managed. Consumer organizations plan a meeting and formulate a group 
which aims to achieve a particular goal common to all group members. The common goal 
could be achieved more effectively by taking joint action than by each of the consumer 
organizations acting individually. Joint action is useful both in national and cross-border 
activities of consumers organizations, although the main activities cross-border infringements. 
It is not necessary to establish an institutional structure for the group, or to monitor or control 
the activities. Common linkages between the consumer organizations suffice. It is also not 
necessary to develop common and long-term methods that could be used by all group 
members since they are autonomous. Important factors are planning the initial meeting and 
organizing a group of meeting participants. In doing so, consumer organizations continue to 
act within their previously established structures. The planning and organizing activity might 
end after one meeting if they have agreed on a common goal for their joint action.  
The individual internal structures and general rules of activity of consumers 
organizations would be changed neither structurally nor instrumentally, as they would remain 
as they were before the action was taken. This means that internal structures, organization and 
strategies set up by each consumer organization differs, since a joint action does not provide 
any common denominator upon which organizations can bring action. Therefore, the joint 
action refers to an action in which other consumer organizations are engaged, without a need 
to indicate the extent to which they are engaged, or who is responsible for particular areas or 
who causes something to happen. Put simply, the goal is a single one, but the rules regarding 
how a group operates depends on individual decisions of each member of the group. In 
practical terms this means that consumer organizations agree on a quite general plan of action 
and clarify the goal of the joint activity, but they do not need to discuss in detail, the 
framework for the action.  
A joint action may be described as an umbrella under which a group of individual 
actions can be brought individually and for each Member States separately by national 
consumer organizations. The only factors linking the organizations are a common goal and 
the organization of an initial meeting. Once a common goal has been identified, consumer 
organizations do not communicate with each other since they act on an individual basis. Their 
joint action is completed as soon as the common goal is established but not necessarily 
achieved, and since no other relationship between them exists, further decisions within the 
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framework of the case are undertaken on an individual basis. There is no facility for 
exchanging information or ideas, or discussing procedures, since each consumer organization 
operates independently. Activities initiated by joint actions continue, and are performed on an 
individual basis. Moreover, consumer organizations included under the umbrella of the case 
do not have to share any experiences or information with other organizations within the 
group, about the final outcome of the joint action. This scheme based on planning and 
organizing only would also fit to national activities of consumers organizations within a state. 
It is likewise the simplest form to fight cross-border infringements 
 
7. 2. Co-operative Action 
 
Co-operative action occurs when at least two consumer organizations decide to 
collaborate. This is recognized as a medium level of consumer organizations cross-border 
activity between joint action and co-ordinated action. Consumer organizations work together 
to discuss how to proceed toward their commonly established goal and what actions they need 
to take in order to achieve it.  
CLEF puts the main focus on (i) development of strategies on how to engage in 
enforcement, both at national and European level, and (ii) on improvement of their knowledge 
of different enforcement tools, (iii) development of a role to be played by consumer 
organizations in the frame of public and private enforcement bodies. COJEF shifted the focus 
towards creation and maintenance of a strong network between European consumer 
associations in order facilitate and encourage their cooperation and co-ordination in cross-
border issues: (ii) evaluation of the practicability of specific enforcement means for individual 
and collective redress judicial and out-of-court measures, (iii) development and support of 
consumer organisations in the Eastern and Central European Member States on their way of 
development of strategies for enforcement activities and empowerment them toward 
improvement of enforcement in their country.  
Both reports are based on practical experiences of national consumer organizations. 
The meetings held for both CLEF and COJEF projects serve as a forum for consumer 
organizations in order to share their experiences, problems and difficulties. The most 
important for co-operative action is to agree on the “subject” of co-operation, hence its 
objectives must be defined. Ideally the definition of the subject would be resolved within the 
group. The group may also discuss a solution but do not necessarily need to discuss each 
single solution. Consumer organizations support each other in their current actions and 
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activities and discuss and share ideas relating to the common strategies regarding the 
achievement of the common objectives. Their co-operation might require education and 
training activities in which consumer organizations find temporary economic support within 
the group. This would help smaller consumer organizations and all those who cannot co-
operate due to lack of resources.  
Co-operation of consumer organizations requires mutual learning. Consumer 
organizations need to schedule workshop during which a current action is discussed and 
future plans are considered. A major benefit of the meetings is experience sharing. Planning 
and organizing are necessary elements in order to establish a mutual goal and to organize a 
structure within the group, which facilitates information exchange and ensure its smooth flow. 
Obviously, group meetings are desirable, to work on the agenda for their future activities and 
follow the plan development, establishment of information exchange procedures and 
improvement of information flow and mutual assistance requires information exchange until 
the final goal is achieved (or perhaps not achieved).  
Group members need to communicate with each other, plan advisory meetings to help 
develop a common strategy and discuss the best ways in which cooperation can be 
established. The information exchange could be established on a frequent basis, therefore a 
cooperative proposal would require considerable human resources in order to keep the 
information flow. Staff members need to be assigned specific tasks, such as to lead and plan 
the common activities and discussions on goal achievement. The staff would need a leader or 
leaders in order to moderate the discussion.
538
 It is desirable to establish a network in order to 
ensure the information flow and to identify a person in charge of information exchange within 
each consumer organization, a team leader, the one who would be responsible for the 
reporting of consumer organizations’ current activities and reporting the recent activities. 
Reports must outline the current stage of co-operative action. 
The co-operative action shall be described as a kind of a network of suggestions and 
ideas, which identifies fields of cooperation between network members, somehow to build a 
skeleton plan of action, whilst all the individual points of the plan are fulfilled by 
organizations working independently. They assist each other until the common goal is 
achieved, or perhaps not achieved. The activity of consumer organizations within CLEF and 
COJEF projects may serve as a good example of how the co-operative action may be 
organized and how it works in practice. The empirical analysis of consumer enforcement 
                                               
538 G. Howells and Professor H.-W. Micklitz were involved as legal advisors.  
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problems was reported for both the projects (i) CLEF Report “Guidelines for Consumer 
Organisations on Enforcement and Collective Redress” dated on September 2009539, and (ii) 
COJEF Report “Guidelines for enforcement of consumers rights” dated on May 2013 are 
both available online.
540
 
 
7. 3. Co-ordinated Action 
 
Co-ordinated action constitutes a more advanced model of cross-border action of 
consumer organizations in comparison to joint or cooperative action. In case of co-ordinated 
action organizations unify, integrate and synchronize their efforts so as to provide a unified 
action in the pursuit of a common goal and objectives common to the group.  
Co-ordination can be described by the following elements: planning - planning 
facilitates co-ordination by integrating various plans through mutual discussion, exchange of 
ideas, workshops, meetings, and scheduling future plans; organizing – co-ordination is the 
very essence of organization; there is a need to build relationships between team members in 
order to provide a group with an effective flow of information and information exchange; to 
establish a team, and a network between national teams and lastly, to build a group structure 
at various levels; staffing - it would be necessary for a number of people to be in charge of the 
execution of the plan and strategies in order to achieve the common objectives.  
Working on selected issues shall direct, control and monitor the procedure at every 
stage and report their findings to other group members. A more professional approach is 
needed. It is necessary to establish a project team from administrative advisors to legal and 
economic advisors; directing - it is necessary to identify a manager, to direct, lead, give 
instructions and guidance, to achieve a balance between the group members and supervise the 
network; controlling/monitoring - one of the staff members performs the role of team leader, 
ensures that there is co-ordination between the group’s activities and its members in order to 
achieve the common goal. 
Co-ordinated action was highly appreciated by the EU Commission as practical 
experience demonstrating how consumer organizations from different Member States may co-
operate within existing national enforcement structures across borders. The first co-ordinated 
                                               
539 Consumer Law Enforcement Forum Project, Guidelines for Consumer Organizations on Enforcement and 
Collective Redress (2009), <http://www.cojef-project.eu/IMG/pdf/d_CLEFfinalguidelines_76647.pdf> accessed 
on June 2, 2014. 
540 Consumer Justice Enforcement Forum, Guidelines for Enforcement of Consumers Rights (2013), 
<http://www.cojef-project.eu/IMG/pdf/Conclusions_document_cases__FINAL_8_May.pdf> accessed on June 9, 
2014. 
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action was arranged by consumer organizations from Belgium, France and Portugal, which 
identified the vast number of consumer rights’ infringements by carriers through the use of 
unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices. The joint action resulted in injunctions 
against the most popular carriers in Europe, which ended successfully.
541
 However, there was 
not much co-ordination outside the identification of a common goal. 
The co-ordinated activity highlighted the significant relevance of consumer 
organizations vis-à-vis industry and emphasized their position in the protection of consumer 
rights. This action served as a deterrent to industry. The joint action enabled consumer 
organizations to demonstrate their strength and power, and how their strength could be 
enhanced by collaborating more closely and be used as an important weapon in the battle for 
the protection of consumer rights throughout Europe. The co-ordinated action may serve as a 
catalyst for future actions of this kind. Nevertheless, considering the reaction on the business 
side, it seems that although the co-ordinated action by consumer organizations was brought on 
behalf of consumers in order to protect consumer rights, in reality its success was rather 
limited. Whilst industry was monitoring the potential effects, the envisaged political solution, 
banning certain unfair terms European wide in air carrier regulation, was not achieved.  
On the basis of experience gained, consumer organizations may specify the parameters 
for taking action and draft a schedule for future joint activities. This is what happened in the 
Apple case, where consumer organisations attacked Apple’s commercial guarantee as 
violating consumer laws. The form in which co-ordinated action was undertaken shows its 
improvement and development in comparison to other existing forms of co-operation of 
consumer organizations. In 2011, the Italian Antitrust Authority issued a decision
542
, which 
condemned Apply for a breach of provisions on unfair commercial practices of the Italian 
Consumer Code. Consumer organizations in Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Spain, Slovenia, and Greece were part of the co-ordinated 
action organized by BEUC. The input for the co-ordinated action of consumer organization 
came from decision of the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, which gave an incentive 
                                               
541 According to Ryanair’s statistics 99,8% of bookings are made online [for details see: judgment Test 
Achats/Ryanair, 10 March 2010, Tribunal de Commerce de Namur, Belgium, page 12]. Other companies have a 
lower percentage of online bookings since they offer call centres booking and booking through their dedicated 
agents. Recently, also EasyJet, Brussels Airlines, Spainair and Vueling have begun on-line booking campanges, 
including a possibility of booking by mobile applications. 
542 Decision of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato of 21 December 2011, Soc Apple Sales 
International v l’Autorita' Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato – Antitrust, AGCOM No. 23155 (caso 
PS/7256). 
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for “(…) the commencement of a pan-European action against Apple throughout the 
European Union”.543 
Consumer organization have co-ordinated their powers in order to undertake an action 
"for an immediate halt to misleading practices by Apple in relation to consumers' product 
guarantee rights”.544 That was an objective for consumer organizations’ action, expressed in 
a common public statement of consumer organizations under the auspices of BEUC
545
 with a 
request of cessation of its unfair practices.
546
 Some of the consumer organizations started also 
a national battle toward modification of practices by Apple. That means that they have started 
a separate procedure before their national entities according to the same or similar reasoning 
and legal basis of the claims as the Italian Authority claimed. The result of a majority of 
claims is however still unknown.  
All requirements of a co-ordinated action were met. Planning, organizing, staffing, 
directing and controlling appeared in the scheme of co-ordinated action toward Apple. One 
additional issues, which can be linked with controlling by an external body - the co-ordinated 
approach in Apple case gained support by the EU Commission.
547
 The media hype has drawn 
the attention of most consumers in the EU to the incriminated marketing practices of Apple. 
The penalties raised aware in the US and in China.
548
 The Apple case also disclosed 
weaknesses. Although the decision providing for action for injunction as requested by 
Altroconsumo stopped the unlawful marketing of the guarantee, a single consumer is still 
supposed to claim individually her compensation.
549
 
 
                                               
543 Djurovic M. (2013), The Apple Case: The Commencement of Pan-European Battle Against Unfair 
Commercial Practices, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 9(3), p. 253-266. 
544 Press release: Quotation of the interview given by M. Perani from Altroconsumo, an Italian consumer 
organizations; Willan (2012), Apple Loses First Appeal in Italian Warranty Case, Business Ready, 2012, 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/252508/apple_loses_first_appeal_in_italian_warranty_case.html> accessed on 
July 2, 2014. 
545 A public statement of BECU was published on March 19, 2012, <http://cojef-
project.eu/IMG/pdf/BEUC_PR_Apple.pdf> accessed on June 2, 2014. 
546 The public statement of BEUC acting on behalf of consumer organizations which joined the co-ordinated 
action has been disclosed in press release <http://www.beuc.org/press-media/press-releases> accessed on June 9, 
2014.  
547 On 21 September 2012, Ms V. Reading (Vice President of the EU Commission) sent a letter addressed to all 
EU Member States Ministries in charge of consumer protection with a request to check whether Apple’s 
practices regarding the consumers’ right to guarantee is a common standard in their respective countries. The 
feedback of this research was supposed to be sent to the Commission for final verification as a basis for an action 
plan in the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network. Full text of the letter can be found in ARES(2012) 
1099756 as of 21 September 2012.  
548 The decision of the Italian Antitrust Authority imposed a fine of 900. 000 EU and additional fine of 200. 000 
EU for a lack of compliance with the previous decision of the Italian Antitrust Authority.  
549 For example: Luxemburg – a contract concluded upon the unfair commercial practice is null and void, 
Belgium – in such a case a trader is supposed to refund consumers fully.  
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7. 4. A Future Potential of Consumer Organization Actions  
 
The Ryanair case and the Apple case demonstrate the potential of co-ordinated 
activities.
550
 Consumer organizations gain popularity, turn into active players of consumer law 
enforcement and close the gap resulting for the difficulties in making use of the action for 
injunction in a cross-border dimension. No matter which of the actions is concerned, the joint 
one, co-operative or co-ordinative, consumer organizations have learnt by sharing 
experiences, identifying common goals and to fight even against global players. There is a 
major difference between the Ryanair case and the Apple case. First of all, the number of 
consumer organizations, which took part in the action had significantly increased. Secondly, 
in Apple BEUC had a leading role. Thirdly, the cross-border activity encouraged consumer 
organization to act not only in terms of cross-border cooperation, but also at national level - 
since national organizations initiated judicial proceedings and tried to litigate the core of the 
cross-border problem “home”. The increased value of co-ordinated action had already been 
stressed by the Report on application of the Injunction Directive, which in open words refers 
to co-ordinated action by consumer organizations as a form in which a collective enforcement 
in consumer matters can be exercised.  
 
8. Out-of-court Enforcement Schemes in Cross-Border Consumer Cases 
 
The new enforcement schemes upon the frame of the Injunction Directive and the 
Regulation 2006/2004 have turned out to be a very complex and too complicated for 
consumers to effectively enforce consumers’ rights.551 Although the procedural cross-border 
tools for consumer law enforcement have been established on paper, the tools could not be 
effectively used in everyday consumer practice. There is potential but this potential has not 
yet really been utilised, despite all efforts established within and outside the regulatory 
schemes of the Injunction Directive and the Regulation 2006/2004. The difficulties in the use 
of these new enforcement tools might be one of the reasons why the European Commission 
put ever stronger emphasis on out-of-court enforcement measures. Currently out-of-court 
consumer measures like SOLVIT
552
, FIN-NET
553
, and others
554
 are recognized as tools for 
                                               
550 The shortcomings of the Injunction Directive have been discussed in the Chapter III 5.3, 5.6.  
551 Report on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, p. 9. 
552 SOLVIT website, <www. ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/index_en.htm> accessed on May 31, 2014. 
553 FIN-NET website, <www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/finnet/index_en.htm> accessed on 
May 31, 2014. 
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individual enforcement. These schemes have significantly helped in removing a relevant 
portion of consumer disputes from the judicial arena to out-of-court fora. It took, however, 
until 2013 before the European Union was able to develop a binding legal framework for out 
of court dispute settlement mechanisms. It is worth recalling that the Injunction Directive 
preceded the ADR/ODR Directive/Regulation by 15 years. In theory the time lag would have 
enabled the European Commission to propose models for combining collective enforcement 
strategies and individual enforcement, for instance via testing collective dispute settlement 
schemes. However, this did not happen. Conceptually the two bodies of law stand side-by-
side, the Injunction Directive and Regulation 2006/2004 the ADR/ODR Directive/Regulation. 
Both remain interconnected via the Annexes and via what is termed here as the dualism of 
enforcement measures.
555
  
By now it is not clear whether and to what extent the ADR/ODR set of rules
556
 will 
lead to a re-structuring of the out-of-court settlement schemes which have been established in 
the last decade. That is why it makes sense to introduce the existing sector-specific tools 
dedicated to particular fields of interest: Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-Net)
557
, Financial 
Services Complaints Network (FIN-NET) and SOLVIT. It is against this background that the 
basics of the ADR/ODR Directive/Regulation are presented. 
 
8. 1. EEJ-Net 
  
The Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-Net) helps consumers to settle cross-border disputes 
with companies that provide defective goods or services, by guiding them towards alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms. EEJ-Net consists of various national contact point or 
“clearing houses”. It is exclusively built to assist consumers in cross-border relations.558 This 
network is based on out-of-court means only and in no extent it is aimed at promoting a 
traditional judicial enforcement method. The Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on the 
Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of consumer 
disputes laid down a rather broad framework of what should be achieved. In order to bring 
                                                                                                                                                   
554 For example: EEJ-NET (the European Consumer Centres Network), 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32043_en.htm> accessed on May 31, 2014. 
555 See Chapter I. 
556 Since the Directive on ADR and the Regulation on ODR are dated on May 2013, therefore currently there is 
no experience regarding its practical application.  
557 Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial 
settlement of consumer disputes (OJ C 155, 06.06.2000). 
558 For more structural and institutional details see EEC-Net website, 
<www.ec.eurpa.eu/consumers/publications/factsheet-ECC-NETECC-NETen.pdf> accessed on May 31, 2014. 
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national extra-judicial dispute settlement bodies together as a network, each Member State is 
supposed to indicate a central point, so-called “a clearing house” to act as a point of contact 
for consumers wishing to settle a dispute out-of-court in another Member State. The contact 
points constitute an "extra-judicial network", intended to make it easier to settle cross-border 
consumer disputes. The main activity of the EEJ-Net is focused on:  
(i) providing information for consumers of possibilities of recourse to alternative dispute 
resolutions mechanisms,  
(ii) facilitation of cross-border consumer complaints, mainly by helping the complainants 
to overcome language difficulties by providing practical assistance such as translations 
of consumer complaints forms,  
(iii) facilitation of lodging complaints using the appropriate standard forms for alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and  
(iv) following-up the resolution of complaints and action taken involving the ADR within 
the network.  
The EEJ-Net promotes the idea of close co-operation between bodies responsible for 
enforcement of consumer rights and professionals, companies, economic organisations, 
consumer groups, extra-judicial organisations, the Member States and the Commission. Once 
the Council noted that the out-of-court bodies falling outside the scope of Recommendation 
98/257/EC started to play a useful role for the consumer, the Commission was invited and 
encouraged to develop in close cooperation with Member States common criteria for the 
assessment of bodies, which should ensure their quality, fairness and effectiveness.
559
 
Recommendation 2001/310 has given a strong background to the EEC-Net and indicating 
these and establishing the rules of the co-operation between the EEC-Net and the 
Commission. The latter provides technical support for the creation and operation of the 
network and is in charge of making use of new communication technologies.
560
 Furthermore, 
the Commission has been given a supervisory role in the enforcement actions. This is what 
the Recommendation has in common with Regulation 2006/2004. Although it looks like a 
scheme, which is designed for both the Injunction Directive and Regulation 2006/2004, the 
EEJ-Net has never played a role in collective enforcement. If any, the EEJ-Net gained 
importance in the enforcement of individual rights, be it under the implemented EU consumer 
protection rules or national consumer law.  
                                               
559 Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the 
consensual resolution of consumer disputes (notified under document number C(2001) 1016). 
560 The role of the Commission may be compared to its role with regard to Regulation 2006/2004, where the 
Commission plays a role of “a spider in the cobweb”, see Chapter III 6.2. 
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In January 2005 institutional change came in the form of merger of two previously 
existing networks – the Euroguichets and European Extra-Judicial network. The ECC-Net 
provides consumers with information on their rights under European and national law, gives 
advice and assists in the resolution of cross-border consumer disputes and complaints.
561
 The 
new design benefits much from the experiences gained.
562563
 The ECC-Net is based on the 
activity of national European Consumer Centres established in each of the Member States and 
in Iceland and in Norway.
564
 Every national Consumer Centre must be a public or non-profit 
making body and is selected by a Member States. The choice of the Member State requires 
the EU Commission’s approval.565 The EEC-Net aims at performing the following tasks: 
(i) providing an information to consumers and giving them an advice about their rights in 
cross-border shopping,  
(ii) giving advice and providing a support to any consumer with a complaint related to 
cross-border shopping,  
(iii) providing an easy access to ADR-bodies if there is no chance to solve a cross-border 
consumer complaint amicably and assisting consumers during this procedure,  
(iv) raising the awareness of the out-of-court resolution schemes among consumers and 
traders, 
(v) sharing best practices between consumers and traders at the national and the EU level,  
(vi) entering in cooperation with other EU-networks which provide for information on EU, 
national legislation and case studies (for examples SOLVIT, FIN-NET).  
ECC-Net has developed a particular case-handling procedure for cross-border 
disputes. The Consumer Centre of the country of the consumer’s residence will receive 
support of the Consumer Centre of the country where the dispute occurred. Consumer Centres 
are supposed to perform the following role:  
                                               
561 More details: website of ECC-NETECC-NET <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/index_en.htm> accessed on 
June 9, 2014.  
562 In order to increase consumer confidence in the Internal Market, ECC-Net is supposed to follow the following 
six main objectives: (i) promotional activities to raise consumer awareness; (ii) responding to consumer inquiries 
about rights in connection to cross-border shopping; (iii) to assist consumers with complaints; (iv) to assist 
consumers with disputes; (v) to contribute to the development of ADR schemes in their host countries; (vi) to 
engage in networking in feedback to be found in CPEC (2011); Evaluation of the European Consumer Centres 
Network. p. v. 
563 ECC-Net (2009) Cross-border Dispute Resolution; European Parliament (2011), Cross-border Alternative 
Disputes Resolution in the European Union, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: 
Economic and Scientific Policy, Internal Market and Consumer Protection, IP/A/IMCO/ST/2010-15, PE464.424. 
564 The finding comes from the EU Commission and from national governments of the member states 
participating in the ECC-Net.  
565 For procedural details EEC-Net (2009), Cross-border Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Europe – Practical 
Reflections on the Need and Availability. 
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(i) to indicate a consumer a proper alternative dispute resolution scheme which fits to the 
case at hand, 
(ii) to inform a consumer about the alternative disputes resolution bodies relevant for the 
case at hand,  
(iii) to indicate the pros and cons of the case at hand,  
(iv) to support a consumer in monitoring of the dispute,  
(v) to support a consumer in the formalities accompanying the procedure, for example by 
assuring access to translation service of the relevant documents for the case at hand. 
In theory, the case-handling procedure is designed in a complex manner and it should 
be beneficial for consumers to bring cross-border cases before the Consumer Centres. 
Nevertheless, there is an important practical problem, resulting from the lack of alternative 
disputes resolution mechanisms.
566
  
The ECC-Net established an effective legal network. In 2011, it dealt with more than 
70,000 cases. As the annual report for 2012 shows 72,000 EU consumers requested help from 
European Consumer Centres. More than half of these contacts related to 32,000 complaints 
about a purchase made in another EU country, Norway and Iceland. The ECC-Net turned out 
to be particularity valuable in air transportation sector. According to the data collected in the 
Annual Report for 2012 about one third were related to the transport sector, of which 22% 
were linked to the air transport. E-commerce area covered around 60% of complaints.
567
  
 
8. 2. FIN-NET 
 
FIN-NET was launched by the Commission in 2001. The network is addressed to 
financial dispute resolution only within the European Economic Area countries. This means 
that it scope has been extended to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The states are 
responsible for handling disputes between consumers and financial service providers, such as 
banks, insurance companies, investment firms and others of this kind.
568
 The FIN-NET is 
meant to bring solutions for consumer problems in cross-border cases regarding the relations 
between consumers and the financial sector. 
                                               
566 EEC-Net (2009), Cross-border Dispute Resolution, pp. 10-11.  
567 For more details and in particular figures regarding the ECC-Net activity see website. 
568 For more details see the website of the FIN-NET. 
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 The activity of FIN-NET is aimed at providing consumers with easier access to ADR 
schemes in cross-border cases related to financial matters through cooperation and assistance 
of national alternative dispute resolution bodies.
569
 The FIN-NET activity is aimed at: 
(i) providing a consumer with easy and informed access to out-of-court means of redress 
in cross-border matters,  
(ii) assuring exchange of information between the European out-of-court complaint 
schemes,  
(iii) improving the quality of alternative dispute resolution schemes and making sure that 
there are based and run upon a common set of principles addressed to alternative 
dispute resolution frames
570
, 
(iv) increasing consumer confidence in terms of use alternative dispute resolution schemes 
among the Member States.  
The activity of FIN-NET has systematically grown. Since 2001 the year of initiation of 
the FIN-NET activity there were 335 complaints to be handled, in 2009 this number increases 
up to 1.542 cases, in 2011- 1.854 cases.
571
  
 
8. 3. SOLVIT 
 
SOLVIT was set up in year 2002 as an on-line problem solving network with a single 
national centre in every Member State and in Norway and Lichtenstein. The SOLVIT 
activities are addressed to both consumers and business.
572
 Nevertheless, they are not 
involved in disputes between consumers and businesses. The SOLVIT network is aimed at: 
(i) ensuring that all EU citizens and businesses have access to a high-quality service both 
in their country of residence and in the country in which the problematic issue has 
arisen,  
(ii) making a guarantee that all SOLVIT centres are committed to working with the 
Commission to achieve a high-quality service,  
                                               
569 European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and Services (2013), FIN-NET Activity Report, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-net/docs/activity/2012_en.pdf> accessed on May 31, 2014. 
570 Recommendation 98/257 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of 
consumer disputes (OJ L 115, 17.04.1998, p. 31–34). 
571 Directorate General Internal Market and Services (2013), FIN-NET Activity Report, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fin-net/docs/activity/2012_en.pdf> accessed on May 31, 2014; which 
provides for more recent data.  
572 Recommendation of 17 September 2013 on the principles governing SOLVIT European Commission (OJ L 
249, 19.09.2013, p. 10). 
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(iii) ensuring that the quality and performance of the SOLVIT service will not deteriorate 
with the expansion of the network and an increase in numbers of cases submitted,  
(iv) working with a completely transparent database that allows all parties involved to 
monitor the network’s quality and sufficiency, and  
(v) emphasising that SOLVIT represents a completely new approach that combines the 
handling of complaints with a high level of administrative cooperation. 
The claims must have a legal background in violation of EU consumer law, or 
misapplication of single market rules by the public authorities, or social security issues.
573
 
SOLVIT network is a good example of the cooperative element between authorities 
dominates. Contrary to Regulation 2006/2004 the co-operation in SOLVIT network operates 
on a voluntary basis. SOLVIT Centres are committed to providing real solutions to problems 
within ten weeks. Short and speedy dispute resolution is one of the predominant elements of 
SOLVIT’s activity. The effectiveness of its activity is incomparably higher than other 
networks aiming to combat difficulties in cross-border cases. One of the most positive aspects 
of SOLVIT’s is the short time-span of dispute resolution, as well as the strong 
interconnectedness of the authorities via a central database boasting transparency. For many 
years, different kinds of organisations representing consumers or businesses have been able to 
submit their cases online.
574
  
 
8. 4. The New Design under the ADR/ODR Directive/Regulation 
 
In 1998
575
 and 2001
576
 the Commission had already adopted two recommendations 
defining common principles for efficient and effective ADR entities. Ten years later in 2011, 
the Commission launched a Proposal for Directive on ADR
577
 and a Proposal for Regulation 
on ODR
578
, both were adopted in 2013 as Directive on ADR and the Regulation on ODR. The 
main objective was “(…) to improve the functioning of the retail internal market and more 
                                               
573 Recommendation of 17 September 2013 on the principles governing SOLVIT European Commission (OJ L 
249, 19.09.2013, p. 10). 
574 Santini (A.A. 2008/2009), La Risoluzione Extragiudiziale dei Conflitti tra Cittadini Privati e Pubblica 
Amministrazione nell'Unione Europea: la Rete SOLVIT, Tesi di Laurea in Sistemi amministrativi comparati. 
575 Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (OJ L 115, 17.04.1998, p. 31–34). 
576 Commission Recommendation 2001/310 of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in 
the consensual resolution of consumer disputes (OJ L 109 , 19.04.2001, p. 56 – 61). 
577 Commission Proposal for a Directive on Consumer ADR, COM(2011) 793 final. 
578 Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Consumer ORD, COM(2011) 794 final. 
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particularly to enhance redress for consumers”.579 Both the pieces based on Article 114 
TFEU, which refers the Internal Market rationale.
580
 This is in line of rationale of the 
Injunction Directive and Regulation 2006/2004.  
The Commission had carefully prepared the step from mere recommendations to a 
binding piece of law. The therefore initiated study
581
 concluded that geographical 
inaccessibility and limited sectorial availability lead to serious obstacle for consumers, which 
“(…) prevent a consumer and business from fully exploiting their [ADR] potential”.582 The 
new Commission’s plan was supposed not only to fill up the gap in coverage, but also to 
consider the new challenges, resulting from of e-commerce trade. Somewhat oversimplified 
one what argue that the ADR Directive constitutes the follow on to the Recommendation 
98/27 and the ODR Regulation to Recommendation 2001/310. 
The ADR scheme covers non-judicial procedures, such as conciliation, mediation, 
arbitration
583
 or complaints board. ADR, or as Hodges remarks CADR
584
 - Consumer ADR - 
refer to the resolution of disputes between consumers and traders (in relation of b2c) linked to 
the sale of goods and provision of services by traders, online and off-line.  
The ADR Directive builds on existing national schemes. The aim is not to impose 
obligations on Member States to create a specific ADR entity for each retail sector, but rather 
to introduce a set of common binding principles
585
, codifying the Alassani judgment of the 
ECJ.
586
  
The ADR Directive does not replace existing schemes but shall bring them down to a 
common standard Article 3(1) states “(…) if any provision of this Directive [on ADR] 
conflicts with a provision laid down in another Union legal act [EEC-NET, FIN-NET, etc.] 
                                               
579 Commission Communication by the European Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer 
disputes in the Single Market’, COM(2011) 791 final, dated in 29 November 2011. 
580
 Chapter IV 4.1. 
581 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis… 
582 Commission Communication on ADR for consumer disputes in the Single Market’, COM(2011) 791 final. 
583 It is highly conflictual whether arbitration in consumer litigation is an appropriate means. The ECJ refused to 
declare arbitration clauses in standard terms non-binding; See: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 
October 2006, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05 (ECR2006, p. I-10421). 
584 Hodges, Ch., Benöhr, N. Creutzfeld-Banda (2012), Consumer-to-Business Disputes Resolution: the power of 
CADR, ERA Forum 2012, Vol. 13, p. 199-225, DOI 10.1007/s12027-012-0263-y.  
585 Article 1 of the ADR Directive “(…) consumers can, on a voluntary basis, submit complaints against traders 
to entities offering independent, impartial, transparent, effective, fast and fair alternative dispute resolution 
procedures”, and upon requirement of effectiveness as in Article 8 let. (e) of the ADR Directive provides a 
deadline for dispute solving: “(e) the outcome of the ADR procedure is made available within a period of 90 
calendar days from the date on which the ADR entity has received the complete complaint file”. The costs issue 
has been defined in Article 7 let. (l) “(l) the costs, if any, (are MO) to be borne by the parties, including any 
rules on awarding costs at the end of the procedure”.  
586 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 18 March 2010.European Court of Justice, Rosalba Alassini v 
Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v 
Telecom Italia SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08), ECR 2010, p. I-02213. 
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and relating to out-of-court redress procedures initiated by a consumer against a trader, the 
provision of this Directive shall prevail”. Therefore, the ADR Directive will prevail over 
existing out-of-court measures. The ADR Directive envisages an active participation of the 
EEC-canters, in cases where the EU consumers run into problems when buying from a trader 
based in another EU country, so then they can ask for help and assistance of the ECC-Net, 
Article 14:  
“1. Member States shall ensure that, with regard to disputes arising from cross-border sales 
or service contracts, consumers can obtain assistance to access the ADR entity operating in 
another Member State which is competent to deal with their cross-border dispute”, while in 
para. 2 of Article 14 is directly made to the ECC-NET.  
2. Member States shall confer responsibility for the task referred to in paragraph 1 on their 
centres of the European Consumer Centre Network, on consumer organisations or on any 
other body”. 
With regard to FIN-NET, the respective reference can be found in Article 16(1): 
“1. Where a network of ADR entities facilitating the resolution of cross-border disputes exists 
in a sector-specific area within the Union, Member States shall encourage ADR entities that 
deal with disputes in that area to become a member of that network.  
Recital (56) Networks of ADR entities, such as the financial dispute resolution network ‘FIN-
NET’ in the area of financial services, should be strengthened within the Union. Member 
States should encourage ADR entities to become part of such networks”. 
SOLVIT and ADR will work side-by-side. SOLVIT is a problem-solving network 
designed to help citizens and businesses who run into difficulties. Therefore, SOLVIT 
remains outside the scope of the ADR directive, Article 2(1): 
“1. This Directive [on ADR] shall apply to procedures for the out-of- court resolution of 
domestic and cross-border disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales 
contracts or service contracts between a trader established in the Union and a consumer 
resident in the Union through the intervention of an ADR entity which proposes or imposes a 
solution or brings the parties together with the aim of facili­tating an amicable solution”. 
Apart from ADR, the ODR Regulation is dedicated to consumers’ e-commerce 
transactions.
587
 The ORD introduces a pan-European online dispute resolution platform free 
                                               
587 The ODR frame is the response to consumers’ needs. According to the report submitted by the ECC-Net in 
2010 56,5% of EEC-Net complains referred to e-commerce transactions; EEC-Net website, Recital (18) and 
Article 5(2) of the ODR Regulation. 
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of charge.
588
 The ORD platform will check the admissibility of the claim and then transmit it 
to the relevant ADR. The complaint shall be solved within 30 calendar days.
589
 Time will tell 
if and ORD will work in practice once it is established. One of the crucial issues in the 
legislative process was the development of software, which could be used for cross-translation 
of the claims into other languages.
590
 
 
9. Intermediary Conclusion 
 
The chapter shows the transborder side of the dualism of enforcement measures in the 
field of cross-border consumer enforcement, which is based on (i) collective cross-border 
scheme designed by the Injunction Directive, (ii) Regulation 2006/2004 which is focusing on 
collective enforcement via national public bodies, (iii) ADR and ODR schemes, which 
stressing individual enforcement out of courts. 
Dualism of enforcement measures in the cross-border context differs from the thesis of 
dualism in national context. In cross-border context contrary to the national context, there is 
no true parallel between the collective and the individual. Although both the national and 
collective frame cover consumer protection in the same manner, in national cases the two 
forms coexist in parallel, while in cross-border matters they may have different ends, links, 
and conjunctions. In the cross-border context a more holistic vision of the collectiveness of 
procedural measures failed since neither the injunctive procedure nor the frame of national 
bodies brought by the Regulation 2006/2004 was sufficient to address collective cross-border 
matters. At the cross-border level the two spheres of enforcement stand rather separately from 
each other.  
After the European Commission had realised the limited impact of the Injunction 
Directive it shifted the focus from judicial enforcement through collective actions of 
consumer organisations to administrative enforcement through co-operation between national 
authorities. Regulation 2006/2004 is currently under review as its limits became abundantly 
clear. Both schemes are not inter-related, although the action for injunction survived as a 
means of last resort in Regulation 2006/2004. The new development results from the 
consumer organisations which instead of engaging in complicated transborder litigation, co-
                                               
588 Article 5(2) of the ORD Regulation.  
589 Article 9(8) of the ODR Regulation.  
590 Personal communication of the author with lawyers, politicians and academics at the occasion of “Conference 
on ADR & ODR in the European Union” organized by European Justice Forum in Brussels held in Brussels, on 
May 15, 2012 at the Representation of the Free State of Bavaria to the European Union.  
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ordinate their enforcement activities at the national level against one and the same wrongdoer 
or one and the same problem through the European consumer organisations, BEUC. The most 
recently adopted Directive on ADR and the Regulation on ODR opens up new avenues of 
individual cross-border enforcement, however, without looking for possible links between 
collective action via injunction and dispute settlement procedures. 
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Chapter IV From Multi-level Diversity to Convergence 
 
1. The European Skeleton  
 
The European enforcement scenario of injunctions and other types of remedies 
presents a very specific structure arising from a combination of the EU and MS models. The 
two-level structure is often called a multi-level structure since it ties two layers of law at 
national and the EU level.
591
 The European concept of the multi-level structure of injunctions 
shows a certain similarity to the US model advocating a convergence between the US-federal 
and US-state level, which may serve as background for the comparison of Member States and 
the EU level.
592
 This does not mean that I intend to embark on a deeper comparison between 
the US and the EU, but to indicate that the multi-level structure of the US might serve as a 
source of inspiration for analysing the interplay between the EU and the US models and for 
testing the potential for convergence in the field of consumer law enforcement via the action 
for injunction. 
 
2. The “Hybrid”593 Structure of Action for Injunction 
 
Currently, in the design of European law, there are convergences and conjunctions of 
various kinds to be discovered at the EU level and at the national level. Remedies constitute 
an example/illustration of hybridity because they are multi-level constructs remedies. This 
issue has been investigated by N. Reich, who advanced the theory of hybridsation of legal 
remedies.
594
 Although Reich’s theory refers to competition law, it can be extended to the field 
of consumer protection. In terms of European remedial law, the theory of hybridization draws 
on the principle of equivalence and effectiveness. It requires a “reshaping” and an 
“upgrading” of the national system of remedies in order to assure the effect utile of 
                                               
591 Storme (2008), Une Question de Principe(s)? Réponse à Quelques Critiques à L’égard du Projet Provisoire 
de “Cadre Commun de Reference”, Lecture Conference, The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 
Europäische Rechtsakademie, Trier, 6–7 March; Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 1-38, p. 2-3; Le 
rapport entre les Règlements européens en matière de procédure (en particulier celle relative aux petites 
créances) et le droit judiciaire interne belge, Revue de la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Liège 2010, p. 5-30, 
<www.storme.be/procedureeuropeenne.pdf> accessed on June 9, 2014; Smits (2011), Plurality of Sources in 
European Private Law, or: How to Live With Legal Diversity? in Brownsword/Micklitz/Niglia/Weatherill 
(2011), The Foundations of…, p. 161-171. 
592 Storme (2008), Une question de…, p. 65-77. 
593 Tuori (2014), On Legal Hybrids, in Micklitz (2012), A Self-sufficient European Private Law – A Viable 
Concept? EUI Working Paper, 2012/31, Florence, p. 67-74. 
594 Reich (2007), Horizontal Liability in EC Law: Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation in Case of 
Breaches of EC Rights, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 44(1), p. 705-742. 
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substantive rights granted in the EU law. Reich’s conclusion has been based on the principle 
of direct effect of EC law towards individuals, whose rights are protected by the EC law.
595
 
Micklitz defines hybridization more generally “(…) as an overall normative model of a 
composite legal order, within which the European and the national legal both play their part 
in some sort of a merged European-national private legal order. Hybridisation means that the 
legal character of the respective rule is neither European nor national. It bears elements of 
both legal orders and is therefore supposed to be hybrid”.596 
In order to elaborate the conjunction between the national and the EC frame, Reich 
proposes a two-step procedure: first, there is a need to find out the applicable rules of Member 
States law in which are relevant to the frame of EU law. Secondly, there is a need to evaluate 
these rules in light of EC principles in order to make sure that the minimum (adequate) 
standard of protection is achieved. Thirdly, the applicable Member States law has to be 
corrected under principle of supremacy and direct effect of EC law.
597
 Hybridisation is bound 
to the scope and reach of the EU legal framework granting rights to individuals on the one 
side
598
 and the procedural autonomy of the Member States on the other.
599
 According to 
Micklitz and Cafaggi hybridisation should be understood as a gradual intrusion of EU law 
enforcement measures into national legal orders. Such an understanding fits to the Injunction 
Directive which links the EU and the Member States level. 
 
3. Approved Diversity of Injunctions and the Way Forward  
 
The enforcement of consumer law in the European Union through the remedy of 
injunction is characterized by a high degree of differentiation. There is no uniformisation of 
national remedies.
600
 Each Member State determines individually the shape of remedies
601
 in 
                                               
595 Reich (2007), Horizontal Liability in…, p. 705-742. 
596 Micklitz (2013), The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law – The Transformation from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation, 
<http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/8/3581/19.pdf> accessed on April 25, 2014. 
597 Craig/De Búrca (2011), The Legal Effect of... 
598 Reich (1998), System der Subjektiven-öffentlichen Rechte, to Be Found in the Union: A European 
Constitution for Citizens of Bits and Pieces, Academy of European Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law VI/1 1995, p. 158-236. 
599 Van Gerven (2000), Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37(3), p. 501-
536; Kakouris (1997), Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural Autonomy? Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 34, p. 1389-1412; Galetta (2009), Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost? A 
Study on the „Functionalized Procedural Competence of EU Member States”, p. 11-17. 
600 Dougan (2004), National Remedies Before the Court of Justice. Issues of Harmonization and Differentiation, 
Modern Studies in European Law, Oxford, p. 97-99. 
601 Chiti (1995), Towards the Unified Judicial Protection in Europe(?), European Review of Public Law, Vol. 9, 
p. 553-565. 
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order to ensure compliance with EU standards.
602
 This yields a broad diversity of national 
models of enforcement and forms of injunction. The result is heterogeneity.
603
 This hardly 
complies with the ideal of legal certainty.
604
 Nowadays, it is quite difficult, if not impossible 
to find a common denominator among in the various schemes for the action of injunction. The 
degree of heterogeneity in enforcement informs the level of consumer protection available.
605
 
According to Micklitz emphasis should be put on effective application and 
enforcement of remedies already in force.
606
 Member States should focus on the introduction 
of effective and adequate means of implementation of the respective directives. National 
enforcement measures should be shaped in a way, which allows for the realization of the 
effect utile of consumer law.
607
 There is no need for copy-paste technique of enforcement 
measures, but only for the establishment of common rules of application.
608
 The European 
Union is built on diversity of enforcement schemes. This is the essence of the principle of 
procedural autonomy.  
The difficult question is how much diversity and much hetereogenity the European 
Union can live with, without jeopardizing the whole enterprise of European Union consumer 
law. Europe is united in diversity. This means there is more than simply approved diversity, 
there is also the striving for more unity – the EU means unity in diversity. Before I look into 
the potential for convergence out of or in heterogeneity, I will first analyse the reasons, which 
explain the multi-level structure, which explain hybridization and which explain the broad 
variety of injunction mechanism. 
 
 
                                               
602
 Kas (2014), Reshaping the Boundaries of the Enforcement of European Social Regulation: Unitas in 
Diversitate – The Construction of a Hybrid Relationship, in Micklitz/Svetiev (2012), A Self-sufficient 
European…, p. 119-139. 
603 Report on the application of Directive 2009/29/EC, p. 11. 
604 Legal certainty is often considered in the substantive law context, while omitted in procedural matters; See: 
Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 final, p. 2. 
605 Cross-border tools of consumer protection are often criticized by consumers because of the complexity of the 
procedure, its length, language barriers, etc. For more details see: Eurobarometer Survey 358, Flash 
Eurobarometer (2013); Consumer Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade and Consumer Protection; Twigg-
Flesner (2011), Good-Bye Harmonization by Directives, Hello Cross-Border only Regulation? – A Way Forward 
for EU Consumer Contract Law, European Review of Contract Law, Vol. 7(2), p. 235-256, p. 239.  
606 Following Micklitz, in order to realize the effect utile of consumer protection directives, more emphasis shall 
be put on enforcement. For similar approach see: also Kas (2014), Reshaping the Boundaries…, in 
Micklitz/Svetiev (2012), A Self-sufficient European…, p. 119-139. 
607 Kas (2014), Reshaping the Boundaries…, in Micklitz/Svetiev (2012), A Self-sufficient European… 
608 Micklitz (2011), The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States – A Plea for a Judge-made 
European Law on Remedies, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of 
the Member States, Antwerp, p. 367-369. 
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4. Looking for an Explanation of Heterogeneity of Injunctions 
 
Many different pieces of legislation have been adopted thus far at the EU level, all of 
which were meant to bring the different legal systems closer together, to strive for 
harmonisation.
609
 The emphasis has always been on the harmonisation of substantive law, 
initiated at the EU level.
610
 The approximation of procedural matters remains by and large 
outside the scope of application of EU law. That it occurred in this manner through Directive 
of injunctions does not lead to harmonization but at the very best to the development of a 
broader framework.
611
 Until today it is unclear whether and to what extent the EU is allowed 
or not allowed to bring an action in order to intervene into procedural matters of the Member 
States; what the limits of this intervention are and what the legal basis of such an enterprise 
could be.
612
  
This ambiguity is mainly rooted in the division of competences for procedural matters 
between the EU and Member States.
613
 The Rome Treaty as well as subsequent EC Treaties 
were silent or only fragmentarily tackled the issue of EU competence in the area of the civil 
justice. The Treaties have never provided all-encompassing solutions. The Amsterdam Treaty 
extended the EU competence to “the area of freedom, security and justice”. In the aftermath, 
the EU used its monopoly to initiate more harmonization measures in civil justice. That is 
why in the course of time harmonisation has more and more used in procedural law matters 
too. The Lisbon Treaty has not brought any further innovation in this regard. It left the main 
division of responsibilities untouched.
614
 However, since 2009 the EU has a wider 
                                               
609 Craig/De Búrca (2011), EU Law…, p. 203; Vogenauer/Weatherill (2006), The Harmonization of European 
Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice, Studies of the Oxford 
Institute of European and Comparative Law, p. 115. 
610 Green Paper of 16 November 1993 on access of consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes 
in the single market, COM(93)576, 16 November 1993, p. 57; where the Commission has concluded that the 
divergences between national procedures „are the product of country-specific traditions: rules of procedure as a 
whole represent a delicate balance and can only be harmonized gradually and with the utmost caution”. 
611 Which thanks to the Recommendation 2013/396, can be regarded as a pattern in order do design other 
collective redress mechanisms, see for more details in Chapter III.  
612 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 65. 
613 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 70; states as follows 
“(…) this principle of procedural autonomy only applies when there are no procedural rules at the EU level. 
Interestingly, the EU legislation (directives, regulations), including legislation in the consumer field, goes 
halfway in prescribing national procedural rules for the enforcement of the substantive provisions it sets”. For 
more details see Betlem (2007), Public and Private Transnational…, p. 683-704. 
614 The amended Article 3(1) of the Lisbon Treaty states that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain within the Member States”. This is subject to principle of loyalty which has been expressed in 
the same article; See: Bernitz/Nergelius/Cardner (2008), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of 
Development, p. 75-76. 
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competence to adopt civil justice measures, which legal harmonization of national procedural 
law.
615
  
The principle of procedural autonomy of Member States remains the key to 
understanding the constitutional limitations in harmonizing procedural laws. Although the EU 
has not been granted a treaty right to “intervene” into procedural matters, under certain 
conditions the EU might initiate legislation with regard to procedural aspects if the non-
existence of enforcement measures endangers the uniform application of EU law.
616
 
Originally the boundaries between substantive law and procedural law were quite clearly 
established. The division of competences between Member States and the EU were sharp and 
impassable. Member States kept their independence as to procedural matters and the EU did 
not to intervene. However, as the European integration process advanced the boundaries of 
competences between the Union and Member States gradually changed and the division of 
competences became less clear-cut.
617
 Hence, the role of the EU and of Member States has 
changed significantly in the last decade, which is illustrated through the uncommon/unusual 
scheme of the Injunction Directive. M. Storme has expressed this quite radically
618
 “(…) the 
European Union has only attributed powers, most of these are non-exclusive and thus 
concurring with the Member States, the exercise of these concurring powers is governed by 
complex rules, different legal procedures including a common use of so-called co-ordination 
methods”. 
In the process of legal harmonisation, as far as procedural rules are concerned, the EU 
has progressively extended its powers and capacities to “intervene” and to “interrupt” the 
national legal orders.
619
 However, the EU disguised its intrusions because it sold the intrusion 
into the national law to the Member States to the Council through the idea of minimum 
harmonization which left the Member States room for manoeuvre. That strategy, however, 
                                               
615 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), Introduction, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 2.  
616 There are policy areas in which the Commission has no enforcement power, like environmental law. In such 
cases, the Commission uses the infringement procedure as a tool for assuring the proper implementation of EU 
law, and its proper application, including its proper enforcement. For further details see: Micklitz (2011), 
Administrative Enforcement of Private Law, in Brownsword/Micklitz (2011), The European Foundations of 
European Private Law, Oxford. 
617 Micklitz/Cafaggi (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 1-7. 
618 Storme (2009), The Foundations of Private Law in a Multi-level Structure: Balancing, Distribution of 
Lawmaking Power and other Constitutional Issues, in Brownsword/Micklitz/Niglia/Weatherill (2011), The 
Foundations of European… 
619 For one of the most radical statement refers (I) to harmonization of national laws as intrusive and disruptive 
to national legal systems and therefore in conflict with the principle of proportionality; Schulte-Nölke (2010), 
The Way Forward in European Consumer Contract Law: Optional Instrument Instead of Further 
Deconstruction of National Private Laws, in Twigg-Flesner (2010), The Cambridge Companion to European 
Union Private Law; and (II) to disruption of the national legal cultures by EU law, see: Collins (1995), European 
Private Law and the Cultural Identity of the States, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 3, p. 353-365. 
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yielded changes in the institutional relationship between the EU and the Member States. 
Under the blurred rules of the EC Treaties, the EU has been equipped in “a veiled” 
competence- because still not granted ex lege - to intervene into procedure-related national 
law. This veiled competence has found approval by the ECJ.
620
  
 
4. 1. The Legal Basis of the Injunction Directive 
 
The controversies on the nature, scope and content of the Injunction Directive result, 
perhaps not solely but to a large degree, from such basic issues as the search for the 
appropriate legal basis. Three possible legal bases exist: 
(i) Article 114 - a proper legal basis that has been chosen as the Treaty 
background for the Injunction Directive, 
(ii) Article 81 - as a possible legal basis that might have been chosen, that would fit 
to its cross-border dimension and to the idea of procedural law harmonization, 
(iii) Article 169 - as a potential legal basis for the Injunction Directive that would 
emphasise its particular consumer protection dimension.  
Article 114 of the EC Treaty as a proper legal basis: Article 114 of the EC Treaty has 
been recognized as the proper and only suitable legal basis for the Injunction Directive since it 
applies to pieces of legislation which “(…) adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”. The EU, in 
measures touching upon health, safety, environmental and consumer protection, pursues a 
high level of protection, taking into account scientific evidence.
621
 Within the scope of their 
respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council seek to achieve this objective.  
Article 114 of the Treaty focuses on legal approximation, in para III achieving a high 
level of consumer protection
622
, but although consumer protection forms an integral part of 
the internal market building, it is not mentioned in Art. 114 para 1. It neither grants specific 
competence to the EU nor diminishes Member States competence in procedural matters. The 
main question which was posed at the time of choosing the legal basis for the Injunction 
Directive was related to the proper description of the subject, or rather the object of the legal 
                                               
620 Micklitz (2011), The ECJ between…, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The European Court…, p. 367. 
621 Which is perfectly in line with Article 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
622 It is not clear what high means and whether high is high enough to satisfy the requirements of this provision, 
according to AG Trstenjak not “highest level of protection”; See: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 
December 2008, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA, Case C-205/07 (ECR 2008, p. I-09947). 
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protection in the frame of the Injunction Directive. By choosing Article 114 the EU referred 
to the completion of the Internal Market, rather than the protection of consumers
623
; Internal 
Market comes first and the consumer only after the Market, as a subject of the legal 
protection
624
: 
(i) Article 114 of the Treaty aims at the completion of the Internal Market, not at the 
protection of consumers, despite Art. 114 para 3 promoting a high level of consumer 
protection. The assured level of consumer protection should foster the functioning of 
the Internal Market, but not primarily the protection of consumers; 
(ii) Article 114 of the Treaty does not leave any doubt that consumer protection is covered 
by its scope. It allows for the harmonization of consumer law, which follows the idea 
behind the Injunction Directive. Article 114 requires a high level of protection 
throughout the EU as a basic standard of procedural harmonization; 
(iii) Article 114 of the Treaty covers both the national and the cross-border element625, 
since approximation concerns the Internal Market as a whole. A consumer who suffers 
damage at the national level might prima facie become the victim of a cross-border 
infringement of the very same substantive rule.
626
 
Since the consumer is one of the key players in the Internal Market, his activities have 
been recognized as the catalyst of the Internal Market enhancing and promoting its 
development and improvement. Hence, consumer protection is a part of the effective 
protection of the Internal Market. The Internal Market functions well, only if consumers 
participate in national and cross-border market relations, and provided they do not need to 
face legal obstacles related to the functioning of the Internal Market. To improve the Internal 
Market yields the necessity to render the consumer convinced of his strong position in cross-
border relationships. Only a consumer who is confident, aware of his rights and convinced as 
to the sufficiency and effectiveness of his rights may become an active participant within the 
Internal Market relations.
627
 
                                               
623 Mak (2009), Review of the Consumer Acquis - Towards Maximum Harmonisation? Vol. 17(1), p. 55-73. 
624 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 65-70. 
625 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 66. 
626 Stuyck (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 65-66.  
627 Currently, 1 in 20 consumers face problems with cross-border purchases of goods or services, while 59% of 
traders face an important obstacles in selling cross-border, because of the lack of effective and sufficient 
mechanisms of collective redress; Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment of 29 November 2011, 
SEC(2011), 1409 final, p. 5; Flash Consumer Confidence Indicator for EU Area and EURO Area 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/documents/2014/fcci_2014_04_en.pdf> accessed 
on April 28, 2014. 
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However, taking ECJ case-law into consideration
628
, Article 114 cannot be read as the 
unlimited power to design the Internal Market. Tobacco I had drawn the limits of the scope of 
Article 114 in a quite precise manner and taken into consideration the issue of the 
constitutionality of minimum harmonization. These issues have been reconsidered in Tobacco 
II.
629
 Measures that are adopted under Article 114 are supposed to bring forth an improvement 
of conditions in the Internal Market. This is not necessarily the case if EU legislation prohibits 
certain marketing practices. If one considers both Tobacco judgments, no doubts are left that 
all measures taking on the basis of Article 114 must aim at the improvement of the Internal 
Market. As the Injunction Directive is based on Art. 114, it must be recognized as a means 
which is supposed to improve the Single Market, in addition to improving consumer 
protection. The wide scope of Article 114 allowed for the procedural novelties that have been 
brought about by the Injunction Directive.  
Article 81 of the EC Treaty as a possible legal basis: In various discussions concerning 
the pros and cons of the Injunction Directive, its legislative scope and purpose is taken into 
consideration. This quite necessary leads to Article 81 as a basis for achieving coherence in 
terms of injunctive procedures. Article 81 of the EU Treaty states that measures in the field of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters
630
 “having cross-border implications”631 shall be taken 
“in so far as it necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”.632 Measures shall 
be used in order to “(…) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of the civil 
proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules of the civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States”.633 
                                               
628 Judgment of the Court of 5 October 2000, Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, Case C-376/9 (ECR 2000, p. I-08419). 
629
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 December 2006, Federal Republic of Germany v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-380/03 (ECR 2006, p. I-11573). 
630 Miedzińska (2011), Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters in the European Union, Conference Materials, 
Vilnius, 2011, <http://www.tf.vu.lt/dokumentai/Admin/Doktorant%C5%B3_konferencija/Miedzinska.pdf> 
accessed on June 9, 2014. 
631 Sadowski/Taborowski (2011), Współpraca Sądowa w Sprawach Cywilnych, Seria podręczników: System 
prawa Unii Europejskiej - przestrzeń wolności bezpieczeństwa i sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, Vol. XI.3, 
2nd ed., p. 234-256. 
632 A broad interpretation of Article 81 is recommended by J. Stuyck, who states that “(…) the aim of the Article 
is to ensure that citizens do not suffer any inconveniences from the fact that civil litigation is not restricted to 
their Member State of residence. In this sense a cross-border case is one where there is a legal issue relating to 
goods or persons outside the borders of a particular Member State”; Stuyck (2009), Public and Private… 
633 Proposal for a Council Directive to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing 
minimum common rules relating to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil states as follows proceedings 
(OJ C 103E , 30.04.2002, p. 368–372), Explanatory Memorandum, Objectives, sent. 3. states as follows “By 
Article 65(c) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, these measures are to include measures 
eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of 
the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States”. 
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Concerning its procedural, cross-border and harmonization-friendly approach, Article 
81 of the EU Treaty has been proposed as a legal basis for an action for injunction. The 
Article expresses in a direct way the possibility of approximation of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States. It includes within the list of areas in which such measures can be taken 
“access to justice”. Civil law matters including consumer law issues are to be included into 
the specific list.  
Article 81 should be read in accordance with Article 5 of the Lisbon Treaty, laying 
down the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality. Considering that 
Article 81 of the Treaty is focusing on the development of judicial cooperation in civil matters 
“having cross-border implications”, it goes hand-in-hand with the procedural nature and the 
cross-border implications of the Injunction Directive. Article 5 should not be overlooked in 
the research for the appropriate legal basis of the Injunction Directive. The relatively broad 
scope of Article 81 and its openness towards the harmonization of procedural law, makes 
Article 81 a possible legal basis for legal acts such as the Injunction Directive. The Article 
immediately indicates a cross-border dimension by going deeper into specific aspects of 
cross-border relations. It explicitly addresses the cross-border aspects quite contrary to most 
other competence rules. This would be suitable for the Injunction Directive if its cross-border 
aspects are considered only, but it would not necessarily include judicial cooperation in cross-
border litigation outside and beyond the preliminary reference procedure. However, judicial 
co-operation might be the answer to some of the deficiencies of the Injunction Directive.  
Article 81 states the competence of the European Parliament and the Council to adopt 
measures particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of Internal Market, which, 
however, is focused on ensuring effective access to justice and the proper functioning of civil 
proceedings, by promoting the compatibility of rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States. This reasoning complies with the arguments behind the Injunction Directive, 
even if formulated from a somewhat different legal perspective than Article 114. However, 
one key difference remains, Article 81 envisages procedural barriers in cross-border relations, 
whereas Article 81 aims at setting aside barriers hindering the completion of the Internal 
Market as a whole. 
The analysis of the basic requirements of Article 81 demonstrates how broad the 
general scope of Article 114 is. Article 81 includes a reference to “in so far as necessary for 
the proper functioning of the Internal Market”. It has to be emphasized that Article 81 
introduces another limitation using the word “proper”, which does not appear in Article 114. 
This leads to the conclusion that the scope of Article 81 is broader than that of Article 114, 
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since Article 81 not only requires measures to ensure the functioning of the Internal Market 
but also the adoption of measures ensuring that the Internal Market functions properly. The 
EU would therefore be competent under Article 81 where goods or persons are present in 
another Member State. In other words, the reference to the Internal Market within the scope of 
Article 81 does not add to the “cross-border” requirement. Therefore, concerning the 
typically procedural dimension of the Injunction Directive, Article 81 would suffice as a legal 
basis. Although it seems to meet all requirements which hypothetically need to be considered 
in the Injunction Directive, it has never been considered as the appropriate legal basis, not 
even in the preparatory work on the Injunction Directive, or in the process of adopting the 
consolidated version in 2009 (Directive 98/27 became Directive 2009/22). The reason might 
be that Article 81 focuses excessively on cross-border elements while the cross-border issue 
of injunctions constituted just one of elements in the Injunction Directive. One might even 
have the impression that the an important if not the underlying/main purpose of the Injunction 
Directive was and is, to lay down a common scheme for the collective enforcement of 
consumer rights within the Member States.
634
 All things considered, Article 114 gives more 
leeway than article 114, and could be regarded as a kind of open-bag, which may cover 
national and cross-border aspects of consumer relations. 
Article 169 of the EC Treaty as a potential legal basis: Article 169 is the only Treaty 
provision that is directly and exclusively aimed at consumer protection issues and which 
considers consumer protection policy as a key issue in order to strengthen consumer rights. It 
expresses the substantial impact of EC legislation on Member States’ domestic laws, although 
adhering to a minimum level of consumer protection.
635
 More closely Article 169(2) is 
divided into two types of measures. Para 2 (a) explicitly refers to Article 114, this means it 
reiterates the link between the Internal Market and consumer protection. The much more 
important provision is para 2 (b) which empowers the EU to take action in the interests of 
consumers without there being a connection to the Internal market, thereby distinguishing 
measures to “support”, “complement” and “monitor” the policy of the Member States in the 
field of consumer protection. The EU has used Article 169 only once, in the adoption of 
Directive 98/6 on price indications. All consumer contract law directives have been adopted 
on the basis of Article 114. Following Reich
636
 and Twigg-Flesner
637
 Article 169(2)(b) could 
                                               
634 See Chapter I 1.6., 5.3.  
635 Mak (2012), Two Levels, One Standard? The Multi-Level Regulation of Consumer Protection in Europe, in 
Davenney/Kenny (2012), European Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice, p. 21-43. 
636 Reich (2005), A European Contract Law, or an EU Contract Regulation for Consumers? Journal of 
Consumer Policy, Vol. 28, p. 383-407. 
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serve as a legal basis not only for consumer contract law rules but also and in particular for 
adoption of procedural rules such as the Injunction Directive. Consumer matters would be 
recognized as a basic element of the EU policy behind the Injunction Directive. Taking into 
consideration that the Injunction Directive has introduced an action for an injunction 
exclusively dedicated to the field of consumer law, thus providing for the sectorial 
specification of remedies, it seems that due to its enhancement of the power of remedies in the 
field of consumer law, Article 169 of the Treaty would have been the best possible legal basis 
for issuing the Injunction Directive.  
Looking deeper into matters regulated by Article 169(1) EC, it is argued that this 
article obliges the Community to ensure a high level of protection in the field of consumer 
law. It is in line with Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
638
 Article 169 (4) is in 
line with the logic laid down in (3) (b) is limited to minimum harmonisation.
639
 To this extent 
Article 169 differs from Article 114 which is read by the EU in a way that offers a choice 
between minimum and maximum harmonization. Since the famous Lisbon Strategy 2000
640
 
the EU aims at maximum harmonization in the field of consumer law and this has triggered 
strong resistance in a number of member states and in the academic environment. I will come 
back to the question of minimum versus maximum harmonization.
641
 
 
4. 2. The Principle of the Procedural Autonomy 
 
The basic meaning and legal interpretation of the principle of procedural autonomy 
has been laid down and confirmed by the ECJ in a whole series of judgments: “(…) it is for 
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to 
determinate the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the 
protection of the rights which the citizens have from the direct effect of the Community 
                                                                                                                                                   
637 Twigg-Flesner (2012), A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions in the EU, A Fresh 
Approach to EU Consumer Law. 
638 Article 38 “Consumer protection” stating that Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer 
protection; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ L 303/01, 14.12.2007). 
639 Mak (2009), Review of the Consumer…, p. 55-73. 
640 European Council held a special meeting on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon to agree a new strategic goal for the 
Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based 
economy; “The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. 
641 See Chapter IV 4.4. 
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law”.642 The principle of procedural autonomy is a broad concept that has been developed in 
order to “protect” the rules of national legislation from too strong and too extensive an 
intervention of the Community within the national legal orders.
643
 The principle of procedural 
autonomy covers remedies and procedures.
644
 Thanks to the principle of the procedural 
autonomy, Member States have been left the choice between procedural enforcement 
measures and their modes of governance.
645
 It promotes diversification of the European 
enforcement structure and has brought extensive fragmentation since the EU Treaty does not 
grant powers to the EU to adopt and to harmonise procedural matters, outside Article 81.  
More often it is questioned whether the EU has the power and the EU can get a 
mandate to intervene into procedural matters. Currently procedural autonomy is divided in 
procedural autonomy sensu stricto, in the standard form based on a clear-cut division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States and procedural autonomy in which 
substantive law and procedural matters are so closely intertwined that the original division of 
power enshrined in the Treaty seems to be somewhat outdated and does not fully reflect the 
reality of EU law making in the last decades.
646
 In the light of the growing European influence 
on the national enforcement structures the concept of procedural autonomy has lost its 
previous relevance and the clear-cut distinction between EU and Member State law simply 
                                               
642 Judgment of the Court of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, Case C-33/76 (ECR 1976, p. 1989), para. 5; since then repeated in 
dozens of cases, e.g. Judgment of the Court of 16 December 1976, Comet BV v Produktschap voor 
Siergewassen, Case C-45/76 (ECR 1976, p. 2043), para. 13; Judgment of the Court of 28 September 1994, 
Geertruida Catharina Fisscher v Voorhuis Hengelo BV and Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de 
Detailhandel, Case C-128/93 (ECR 1994, p. I-04583), para. 39; Judgment of the Court of 6 December 1994, 
Elsie Rita Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer, Case C-410/92 (ECR 1994, p. I-05483), para. 21; Judgment of 
the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 November 1995, Gabriel Alonso-Pérez v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Case C-
394/93 (ECR 1995, p. I-04101), para. 28; Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 11 December 1997, Mary 
Teresa Magorrian and Irene Patricia Cunningham v Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Department 
of Health and Social Services, Case C-246/96 (ECR 1997, p. I-07153), para. 37; Judgment of the Court of 16 
May 2000, Shirley Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others and Dorothy 
Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc., Case C-78/98 (ECR 2000, p. I-03201), para. 31; Judgment of the 
Court (Fifth Chamber) of 22 February 2001, Office national des pensions (ONP) v Gioconda Camarotto (C-
52/99) and Giuseppina Vignone (C-53/99), Joined cases C-52/99 and C-53/99 (ECR 2001, p. I-01395), para. 21; 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 March 2007, Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd 
v Justitiekanslern, Case 432/05, (ECR 2007, p. I-02271), para 39; Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 
25 June 2008, Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies v Commission, Case T-268/06 (OJ C 197, 02.08.2008, p. 22–22), 
para. 44; Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina 
Rodríguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08, (ECR 2009, p. I-09579), para 41. 
643 Craig/De Búrca (2007), EU Law…, p. 677–679; Steiner/Woods/Twigg-Flesner (2006), EU Law, 9th ed., 
Oxford, p. 378–382, 397. 
644 Van Gerven (2000), Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 37(3), p. 501-
536. 
645 Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-501. 
646 Kakouris (1997), Do the Member…, p. 1389.  
207 
 
does not make sense any more.
647
 Some scholars even question whether the procedural 
autonomy still exists.
648
 In the light of this development it seems desirable to reconsider the 
concept of procedural autonomy.
649
 In this new configuration the EU is granted the role of a 
moderator in the current heterogeneous enforcement scenario and the Commission has more 
power to this end. The relevant question is what is the proper legal basis for this 
development? 
De facto national courts are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection that citizens 
derived from the supremacy and the direct effect of the provisions of Community law. The 
pros and cons of the various procedural consequences have been discussed both from the EU 
or the Member States perspective.
650
 Legal rules and concepts are subjects to change. The 
dynamics of the market changes and the fact that some legal rules over the course of time 
might be upgraded or downgraded lead toward a reconsideration of the notion of the 
procedural autonomy of the Member States. In the light of the change as of the laws and the 
market, it would perhaps be better to replace the term of procedural autonomy with 
“procedural competence” as Bobek proposed651, or through “primary national procedural 
responsibility”.652  
The principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States is applicable when there 
is a deficit of procedural rules at the European level.
653
 However, procedures by themselves 
have to be defined at the national level since only the national legislator has the competence 
to establish them.
654
 Establishing procedural rules has never been a task of the EU. This issue 
has been reserved to the national legal orders. The competence of the national legal orders to 
decide on procedural rules does not oppose the fact that the Member States are bound by 
procedural rules at the EU level such as the Brussels I Regulation
655
, Rome I
656
 and Rome 
                                               
647
 A radical statement that there is no procedural autonomy of the Member States to be found in Bobek (2011), 
Why There is no Principle of “Procedural Autonomy” of the Member States, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The 
European Court…, p. 305-322. 
648 Bobek (2011), Why There is…, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The European Court…, p. 305-322. 
649 Bobek (2011), Why There is…, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The European Court…, p. 305-322. 
650 Craig (2008), The Institutional Balance…, p. 1-35. 
651 Bobek (2011), Why There is…, in De Witte/Micklitz (2011), The European Court…, p. 305-322. 
652 Craig/ De Búrca (2011), EU Law…, p 306-309. 
653 For more detail see: Van Gerven/Dougan/Kakouris/Delicostopoulos (2003), Toward European Procedural 
Primacy in National Legal Systems, European Law Journal, Vol. 9(5), p. 599-613. 
654 “Of course, the EU law has no binding force in Poland. (…) Poland is thereby obliged to use ‘its best 
endavours to ensure that future legislation is compatibile with community legislation. (….) the Constitutional 
Tribunal holds the obligation to ensure compatibility of legislation(…) results also in the obligation to interpret 
the existing legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such compatibility”; 
Constitutional Tribunal, 29 November 1997, Case K 15/97. 
655 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 012 , 16.01.2001, p. 1-23). 
656 Rome I (OJ L 177, 04.07.2008, p. 6-16). 
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II
657
 and the Small Claims Procedure.
658
 These pieces of legislation might be regarded as a 
kind of “upper measures” which establish and give shape to an overall structure of 
procedural law in Europe. To achieve sufficient coherence of rules in the interrelationship 
between the different national legal orders, the EU had to develop such regulations which 
include consumer protection measures which decide issues of jurisdiction and applicable 
law.
659
 The Injunction Directive is embedded in this context. Although Member States are 
given a broad margin of discretion in its implementation, they are not allowed to remove the 
duty to respect the totality of procedural regulations at the EU level. Even if the Member 
States keep their procedural autonomy, they still have to operate within the limits, set out in 
EU measures.  
What remains is the problem that there is no specific EU consumer procedural law, 
which would be applicable for all Member States on the equal basis.
660
 Currently, there are 
neither general procedural standards nor specific regulations designed and applicable for 
consumer matters. This leads to a situation in which specific rights of the European Union are 
supposed to be enforced in 28 different member states. Differentiation between and 
divergence of enforcement standards are a commonplace in the EU. The Injunction Directive 
is just one, perhaps one of the most puzzling, piece of EU law which reflects the 
consequences of procedural autonomy, despite all the tendencies towards a Europeanisation 
of procedural law. First and foremost, procedural issues have to be read and interpreted in 
light of procedural nuances which vary across Member States.
661
  
The truth of the matter is: Member States are allowed to shape to a remedy according 
to the needs and nuances of their national legal orders. Cafaggi proposes to draw a distinction 
between (1) the gap-filling function of the principle of procedural autonomy
662
 and (2) the 
recognition of procedural autonomy as a certain kind of constraint that could set limits for 
                                               
657 Rome II (OJ L 199, 31.07.2007, p. 40–49). 
658 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure (OJ L 199, 31.07.2007, p. 1-22). 
659 See Chapter III 5.6. 
660 There is not much discussion about consumer procedural law. Only in Germany there has been a sustained 
effort by H. Koch who discussed the need of such a branch of law already in 1991. 
661 When applying a national rule, a national judge shall take into account the EU rule corresponding thereto, 
including its interpretation by the ECJ or (ideally, and if only exists) also the practice in the EU Member States. 
Moreover, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal stated this to be a general rule of construction under its domestic 
law: Decision of The Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 29 September 1997, K. 15/97, pub. Z.U. 1997 / 3_4 / 37 
with a note in English Gender Equality in the Civil Service Case. In Polish decision K.15/97, Collection of 
Decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal, no. 19/1997, p. 380. 
662 The gap filling function implies that absent Community legislation courts have to refer to national legislation. 
For example, the previously quoted Rewe Case.  
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both Member States and the EU.
663
 This “double path interpretation” of the principle of 
procedural autonomy has been adopted and found confirmation by the ECJ, thereby 
confirming the law-making function of domestic judicial bodies
664
 that try to close gaps in 
incomplete enforcement schemes counting on measure of domestic legislation that include an 
intervention as to the scope of “rights, remedies and procedures”. The same is true at the 
European level. M. Storm writes “(…) European judges have found and also invented the 
principle common to the law of the Member States”. However, thus far the ECJ had only one 
occasion to interpret the action of injunction under the unfair terms Directive 93/13/EEC – 
Invitel.
665
 The Injunction Directive is still a “sleeping beauty”, to parrot the metaphor used by 
Micklitz/Reich
666
 for the unfair terms Directive which expresses the potential which lies 
behind the Injunction Directive. If national and European courts were given the opportunity to 
engage in an open process of interpretation and judicial co-operation, judges could concretise 
the basic principles of a European procedural law on the action of injunction. 
 
4. 3. Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
 
The EU’s competence as regards the creation and modification of procedural 
enforcement regulations is shaped through the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Both principles are anchored in the Treaty and may provide for answers on ambiguities as to 
whether or not the EU enjoyed competence to adopt Injunction Directive. In areas which do 
not fall within the Union’s exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity, laid down in 
the Treaty on European Union, defines the circumstances under which it is preferable for 
action to be taken by the Union, rather than the Member States.
667
 The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU distinguishes between three types of competence
668
 and draws up a 
non-exhaustive list of the fields concerned:  
(i) exclusive competences (Article 3 of the TFEU): the EU alone is able to legislate and 
adopt binding acts in these fields. The Member States’ role is therefore limited to 
applying these acts, unless the Union authorises them to adopt certain acts themselves;  
                                               
663 Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-539. 
664 Kühn (2005), The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Predictions, 
German Law Journal, Vol. 6(3), p. 563–582. 
665 See Chapter I 3.1.4. 
666 Micklitz/Reich (2014), The Court and the Sleeping… 
667 Craig/De Burca (2011), EU Law…; Groussot (2003), The EC System of…, p. 221-248, Tridimas 2 nd edition, 
p. 175-192. 
668 Cremona (2011), External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in: 
De Búrca/Craig, The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed., OUP, p. 244-259. 
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(ii) shared competences (Article 4 of the TFEU): the EU and Member States are 
authorised to adopt binding acts in these fields. However, Member States may exercise 
their competence only in so far as the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to 
exercise, its own competence; 
(iii) supporting competences (Article 6 of the TFEU): the EU can only intervene to 
support, co-ordinate or complement the action of Member States. Consequently, it has 
no legislative power in these fields and may not interfere in the exercise of these 
competences reserved for Member States. 
In the context of my analysis the key question is whether the Member States are better 
placed to regulate the action for injunction or whether it is better for the EU to decide 
unilaterally for all Member States. What is at stake is, in essence, the reach and importance of 
the principle of subsidiarity. Since the harmonization of procedural law has not been given a 
green light in the Treaty – outside Article 81, one might argue in line with the subsidiarity 
principle that the broader competences of Article 114 and Article 169 (2) (b) should not be 
used to set the basic competences of the Member States in the field of procedural law aside. 
However, one might also argue a contrario. The principle of subsidiarity should not be used 
by the EU to justify non-action, provided the Member States are not ready to take action. 
Read this way the subsidiarity principle would hinder progress in the field of consumer 
protection.
669
 One might pose the question as to what is wrong with granting the EU 
competence, if in EU action yields benefits for consumers. Basically, the scope and reach of 
EU consumer law should respect the boundaries of the proportionality principle and make all 
efforts to create an added value for consumers. Another problem results from the importance 
of subsidiarity for Member States. If Member States refer to the principle of subsidiarity to 
justify in-action, the principle of subsidiarity may be used as a justification for EU activities, 
provided the converse of the subsidiarity principle is the responsibility of the Member States 
to take action.
670
  
The core issue of the principle of subsidiarity may be summarized as its “allocation of 
competence” between the EU and Member States. The principle is considered necessary by 
the Member States to participate in the development of the process of European integration. If 
the EU refers to its competence and sets aside the subsidiarity principle it puts emphasis on 
the realization of the Internal Market, very much in line with Article 114. Nevertheless, 
                                               
669 Craig/De Burca (2011), EU Law… 
670 Micklitz (1993), The Maastricht Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity and the Theory of Integration, 
LAKIMIES, The periodical of the Association of Finnish lawyers, Special Issue on European Integration, 
4/1993, p. 508. 
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consumers may benefit from Internal Market-driven EU consumer protection rules.
671
 In the 
manner consumers need to be sure that equal rules of consumer protection are applicable in all 
Member States, there is a need to make sure that their own State has participated in the 
development of the rules on consumer protection.  
However, lately Article 114 TFEU has been turned into a tool that is used to justify 
EU intervention into fields of law in which EU competences is at least shaky. It remains to 
determine whether a European intervention into national procedural rules shall be really 
recognized as covered by the scope of Article 114 or whether it violates the principle of 
subsidiarity and must be regarded as misuse of EU power. In this aspect subsidiarity allows 
the EU to hide its activities such as imposing obligations and new commitments on the 
Member States. Is the EU entitled to broaden the EU fundamentals and include procedural 
rules, justifying them through the vehicle of the principle of subsidiarity?  
If the Member States themselves are not in a position to find an appropriate procedural 
solution for a particular consumer problem, this can obviously be a reason for the initiation of 
EU action. This is particularly true in situations in which an EU action would bring better 
results than actions at Member State level. The dilemma of EU legislation is the tension 
between rules which apply to cross-border transactions only and those which are equally 
applicable to transactions within the Member States. The cross-border dimension easily 
justifies the competence of the EU. Member States are simply not in a position to offer a 
solution for the EU as a whole. Here the EU is structurally and institutionally better placed. 
The experience gained so far in the application of the Injunction Directive
672
 seems to 
advocate an even deeper intervention, in an even broader and more comprehensive regulation 
of the action for injunction. The problem begins with the extension of the Injunction Directive 
to mere national transactions. Here Member States might rightly argue that they are better 
placed, as they know the field and are in a better position to access and rank those qualified 
entities which should be given standing, including the requirements these entities have to 
meet to act legitimately in the collective interest of consumers. The only convincing argument 
which could justify the establishment of common standards for cross-border and for national 
transactions results from the deeper foundations of Article 114 which ties the completion of 
                                               
671 The activity of the Commission can also be justified by the paradigm of the confident consumer; 
Wilhelmsson (1995), The Principle of the Legitimate Exception as a Basic Principle of Community Private Law, 
in Paasivirta/Rissanen (1994), Principles of Justice and the Law of the European Union, Proceedings of the 
Helsinki Seminar, Hanasaari, Finland, 325-331. 
672 See Chapter I 1.6., 1.7. 
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the Internal Market to the existence – or the introduction of a common platform of consumer 
protection throughout the EU. 
Since the harmonization of procedural rules represents the best solution, the EU has 
rightly decided to adopt the Injunction Directive in its present form. EU law is different from 
national law, since it is interpreted by the ratio legis and the general spirit of the overall 
European measure. That is why the EU’s competence reaches beyond the standard design of 
competences in national constitutions. The required high level of consumer protection which 
is a primary aim of al consumer law might then serve as a bridge to close the gap between the 
cross-border and the internal national dimension of the scope of the Injunction Directive.  
 
4.4. Minimum Harmonisation in the Injunction Directive 
 
The flexibility of the Injunction Directive is grounded not only in the principle of 
procedural autonomy, but also in the minimum harmonisation approach used for framing the 
Injunction Directive. Until the Lisbon Council 2000, the minimum harmonisation approach 
dominated the adoption of directives on consumer protection.
673
 Minimum harmonization 
served as a means to set reservations aside which resulted from the fact that the EU was 
intruding ever deeper into national private legal orders. The marketing strategy of the EU was 
to sell minimum harmonization as a means to establish a platform of consumer protection, in 
line with Article 114 (3). The Consumer Policy Programme 2002-2006 marked the break-
even point in that the EU started to promote maximum harmonization
674
 as a means to 
complete the Internal Market.
675
 The EU succeeded in Directive 2002/65 on distant sales of 
financial services
676
, in Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices
677
 and partly in 
the consumer rights Directive 2011/83/EC.
678
 However, in line with academic literature the 
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Member States rejected maximum harmonization in core fields of contract law – unfair terms 
and consumer sales.
679
  
It can be questioned whether minimum harmonisation applied in the Injunction 
Directive constituted the best solution possible or whether it would have been better to fully 
harmonise the respective procedural rules. In light of the various ambiguities that have been 
brought up by the Injunction Directive due to its unclear structure and hybrid nature, it seems 
that the minimum harmonisation approach has brought about more confusion than legal 
certainty.
680
 The minimum harmonisation approach might be blamed for the patchwork 
structure of the European enforcement map. The idea of coherence, strongly promoted in most 
national legal orders, suffers considerably in procedural rules. The variety of the EU 
enforcement scheme has been spelt out and explained in detail. The Injunction Directive 
clearly demonstrates that “the effective enforcement of minimum protection rules depends on 
implementation by the Member States which may vary from country to country”.681 At least at 
the time of its adoption in 1998, noone expected that the long-heralded Injunction Directive 
would bring diffusion and variety instead of coherence and consistency. 
The idea behind minimum harmonisation is to leave Member States the possibility of 
applying more stringent rules than those indicated in the directive itself. They may raise the 
level of consumer protection but cannot lower the standards established in the relevant 
directive. It might already be difficult to set a clear benchmark of what is higher or lower in 
substantive law. Although here the logic is that, for better or worse, more stringent rules 
guarantee better and broader consumer protection. In procedural law such a prima vista 
assessment does not work. The Injunction Directive has laid down common standards for the 
mutual recognition of standing recognition. However, the Directive does not lay down 
standards on the legitimacy of qualified entities to take collective action.
682
 What should the 
criteria to decide what is less and what is more legitimate be? Minimum harmonization in 
procedural law does not result in coherence of rules per se because Member States implement 
rules which are most suitable to their national enforcement patterns. 
Indeed, the minimum harmonisation approach opened the possibility for the Member 
States to shape the remedy of injunction at the national level. This can be understood as part 
                                               
679 Micklitz/Reich (2009), Crónica de una…, p. 471-519; The Commission Proposal for a Directive on 
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of their procedural autonomy. EU law sets a threshold and defines requirements, which 
national legislations must meet: indicating the qualified entities, which represent the 
legitimate interests of the consumers, whether public or private, notifying these qualified 
entities to the European Commission. Under the minimum approach there are no obstacles to 
exceed the terms of the Injunction Directive, if Member States so desire and if it is for the 
purpose of consumer protection. They may define “legitimate interests” in a much more 
comprehensive way. They may ask for qualified entities to be registered as a condition of 
legal standing (the French solution).
683
 The Injunction Directive was not supposed to regulate 
these procedural details. It laid down minimum standards for procedural design but these 
minimum standards are different from substantive standards which could be conceived of as 
lower or higher. Since the Injunction Directive leads to a mixture of different national and the 
EU elements, the minimum harmonization approach allows for and promotes a patchwork of 
different legal solutions and differences between the 28 Member States.  
For the consumer, who is crossing a border, the minimum harmonization approach 
seems quite detrimental. He may never know how to recognize and how to make himself 
familiar with normative diversification and particularities of different legal models. Apart 
from the language differences that are somehow unavoidable, the diversity of different and 
incoherent legal solution across the European Union produces additional barriers for 
consumers.
684
 This increases the level of legal uncertainty, which is recognized as an 
additional disincentive to cross-border consumer shopping. The Injunction Directive has been 
designed with good intentions to establish an institutional framework for consumer law 
enforcement, but it did not seem to take the social needs of consumers seriously into 
consideration. Such an undertaking would have needed a much more sophisticated discussion. 
Member States, this is the lesson to be learnt from the implementation process through the 
Member States in all its variations, were much more concerned with internal consistency of 
the national legal order than with a vision to improve consumer protection law enforcement 
within the EU as a whole. 
 
                                               
683 According to the French model, qualified entities, but only those whose main activity focuses on the 
protection of the collective interests of consumers shall be passed for approval of the Association of Unions 
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5. From Diversity to Convergence? 
 
The use of various legal instruments produced considerable diversity of enforcement 
frames in Europe. The implementation of the Injunction Directive in the national legal orders 
could be regarded as approved diversity, as the variety of frames has been developed under 
“the auspices of the EU”. The legal acceptance of the diversity has pros and cons. On one 
hand, with respect to the procedural autonomy of Member States, Member States have the 
chance to develop their enforcement models. On the other hand, the ratio legis of the 
Injunction Directive has not been entirely achieved. The Injunction Directive has not 
introduced the desired or intended consistent remedy within a coherent European enforcement 
scheme/model? The implementation of the Injunction Directive gave rise to a broad diversity 
of modes of enforcement
685
, which, however, might pave the way for more convergence of 
the enforcement frames and modes.  
I will continue the debate already started in the beginning.
686
 I will develop my 
argument in three steps: first I will demonstrate that the Injunction Directive and Regulation 
2006/2004 read together can be understood as a rudimentary design of a two-step European 
enforcement scheme; secondly, I will show the potential for convergence within the 
seemingly messy picture of the national enforcement schemes; thirdly, I will integrate the 
herein developed understanding into the interplay of individual and collective, horizontal and 
vertical enforcement.  
 
5. 1. The European Design of Consumer Law Enforcement 
 
Gradually a European enforcement scheme is emerging. The first step constituted the 
adoption of the Injunction Directive, promoting diversity and private collective enforcement; 
the second constituted the adoption of the Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation shifting the focus towards public enforcement. Both read together can be 
understood as a two-layer system: on top the public authorities on bottom the consumer 
organisations. 
 
 
                                               
685 See Chapter I 5. 
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5. 2. Approved Diversity through the Injunction Directive 
 
The minimum approach realized in the Injunction Directive respects the principle of 
procedural autonomy.
687
 The result is a broad variety of injunction mechanisms in the national 
enforcement schemes.
688
 Although all Member States met the implementation requirements – 
the Commission did not make use of the infringement procedure - the way in which the 
Injunction Directive has been implemented within the Member States differs from one 
Member State to another. In practical terms, one cannot understand the degree of variety in 
enforcement frames without looking into the reality of enforcement frames throughout 
Europe.
689
 The maximum harmonization approach was never seriously considered. It would 
be too strong a tool, which could have destroyed national frames and enforcement traditions.  
A less intrusive, though more effective, alternative would have been to realize the very 
same objectives of harmonisating injunctions through the means of a regulation instead of a 
Directive. Reich promoted the adoption of consumer law regulations under Article 169(2)(b); 
however, his argument is somewhat directed against the move towards maximum 
harmonization. It has to be recalled that Article 169 (4) allows only for minimum 
harmonization.
690
 The advantage would have been a directly applicable piece of EU law, a 
technique, which the EU had realized in the Brussels Regulation
691
 and the two Rome 
Regulations
692
 under the umbrella of Article 81. However, the EU used neither its power to 
design the rules in a frame of a regulation nor seriously considered a shift from minimum to 
maximum standards, not even in its attempts to modernize the existing consumer law 
acquis.
693
 In utilizing the directive option, the EU paved the way towards variety of 
enforcement schemes in injunction in Europe. The EU clearly intended to introduce the 
Injunction Directive as a flexible frame, which allows for leeway for Member States. Thus 
Member States could choose to implement elements of the Injunction Directive within their 
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690 Reich (2005), A European Contract…, p. 383-407; Reich discussed the idea of replacing directives with a 
regulation, basing his reasoning on the drawbacks of using directives. 
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national legal orders in a way that made them the most suitable and compatible with the 
particularities and nuances of their national enforcement frames. According to M. Monti 
“Currently, 80% of the single market rules are set out through directives. These have the 
advantage of allowing for an adjustment of rules to local preference and situations”.694 What 
the European legislator offered is a general frame for the establishment of the injunction 
procedure, without giving further details as to how the procedure should be sketched in the 
national enforcement schemes. These matters are all left in the hands of Member States.
695
  
 
5. 2. 1. Freedom of Choice between Private and Public Enforcement 
 
Having in mind the overall structure of the EU enforcement map and the models that 
have been employed in Europe, the remedy of injunction is embedded in the interplay 
between public and private enforcement measures. In 1998, at the time the Injunction 
Directive was adopted, the EU entered into unknown legal territory.
696
 In the Injunction 
Directive for the first time ever, the Member States are left the choice of the enforcement path 
to be used, which may be either public or private, or a combination of the two.
697
  
The Injunction Directive triggered for the first time an interaction between European 
and Member State levels
698
, between public and private enforcement devices; and finally 
between judicial and administrative enforcement schemes.
699
 It is argued that public and 
private devices do not necessarily correspond with the distinction between administrative and 
judicial enforcement schemes. Although the distinction public and private on the one side, and 
judicial and administrative on the other, sounds plausible and even systematic, in fact, they 
are incomparable.
700
 Micklitz and Cafaggi have described the enforcement scenario in these 
words “There are Member States that have laid enforcement in the hands of competent 
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ministry or an independent or dependent agency and there are others that have combined 
administrative and judicial enforcement or simply relied on judicial enforcement alone”.701 
Member States may make choices according to their national history, culture and other 
national conditions. This is not imposed by the European Union, the EU legislator just leaves 
Member States the choice.  
The EU did not indicate any preference as of the enforcement measures to be in place 
at the national level. Neither do the EU documentation as to the Injunction Directive.
702
 On 
one hand, the Injunction Directive may be easily implemented in the national enforcement 
scheme following established preferences of the Member States. On the other hand, 
enforcement schemes of the Member States vary so that the consumer can never be sure what 
kind of enforcement scheme he has to face in a given Member States. This situation, as the 
EU repeatedly reiterates is said to negatively affect cross-border consumer shopping. Leaving 
the choice of the enforcement path in the hands of Member States was, however, the best 
available option possible at the time the Injunction Directive was adopted. If the EU would 
have chosen one of the two enforcement paths, that decision would not only have provoked 
rigorous reactions by Member States but would have led to drastic changes in Member States 
enforcement schemes. This would have been too much of a revolution, in particular in light of 
the shaky competence of the EU in procedural matters.
703
 The European scenario shows, that 
there are some Member States in which a public enforcement does not exists, or even if it 
exists, they do not have any specific legal relevance; therefore, the EU does not impose an 
obligation for shaping and creating additional bodies for the effective consumer law 
enforcement. The choice is put in the hands of the Member States leading to “united 
diversity” – “united”, because national frames are shaped he Injunction Directive, “diversity” 
– due to the lack of coherence in the enforcement models within the European Union. Each 
Member States may achieve the goal defined in the Injunction Directive, but through the use 
of a variety of solutions. Approved diversity and choice turns into the means to keep the legal 
irritation which the Injunction Directive triggered in the Member States enforcement schemes 
under control.
704
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703 See Chapter IV 4. 
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The EU starts from the premise that a lack of consumer confidence constitutes a 
potential obstacle in consumer trade.
705
 This legitimates measures to improve the structure of 
enforcement, nationally as well as solving cross-border issues. The Injunction Directive was 
the response to cross-border consumer problems, even if at the end it introduced many 
ambiguities and uncertainties.
706
 The EU legislator equipped the Member States with a 
flexible remedy in the form of a so-called “one suit fits all solution”. Obviously the EU 
legislator and more precisely the EU relied on Member States willingness, in particular the 
willingness of their enforcement authorities, to fill the frame with actual practice and pave the 
way for further coherence through practice. This turned out to be an misplaced trust.
707
 What 
remains is an amazing coincidence between the broad shaky legal basis and the “trust” in 
bringing the different enforcement schemes closer together – not through tight European 
standards but through legal practice. 
 
5. 2. 2. Towards Public Administrative Enforcement 
 
The free-choice policy promoted by the Injunction Directive has turned into a single 
enforcement models under Regulation 2006/2004.
708
 This was a radical change in designing 
“(…) a pan-European network of national public authorities responsible for enforcing EU 
consumer law and obliging them to work together in a mutual assistance model and with the 
Commission”.709 The reason behind, perhaps not the only one, but a highly important, is 
certainly the limited success of the double path model.
710
 The EU turned towards public 
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Redress (COM/2008/0794 final, 27.11.2008); 4. Report Concerning the application of the Injunction Directive 
(COM(2008) 756 final, 18.11.2008); 5. Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms in the EU 2008, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-
final2008-11-26.pdf> accessed on June 9, 2014; 6. Eurobarometer - Consumer Redress in the EU: consumer 
experiences, perceptions and choices; Aggregated Report, August 2009, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/cons_redress_EU_qual_study_report_en.pdf> accessed on 
June 9, 2014; 7. Public Consultation: Toward a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress, (SEC(2011)173 
final04.02.2011). 
706 Pegado Liz (2010), The EESC Opinion on Consumer Law Enforcement, A presentation for High Level 
Conference “European Consumer Protection Enforcement Day”, held in Brussels on 22 September 2010; On 
Law in action vs. Law in the Books, Schwartz (2000), Loose Teeth in…, p. 527-552. 
707 See Chapter III, 5.,6. 
708 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement 
of consumer protection laws (OJ L 364, 09.12.2004, p. 1-11). 
709 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 109. 
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Leuven, Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…  
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enforcement
711
 in order to provide for more efficient and effective tools of consumer law 
enforcement.
712
 Regulation 2006/2004 does not introduce new rights and remedies, it only 
establishes a procedural framework of collaboration among Member States.
713
 In a straight-
forward way Regulation 2006/2004 shifted towards the public enforcement path as the only 
suitable one in enforcement of consumer rights. The private enforcement model is not 
abandoned by virtue of Regulation 2006/2004.
714
 In fact under pressure from Austria and 
Germany, consumer organisations can be entrusted with cross-border enforcement. However, 
private enforcement remains subsidiary to public enforcement. All Member States are obliged 
to designate a public authority, which has the ultimate responsibility for the co-operation 
duties under the enforcement scheme.  
The best possible option to enhance the protection of consumers in cross border 
litigation is no longer the action for injunction but the co-operation between public national 
enforcement authorities, along the line of Regulation 2006/2004.
715
 Co-operation was, indeed, 
the missing link in the Injunction Directive. The exchange of information is crucial in cross-
border consumer enforcement. It aims at overcoming difficulties faced by a national body 
which under the former regime of the Injunction Directive were directed towards making use 
of the action for injunction in another Member State, with all the legal and practical 
difficulties which result from the cross-border use in terms of jurisdiction, applicable and 
enforcement of injunction judgments. 
The EU never justified the shift neither in explanatory documents nor in any other 
report on enforcement matters. The two sets of rules, the Injunction Directive and Regulation 
2006/2004 are kept deliberately distinct from each other as if there is no relationship at all. It 
seems as if the EU is not ready to open Pandora’s Box, to openly address in policy and 
political terms if and how the two pieces of legislation could be integrated into a European 
enforcement scheme. This is left to the courts and academia. Without much noise the 
Commission tends to keep two procedural enforcement realities in place (i) an alternate 
enforcement measures approach in the Injunction Directive and (ii) uni-directional purely 
public approach on enforcement provided by Regulation 2006/2004.
716
 The two forms comply 
                                               
711 Report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004. 
712 The frame of the public enforcement bodies played a gap-filling role in effective cross-border enforcement 
and assistance. 
713 See Chapter III 6.; Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 109-110. 
714 See Art. Article 4(1) Regulation 2006/2004, for details see Chapter III 6.  
715 Micklitz (2010), Reforming European Unfair…, 348-383. 
716 This has been criticized by van den Bergh since such a shift to a purely public enforcement may significantly 
disrupt national legal orders with established private enforcement rules; Van den Bergh (2009), Should 
Consumer Protection Law be Publicly Enforced? An Economic Perspective on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its 
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in abstracto and in concreto with modes of enforcement; the first being more closely related 
to public administrative enforcement, the second to private judicial enforcement. There are 
Member States
717
, in which in abstracto control is already triggered through a suspicion 
expressed by a consumer or a consumer organization. Other Member States require much 
more concrete information on an infringement and select the control vis-à-vis specific fields 
of consumer law.
718
 
Before the Injunction Directive had been passed the public enforcement model was the 
dominant form of enforcement in the field of consumer protection.
719
 The break-even point 
occurred when consumer organizations discovered cross-border litigation as a field of action 
in which they could demonstrate strength against rogue traders benefitting from the ever 
lower barriers to trade in Europe.
720
 For the first time, consumer organizations were 
recognized as active players in cross-border consumer law enforcement.
721
 The Injunction 
Directive recognized and legitimated their legal standing. „It is also necessary to strengthen 
bodies and organizations that are active in the area of consumer protection as that they can 
be more effective driving force for making consumer aware of the priorities set by the 
Community”.722 Finally the EU could rely on consolidated bodies, which helped “to 
safeguard the consumers’ interest by themselves”.723 Both the EU as well as Member States 
devoted more attention to the pros and cons of consumer associations’ enforcement activities. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Implementation in the Consumer Protection Laws of the Member States, in Van Boom/Loose (2007), Collective 
enforcement of…, p. 181. 
717 Poland is a good example, see also Safjan/Gorywoda/Janczuk (2009), Taking the Collective Interest of 
Consumers Seriously: A View from Poland, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 171-200. 
718 For instance in Germany, where even an action for injunction against unfair terms can only be initiated 
provided the consumer organizations can bring evidence that the term has been used in practice and it could 
potentially cause a harm for consumers, for Poland the Supreme Court November 11, 2007, III SK 19/07 hand 
watered down the standards, it allows the assessment of unfairness of the contact term in separation from the 
circumstances of the contract conclusion. 
719 See also for the superiority of public enforcement Van Boom/Loose (2007), Effective Enforcement of 
Consumer Law in Europe, in Van Boom/Loose (2007), Collective Enforcement of…, p. 250; The public 
enforcement, understood as enforcement in the form of administrative measures was the crucial method of 
dispute resolution in post-socialist countries; Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (2009), Public and Private Enforcement of 
Consumer Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Institutional Choices in the Shadow of the EU Enlargement, in 
Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 101-102. 
720 This was particularly important for cross-border consumer cases as illustrated in the Home Vertrieb Case; 
Joustra (1993), Cross-Border Consumer Complaints in Private International Law, Journal of Consumer Policy, 
Vol. 15(4), p. 431-443. 
721 Hodges (2008), Competition Enforcement…, p. 1381-1407. Hodges has provided a short summary of the 
situation relating the activity of consumer organizations, also in the light of the umbrella activity of BEUC.  
722 Decision No. 283/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 1999 establishing a 
general framework for Community activities in favour of consumers (OJ L 34, 09.02.1999, p.1), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer /general_info/legal_base01_en.print.html> accessed on June 9, 2014. 
723 Article 169 (1) TFUE. 
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Problems such as the requirements and rules of establishment and terms of the functioning of 
consumer organizations were quickly identified and put forward for political solution.
724
  
Although the Injunction Directive promoted the legitimacy of consumer organizations, 
the Injunction Directive does not impose an obligation on Member States to establish 
consumer organizations for purposes indicated in the Injunction Directive. The debate arose in 
the aftermath of the Directive 93/13 when British consumer organisations obtained a 
preliminary reference. However, the ECJ did not need to decide the case as the incoming Blair 
government changed the implementing law to the benefit of consumer organisations.
725
 
Despite the even less favourable language in the Injunction Directive, consumer organisations 
benefitted from the favourable environment of the 1990s. This addressed the need to 
strengthen civil society in the envisaged Eastern enlargement of the EU and resulted from 
pro-European sentiment after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many Member States were used to 
living without established consumer organizations. It might be that there was no real need for 
consumer organisations, in particular in member states with strong public enforcement 
authorities. When the need was insinuated, when consumer organisations were formally 
established, they then tended to play no role at all or a minor role. They document the 
Europeanization of domestic legal orders without producing real effect. Overall, however, the 
impact of the Injunction Directive was positive. It brought consumer organisations to the 
political fore in Europe and strengthened their position not only in courts but in civil society.  
The rise of consumer organisations under the auspices of the Injunction Directive was 
not promoted as an alternative to public bodies. In Austria and Germany consumer 
organisations are hybrids
726
, they look like private associations, but they are heavily funded 
by their governments.
727
 The most prominent enforcement design is a mix of public and 
private authorities.
728
 Just to give an example of hybrid enforcement schemes: various public 
                                               
724 See Chapter III 5.4; Micklitz (2010), Reforming European Unfair…, p. 348-383. Until now there is no 
monograph that analyses consumer organizations across Europe. 
725 For the background Dickie (1996), Article 7 of…, p. 112-117. 
726 Jolowicz (2000), On Civil Procedure, Cambridge, p. 128-129, 160-174. 
727 The Austrian consumer association, Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI) counts four ordinary 
members (the social partners) and one extra-ordinary member (the Federal Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs 
and Consumer Protection) which is responsible for consumer protection. It is financed primarily the Federal 
Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection on the basis of a contract; 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/docs/AT_web_country_profile.pdf> accessed on June 9, 2014. 
The Germany consumer associations are paid for from the public purse, see: German Report on Consumer 
Association Activity, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/cons_networks_en.htm> accessed on June 
9, 2014; Koch (2001), Non-class Group Litigation…, p. 355-367; Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van 
Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis… 
728 J. Stuyck: „In all Member States both public and private enforcement of consumer law exists. But the mix of 
provate and public law remedies and procedures varies a lot”; Stuyck, (2009), Public and Private…, in 
Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 65-70. 
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bodies utilize private bodies in the “pre-trial phase”. Hence, on various occasions the public 
bodies influence this private law-related activity. Doubtless the Injunction Directive has 
triggered juggling between administrative and judicial enforcement, promoting hybrids or 
mixed solutions, which is well perceived in the academia.
729
  
However, this is not the full story. With Regulation 2006/2004 the wind changed. 
Public enforcement was pushed into pole position. This is in line with the overall tendency of 
the EU legislator to establish strong public authorities in regulated markets, such as 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, transport, and financial services. The EU puts 
pressure on these national regulatory agencies not only to look after the proper functioning of 
the respective markets, but also to look after the interest of consumers. In the EU public 
authorities are the key players when it comes to enforcement, consumer organisations should 
fill gaps and are thus put into a subsidiary position.  
 
5. 2. 3. The Member States Response: A Regulatory Mix 
 
The enforcement map can be divided into the following modes of enforcement: 
(i) Enforcement through public authorities730, mainly ministries731, sometimes 
independent or dependent public authorities
732
, 
(ii) Enforcement through an ombudsman as a particular variant of public authorities to be 
found in the Nordic countries only, 
(iii) Enforcement through courts heading toward a private model of enforcement733, 
(iv) Enforcement through mixed solutions binding private and public (e.g. post-socialist 
countries).
734
 
Despite all the ups and downs triggered by the Injunction Directive and Regulation 
2006/2004, public enforcement is still the most prominent and strongest form through which 
                                               
729 Van den Bergh (2009), Should consumer protection…, in Van Boom/Loose (2007), Collective 
Enforcement…, p. 202-203. 
730 The tradition of the enforcement of consumer law by public bodies is strong in Scandinavian jurisdictions, 
Ireland and in the United Kingdom.  
731 Very often ministries are involved in supervisory activities, like in Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Hungary. In Belgium public enforcement is left in the hands of the Minister of Economic Affairs.  
732 Cyprus – the Competition and Consumer Protection Department of Cyprus Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Tourism; in Estonia - the Consumer Protection Board, the State Agency of Medicines, the Communication 
Board, the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Ministry of Culture.  
733 For example: Germany, France. 
734 For example: Poland, and most of the post-soviet countries; See: also Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van 
Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis… 
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the enforcement frame is designed in Europe.
735
 The Injunction Directive yielded a positive 
climate for consumer organisations but did not affect established public enforcement 
schemes.
736
 The reasons might be found in established legal cultures and traditions.
737
 There 
is a common believe in civil society throughout Europe that national governmental bodies are 
best suited to handling law enforcement.
738
 
The ombudsman
739
 constitutes a special variant of the public enforcement model in the 
field of consumer protection.
740
 The ombudsman is recognized as a public authority that is 
granted standing before special tribunals called Market Court.
741
 To some extent the role of 
the ombudsman in the Nordic countries is comparable to the role of the now dissolved Office 
of Fair Trading.
742
 Since in these countries, actions are only rarely delegated to private bodies, 
consumer organizations are of limited importance, sometimes even deprived of their socio-
legal value.
743
 The high level of a social acceptance can only be explained through the 
particular spirit of the community, an element of belongingness, which de facto convinces 
people as to the effectiveness and large public power.  
Although public enforcement dominates in Europe, there are some countries with a well-
developed private enforcement model, likes as France and Germany. The two dispose of a 
well-functioning and easily accessible judicial system. Until today many different private 
enforcement schemes exist across the European Union
744
, which can be broken down into the 
following sub-models according to the intensity of the mix of public and private enforcement 
frames: 
                                               
735 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 239; refers to Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK as the examples of public model enforcement, which give – if ever – the secondary and a 
highly restricted capacity to private law issues, and activity of consumer organizations. 
736 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial…; Stuyck/T erryn/Colaert/Van 
Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…; Hodges/Tulibacka, Costs and Funding…, p. 461-462. 
737 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2008), Administrative and Judicial…, p. 10. 
738
 Bakardijeva-Engelbrekt (2009), Public and Private…, in Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 91-
133. 
739 The Nordic ombudsman engages in direct negotiations with suppliers, using soft law techniques such as 
guidelines for consumer law enforcement, and various forms of dialogue between the parties to the dispute; 
Hodges (2008), Model A: Primacy of Public Bodies, in Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 27-37. 
740 More information as of the functioning of the Ombudsman’s office, <http://www.kkv.fi/en-GB/> accessed on 
April 29, 2014. 
741 Viitanen (2007), Enforcement of Consumers’ Collective Interests by Regulatory Agencies in the Nordic 
Countries, in Van Boom/Loos (2007), Collective Consumer Interests and How they Are Served Best in Europe: 
Legal Aspects and Policy Issues on the Border between Private Law and Public Policy, p. 83-107; Viitanen 
(2010), Nordic Group Actions: First Experiences and Future Challenges, Consumatori, Diritti e Mercato. 
Argomenti, p. 119-133. 
742 Lindblom (2007), National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden; Vittanen (2007), Collective Litigation in 
Finland, Country Report, accessed on <http://globalclassactions.standford.edu/>. 
743 Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-539. 
744 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 27-37; refers to Germany, Austria, Italy and Portugal which have 
somehow “privatized” enforcement including development and improvement of activity of consumer 
organizations. 
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(i) A private model with no public bodies, which could be entrusted to enforce the law. 
European legislators rely on private bodies, which are entitled to bring an action for an 
injunction, and although the legislator grants rights, he does not impose any 
obligations. This means that although private bodies may take an action, they are not 
obliged to so.  
(ii) A private model with the assistance of public agencies, in which private bodies have 
no mandate at all, with the so-called “puppet’s role” of private bodies.745  
(iii) A private model that is mixed with the activities of public bodies, in which public 
bodies often take a lead while private bodies are rather responsible for the monitoring 
of enforcement decisions.
746
  
The choice of a model depends on particularities of national schemes and usually meets 
requirements posed by the national legislator. A mix of public and private enforcement 
measures has been chosen by most of the post-socialist countries as the best possible option. 
These countries were supposed to build up the enforcement structure according to the EU 
frames of legislation, from an obsolescent stage in respect to people’s beliefs and previous 
experiences from the socialist interval, which are still alive in the cultures of these states and 
are so deeply rooted in the legal and cultural aspect of people’s life. The idea of mixed 
solutions on enforcement in the field of consumer law has gained popularity though Ms 
Kuneva, Commissioner for Consumer Protection at Lisbon in 2007
747
, where the Commission 
underlined that enforcement of consumer law is based on the interplay of various enforcement 
frames.
748
 It seems that it is exactly this mix of public and private which has the greatest 
potential for convergence.
749
 
 
5. 3. Convergence through Practice – the Move towards Soft Remedies 
 
Historically the Injunction Directive marked the beginning of the EU involvement in 
getting to grips with consumer law enforcement. As the name indicates the action for 
                                               
745 The public enforcement bodies are supposed to intervene, or react in any other way, if the private 
organization activity fails, see also Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p.104. 
746 Injunctive relief obtained by a consumer organization by no means guarantees voluntary compliance with the 
court decision. Therefore, the question arises as to who will monitor the enforcement decision. The issue of the 
monitoring of the enforcement decisions is often put into question, because it is rather insufficient to grant 
consumer associations a right to monitor the decisions passed by public bodies. Full monitoring might be too 
expensive and inefficient; Shavell (1993), The Optimal Structure…, p. 255-287, Becker (1968), Crime and 
Punishment…, The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), p. 169-217, at p. 193. 
747 Kuneva (2007), Healthy Markets Need… 
748 Kuneva (2007), Healthy Markets Need… 
749 See Chapter IV 5.2.1, 5.2.3. 
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injunction was regarded as the key to building such a scheme. Over time it turned out that 
softer enforcement is needed and might even be more efficient. This is documented through 
the regulation on the co-operation in transborder law enforcement. Again the name of the 
measure contains the message – from injunction to co-operation. This shift nicely coincides 
with the similarities of the prior consultation procedure under the Injunction Directive and the 
informal solution approach under Regulation 2006/2004. It is this move which brings back the 
thesis of dualism of enforcement enshrined in the interplay of individual and collective 
enforcement which is rooted in the Injunction Directive
750
 had been – temporarily – 
overturned in the strong focus on transborder issues in Regulation 2006/2004. This 
development is conditional on the shift from ex ante to ex post control of consumer law 
enforcement.  
 
5. 3. 1. Towards ex post Control 
 
The choice of the enforcement path is determined through the timing of the control. 
The nature of the interests involved which are protected through the Injunction Directive 
require quick action, the effectiveness and success of which may depend on the timing and the 
action’s speed.751 The type of the enforcement body involved affects whether ex-ante or ex-
post device will be taken into account. As a rule, regulatory activities of administrative bodies 
may be ex ante or ex post, while judicial measures are classified as an ex-post device. Within 
the scope of consumer law, more precisely the law on the control of unfair terms and unfair 
commercial practices, ex ante control through prior approval mechanism has never been an 
issue. Quite the contrary, in the litigation between the Commission and Germany on the 
compatibility of prior approval mechanism with EU law, the ECJ paved the way for the 
liberalisation of insurance contract law through secondary legislation.
752
 Since then ex ante 
control in contract law is no longer an issue.  
Product safety is a special case. Not least due to its non-positioning in the Annex to 
the Injunction Directive
753
, it might serve to illustrate the deeper logic of the ex ante and ex 
post control design. It is a good example to illustrate these issues whilst having a closer look 
                                               
750 See Chapter I 5.1. 
751 With regard to timing and the procedure’s speed; Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van 
Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…, p. 326; Rott (2001), The Protection of Consumers’…, 
p. 404. 
752 Judgment of the Court of 4 December 1986, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of 
Germany, Case 205/84 (ECR 1986, p. 03755). 
753 Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety (OJ L 11, 15.01.2002, p. 4–17). 
227 
 
at the national legal regimes of the selected Member States.
754
 Up to the harmonisation of 
product safety regulation through the EU, both product safety and to some extent quality as 
far as it is enshrined in technical standards, have been in the hands of national administrative 
bodies that operated ex ante, which means that they carried out control before a product is 
circulated on the market. Initially the EU believed that the European product liability 
Directive 85/374 sufficed as an ex post device executed in courts to manage post-market 
control However, Directive 92/59/EC on general product safety set a new tone in EU 
regulation and introduced for the first time ever in product regulation a comprehensive 
administrative post-market control regime.  
Following Shavell, the choice of one or the other option depends on the balance and 
accessibility of information.
755
 The accessibility of information before the product arrives in 
the market has often triggered the need for administrative enforcement, while information 
about risks caused by products typically set judicial mechanisms into action. The growing 
interest of the EU in the administrative enforcement model goes hand in hand with the 
development of the idea of networking and co-operation spirit
756
 and with the increasing need 
to improve and speed up the information flow within the EU.  
The ex post administrative control, established in Regulation 2006/2004 and governed 
by the spirit of co-operation, became the dominating model of the EU enforcement model. 
This is not only true for the rather narrow domain of cross-border co-operation, but for the 
much broader fields of regulated markets in which the EU has established administrative 
bodies, with ex post private enforcement powers.
757
 Ex post control documents the new trend 
in the EU aiming at the improvement of the Internal Market Structure and at the increasing 
interest of the EU in developing enforcement tools, to manage potential infringements not via 
prior restrictions to the Internal Market but via an extensive net of post-market control 
measures through administrative bodies. Private regulators such as standards and certification 
bodies, play their part and are more and more integrated into the European design. The EU 
enforcement policy through administrative networks under integration of private bodies is 
well documented in the frame of the general product safety Directive.
758 
 
                                               
754 Tulibacka (2009), Product Liability Law..., p. 17-43. 
755 See also Shavell (1993), The Optional Structure…, Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial… 
756 Micklitz (2010), Reforming European Unfair…, p. 352-354; with regard to networking COM(98) 198 final at 
10 the Commission has already established a database of organizations and resolution bodies pursuant to the 
goals of the recommendation.  
757 Verbruggen (2009), Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of Case Studies in 
Advertising and Food Safety, EUI phd 2012; Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-539. 
758 Directive 2001/95/EC on general consumer product safety (OJ L 11, 15.01.2002, p. 4). 
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Similarly, the wind of change from ex ante to ex post can also be observed in judicial 
enforcement measures. The growing popularity of ex post judicial measures may be regarded 
as a consequence of Internal Market. The Injunction Directive is in line with such overall 
trend. Injunctive relief is meant to stop the eventual future harms, together with a formal ban - 
in the form of cessation or prohibition - of a certain practice or an unlawful activity. 
Therefore, the Injunction Directive combines ex ante and ex post devices under one single 
piece of law.
759 
The concept, the definition and the function of injunction points towards ex 
ante and ex post control as implemented in Member States laws across the EU. The Injunction 
Directive enables not only an order “requiring the cessation or prohibition of any 
infringement”, but also “a publication of a corrective statement with a view to eliminating the 
continuing effects of the infringement”. The content of the injunctive order provided for by 
the Injunction Directive may change according to the field of law, or the specific sector that is 
taken into consideration. In some areas of law, like unfair contract terms, or misleading 
advertisements, injunctions may perform both functions at the same time, namely they may be 
used to cease unlawful conduct or take a kind of corrective action. In regulated markets the 
injunction may require additional activities.
760
 The minimum character of the Injunction 
Directive leaves procedural autonomy to the Member States in designing the injunction 
procedure but they are barred from re-introducing ex-ante administrative control. So all the 
different ways Member States have developed to transpose the Injunction Directive should be 
understood as attempts to shape the most appropriate and the most efficient stop order 
mechanism.
761
 
 
5. 3. 2. Towards Soft Remedies 
 
Read together individual and collective enforcement, judicial (courts), extra-judicial 
(ADR) and administrative enforcement (public agencies), there is an overall trend strongly 
promoted by the EU and gradually finding ever greater acceptance in Member States, to use 
soft remedies as means to solve consumer conflicts, individually and collectively, within the 
nation state territory or cross-border, outside courts and outside administrative regulatory 
action, through co-operation between the regulators and the regulates individually and 
collectively. The shift from hard remedies (injunctions) to soft remedies (all sorts of 
                                               
759 See Chapter I 1.5. 
760 For example, a compliance with information requirements, disclosure of information or a monitoring of 
compliance.  
761 See Chapter I 1.6.2.  
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“agreements”), from the traditional enforcement institutions (courts and regulatory bodies) to 
new institutional designs, mixing the public and the private, paves the way for convergence in 
the enforcement of European consumer law. This is not to pretend such convergence has been 
realised already, but it shows the potential of new institutions and new remedies to enhance 
convergence in the European consumer law enforcement. The Injunction Directive has 
triggered a development, which read only in conjunction with Regulation 2006/2004 and new 
Directive 2013/11 on ADR and Regulation 524/2013 on ODR discloses its enormous 
potential for a transformation of enforcement. This brings together – the increasing 
importance of ADR in individual dispute resolution, the thus far under-estimated and under-
investigated prior consultation procedure in the Injunction Directive and the information-
exchange and cooperation mechanism in Regulation 2006/2004.  
 
5. 3. 3. The Place of Dispute Resolution in Individual Litigation 
 
The move towards an ever denser European frame on solving consumer disputes via 
ADR is obvious. Since the adoption of Recommendation 98/257 the EU activities aim at 
promoting redress through alternative dispute resolution schemes. These out-of-court 
mechanisms are meant to serve as an alternative not a substitute to judicial and administrative 
means of redress. The two 2013 measures, Directive 2011/83 and Regulation 524/2013 
introduce a new layer of consumer law enforcement into the European enforcement scheme, 
so far composed of the judiciary and the administrative agencies. One might go as far to argue 
that the EU has generalized the approach, which has been distilled out of the Injunction 
Directive. Individual enforcement of consumer contract law – the economic rights of the 
consumer – are thereby harmonized, contrary to the judicial systems where the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction as to the interpretation of EU law and contrary to administrative enforcement, 
where a Europeanisation of the law enforcement occurs only in steps such as through 
Regulation 2006/2004 and the secondary law measures on regulated markets. The new layer 
is universally applicable to all consumer conflicts, national and transnational, online or 
traditional. The decade long promotion of ADR by the EU and through an endless chain of 
sector and subject related references to out-of-court dispute settlement procedures in 
consumer law directives have not only paved the ground politically within Member States but 
have also helped to give ADR with considerable popularity.  
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Most consumers faithfully accepted its development alongside judicial and 
administrative enforcement.
762
 ADR helps consumers to resolve low value consumer disputes 
in cases where long-lasting and expensive court-led consumer disputes are not really a serious 
option.
763
 Looking for explanations for these apparently contradictory legislative procedural 
elements there is a need for more in-depth analysis, including elements of its legal history 
including the EU plans and policies regarding the ADR schemes in Europe.
764
 The focus has 
been two elements justice through litigation
765
 and the limits of judicial adjudication 
throughout Europe.
766
 This bring to light the lack of effectiveness of enforcement measures in 
Europe and a lack of a confidence in judicial measures
767
, due to strained resources, growing 
case loads and the increasing number of lay litigants who cannot afford legal representation 
and cannot obtain legal redress. In practice ADR performs a gap-filling function.
768
  
 
5. 3. 4. Consultation and Co-operation prior to Litigation 
 
The prior consultation mechanisms introduced in Article 5 of the Injunction Directive 
should be regarded as an out-of-court dispute settlement mechanism
769
, which is meant to 
offer “qualified entities” – enjoying legal standing – a way to settle the conflict before going 
to court. Prior consultation might better meet the needs of both consumers and professionals 
than directly going to court.
770
 The preliminary scheme allows for “a moment of reflection” 
as to whether the parties to the conflict should really engage in complex litigation. In that 
sense it could serve as a realistic and pragmatic alternative for the normal course of judicial 
procedure paving the way for a speedy solution which is mutually satisfactory.
771
 
                                               
762
 Hodges (2008), The Reform of…, p. 101-103. 
763 Weatherill (1997), EC Consumer…, p. 146; “Consumers frequently write off disappointing purchases”, 
especially where dealing with non-home state Member State’s avenues of consumer redress. “Literally the last 
thing consumers want to do is to go through the expense and delay of purchasing formal proceedings in court”; 
Hodges/Tulibacka/Vogenhauer (2010), The Costs and Funding…, p. 20-27, 30-32, 106, 456; stress (1) the high 
costs of consultations, opinions and fees, (2) the overloading of Member States’ courts, (3) a risk of the looser 
party pays principle, (4) a psychological barrier arising from formalism and complexity of court’s procedure. 
764 Carbonneau (1989), Alternative Disputes Resolution, Oxford, p. 60-66; Hodges/Benöhr/Creutzfeld-Banda 
(2012), Consumer ADR in…, p. 2-3. 
765 Hazel (2010), Judging Civil Justice, Cambridge, p. 119-125. 
766 Hodges (2008), The Reform of… 
767 Posner (2008), How Judges Think, Harvard University Press, pp. 19-56 
768 Howells/Rhoda (2002), Litigation in the Consumer Interest, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative 
Law, Vol. 9(1), p. 1-56; Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…, p. 
326.  
769 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2009), New Frontiers of…, p. 3. 
770 Howells/Rhoda (2002), Litigation in Consumer…, p. 1-59. 
771 Posner (2008), How Judge Think…, p. 19-56; Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-539. 
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Article 5(1) of the Injunction Directive does not impose an obligation on Member 
States, but introduces prior consultation as a mere option:  
“Member States may introduce or maintain in force provisions whereby the party that intends 
to seek an injunction can only start this procedure after it has tried to achieve the cessation of 
the infringement in consultation either with the defendant or with both the defendant and a 
qualified entity within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Member State in which the injunction 
is sought. It shall be for the Member State to decide whether the party seeking the injunction 
must consult the qualified entity. If the cessation of the infringement is not achieved within 
two weeks after the request for consultation is received, the party concerned may bring an 
action for an injunction without any further delay”.772 
The way in which the primary consultation procedure requirement is shaped 
documents the high degree of flexibility leaving the Member States the choice between direct 
adjudication or combined consultation/adjudication. The need (not the obligation) to integrate 
a preliminary consultation requirement into the judicial system may yield difficulties since the 
EU legislator promotes the combination of court-related and non-court procedures. There are 
no explanatory documents which help to understand what is behind that step. Integration is 
certainly related to overall policy to strengthen dispute resolution mechanisms in different 
spheres of private law.
773
 Again, the preliminary consultation element arises as an alien 
element, which does not fit at all to the rest of the structure of the Injunction Directive. 
However, the open design of the Injunction Directive allows flexibility in the transposition 
process of the Injunction Directive which could be understood as a necessary condition for the 
suggested process of convergence. Flexibility and the optional character can be viewed as 
security tools allowing for a simplification of the legally complicated injunction procedure.
774
 
This flexibility is related to its hybrid legal nature and the fact that the injunction procedure is 
at the conjunction of various fields of law. The diversity and the patchwork of solutions do 
not only present a risk they also present an opportunity for new modes of governance in the 
enforcement of consumer law.  
                                               
772 Article 5(1) of the Injunction Directive. 
773 The European Commission has been very proactive by promoting the Directive on ADR and the Regulation 
on ODR. 
774 In this context see: Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the 
bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, 98/257/EC (OJ L 115, 17.04.1998, p. 31–
34); Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial 
settlement of consumer disputes (OJ C 155, 06.06.2000); Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the 
principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes C(2001/310/EC 
(OJ L 109, 19.04.2001, p. 56–61). 
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More concretely Article 5 (1) leaves those Member States, which are ready to 
introduce a two-step mechanism without guidance. Member States may require consultation 
not only with a defendant, but also with an independent public body that is recognized as a 
qualified entity. How the consultation takes shape, however, is entirely left to the Member 
States. Therefore, the prior consultation procedure does not influence the EU designed 
injunction procedure, since the injunction procedure applies, no matter whether a primary 
consultation phase has been introduced or not. Thus far the prior consultation procedure has 
not attracted much comment. Cafaggi and Micklitz discuss it in their monograph on collective 
redress measures in the field of consumer law, looking also into the prior consultation 
requirement of the Injunction Directive.
775
 However, they did go deeper into the reasons why 
the EU legislator has not put more emphasis consultation phase and discussed the 
preclusionary effects. The explanation is only given later, through the adoption of Regulation 
2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation and Directive 203/11 on ADR and Regulation 
524/2013 on ODR.  
In light of this broader context, in particular taking into account Regulation 2006/2004 
which relies on a network of public agencies, the preliminary consultation scheme can be 
developed as a tool to improve cross-border consumer resolution and help to clarify linguistic 
nuances in advance. Within the framework of the Injunction Directive prior consultation 
remained under the sole management of the national legislator in each Member States.
776
 The 
European Commission had only the task of managing the list of qualified entities. This is 
different under Regulation 2006/2004. The whole spirit of the Regulation 2006/2004 is 
governed by co-operation, information exchange, mutual trust and mutual assistance, the 
search for joint solution – under the guidance of the European Commission which is sitting 
like the spider in the web.
777
 Therefore, the Regulation 2006/2004 broadens the factual reach 
of the prior consultation procedure by allowing the exchange of information on prior 
consultation procedures part of the exchange mechanism.
778
  
  This, however, does not overcome diversity in the Member States. Some member 
states had such a mechanism already in place prior to the adoption of the Directive.
779
 In 
                                               
775 Cafaggi (2009), The Great Transformation…, p. 496-539. 
776 Schulte-Nölke/Twigg-Flesner/Ebers (2008), Consumer Law Compendium...., p. 400; as various modes of 
implementation of the mechanisms proved.  
777 See Chapter III 6.2. 
778 Terryn/Voinot (2012), Droit Européen des Pratiques Commerciales Déloyales. Évolution et Perspectives. 
Brussel, Larcier. 
779 Other preliminary measures, which are similar in the functions existing Cyprus and Poland, for more details 
see: Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…, p. 336-337; Schulte-
Nölke/Twigg-Flesner/Ebers (2008), Consumer Law Compendium…, p. 399-401. 
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consequence, a certain modification was needed. Thus, there was no need of duplication and 
the establishment of a similar or even identical tool of preliminary consultation, which would 
be equivalent to measures already existing in the national legal systems. Others developed 
mechanisms, which anticipate the existing judicial/administrative injunction procedure.
780
 In 
some of the national enforcement models the mechanism recommended in the Injunction 
Directive does not fit because of the specific nature of consumer protection directives which 
did not need the introduction of an action for injunction since the specific remedies were 
regarded as sufficient. Most of the consumer protection directives from e.g. Poland have only 
been subject to a fragmentary implementation.
781
 Whilst it is permitted it does not illustrate a 
commitment to the philosophy behind the Injunction Directive.  
A comparison of those countries, which have a mechanism in place, reveal difference. 
Although consultation procedure has been introduced in 13 Member States, in 8 of the 13 
Member States introduced a consultation with defendant only, whereas 5 require consultation 
with both the defendant and a national qualified entity.
782
 Most Member States where the 
primary consultation procedure is in place, have introduced a two-weeks’ time limit after 
which an action for injunction can be brought to court if the addressee does not respond.
783
 
This short time period was supposed to draw a reasonable limit to a claim, as the entity in 
charge cannot wait more than 15 days before deciding to move ahead. Further delays are not 
acceptable
784
, since the injunction procedure is supposed to be a kind accelerated measure per 
se.  
Even though the national mechanisms obviously vary in their overall structure and the 
more technical details, they perform the same functions. The Directive opened a window of 
opportunity for the Member States to simplify the injunction procedure through the 
introduction of prior consulation mechanism. The Injunction Directive has improved the 
situation of EU consumers, but cannot be regarded as a procedural tool that was able to 
resolve the remedial problems of collective actions.
785
 It is only in combination with 
                                               
780 For example: Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
781 See Chapter I 1.6.2.(v). 
782 Notices from Member States – Rules governing prior consultation adopted by Member States pursuant to 
Article 5 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on inunctions for the protection 
of consumer’s interest (2009/C 181/06), 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:181:0006:0037:EN:PDF> accessed on June 
9, 2014. 
783 Schulte-Nölke/Twig-Flesner/Ebers (2008), EC Consumer…, p. 396-399. 
784 Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis… 
785 Collins (2004), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices, Contract, Consumer and 
Competition Law Implications, Vol. 5, London, p. 124-126. 
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Regulation 2006/2004 that the role and function of the prior consultation procedure becomes 
clear.  
 
6. The Thesis of Dualism Adjusted 
 
In the first monograph that touched upon judicial and administrative enforcement of 
consumer law, Cafaggi and Micklitz
786
 indicated three functions to be performed by consumer 
protection legislation. These three functions: level 1 individual consumer protection level 2 
horizontal collective consumer protection and level 3 vertical sector specific consumer 
protection, serve as a starting point for the thesis of dualism of enforcement measures 
developed under the frame of the Injunction Directive (Graph 1 below). 
 
 
Regarding level 1, consumer protection requires first and foremost the protection of 
the individual consumer, whose interest may be infringed by unlawful business practices. 
Individual enforcement underpins the consumer protection directives
787
, it can be either 
guaranteed through the Member States courts and/or through the EU induced ADR and ODR 
mechanisms. Individual enforcement was the only enforcement path promoted in the 
European Union until the Injunction Directive was passed in 1998.
788
 Prior to that date the 
action for injunction had been introduced in two fields of consumer law: misleading 
advertising and unfair contract terms. The Injunction Directive scope of application goes in 
line with the Annex to the Directive. The substantive law consumer protection directives are 
                                               
786 Cafaggi/Micklitz (2007), Administrative and Judicial…, p. 35. 
 
787 For example: The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive although it introduced an action for injunction 
remained without prejudice to individual actions. Therefore, it allows for both the individual and collective 
enforcement measures, which may be used side-by-side, as the authors state „without prejudice”; De Groote/De 
Vulder (2007), The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, in Howells (2007), The Yearbook of…, p. 275-276. 
788 Following Styuck in the report from 2007: „Although the Injunction Directive does not aim to protect the 
individual interest of consumers, it does not place any restrictions on such protection either”; 
Stuyck/Terryn/Colaert/Van Dyck/Peretz/Hoekx/Tereszkiewicz (2007), An analysis…, p. 328, 322. 
 
Consumer protection 
legislation 
is supposed to 
protect: 
• 1 level: an individual consumer 
• 2 level: collective consumers 
horizontally 
• 3 level: collective consumers 
vertically 
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addressed to individual consumers.
789
 The dualism of enforcement explains and justifies the 
existence of individual and collective enforcement measures side-by-side. Even if the 
Injunction Directive seems to refer to collective enforcement only, this does not mean that 
individual protection is cancelled ex lege. Quite the contrary is true. The “mark of reference” 
opens the gate towards the parallelism of individual and collective enforcement in European 
consumer law.
790
 Hence, the Injunction Directive provides for protection individual 
consumers too. 
Regarding the level 2, the Injunction Directive has horizontalised collective 
enforcement. The collective element assures more complex legal protection for consumers in 
the vast majority of consumer protection directives provided they aim at the protection of the 
economic interests of consumers. The mechanism of collective consumer enforcement 
introduced by the Injunction Directive hence protects the consumers independently from the 
sector, since the Injunction Directive provides for collective horizontal protection. It is only in 
connection with Regulation on 2006/2004 that the prior consultation procedure so reluctantly 
introduced in the Injunction Directive turns into a horizontal means to co-ordinate 
enforcement measures in cross-border transactions. 
Regarding level 3, the vertical dimension in the Injunction Directive comes clear in 
the list of substantive law directives covered by the Annex, which are addressed to specific 
fields of law, like unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practices, and others. The link is 
made and stressed procedurally by the mark of reference. On one the hand, the substantive 
directives grant individual protection, read in junction with the Injunction Directive however, 
the collective nature of the substantive consumer law directives comes clear. In the end both 
collective and individual consumer protection stand side by side. The Regulation 2006/2004 
and the Injunction Directive differ from each other. Substantive consumer law rules in the 
regulated markets of energy, telecommunication, financial services are not systematically 
integrated. Here the more open and more flexible network of information exchange and 
consultation under the Regulation 2006/2004 compensates for the deficits in the two Annexes, 
as it allows for at least an informal exchange of information outside the scope of the Annex 
and below the threshold of regulatory action through the action for injunction.  
 
                                               
789 Dickie (1998), Consumer Confidence and the EC Directive on Distance Contract, Journal of Consumer 
Policy, Vol. 21, p. 217-229.  
790 Hodges (2006), Competition Enforcement…, p. 1381-1407; “Further relevant evidence is the complete 
absence of cases brought by either individuals or organizations under the various cross-border injunction 
Directive (…) apart from a single case brought by the British regulatory authority”; (OFT). This underpins the 
thesis of dualism of the enforcement measures in the area of consumer law.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Injunction Directive provides for a general framework on the consumer injunction 
procedure in national and cross-border litigation. Qualified entities, public agencies and/or 
consumer organisations, are granted legal standing. Once notified to the European 
Commission and published in the Official Journal, qualified entities may engage in cross-
border litigation. National courts are bound to mutually respect the standing of notified 
qualified entities. Outside these clear-cut rules on the mutual recognition of standing, the 
Injunction Directive remains largely silent. There are no European requirements on qualified 
entities, there is no definition on the protection of the collective interests which have to be 
defended by “legitimate” entities, there is, in short, no guidance on the procedural 
requirements beyond the formal recognition of standing. There is an implicit policy to 
promote the role of consumer associations as the guardians of European law, but not even this 
policy is translated into clear rules. EU law introduces a new remedy – injunction – but the 
content, the form and the effects of the remedy have to be shaped by the Member States 
through suitable and appropriate national enforcement models. With due respect to the 
principle of procedural autonomy the Injunction Directive unites Member States in diversity. 
Therefore it is correct to understand the Injunction Directive as a mean of “legally approved 
diversity”. 
Member States differ in their understanding of the remedy of injunction. As far the 
remedy already existed and was made available in consumer litigation, Member States had to 
adapt their enforcement system to the EU requirements. Those Member States in which the 
remedy of injunction was not developed had to make it compatible with the existing systems 
of enforcement. Underneath the more technical surface there are deep historical and cultural 
differences on what an injunction means at all, of whether enforcement should be put into the 
hands of public or private bodies, on the requirements under which public and private bodies 
should enjoy standing, on whether public bodies must seek an injunction order via courts or 
whether they may act on their own motion, on how the collective enforcement should or 
should not be linked to individual enforcement and whether res judicata can and should be 
extended to individual litigation.  
This dissertation is meant to highlight the differences in approach between Member 
States, explain and structure them. One way of looking at the effects of the Injunction 
Directive on national consumer law enforcement schemes is to underline and to highlight the 
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broad differences and the variety of legal solutions across Europe. In such a perspective the 
rather limited harmonising effect of the legislative effort of the EU does not come as a 
surprise. The practical importance within national consumer litigation varies according to the 
role, function and resources provided to consumer organisations. All in all the policy of the 
European Commission to promote the development and the importance of consumer 
organisations through the Injunction Directive failed. In practice, there is no real difference in 
the use of injunctions before and after the adoption of the Injunction Directive. The adoption 
did not trigger a rise of actions of injunctions, at least not to the degree the European 
Commission was hoping for. The results are even more modest in cross-border litigation. 
Here an extremely limited number of cases demonstrate the legal difficulties of cross-border 
litigation. The broad leeway left to the Member States, the legally approved diversity turns in 
legal practice to nearly unsurmountable legal barriers. The immediate policy reaction seems to 
be call for ever more comprehensive harmonisation. This, however, did not happen for good 
reasons, as the competence of the EU in procedural matters is disputed. It seems as if the legal 
experiment failed. 
Such a finding, however, falls short of catching the overall tendency of convergence of 
consumer law enforcement schemes that has been triggered by the Injunction Directive. The 
herein defended “thesis of the dualism of enforcement” paves the way for a more promising 
future understanding of the long standing effects of the Injunction Directive. Read together 
with the Annex, the Injunction Directive establishes the deep interconnection between 
collective and individual enforcement, of substantive and procedural enforcement, of judicial 
and administrative enforcement. The different levels and means of enforcement should not be 
regarded separately but should always be regarded in their interplay, in their mutual 
institutional design and their mutual impact. This is still rather abstract, but it allows for a new 
understanding of the drafting of consumer law enforcement schemes. It pays tribute to the 
overall idea behind the Injunction Directive that is setting a framework in which the Member 
States have to operate and in which they have to build links.  
There are limited but promising developments that underpin the herein defended thesis 
of dualism. The well-known Invitel judgment of the ECJ extends res judicata of the action of 
injunction to individual consumer claims.
791
 This is dualism of collective/individual 
enforcement in action. The same is true for the so-called “co-ordinated action of consumer 
organisations” to combat consumer problems across Europe through the use of the existing 
                                               
791 See Chapter I 1.7. 
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dual enforcement structure.
792
 The different design of the action for injunction is overcome 
outside the formalised setting of international procedural and international private law through 
a combination of action within the established bodies of enforcement – courts and agencies, 
within the meaning of the remedy of injunction – and new modes of enforcement through 
information exchange and enforcement. 
With the adoption of Regulation 2006/2004 the EU shifted the focus from private to 
public enforcement, first and foremost in cross-border consumer problems but certainly meant 
to re-restructure the responsibilities for the handling of national consumer conflicts. For the 
first time all Member States are obliged to nominate a public authority responsible for 
consumer law enforcement. This entails a considerable streamlining of the enforcement 
models. Private enforcement through consumer organisations is not eliminated, but is meant 
to play a secondary role only. This could be understood as a refinement of the thesis of 
dualism.  
The second major move in Regulation 2006/2004 results from the shift from formal to 
informal modes of enforcement, from hard remedies to soft remedies. Public agencies may 
still rely on the action of injunction as a means of last resort, but conflict management is 
primarily done via co-operative conflict management. Read together with ODR Regulation 
524/2013 and ADR Directive 2013/11 the recent developments in the EU demonstrate the 
potential for further convergence through para-legal means, used and applied in the shadow of 
the law. The potential impact of enforcement of consumer rights, individually and 
collectively, outside courts on the overall body of consumer law, on legal certainty, the rule of 
law and the principle of legality requires further investigation which reaches beyond the aim 
of this dissertation.  
                                               
792 See Chapter III 7.3. 
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